Gary R., List: Just one additional comment at this time.
CSP: The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one element of it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; and it has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad. CP 1.326 GR: Besides a monoidal suchness, the dyad "has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad." I take the plural form of suchness here to relate to Peirce's understanding that subject 'a' will relate to subject 'b' in a somewhat different way from which subject 'b' relates to subject 'a'. In any event, the suchness is "peculiar to it as a dyad." But what did Peirce go on to write in the rest of that paragraph? CSP: The dyad brings the subjects together, and in doing so imparts a character to each of them. Those characters are, in some sense, two. The dyad has also two sides according to which subject is considered as first. These two sides of the dyad form a second pair of subjects attached to the dyad; and they have their mode of union. Each of them also has a special character as a subject of the dyad. The "suchnesses" are *characters*, and thus 1ns. The correspondence with syntax is reflected in the significance of "which subject is considered as first." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 7:10 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > For now, I'll respond briefly to clarify a few things and expand on at > least one. > > GR: I've argued that we can go "beyond merely observing" phenomena (the > very first act of a phenomenologist but, in my view, certainly not the > last) by employing a logica utens. > > > JAS: Again, would you extend this to being a *semeiotica utens* that we > can employ without a formal Speculative Grammar? > > > A while back, in another thread, I suggested this very thing, that is: > since a phenomenologist may be observing all sorts of phenomena including > signific things, and yet he has no real need of a formal Semeiotic, logica > utens really does mean something like semeiotica utens. But since every > Peircean phenomenologist already knows that Peirce considered logic as > semeiotic, there's no need for another term: logica utens really ought to > do. And, as Gary F wrote re: the character of what be termed a semeiotica > utens: > > GF: It’s called “language.” It’s the same *semeiotica utens* that > physicists use when they talk about physical phenomena (without knowing > anything about linguistics). The special difficulty of phaneroscopic > language is that there is nothing special about the phaneron: it’s right > there in everyone’s face *all the time*, and that makes it difficult to > talk about. > > Continuing: > > GR: Peirce did not associate "suchness" exclusively with 1ns. See, for > example: > > > CSP: [. . .]. God and light are the subjects. The act of creation is to > be regarded, not as any third object, but merely as the suchness of > connection of God and light. The dyad is the fact. (CP 1.326-327; c. 1903) > > > JAS. . Notice that the "suchness" is the *latter *aspect, which is "of > monoidal character"; the "connection of God and light" that corresponds to > the *syntax *of the proposition expressing the dyadic fact, rather than > "any third object." I suggest accordingly that the "suchness" in this > context is a 1ns of 2ns. > > > I don't read it this way. But let's look at the other passage I quoted: > > CSP: A dyad consists of two subjects brought into oneness. [. . .] They > are two, if not really, at least in aspect. There is also some sort of > union of them. The dyad is not the subjects; it has the subjects as one > element of it. It has, besides, a suchness of monoidal character; *and it > has suchness, or suchnesses, peculiar to it as a dyad*. CP 1.326 > > > Besides a monoidal suchness, the dyad "has suchness, or suchnesses, > peculiar to it as a dyad." I take the plural form of suchness here to > relate to Peirce's understanding that subject 'a' will relate to subject > 'b' in a somewhat different way from which subject 'b' relates to subject > 'a'. In any event, *the suchness is "peculiar to it as a dyad.*" > > GR: Btw, why do you think that in a discussion of phenomena that Peirce > offers these examples (magenta, attar, love, etc.)? > > > JAS: My guess is that he assumed his readers at the time would already be > familiar with them from previous Collateral Experience--perhaps of an > especially vivid nature--and hence could proceed to participate in the > subsequent thought experiment (or "feeling experiment") of prescinding each > quality *in itself* as a "may-be" from the *actual *experience of it. > > > But then, say, if two people have collateral experiences of several > qualities *in themselves* (which have been characterized by them through > a logica/semeiotica utens), they can then discuss many matters, some of > which may be of potential interest to phenomenology and to other sciences, > for example and perhaps especially, to metaphysics. I mean this in the > sense in which (and I use this only as a kind of shorthand for myriad > comparisons, etc.) Atkins argues that there are ways in which seeing a > scarlet red is like hearing a trumpet's blare. > > GR: I think one needs to do Phenomenology in order to appreciate it. > > > JAS: Probably so, but I obviously still have trouble just figuring out *what > it is* so that I might *attempt *to do it. Perhaps I simply lack the > requisite faculties for engaging in that discipline as a *scientific * > pursuit. > > > As I mentioned in an earlier post, I think that strong logical minds may > indeed find it difficult to engage in phenomenological research since they > have a tendency to translate most everything they come upon in terms of > logic as semeiotic. Still, as Gary F suggested, Peirce offers many hints on > how to prepare oneself for phenenological inquiry while acknowledging that > it is a difficult science which not all may be well suited to. > > The way I began my own phenomenological research was to engage in musement > as Peirce describes it in the Neglected Argument. > > > If one who had determined to make trial of Musement as a favorite > recreation were to ask me for advice, I should reply as follows: The dawn > and the gloaming most invite one to Musement; but I have found no watch of > the nychthemeron that has not its own advantages for the pursuit. It > begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one > of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into attentive > observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of > communion between self and self. If one’s observations and reflections > are allowed to specialize themselves too much, the Play will be converted > into scientific study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half hours. "A > Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," 1908, CP 6.458-459 > > > I'm not suggesting that musement itself is equivalent to phenomenological > investigation. But I do recall that when, decades ago, I began to passively > "[drink] in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes," > for me, after at least a month or two absorbing what I could of the first > universe," the "very air-nothingness" of mere "Ideas" (in the Platonic > sense) which may *possibly* be thought, I made some phenomenological > discoveries. After moving on to 2ns (or, as you've been insisting, the 2nd > universe) and 3ns, I began to move "[f]rom speculations on the > homogeneities of each Universe, [passing] to the consideration of > homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all > three." > > Again, this is not phenomenology per se, but I think it constitutes an > excellent propaedeutic to phenomenological inquiry. I think all logicians > should try engaging in musement. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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