Dear Cathy,

"Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 

        1. the religious dualist, 
        2. the scientific dualist. 

Often they are in both. 

One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more generally, 
"the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not know how to ground 
Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas 
working against the Peircean. 

It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I 
respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: 

        Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
        
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72

This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.

Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, because 
the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. "Thirdness") beyond 
the reach of 20th Century science and logic.

It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did 
indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called "Thirdness," 
as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of Physics. Now I 
rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this "God" conception is 
not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" in the modern sense, in 
that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western 
conception. 

This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in 
this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's "Ideality in the 
physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more 
like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion 
of the later).

So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is 
important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you 
do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience 
unfamiliar with them.

With respect,
Steven


--
        Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
        Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
        http://iase.info







On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:

> Gary R wrote:
> *
>>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see
> esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial
> relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic
> vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow
> the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may
> also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in
> turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of
> representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to
> ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars
> have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and
> I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of
> movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not*
> follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
> 
> This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
> 
>>> Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be
> relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking.
> Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and
> considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck
> me as quite odd.
> *
> 
> I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in
> seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much
> sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
> 
> Cathy
> 
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