Steven, List,
- "Falliblism" as such speaks about the validity of scientific statements, not
statements in general.
I'm in doubt about that.
[[ For fallibilism is the doctrine that *our* knowledge is never
absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty
and of indeterminacy.
CP 1.171]]
If it was like you say, should Peirce then not write "scientific
knowledge" in place of "our knowledge"? Is the fallbility of knowledge
limited to knowledge produced by one method of fixing belief? Isn't the
knowledge produced by other methods also fallible?
So, from my point of view it is interesting to ask what Peirce means by
scientific. In my opinion he means by it an ethos of argueing, something
like the socratic logon didonai. Following this ethos makes it possible
to produce knowledge less fallible, but still fallible.
This ethos trains us to resist the doxa! Since i am not at the zenith of
peirce exegesis, everything i have written is fallible.
Best
Stefan
Am 05.08.2011 00:20, schrieb Steven Ericsson-Zenith:
There is a clear distinction between Peircean "Falliblism," what Popper called
"Falsification," which is a part of scientific methodology, and making informal statements that may
be false or confused. "Falliblism" as such speaks about the validity of scientific statements, not
statements in general.
The full context of Wittgenstein's quote :
Philosophical Investigations (I.43): "For a large class of cases---though not for
all---in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word
is its use in the language."
Adds an important qualification and that qualification may not be obvious. It is "in which we
employ the word." He is not presenting a standalone definition of the term but rather
commenting upon the common usage of the term. Hence, when the term is employed, in a large class of
use cases he says, this is indeed how it is defined. Wittgenstein is "referring" to the
use case.
This does not make the common usage a good or logical definition.
I leave the remainder to Joe:
"It is implicit in this that we never bestow meaning on signs by acts of sheer will or intention or "stipulative"
fiat. There is no creation of meaning ex nihilo. Meaning creation and change is primarily a function of the dispositions and
spontaneities of the signs themselves; and although we may develop our skills of artful production, the result of our efforts is
never due solely or primarily to what we do: man proposes, but the sign disposes. We can indeed successfully stipulate meaning
("lay down" a rule of meaning, establish a meaning "by convention"), if that only means that we can, for
example, say something like "Let X mean such-and-such!" and then make it come about--sometimes--that X actually does
acquire that meaning, provided we are clear-headed enough to know what we are doing, skillful enough to know how to do it, and
resolute enough to follow through on our original resolve. But there is no such thing as a stipulation of meaning or an act of
establishment of a meaning convention or of a rule of meaning which has any logical--as distinct from causal--force or
effect."
Incidentally, it seems to me that my views are entirely in accord with Joe's
paper and Peirce in general since this is the view Joe presents. It is my
intension only to defend his position and seek clarity.
With respect,
Steven
On Aug 4, 2011, at 9:23 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
List and Steven,
I'm replying here to Steven's post, and will do so directly below, but i'm
addressing the list first (and changing the subject line) because i think
Steven's cryptic remarks furnish a good illustration of what happens when the
fallibilism implied in the Ransdell paper is forgotten. Here i'm referring
specifically to paragraph 2:
[[ Let us note to begin with that to regard semiosis--the generation of the
interpretant--as always due primarily to the agency of the sign itself rather
than to the agency of an interpreter, human or otherwise, does not deny that
human agency has an important role in the occurrence of meaning phenomena, in
changes in meaning, in the creation of meaning, and so forth. It does mean,
though, that an interpreter's interpretation is to be regarded as being
primarily a perception or observation of the meaning exhibited by the sign
itself--for the limited purposes of this paper we can equate the meaning of a
sign with the interpretants it generates--and that such control as we do have
over the powers of signs (thus over meaning phenomena in general) lies in our
skill at setting them in interaction with one another in the compositional
process in ways favorable to some desired result. But we can predict such
results only to a limited extent, owing both to our typically incomplete
understanding of what the generative powers of a given sign actually are and to
the spontaneity of the signs themselves. ]]
If we look at semiosis in terms of the dialogue between Utterer and Interpreter (which
Peirce frequently did circa 1906-8), the last sentence of this excerpt refers to the
fallibility of the Utterer by saying that the results of even a skillful utterance are
not fully predictable. But the Interpreter is also fallible, and this is clearly implied
in the second sentence. If the meaning of a sign is the series of interpretants it
generates, then the meaning is in futuro, with the ultimate logical interpretant
completing itself only at the very end of the semiotic process. It follows that "a
perception or observation of the meaning exhibited by the sign itself", insofar as
it is actualized, is really a prediction, since there is no direct perception of
something that does not presently exist. In practice, therefore, interpretation is just
as fallible as utterance. This is already implied in Joe's first sentence, and indeed is
so obvious that he probably saw no need to make it more explicit.
It should also be obvious that successful communication depends not only on
respecting the autonomy of the semiotic process (which is Joe's main point) but
also on making allowances for our own fallibility as utterers and interpreters.
This fallibility entails that any actual interpretant can be a misinterpretant.
If we don't recognize our own fallibility, we don't respect the honest (albeit
fallible) attempts of others to contribute to the growth of meaning and
reasonableness.
Turning to the meaning of words -- which was the specific subject of the
"Wittgenstein" thread launched by Steven -- we must all recognize that our
interpretive acts involving words are necessarily based on habits informed by our
previous experience with use of those words. But since any one person's experience is
limited, his habits are to some degree idiosyncratic; while the meaning of words must be
considered public property, ideally the property of an infinite community. That is a
regulative principle, not a historical fact. Communication consists of finite individuals
trying to contribute to the development of meaning. Using words to communicate involves
an attempt to harmonize and synchronize our fallible habits of usage. This means weeding
out idiosyncratic usages when we find them, which we can't do if we overlook our own
idiosyncrasies. It also means disambiguating when we can, but also recognizing that
ambiguity can never be totally eliminated from communication. (It can be eliminated from
an artificial language, perhaps, but not while it's being used to communicate.)
Now to the specific example of how communicative dialogue breaks down when the
utterer and interpreter ignores his own fallibility.
Steven, you wrote that
[[ There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a word is
merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and arbitrary thing
... ]]
(I'm omitting the irrelevant mixed metaphor at the end.) You are reacting here
to a statement which you paraphrase thus:
[[ the meaning of a word is merely a reference to that usage ]].
In saying explicitly that "the meaning of a word is a reference", this paraphrase is clearly a misinterpretant of
Wittgenstein's original statement, which is that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." It's you, not
Wittgenstein, who introduced "reference" into the statement to which you objected. Since then it's become clear that
you have also imposed an idiosyncratic interpretation of the word "use". Thus your paraphrase arbitrarily interprets
Wittgenstein's utterance to suit your own habits of usage, creating a straw man that you could react to, without respecting the
autonomy of the semiotic process to which the original sentence was a fallible contribution. This wouldn't have happened if you
had stopped to consider what it might mean in a discourse (and a language) wider than the limited world of your interpretive
habits. The same goes for your cryptic remark about "metaphysics" in your reply to Gary R.
As to your habits of utterance, you've been asked at least three times to explain your cryptic
remark that "Peirce would have none of it". But if anything, your subsequent posts have
been even more cryptic. My guess is that you don't deign to explain yourself in ordinary public
language because your idiosyncratic code is perfectly clear to you, and if it's not clear to
others, well, they're not worth any effort on your part. Your own fallibility as utterer never
enters your thoughts. Nor do you acknowledge fallibility as interpreter, since you treat with
contempt any suggestion that your arbitrary interpretations are questionable. I don't think you
even recognize the irony of signing a contemptuous message "With respect."
That's my guess, but i remain hopeful that you will prove it wrong by making a
genuine contribution to one of these threads. Perhaps you have some real
insights to share, into Peirce or Wittgenstein or semiosis or language or even
all of them. But they'll remain your private property until you make a genuine
(and fallible!) attempt to make them public in a common language, and work with
others to reduce the natural ambiguity of that language.
Gary F.
-----Original Message-----
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf
Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: August-03-11 4:11 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Wittgenstein on meaning
Dear Gary,
I'm not clear on why you think I am confusing meaning with reference - I too am
generally careful not to confuse the two. Indeed, the purpose of my comment is
to observe that Peirce would not confuse a reference to common usage with the
act.
With respect,
Steven
On Aug 3, 2011, at 12:52 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Steven, your comment appears to confuse meaning with reference, something
Peirce was generally careful not to do.
But if we really wanted to compare Peirce and Wittgenstein on the subject of meaning, we would have
to consider my tagline in its context, Philosophical Investigations (I.43): "For a large class
of cases---though not for all---in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the
meaning of a word is its use in the language." Or better, consider that sentence in its
original language: Man kann für eine große Klasse von Fällen der Benützung des Wortes
"Bedeutung" -- wenn auch nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung -- dieses Wort so
erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.
And if we want to discuss the meaning of any word in that sentence (say, "Bedeutung"), we
will have to consider the role that word plays in that language, will we not? Words can only be
meaningful in the context of the larger signs of which they are parts. The sentence is a larger
sign, part of a still larger sign (the Philosophical Investigations), and so on. And the
sign-system which is the language is the context of them all. The question then is whether the
pragmatic use of the word in that context (not a reference to its use!) is the whole of its
"meaning" (in the large class of cases to which Wittgenstein refers). Which strikes me as
a remarkably similar question to the one Peirce grappled with in his attempted proof of
pragmaticism.
Perhaps if you could explain to us just what it is that "Peirce would have none
of", your comment wouldn't hang so loose on the poetic wind.
Gary F.
} What a thing means is simply what habits it involves. [Peirce, CP
5.400] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home
-----Original Message-----
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]]
On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: August-03-11 1:28 PM
On Aug 3, 2011, at 10:11 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
} The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein] {
There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a word is
merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and arbitrary thing
that hangs loose upon the poetic wind and scars each of us in its passing.
And I'm quite sure that Peirce would have none of it.
With respect,
Steven
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