Dear Joe,
Immediacy is a property of all "metaphysical marks" - marks for which
intent exists. Recall that in my model intent is exactly the embodied
experience in semeiosis of the creator of the mark in its creation.
Immediacy is the description, in a point of semeiosis, of the temporal
state of the marks, their state of refinement and their potential
refinement. Immediacy properties are properties that enable us to make
quantative statements about the immediacy of a mark.
For example, a motor vehicle has an immediacy described in part by the
following properties:
* Date of manufacture.
* The final state of the manufactured design.
* Custom modifications since manufacture.
* The age of the design - elapsed time since design was made.
* The changes of wear and tear.
* The current date and time.
Any given motor vehicle is a replica of the original intent whose
immediacy varies with other replicas according to the changes since
their replication.
Books vary in the same way. For example, I have a copy of Edmund
Husserl's "Crisis of the European Sciences" currently on my desk from
the local library. In addition to the publication date, the
underscoring and highlighting by negligent students, the written
comments on the inside cover, the razor cut and removed appendix - are
all quantative measures of the immediacy of the individual book.
A pristine copy is measured by its publication date, its edition and
today's date. We can compare two pristine copies quantatively by this
information. The immediacy of a preceding model of our motor vehicle or
preceding edition of a book is altered by the new model vehicle or new
edition book.
So much for final products. These are the simple cases. A designer or
author can have a material affect on the immediacy of their product by
releasing a new vehicle or publishing a new book.
Immediacy is the property that makes some of us cringe when we see
movies of 1970's fashions and and 1970's hairstyles. In other words,
immediacy is not merely an abstract concept - it is a function in
semeiosis that materially effects how we apprehend the world and it
produces a physiological response (our apprehension of it changes our
characterized experience of the world).
Immediacy in open content development is a greater challenge and a
rather more complex problem to deal with because change is more rapid
and difference is more diverse - I speak of the digital mediums we have
discussed here before - things like Wikipedia, Citizen Journalism
(perhaps all journalism), and the world wide web in general.
Immediacy properties in these digital domains deal with incomplete
refinements, the maturity of documents and the impact of various copies
of indeterminate state and derivatives. This leads us eventually to the
questions of authority, identity and transparency that we have addressed
here before.
I've done various informal experiments in this domain - by developing
ideas in documents or forums on line and observing responses, or simply
by developing any content where rawness and refinement are factors.
This is not good enough and I do feel that this is an area where the
design of some good long term experiments and quantification over time
might allow deeper insight into immediacy effects - it is hard to fund
this from where I am currently though.
In terms of a review of historical documents, such as those of Peirce,
very similar challenges exist. You simply cannot look at the questions
relating to his use of *representamen* or *sign* without consideration
of the immediacy properties related to their use if what you are trying
to achieve is a comprehensive understanding of Peirce.
I will point out - as I have done for Wikipedia in the past - that
random or incomplete interpretations and even misinterpretations or just
plain wrongness (caused often by a failure to grasp the immediacy
properties) can be stimulants for creative thinking that do produce new
insights and assist in the development of new ideas - by stimulating
abduction. Think of it rather like genetic mutation.
Refining such creativity into novel, distinct and useful conceptions is
rare and difficult. So no one should think that solely by random
misinterpretation of Peirce that they are likely to uncover new insight.
You can find a list of immediacy properties here:
http://www.what-it-all-means.com/glossary/immediacy.html
In the nature of immediacy - this entry likely needs review. :-)
I hope that clarifies.
Sincerely,
Steven
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
Steven"
I agree with you in being unable to find what Frances is saying
intelligible, but I want to take the occasion to ask you what you mean by
"immediacy", which seems to have a special meaning in your writings which is
of special importance to you that I don't understand.
Joe Ransdell
----- Original Message -----
From: "Steven Ericsson Zenith" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 12:41 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics
Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Dear List,
I was hoping to keep out of this. Mostly I think the deconstruction of
Peirce's writings concerning representamen / sign is a waste of time and
simply unable to produce any meaningful result.
This message by Frances simply makes no sense to me. How do you,
Frances or Gary, propose a representamen that is prior to "all existent
objects and 'signs' and semiosis" - this assertion makes no sense
ontologically or epistemologically.
Indeed, even if I consider such an argument viable, any such
representamen would not be accessible to apprehension. It leads me to
believe that there is a misunderstanding in Frances argument concerning
the very nature of semeiosis.
I think you are both reading too much into Peirce's exploration - which
he clearly testifies to. Consider the two terms a property of the
immediacy of his manifest refinement (his analysis).
With respect,
Steven
Frances Kelly wrote:
Gary...
Thanks for your search and post.
As you implied, the distinction attempted to be made by me is in deed
the difference between "representamens" that are broader and prior to
all else in the world, including existent objects and "signs" and
semiosis, and that are independent of thought and mind and sense and
life itself. The reason for my making this attempt is simply the
seeming distinction made by Peirce himself in his many passages quoted
here. Agreeably, it may certainly prove useful to distinguish between
"signs" conveying notions to human minds and those "representamens"
which can not or need not do so. My train of thought on this matter
may of course be way off track, in that there may be no substantial
distinction at all. The Peircean writings recently posted to the list
by you on the terms "representamen" and "representamens" and
"representamina" will be read by me in detail for some insight.
-Frances
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