Jack, List: "Value" is a relatively unambiguous term in mathematics, but not in philosophy/metaphysics, and certainly not in your alleged "proof." For example, reviewing earlier posts, I still honestly have no idea what you mean by the "value" derived by a human, bird, snail, or worm from an "interaction." You seem to be talking about different *representations*, which are not "values" in ordinary parlance.
If you are *not *using Kant's well-established philosophical definition of "thing in itself," nor the even longer-established philosophical definition of "essence," then it is problematic for you to be employing those particular terms, especially since you claim to be linking them in a novel way. As Peirce wrote with characteristic bluntness, "whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation" (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903). Moreover, if all you are really seeking to demonstrate is that no *actual *representation is ever a *complete *representation of its object, then that would be utterly uncontroversial, at least among Peirceans. As I have said before, this directly corresponds to the distinction between the *immediate *object (as represented in *this *sign) and the *dynamical *object (independent of *any *representation). The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible *in principle*, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Thanks, Jon On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:38 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > That's a fair point - I shouldn't assume everyone has such an accout. > > I do believe the terminology is clear and consistent - enough for > computational AI to understand the logical formula and break it down into > suitable natural language descriptions. We can overdo "definitions", too, > if you ask me. You're right insofar as all predicates require clear > situation, and I think no one disagrees, but whilst value is broad, it is > also fairly concise (i.e., the value of 3+3= "6", here it has > "result-value" of simple mathematic, as R-V). You could go ad nauseum about > whether the "value" of 3+3=6 ought to be broken down infinitely and > ascribed new terminologies here and there. And that's a fair line of > engagement - it's just not necessary in the proof I here submit (will > submit -CHATGPT). On the other hand, I am open to making it as robust as > possible and putting it to all stress tests, thus it can never be too > precise, perhaps, which is the value of submitting such things here. > > Yes, as for "thing in itself" and "essence" - you are of course correct. > However, I am not following Kant, entirely, but updating him. Making that > link as novel (but merited) contribution. As to its acceptance, I genuinely > await a long back and forth as to the entire structure and premis(ses) of > the series/argument/conclusion (as such is necessary). > > I will fetch a summary and argument-treatment for you, though, - thanks > again for offering to critique. > > Best > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, June 2, 2023 6:30 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and > Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). > > Jack, List: > > An OpenAI account is required for the link, which I do not have. If you > sincerely desire my feedback on your alleged "proof," then please provide > your summary (formal argumentation) in a List post. Note that even if its > conclusions are deductively *valid*, it is not *sound *unless all its > terminology is clear (not vague) and consistent (not equivocal), and all > its premisses are true. I suspect that there will continue to be > disagreement, especially about that last requirement. > > One immediate comment is that "thing in itself" and "essence" are not > synonymous as employed historically within philosophy/metaphysics. > Demonstrating that every dynamical object of a sign has an "essence" that > makes it what it is would not be the same as demonstrating that it is > ultimately an incognizable "thing in itself." Like "value," these terms > seem to be central to your "proof" and thus need rigorous definitions for > how they are being used in this particular context. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 12:02 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Jon/Helmut and List, > > https://chat.openai.com/c/3d2e555a-cd5a-4ff5-8e34-8bd153ca2865 > > The above is but a summary of the "proof". It is, as far as I can make it, > the simplest means of sharing at this moment in time. The logical series is > accurate - that is, it is ontologically consistent and derives the > necessary existence of the "thing in itself" qua "essence" (as "X"). > > These formalisms, logical, I have been engaging with now for a long time. > I publish soon - but am happy to provide overview, done as > quasi-Socratic-heurism with CHATGPT, prior to that publication (as any > criticisms from this list would be well received by me - that is, to refine > my argument, particularly that natural language component wherein I'll have > to synthesize vast amounts of Hume/Kant/Hegel (and more, with Peirce > obviously being present). > > Best wishes > > Jack > >
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