Gary F., List: Let me say at the outset that this post is not intended to engage in a terminological dispute, but rather simply to explain my own current usage.
GF: To me, Peirce’s term “Logic as Semiotic” refers mainly to speculative grammar (and rhetoric) and not to normative Logic--although I’m not prepared to draw a hard line between the two. I understand Speculative Grammar, Logical Critic, and Speculative Rhetoric (or Methodeutic) to be the three branches of Normative Logic as Semeiotic. In other words, *all three* are normative, not just Logical Critic; and *all three* deal with all kinds of Signs, not just Speculative Grammar. One reason why I have been adding "Normative" to "Logic as Semeiotic" lately is because a few months ago, John Sowa proposed treating "Semiotic" as a branch of Phenomenology, rather than Normative Science as a generalization of Logic. As we discussed at the time, that is clearly inconsistent with *Peirce's *classification of the sciences. GF: I consider Peirce’s *study of reasoning* to be *semiotic *but not primarily *normative*. Peirce defined a science as normative if it "treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends" (CP 5.123, EP 2:197; 1903), and considered the subject matter of logic to be "those things whose end is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903)--namely, Signs; hence the generalization to Semeiotic. Speculative Grammar is normative because it studies "what *must be* the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897). The study of reasoning is likewise normative, "For the sole purpose of reasoning is ... to ascertain the Truth, in the sense of that which is SO, no matter what be thought about it" (CP 2.153; 1902). GF: Regarding the three Universes of Experience in “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”, I notice one big difference between them and the three Universes of Capacities, Actualities, and Tendencies in R 300: the latter constitute one level of a holarchy: they are subuniverses of a single Universe (of Discourse), and they in turn subdivide into subuniverses ... In the “Neglected Argument,” on the other hand, there are three and only three Universes; Peirce does not mention any subuniverses (nor does he say that the three “shade into one another”). In R 300, Peirce indeed twice characterized the Universes of Tendencies, Actualities, and Tendencies as "subuniverses"; but he *did not* say that "they in turn subdivide into subuniverses," only that they can be further separated into "provinces." In "A Neglected Argument," he wrote that there are "connections ... between objects in different Universes," and that Musement includes "considering ... some connection between two of the three, with speculation concerning its cause." It culminates in "the consideration of homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three," where ultimately "we find that the three Universes conspire." He also referred once to "the Universe" (singular). Hence I remain unconvinced (so far) that these two sets of three Universes are necessarily different. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 7:49 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > I’m familiar enough with your terminological choices, Jon, to feel that I > know what you’re talking about, most of the time. Thus I’m not inclined to > argue for or against the wisdom of those choices. However, I do tend to > stumble over your phrase “Normative Logic as Semeiotic.” To me, Peirce’s > term “Logic as Semiotic” refers mainly to *speculative grammar* (and > *rhetoric*) and not to normative Logic — although I’m not prepared to > draw a hard line between the two. He introduced the term “logic as > semeiotic” as a *broader* sense of “logic” than Critic, which is Logic in > the narrow sense (CP 1.444, c. 1896). Even the EGs are tools not so much > for Critic as for analysis. I don’t see Peirce using EGs to construct > “proofs” of theorems or test their validity, but rather “to separate > reasoning into its smallest steps so that each one may be examined by > itself … Our system is intended to facilitate the *study* of reasoning > but not to facilitate reasoning itself” (Lowell Lecture 2, 1903). I > consider Peirce’s *study of reasoning* to be *semiotic* but not primarily > *normative*. > > Regarding the three Universes of Experience in “A Neglected Argument for > the Reality of God”, I notice one big difference between them and the three > Universes of Capacities, Actualities, and Tendencies in R 300: the latter > constitute one level of a holarchy: they are subuniverses of a single > Universe (of Discourse), and they in turn subdivide into subuniverses: “I > hope you may be able to see that these three, though they shade into one > another, are nevertheless different. Yet the imperative need of the > manifold differentiation of each of them is even more apparent” (R300, > {38}). In the “Neglected Argument,” on the other hand, there are three and > *only* three Universes; Peirce does not mention any subuniverses (nor > does he say that the three “shade into one another”). I think the > difference is due not to a difference in reference, or classification of > sciences, but to the greater emphasis in the NA on the logic of vagueness. > > Peirce showed a lot of interest around this time in the varieties of > *indeterminacy* and their importance in logic. The two main varieties are > *generality* and *vagueness*, and Peirce as logician did what he could to > render those concepts as exact as possible by distinguishing their > functions in semiosis. But one of the interesting features of the “Bedrock” > MS is this passage about a variant form of generality: > > [[ And by the way, in speaking above of a “generalized” icon, I used the > qualification in a sense of “generalize” common among designers, especially > among cartographers, as well as in vernacular talk, though it is not the > proper logical sense of the verb, since it does not signify the removal of > any constituent of logical depth from a condition, nor confers any liberty > on the interpreter, but implies some almost microscopic items that are > really falsifications committed in the interest of simplification. Thus, a > map “generalizes” its image of a river in representing the latter as not > making sundry small windings that it really does make. So recollection may > be said to “generalize” the remembered perception in representing this to > be without many insignificant details {51} that really did belong to it; > and although an icon is not, properly speaking, *general*, so far as it > is a pure icon, yet every icon must “generalize,” more or less, in this > peculiar sense. Even a photograph does so.) ]] > > As an exact logician, Peirce does not often remark on the cognitive > *value* of generality in the sense of simplification. My book on the > other hand, with its focus on the modelling relation, pays much more > attention to the importance of simplification in modelling, especially with > respect to the “internal model” or *Innenwelt* which serves as a > “guidance system” for every sentient being (see especially Chapter 11, > http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/plx.htm). So I was happy to find Peirce’s > recognition of the value of simplification here (even though he calls it > “falsification”). > > I am emphatically *not* an exact logician, which is why I have so much to > learn from Peircean logic. However, I must confess that I have no use for > Peirce’s EGs *except* to better understand his broader logic, semiotic > and philosophy. Consequently I have no real use for your PGs either. I > don’t agree with some of your claims about their iconicity — I think that > *optimal* iconicity, as Stjernfelt called it, or at least the perception > of it, varies from person to person — but again, this is not something I’m > prepared to argue for or against. It doesn’t matter that much to me. > > Gary f. >
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