John, List: JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things.
Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not what *Peirce *ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself" (CP 8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are "token" and "type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906)--it is not *itself *a physical thing, but it can be *possessed *by a token, which *is *a physical thing (or event) that exists (or occurs) at a single place and time (ibid). A type is "a definitely significant form" that can be embodied in any number of different tokens (ibid), each of which might *also *embody different tones/marks as *indefinite *characters. Consequently, two different tokens of the same type can possess different tones/marks, and two different tokens of two different types can possess the same tone/mark--there is no strict alignment between indefinite tones/marks and definite types. JFS: But Peirce explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a sign of a possibility. To help avoid mistakes, I recommend providing exact quotations when attributing explicit definitions to Peirce. In this case, he *never* defines a tone/mark/potisign as a sign *of *a possibility, as if its (dynamical) *object *were a possibility. Instead, he defines it as a sign that is *itself *merely possible. "A Sign may *itself *have a 'possible' Mode of Being ... For a 'possible' Sign I have no better designation than a Tone, though I am considering replacing this by 'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23). "Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible into: A. *Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.347, EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24). In short, a tone/mark is a *possible *sign, distinguished from a token as an *existent *sign and a type as a *necessitant *sign. Again, none of this is at all controversial among Peirce scholars. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 1:47 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Jon, List, > > See the recent notes about the ZOOM talk on Friday. It is essential for > Peirce scholars to bring his philosophy and its applications to the > attention of philosopher, scientists, and engineers in the 21st century -- > Peirce worked in all three professions. > > The word 'tone' is a special case that Peirce himself forgot when he > coined the new term 'potisign'. He later recalled his definition for > 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary (consciously or not) when he suggested it as > a replacement for 'tone'. I have lectured and adopted Peirce's logic and > semeiotic for a broad modern audience, and I realize that 'mark' is far > more natural, more understandable, and more memorable than 'tone' for any > purpose other than a detailed textual criticism of the MS. As Peirce > himself said, if nobody else adopted a word he coined, he was under no > obligation to keep it. > > JFS: Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. > > JAS: A tone of voice is merely the *example *that Peirce gives in CP > 4.537 (1906) to illustrate what he has in mind. His *definition *of a > tone in that passage is "an indefinite significant character," as opposed > to a token as a "Single event which happens once and whose identity is > limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some > single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being > significant only as occurring just when and where it does," and a type as > "a definitely significant Form." > > No. A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an > image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and > the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable > things.. > > Bur the word 'tone' is an poor choice, which caused the misunderstanding. > Lady Welby assumed that the word 'tone' was an actisign that referred > to an existing thing -- some feeling of the speaker. But Peirce > explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a sign of a > possibility. > > As another example, consider the images on Mayan temples. For years, they > were considered decorations or images of some significant things. But > linguists discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan > words. By assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern > spoken Mayan, linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a notation > for the words of the Mayan language. The same images from one point of > view are marks of tokens of decorations. From another point of view, they > are marks of tokens of morphemes of the Mayan language. > > In textual criticism, Peirce's exact words in any MS must be recorded > exactly. But in publications about Peirce's intentions, the terminology > must be adapted to the way modern readers would interpret the words. Max > Fisch, for example, realized that Peirce's decision to use the word 'logic' > as an abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'. In his 1986 book, Fisch > stated that he was using the word 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for > 'logic as semeiotic". > > Fisch is certainly a respectable authority on the subject, and I believe > that we should follow his example in choosing which of Peirce's options to > consider as a standard for the 21st C.. > > John >
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