John, List:

JFS: Peirce defined this trichotomy [potisign/actisign/famisign] without
making any reference to (Tone Token Type).


This is highly misleading--Peirce wrote EP 2:478-490 over three consecutive
days (1908 Dec 23-25), and he *did* make reference to tone/token/type both
before and after introducing potisign/actisign/famisign.

CSP: For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a *Tone*,
though I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really
good name? An Actual sign I call a *Token*; a Necessitant Sign a *Type*.
(EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23)

CSP: Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible
Presentation, are divisible into:
A. *Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely
possible, but felt to be positively possible ...
B. *Actisigns*, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et nunc*;
such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single
paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. ...
C. *Famisigns*, familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs
must be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24)

CSP: But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now
use. I formerly called a *Potisign* a *Tinge* or *Tone*, an *Actisign* a
*Token*, a *Famisign* a *Type* ... I think *Potisign Actisign Famisign*
might be called *Mark Token Type (?)* (EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)


Peirce was dissatisfied with potisign/sinsign/actisign and was *considering*
replacing "tone" with "mark," so he explicitly asked Lady Welby for her
opinion, which she gave a few weeks later--"I should prefer *tone* to
*mark* for
the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to
his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). He *tentatively*
replaced "potisign" with "mark," using the word "might" and a parenthetical
question mark, but then wrote "tone" in his Logic Notebook two days later (
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i, 1908 Dec
27)--his last known mention of this trichotomy.

Again, some might hold the opinion that "mark" is a *better *choice than
"tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification whose
other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately claim
that "mark" was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice.

CSP: In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes
were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think. (EP 2:489,
1908 Dec 25)

JFS: In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of
trichotomies "the wildest guesses".


What Peirce here calls "the wildest guesses" are not the trichotomies
themselves but "the *relations* I assumed between the different *classes*."
In other words, he never presents all ten trichotomies of the 1906-1908
taxonomies in their proper *logical* order of determination for working out
the 66 sign classes. Instead, he repeatedly presents them in *phaneroscopic*
order.

JFS: For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's
dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about
Potisign.


I agree, and sure enough, there is nothing in Peirce's definition of "mark"
for Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* about it being a
sign whose mode of being, apprehension, or presentation is "merely
possible" as distinguished from an existent token and a necessitant type.
On the contrary ...

CSP: *Mark*. To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of
whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated;
and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say
that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these
terms or things can be predicated.
The word translates the Latin *nota*. It has many practical synonyms such
as quality, mode, attribute, predicate, character, property, determination,
consequent, sign. Most of these words are sometimes used in special senses;
and even when they are used in a general sense, they may suggest somewhat
different points of view from mark. (
https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)


By this definition, a mark is a term that can be predicated of things of
which other terms are predicated. For example, "scarlet" and "crimson" are
different terms that both have the term "red" as a mark--anything that is
scarlet or crimson is also red. However, the *term* "red" is obviously not
a tone/potisign, it is always a token/actisign of a type/famisign. On the
other hand, the *color* red--as well as a specific shade like scarlet or
crimson--can be a tone/potisign when and where it serves as "an indefinite
significant character."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in
> the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was
> based on one example, "a tone of voice".  After two more years of intensive
> study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of
> the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby
> (EP2, p.
>
> "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as
> such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible
> Presentation, are divisible (o) into:
>
> "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely
> possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray
> that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's
> hexagram.8
>
> "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such
> as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single
> paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be
> repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place.
> But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an
> edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy."
> Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token
> Type).   We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it.  But
> later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and
> Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006.
> He also discussed universes in considerable detail.  That is a topic he
> began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token
> Type).  But he is now introducing this new triad without making any
> reference to it.  But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of
> detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly.
>
> Then on p. 488, he writes:  "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in
> 1906,1 devoted much study
> to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as
> I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former
> names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge
> or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type....  I think Potisign
> Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)...
>
> Then he continues:  "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can
> afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I
> must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years
> and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different
> classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think...
>
> In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of
> trichotomies "the wildest guesses".  That should not encourage anyone to
> consider them as having any reliable status.  The best definition of (Mark
> Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign
> Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488.  For the
> definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary
> should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign.
>
> I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made
> far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and
> writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908.   As you know, his
> existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach
> their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta.
> For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell
> lectures.  Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version
> of higher-order logic in 1903.
>
> But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911.
>
> There is much more to say.
>
> John
>
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