I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben

----- Original Message ----- 

Jason, list,

That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
  a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such 
continuity pretty credible. 
  b.. Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons 
instead of physics reasons? 
  c.. Real infinitesimals? 
  d.. Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities 
such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove 
the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences 
of Four Incapacities)
Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they 
say is wrong with synechism?

Best, Ben

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Khadimir
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos


This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one.  
If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a 
scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many contemporary 
positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a 
hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers).  
However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the 
view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection 
of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). 


On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

  Dear Cathy,

  "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two 

         1. the religious dualist,
         2. the scientific dualist.

  Often they are in both.

  One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more 
generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not know 
how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there 
are two dogmas working against the Peircean.

  It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I 
respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:

         Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?

  This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.

  Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, because 
the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. "Thirdness") beyond 
the reach of 20th Century science and logic.

  It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did 
indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called "Thirdness," 
as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of Physics. Now I 
rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this "God" conception is 
not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" in the modern sense, in 
that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western 

  This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction 
in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's "Ideality in the 
physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more 
like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion 
of the later).

  So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is 
important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you 
do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience 
unfamiliar with them.

  With respect,

         Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
         Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering

  On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:

  > Gary R wrote:
  > *
  >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see 
esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation 
so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector 
theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns 
(esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three 
involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, 
even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in 
that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only 
a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. 
Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on 
possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation 
which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
  > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-)
  >>> Indeed, with a  few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively 
little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they 
pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he 
valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd.
  > *
  > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars 
and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to 
people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system.
  > Cathy

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