Jon, you have me scratching my head now … I said that if Normative Logic as Semeiotic is the only kind of Logic as Semiotic, then the word Normative is redundant in that phrase. You said that was not the case because some logic (as semeiotic) is formal, not normative. So I got the idea that there is a Formal Logic as Semeiotic directly from your previous post. If you are now reverting to the view that Logic as Semeiotic is always normative, then I revert to the view that calling it “Normative” is redundant.
Personally, though, I don’t see all of semeiotic/logic as either Normative or Formal; I see much of it (indeed most of it, except logical Critic) as observing, analyzing, classifying and/or describing various forms of semiosis, and thus not requiring “the emphatic dualism of the three normative sciences, which may be regarded as being the sciences of the conditions of truth and falsity, of wise and foolish conduct, of attractive and repulsive ideas” (EP2:378; see also Peirce’s Century Dictionary definition of “normative”). This is not a terminological issue but a question of the nature of semeiotics. It is certainly a positive science, unlike mathematics, but not all positive sciences are normative! Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 8-Mar-19 13:11 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: Where did you get that idea? Again, Semeiotic is a generalization of Normative Logic, not formal/mathematical logic. The latter is limited to necessary reasoning (logica utens) from ideal hypotheses, and thus lacks the "hard dualism" of the former. CSP: Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He does not in the least care whether they are correct or not. (CP 3.559; 1898) Accordingly, I would classify the quote below as Normative Logic (Semeiotic), not formal/mathematical logic. It is an outcome of studying reasoning itself (logica docens), not simply drawing necessary conclusions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 11:33 AM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Jon, So there is a Formal Logic as Semeiotic as well as a Normative Logic as Semeiotic. I was unaware of that. Peirce says that “the normative sciences are thoroughly infused with duality” (EP2:385). Is Formal Logic as Semeiotic, or any other aspect of Semeiotic, free of this “hard dualism” (EP2:376)? For instance, how would you classify the following statement from “Bedrock”: “on the principle that logicians call ‘the Nota notae’ that the sign of a sign of anything, X, is itself a sign of the very same X, the Phemic Sheet, in representing the field of attention, represents the general object of that attention, the Universe of Discourse.” Normative Logic? Formal? Neither? Or both? Gary f.
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