Dear Jason, I think the basic point is that "materialist science," as Fish calls it, is not science at all. It both assumes the essential things of the world are discovered and forbids new discovery in foundations: we are limited to "strings" or "particles" or "probability," none of which can lead to an explanation of sense and how it is characterized, or "the mind." Thus contemporary science is plainly a dualism that leaves any right thinker with only one of two options when it comes to "the mind," identity theory or emergence theory; of which both are as good as the other since you cannot distinguished one from the other, and both fail to provide explanation, they amount to appeals to "magic."
The absolutist view of materialist science violates the principles of good science, science is a "liberal physicalism," in that it is certainly founded upon empiricism, the observable and that which may be inferred from it, but it must always allow for new discovery in these observations and the suggestions that such observations are possible in theory. The irony is that the discipline of physics makes such suggestions all the time, consider string theory for example, but this kind of scientific adventurism is not currently allowed in biophysics (of course, I am referring to the challenges presented by my own work). In fact, I'd say that metaphysical adventurism in contemporary physics has only served to allow contemporary science generally to tolerate the irrational nature of identity theory and emergentism, and to neglect the inquiry of great thinkers like Peirce. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 29, 2012, at 10:44 AM, Khadimir wrote: > Steven, > > This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. > If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a > scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary > positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a > hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). > However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the > view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection > of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity > (synechism). > > Best, > Jason > > > > On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <ste...@iase.us> > wrote: > Dear Cathy, > > "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two > camps: > > 1. the religious dualist, > 2. the scientific dualist. > > Often they are in both. > > One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more > generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not know > how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there > are two dogmas working against the Peircean. > > It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I > respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: > > Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? > > http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 > > This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. > > Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, because > the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. "Thirdness") beyond > the reach of 20th Century science and logic. > > It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did > indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called > "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of > Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this "God" > conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" in the > modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god > of popular western conception. > > This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction > in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's "Ideality in > the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is > more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the > passion of the later). > > So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is > important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you > do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the > audience unfamiliar with them. > > With respect, > Steven > > > -- > Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith > Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering > http://iase.info > > > > > > > > On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: > > > Gary R wrote: > > * > >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see > > esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial > > relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic > > vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow > > the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may > > also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in > > turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of > > representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to > > ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars > > have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and > > I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of > > movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* > > follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. > > > > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) > > > >>> Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be > > relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. > > Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and > > considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck > > me as quite odd. > > * > > > > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in > > seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much > > sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. > > > > Cathy > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. 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