Edwina, List, This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you appear to), why? And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has *anything* to do with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your definition of nominalism. And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with having different concepts? Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today *you* suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild *kind* of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you mean by this. It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory and practice). So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his * words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise. And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cAAAAJ&hl=en Best, Gary On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> wrote: > List > > As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the > correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the > particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to > ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function]. > > Edwina > > On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ > of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s > a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a > more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function > of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on > ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. . > > Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce > prefer’ with the result as you point out that “imaginary distinctions are > often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - > the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally > according to Peirce - these are ‘false distinctions’…. > > Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which > Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your > analysis, it better explains the operative function of what is > semiotically taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour > of rejection??? > > I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the > terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic > object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic > mediation….[*Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; > you are…*” . But without such modernization and explanation of the > function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only > Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be > able to move the real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern > world. And that - - is where I believe the focus should be. > > Edwina > > > On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > List, > I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a > few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but > the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the > six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. > https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens > Regards, > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > > > > Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > a écrit : > >> John, List: >> >> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' >> and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. >> >> >> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in >> Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone," >> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. >> >> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be >> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. >> >> >> Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism >> so that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a >> criterion, then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with >> "token" and "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three >> all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic >> device." >> >> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, >> mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. >> >> >> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is >> the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple >> times between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent >> "token" and necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was >> published during his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic >> Notebook entries and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" >> and "potisign" found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently >> endorsed "tone." As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of >> explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more >> abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find >> simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" ( >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html). >> >> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single >> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody >> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or >> the other, please let us know. >> >> >> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed >> his personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is >> accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on >> *Peirce's >> *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: >> >>> Gary, Jon, List, >>> >>> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous >>> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). >>> >>> My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the >>> words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word >>> pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But >>> some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered >>> ugly. They are certainly not memorable. >>> >>> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible >>> mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word >>> for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more >>> often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. >>> >>> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the >>> triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the >>> issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are >>> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the >>> street). >>> >>> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in >>> logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for >>> publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) >>> >>> But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the >>> future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, >>> and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, >>> find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that >>> point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could >>> not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word >>> 'tone'. >>> >>> If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) >>> one way or the other, please let us know. >>> >>> John >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From*: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> List, >>> >>> While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as >>> it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his >>> reminded me that the principal issue being considered has *not *been >>> resolved >>> unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, >>> completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the >>> 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has >>> and, so, there's no need for further discussion. >>> >>> I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's >>> argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example, >>> contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than >>> sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with >>> Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion >>> of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by >>> Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*. >>> Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an >>> *existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark. >>> >>> Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of >>> a *possible sign* include the idea that its being is a significant >>> "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely >>> possible, [is] felt to be positively possible." >>> >>> John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a >>> "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in >>> Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his >>> talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience >>> over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a >>> session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the >>> trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I >>> found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost >>> none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be >>> most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the >>> letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as >>> it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended). >>> >>> Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy >>> used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but >>> the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of >>> discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have >>> faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words! >>> >>> Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his >>> disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his >>> papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with* several* >>> Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John. >>> >>> And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most >>> recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact >>> did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages where >>> Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as 'tuone' and >>> 'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating his opinions with >>> little textual support. >>> >>> >>> So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic to >>> honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and determine for >>> themself who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. >>> Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest (at least for a time). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all >> the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
