Context is everything:
CP 1.171 If I were to attempt to describe to you in full all the scientific
beauty and truth that I find in the principle of continuity, I might say in the
simple language of Matilda the Engaged, "the tomb would close over me e'er the
entrancing topic were exhausted" -- but not before my audience was exhausted.
So I will just drop it here. Only, in doing so, let me call your attention to
the natural affinity of this principle to the doctrine of fallibilism. The
principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified.
...
On Aug 4, 2011, at 5:04 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote:
> Steven, List,
>
> - "Falliblism" as such speaks about the validity of scientific statements,
> not statements in general.
>
> I'm in doubt about that.
>
> [[ For fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but
> always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy.
> CP 1.171]]
>
> If it was like you say, should Peirce then not write "scientific knowledge"
> in place of "our knowledge"? Is the fallbility of knowledge limited to
> knowledge produced by one method of fixing belief? Isn't the knowledge
> produced by other methods also fallible?
>
> So, from my point of view it is interesting to ask what Peirce means by
> scientific. In my opinion he means by it an ethos of argueing, something like
> the socratic logon didonai. Following this ethos makes it possible to produce
> knowledge less fallible, but still fallible.
>
> This ethos trains us to resist the doxa! Since i am not at the zenith of
> peirce exegesis, everything i have written is fallible.
>
>
> Best
> Stefan
>
> Am 05.08.2011 00:20, schrieb Steven Ericsson-Zenith:
>> There is a clear distinction between Peircean "Falliblism," what Popper
>> called "Falsification," which is a part of scientific methodology, and
>> making informal statements that may be false or confused. "Falliblism" as
>> such speaks about the validity of scientific statements, not statements in
>> general.
>>
>> The full context of Wittgenstein's quote :
>>
>> Philosophical Investigations (I.43): “For a large class of cases—though not
>> for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the
>> meaning of a word is its use in the language.”
>>
>> Adds an important qualification and that qualification may not be obvious.
>> It is "in which we employ the word." He is not presenting a standalone
>> definition of the term but rather commenting upon the common usage of the
>> term. Hence, when the term is employed, in a large class of use cases he
>> says, this is indeed how it is defined. Wittgenstein is "referring" to the
>> use case.
>>
>> This does not make the common usage a good or logical definition.
>>
>> I leave the remainder to Joe:
>>
>> "It is implicit in this that we never bestow meaning on signs by acts of
>> sheer will or intention or "stipulative" fiat. There is no creation of
>> meaning ex nihilo. Meaning creation and change is primarily a function of
>> the dispositions and spontaneities of the signs themselves; and although we
>> may develop our skills of artful production, the result of our efforts is
>> never due solely or primarily to what we do: man proposes, but the sign
>> disposes. We can indeed successfully stipulate meaning ("lay down" a rule of
>> meaning, establish a meaning "by convention"), if that only means that we
>> can, for example, say something like "Let X mean such-and-such!" and then
>> make it come about--sometimes--that X actually does acquire that meaning,
>> provided we are clear-headed enough to know what we are doing, skillful
>> enough to know how to do it, and resolute enough to follow through on our
>> original resolve. But there is no such thing as a stipulation of meaning or
>> an act of establishment of a
>> meaning convention or of a rule of meaning which has any logical--as
>> distinct from causal--force or effect."
>>
>> Incidentally, it seems to me that my views are entirely in accord with Joe's
>> paper and Peirce in general since this is the view Joe presents. It is my
>> intension only to defend his position and seek clarity.
>>
>> With respect,
>> Steven
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Aug 4, 2011, at 9:23 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>
>>
>>> List and Steven,
>>>
>>> I'm replying here to Steven's post, and will do so directly below, but i'm
>>> addressing the list first (and changing the subject line) because i think
>>> Steven's cryptic remarks furnish a good illustration of what happens when
>>> the fallibilism implied in the Ransdell paper is forgotten. Here i'm
>>> referring specifically to paragraph 2:
>>>
>>> [[ Let us note to begin with that to regard semiosis--the generation of the
>>> interpretant--as always due primarily to the agency of the sign itself
>>> rather than to the agency of an interpreter, human or otherwise, does not
>>> deny that human agency has an important role in the occurrence of meaning
>>> phenomena, in changes in meaning, in the creation of meaning, and so forth.
>>> It does mean, though, that an interpreter's interpretation is to be
>>> regarded as being primarily a perception or observation of the meaning
>>> exhibited by the sign itself--for the limited purposes of this paper we can
>>> equate the meaning of a sign with the interpretants it generates--and that
>>> such control as we do have over the powers of signs (thus over meaning
>>> phenomena in general) lies in our skill at setting them in interaction with
>>> one another in the compositional process in ways favorable to some desired
>>> result. But we can predict such results only to a limited extent, owing
>>> both to our typically incomplete u
>>> nderstanding of what the generative powers of a given sign actually are and
>>> to the spontaneity of the signs themselves. ]]
>>>
>>> If we look at semiosis in terms of the dialogue between Utterer and
>>> Interpreter (which Peirce frequently did circa 1906-8), the last sentence
>>> of this excerpt refers to the fallibility of the Utterer by saying that the
>>> results of even a skillful utterance are not fully predictable. But the
>>> Interpreter is also fallible, and this is clearly implied in the second
>>> sentence. If the meaning of a sign is the series of interpretants it
>>> generates, then the meaning is in futuro, with the ultimate logical
>>> interpretant completing itself only at the very end of the semiotic
>>> process. It follows that “a perception or observation of the meaning
>>> exhibited by the sign itself”, insofar as it is actualized, is really a
>>> prediction, since there is no direct perception of something that does not
>>> presently exist. In practice, therefore, interpretation is just as fallible
>>> as utterance. This is already implied in Joe's first sentence, and indeed
>>> is so obvious that he probably saw no need t
>>> o make it more explicit.
>>>
>>> It should also be obvious that successful communication depends not only on
>>> respecting the autonomy of the semiotic process (which is Joe's main point)
>>> but also on making allowances for our own fallibility as utterers and
>>> interpreters. This fallibility entails that any actual interpretant can be
>>> a misinterpretant. If we don't recognize our own fallibility, we don't
>>> respect the honest (albeit fallible) attempts of others to contribute to
>>> the growth of meaning and reasonableness.
>>>
>>> Turning to the meaning of words – which was the specific subject of the
>>> “Wittgenstein” thread launched by Steven – we must all recognize that our
>>> interpretive acts involving words are necessarily based on habits informed
>>> by our previous experience with use of those words. But since any one
>>> person's experience is limited, his habits are to some degree
>>> idiosyncratic; while the meaning of words must be considered public
>>> property, ideally the property of an infinite community. That is a
>>> regulative principle, not a historical fact. Communication consists of
>>> finite individuals trying to contribute to the development of meaning.
>>> Using words to communicate involves an attempt to harmonize and synchronize
>>> our fallible habits of usage. This means weeding out idiosyncratic usages
>>> when we find them, which we can't do if we overlook our own idiosyncrasies.
>>> It also means disambiguating when we can, but also recognizing that
>>> ambiguity can never be totally eliminated
>>> from communication. (It can be eliminated from an artificial language,
>>> perhaps, but not while it's being used to communicate.)
>>>
>>> Now to the specific example of how communicative dialogue breaks down when
>>> the utterer and interpreter ignores his own fallibility.
>>>
>>> Steven, you wrote that
>>> [[ There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a word
>>> is merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and arbitrary
>>> thing ... ]]
>>> (I'm omitting the irrelevant mixed metaphor at the end.) You are reacting
>>> here to a statement which you paraphrase thus:
>>> [[ the meaning of a word is merely a reference to that usage ]].
>>>
>>> In saying explicitly that “the meaning of a word is a reference”, this
>>> paraphrase is clearly a misinterpretant of Wittgenstein's original
>>> statement, which is that “the meaning of a word is its use in the
>>> language.” It's you, not Wittgenstein, who introduced “reference” into the
>>> statement to which you objected. Since then it’s become clear that you have
>>> also imposed an idiosyncratic interpretation of the word “use”. Thus your
>>> paraphrase arbitrarily interprets Wittgenstein's utterance to suit your own
>>> habits of usage, creating a straw man that you could react to, without
>>> respecting the autonomy of the semiotic process to which the original
>>> sentence was a fallible contribution. This wouldn’t have happened if you
>>> had stopped to consider what it might mean in a discourse (and a language)
>>> wider than the limited world of your interpretive habits. The same goes for
>>> your cryptic remark about “metaphysics” in your
>>> reply to Gary R.
>>>
>>> As to your habits of utterance, you've been asked at least three times to
>>> explain your cryptic remark that “Peirce would have none of it”. But if
>>> anything, your subsequent posts have been even more cryptic. My guess is
>>> that you don't deign to explain yourself in ordinary public language
>>> because your idiosyncratic code is perfectly clear to you, and if it's not
>>> clear to others, well, they’re not worth any effort on your part. Your own
>>> fallibility as utterer never enters your thoughts. Nor do you acknowledge
>>> fallibility as interpreter, since you treat with contempt any suggestion
>>> that your arbitrary interpretations are questionable. I don't think you
>>> even recognize the irony of signing a contemptuous message “With respect.”
>>>
>>> That's my guess, but i remain hopeful that you will prove it wrong by
>>> making a genuine contribution to one of these threads. Perhaps you have
>>> some real insights to share, into Peirce or Wittgenstein or semiosis or
>>> language or even all of them. But they'll remain your private property
>>> until you make a genuine (and fallible!) attempt to make them public in a
>>> common language, and work with others to reduce the natural ambiguity of
>>> that language.
>>>
>>> Gary F.
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [
>>> mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>>> ] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>>> Sent: August-03-11 4:11 PM
>>> To:
>>> PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>>>
>>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Wittgenstein on meaning
>>>
>>> Dear Gary,
>>>
>>> I'm not clear on why you think I am confusing meaning with reference - I
>>> too am generally careful not to confuse the two. Indeed, the purpose of my
>>> comment is to observe that Peirce would not confuse a reference to common
>>> usage with the act.
>>>
>>> With respect,
>>> Steven
>>>
>>>
>>> On Aug 3, 2011, at 12:52 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Steven, your comment appears to confuse meaning with reference, something
>>>> Peirce was generally careful not to do.
>>>>
>>>> But if we really wanted to compare Peirce and Wittgenstein on the subject
>>>> of meaning, we would have to consider my tagline in its context,
>>>> Philosophical Investigations (I.43): “For a large class of cases—though
>>>> not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus:
>>>> the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” Or better, consider
>>>> that sentence in its original language: Man kann für eine große Klasse von
>>>> Fällen der Benützung des Wortes “Bedeutung” – wenn auch nicht für alle
>>>> Fälle seiner Benützung – dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines
>>>> Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.
>>>>
>>>> And if we want to discuss the meaning of any word in that sentence (say,
>>>> “Bedeutung”), we will have to consider the role that word plays in that
>>>> language, will we not? Words can only be meaningful in the context of the
>>>> larger signs of which they are parts. The sentence is a larger sign, part
>>>> of a still larger sign (the Philosophical Investigations), and so on. And
>>>> the sign-system which is the language is the context of them all. The
>>>> question then is whether the pragmatic use of the word in that context
>>>> (not a reference to its use!) is the whole of its “meaning” (in the large
>>>> class of cases to which Wittgenstein refers). Which strikes me as a
>>>> remarkably similar question to the one Peirce grappled with in his
>>>> attempted proof of pragmaticism.
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps if you could explain to us just what it is that “Peirce would have
>>>> none of”, your comment wouldn’t hang so loose on the poetic wind.
>>>>
>>>> Gary F.
>>>>
>>>> } What a thing means is simply what habits it involves. [Peirce, CP
>>>> 5.400] {
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm
>>>> }{ home
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [
>>>> mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>>>> ]
>>>> On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>>>> Sent: August-03-11 1:28 PM
>>>>
>>>> On Aug 3, 2011, at 10:11 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> } The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein] {
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a word is
>>>> merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and arbitrary
>>>> thing that hangs loose upon the poetic wind and scars each of us in its
>>>> passing.
>>>>
>>>> And I'm quite sure that Peirce would have none of it.
>>>>
>>>> With respect,
>>>> Steven
>>>>
>>>>
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