Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: ... If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, may provide a natural measure favoring order. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker writes: If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, may provide a natural measure favoring order. What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, physically instatiated? My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP problem, unless we say that only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making multiverse narrower than all mathematically consistent universes. I gather that Tegmark's grand ensembles are not mainstream physics, even among those who accept the MWI. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote: 1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: 1Z wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: David and 1Z: How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions in the linear accelerator)? Is not the only difference that in one case we have a priori labeled the object of study 'matter' and in the other case a 'set of numbers'? Granted, in the matter case we need more energy to explore, but couldn't this be simply from the sheer quantity of number histories we are dealing with compared to the Mandelbrot set? Tom A number of recent developments in mathematics, such as the increased use of computers to assist proof, and doubts about the correct choice of basic axioms, have given rise to a view called quasi-empiricism. This challenges the traditional idea of mathematical truth as eternal and discoverable apriori. In either case, with math and matter, our belief is that there is an eternal truth to be discovered, i.e. a truth that is independent of the observer. Eternal doesn't mean independent of the observer. Empirically-detectable facts are often fleeting. We're getting into the typical bifurcation of interpretation of terms. When you used the term eternal to describe math truth, I assumed you were talking about something that is independent of time. Yes. Which physical truth isn't. According to quasi-empiricists the use of a computer to perform a proof is a form of experiment. But it remains the case that any mathematical problem that can in principle be solved by shutting you eye and thinking. Computers are used because mathematians do not have infinite mental resources; they are an aid. In either case, an experiment is a procedure that is followed which outputs information about the truth we are trying to discover. Math problems that we can solve by shutting our eyes are solvable that way because they are simple enough. As you point out, there are math problems that are too complex to solve by shutting our eyes. In fact there are math problems which are unsolvable. I think Bruno hypothesizes that the frontier of solvability/unsolvability in math/logic is complex enough to cover all there is to know about physics. Therefore, what role is left for matter? Physical truth is a tiny subset of mathematical truth. This agrees with what I am saying. And mathematics per se does not tell us which subset is physical. Empirical investigation has to be used. Contrast this with traditonal sciences like chemistry or biology, where real-world objects have to be studied, and would still have to be studied by super-scientitists with an IQ of a million. In genuinely emprical sciences, experimentation and observation are used to gain information. In mathematics the information of the solution to a problem is always latent in the starting-point, the basic axioms and the formulation of the problem. The process of thinking through a problem simply makes this latent information explicit. (I say simply, but of ocurse it is often very non-trivial). The belief about matter is that there are basic properties of matter which are the starting point for all of physics, and that all of the outcomes of the sciences are latent in this starting point, just as in mathematics. You can't deduce the state of the universe at time T in any detailed way from the properties of matter, This is a subject of debate. If *you* can do it, I'd like to discuss next week's race results with you. you have to get out your telescope and look. A telescope could be a way of looking at the state of the computation of the universe. This doesn't preclude being able to in theory compute the universe (in 3rd pov). Fundamental indeterminism does. The use of a computer externalises this process. The computer may be outside the mathematician's head but all the information that comes out of it is information that went into it. Mathematics is in that sense still apriori. Having said that, the quasi-empricist still has some points about the modern style of mathematics. Axioms look less like eternal truths and mroe like hypotheses which are used for a while but may eventualy be discarded if they prove problematical, like the role of scientific hypotheses in Popper's philosophy. Thus mathematics has some of the look and feel of empirical science without being empricial in the most essential sense -- that of needing an input of inormation from outside the head.Quasi indeed! I'd say that the common belief of mathematicians is that axioms are just a (temporary) framework with which to think about the
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker wrote: It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems. For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Rép : Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
This is a post I wrote yesterday, but apparently did not go through. -- Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by: Computationalism entails COMP. Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that on the one hand: a belief in 'primary' matter can be retained provided it is not invoked in the explanation of consciousness, Imagine someone who has been educated during his entire childhood with the idea that anything moving on the road with wheels is pulled by invisible horses. Imagine then that becoming an adult he decides to study physics and thermodynamics, and got the understanding that there is no need to postulate invisible horses for explaining how car moves around. Would this proves the non existence of invisible horses? Of course no. From a logical point of view you can always add irrefutable hypotheses making some theories as redundant as you wish. The thermodynamician can only say that he does not need the invisible horses hypothesis for explaining the movement of the cars , like Laplace said to Napoleon that he does not need the God hypothesis in his mechanics. And then he is coherent as far as he does not use the God concept in is explanation. The comp hypothesis, which I insist is the same as standard computationalism (but put in a more precise way if only because of the startling consequences) entails that primary matter, even existing, cannot be used to justify anything related to the subjective experience, and this includes any *reading* of pointer needle result of a physical device. So we don't need the postulate it. And that is a good thing because the only definition of primary matter I know (the one by Aristotle in his metaphysics) is already refuted by both experiments and theory (QM or just comp as well). and on the other: that under comp 'matter' emerges from (what I've termed) a recursively prior 1-person level. Why are these two conclusions not contradictory? 'Matter', or the stable appearance of matter has to emerge from the mathematical coherence of the computations. This is what the UDA is supposed to prove. Scientifically it means that you can test comp by comparing some self-observing discourses of digital machines (those corresponding to the arithmetical translation of the UDA (AUDA)) with empirical physics. Again this cannot disprove the (religious) belief in Matter, or in any Gods, for sure. You will have to attach consciousness to actual material infinite. Why is this the case? Because it is a way to prevent the UDA reasoning (at least as currently exibited) to proceed. It makes sense to say that some actual material infinity is not duplicable, for example. To be sure, the AUDA would still work (but could be less well motivated). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail here Why must change... be change in something? It sort of sounds reasonable but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red) and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has changed from red to orange. If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is always changing... Time and Possibility Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing actually occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would be no meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless. Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things change so completely from one moment to the next that there are no conistent things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate is the time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the absence of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless. In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of sameness (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited on being able to say: Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2. You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and space are also different from colour, or any other property an object may have. If we didn't have time there would be no change, if we didn't have height everything would be flat, and if we didn't have colour everything would be black. But it isn't an arbitrary difference. I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to flow and they do not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate rooms, to be separate. I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all mathematical structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till 1 second ago) + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never seen one is evidence against a mathematical multiverse. That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. Not as much. It depends on how constrained they are. Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. If a physical MV exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second. With a very low measure. The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure. Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that is basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or contingnet in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them. If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. What's that got
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, may provide a natural measure favoring order. What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, physically instatiated? My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP problem, unless we say that only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making multiverse narrower than all mathematically consistent universes. That is a variation on measure. Uninstiated universes have measure 0. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 7:21 PM Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted Tom Caylor wrote: Discovery is not simply a matter of seeing where a particular set of axioms and rules of inference leads. i.e. different sets of axioms and rules of inference, that you can start putting together a picture that gets closer and closer to reality. Tom It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of the form It is true that axioms = theorems. Brent Meeker The existing set of axioms and rules leads to the enforcement of the topical content of the actual model we observe. So while I agree with your =, it may be added: presently established to the theorems. Referring to Tom's ... It's only when you see the truth from different perspectives IMO it may go like: ...see different kinds of truth from Of course then we need different axioms (maybe) and definitely different rules. We are walled-in into one topical model with explanations from ages when less information was available, so taking the ongoing axioms and rules as sacrosanct disallows advancement into new ideas. I don't say that those new ideas are 'good', or even 'are there', but I like to keep the possibilities (and mind) open. John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov. And surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple' experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves, informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov. This is why I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion). Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience of 'I'. But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you? All I know is what I am experiencing *now*. Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the A-series versus B-series issue)? What process exists that could coherently totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs? You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping consciousness right now. Well, we don't, because we have different information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy is pretty direct. David Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail here Why must change... be change in something? It sort of sounds reasonable but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red) and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has changed from red to orange. If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is always changing... Time and Possibility Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing actually occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would be no meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless. Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things change so completely from one moment to the next that there are no conistent things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate is the time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the absence of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless. In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of sameness (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited on being able to say: Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2. You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and space are also different from colour, or any other property an object may have. If we didn't have time there would be no change, if we didn't have height everything would be flat, and if we didn't have colour everything would be black. But it isn't an arbitrary difference. I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to flow and they do not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, may provide a natural measure favoring order. What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, physically instatiated? My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP problem, unless we say that only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making multiverse narrower than all mathematically consistent universes. I gather that Tegmark's grand ensembles are not mainstream physics, even among those who accept the MWI. The MWI posits multiple worlds in which every evolution of the world consistent with quantum physics is realized - it's really just one Hilbert space and the multiple arises only because macroscopically different worlds are projected onto orthogonal subspaces. But it is assumed that evolution in this Hilbert space is due to one Hamiltonian with specific values of coupling constants etc. Tegmark's all mathematically consistent universes would seem to include a Newtonian universe, an Aristotelean universe, a Biblical universe, and in fact any universe that didn't include a flat contradiction, X and not-X. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, may provide a natural measure favoring order. What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, physically instatiated? My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP problem, unless we say that only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making multiverse narrower than all mathematically consistent universes. I gather that Tegmark's grand ensembles are not mainstream physics, even among those who accept the MWI. The MWI posits multiple worlds in which every evolution of the world consistent with quantum physics is realized - it's really just one Hilbert space and the multiple arises only because macroscopically different worlds are projected onto orthogonal subspaces. But it is assumed that evolution in this Hilbert space is due to one Hamiltonian with specific values of coupling constants etc. Tegmark's all mathematically consistent universes would seem to include a Newtonian universe, an Aristotelean universe, a Biblical universe, and in fact any universe that didn't include a flat contradiction, X and not-X. Brent Meeker The set of all mathematically consistent universes, i.e. defined by NOT(X and not-X), is very telling. A universe has to have some kind of coordinate/reference system and/or language/units in order for a property or predicate X to be able to be well-defined enough to define not-X. But once that is done, and it is determined that not-X does not hold, then there exists a change to the coordinate system or language that results in X and not-X. This argues for the essentiality of the definer. Otherwise no X could exist at all. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov. Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be rejected. And surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple' experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves, informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov. I don't see how POV's can be logically prior to a space time structure. This is why I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion). Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience of 'I'. But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you? All I know is what I am experiencing *now*. Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the A-series versus B-series issue)? A consciousness spread across time. What process exists that could coherently totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs? The question is what could make the conscious one-at-a-time if not the flow of time. You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping consciousness right now. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Well, we don't, because we have different information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy is pretty direct. My future selves will contain information from my present self. But they are not conscious *yet*. David Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail here Why must change... be change in something? It sort of sounds reasonable but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red) and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has changed from red to orange. If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is always changing... Time and Possibility Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing actually occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would be no meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless. Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things change so completely from one moment to the next that there are no conistent things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate is the time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the absence of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless. In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of sameness (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited on being able to say: Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2. You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and space are also different from colour, or any other property an object may have. If we didn't have time
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Tom Caylor wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. I'm not sure what a mathematical MV is: if you mean the Tegmark idea of the set of all mathematically consistent universes then I think you're wrong. There is no measure defined over that set (and I doubt it's possible to define one). But the physical universe obeys the laws of QM and it appears that eigenselection, as proposed by Zeh, Joos, and others, may provide a natural measure favoring order. What if the set of all mathematically consistent universes were actually, physically instatiated? My point is that physical instantiation per se does not solve the HP problem, unless we say that only the non-HP universes are instantiated, making multiverse narrower than all mathematically consistent universes. I gather that Tegmark's grand ensembles are not mainstream physics, even among those who accept the MWI. The MWI posits multiple worlds in which every evolution of the world consistent with quantum physics is realized - it's really just one Hilbert space and the multiple arises only because macroscopically different worlds are projected onto orthogonal subspaces. But it is assumed that evolution in this Hilbert space is due to one Hamiltonian with specific values of coupling constants etc. Tegmark's all mathematically consistent universes would seem to include a Newtonian universe, an Aristotelean universe, a Biblical universe, and in fact any universe that didn't include a flat contradiction, X and not-X. Brent Meeker The set of all mathematically consistent universes, i.e. defined by NOT(X and not-X), is very telling. A universe has to have some kind of coordinate/reference system and/or language/units in order for a property or predicate X to be able to be well-defined enough to define not-X. No. All it needs is one proposition as an axiom and the ability to negate a proposition and to form the disjunction of two propositions. But once that is done, and it is determined that not-X does not hold, Under most rules of inference (not-X does not hold) = X. then there exists a change to the coordinate system or language that results in X and not-X. Most mathematical structures don't admit a coordinate system. I don't know what you mean by a change of language but I suspect it is not permitted by the rules of inference. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: ... And surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple' experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves, informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov. I don't see how POV's can be logically prior to a space time structure. I don't think logical priority makes any sense except in an axiomatic deduction - which as an empiricist you probably consider irrelevant to spacetime. POV's are epistemologically prior to spacetime. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be rejected. I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point. The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the available information and *responding* perceptually to it. This makes each dyad *informationally* closed with respect to other such dyads, without reference to their 'temporal' or 'spatial' separation. Consequently, in a BU, you shouldn't expect to have an experience of: A consciousness spread across time. if by this, you mean some sort of simultaneous awareness of multiple 'I's. This would require an extra-hypothetical 'super-I' process or structure to integrate the individual povs. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. There is no logical distinction between the two cases, unless you are positing the existence of a soul. The distinction between the OMs in which the 'I' is you, and those in which the 'I' is me, is entirely informationally determined and delimited. There is no other means of differentiation. David David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov. Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be rejected. And surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple' experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves, informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov. I don't see how POV's can be logically prior to a space time structure. This is why I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion). Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience of 'I'. But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you? All I know is what I am experiencing *now*. Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the A-series versus B-series issue)? A consciousness spread across time. What process exists that could coherently totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs? The question is what could make the conscious one-at-a-time if not the flow of time. You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping consciousness right now. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Well, we don't, because we have different information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy is pretty direct. My future selves will contain information from my present self. But they are not conscious *yet*. David Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself change and must endure through change. In more detail here Why must change... be change in something? It sort of sounds reasonable but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the superfluous ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates (x1, t1, red) and another object (x1, t2, orange), then
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: ... We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. But the difference of your and my consiousness is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. My consciousness can change completely in a fraction of a second. You must be talking about your memory, not what you are conscious of. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: ... We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. But the difference of your and my consiousness is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. My consciousness can change completely in a fraction of a second. Not to the extent that you forget you are you. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: ... We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same consciousness. But the difference of your and my consiousness is explained by the difference in content. My consciousness five minutes from now cannot fail to be 99% the same as my consciousness now, information-wise. My consciousness can change completely in a fraction of a second. Not to the extent that you forget you are you. I does to the extent that I'm not thinking about who I am. In fact I don't consciously think about who I am very often. You're confusing what I *could* remember with what I am actually conscious of. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
Peter Jones writes: I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to flow and they do not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate rooms, to be separate. I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all mathematical structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till 1 second ago) + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never seen one is evidence against a mathematical multiverse. That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. Not as much. It depends on how constrained they are. Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. If a physical MV exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second. With a very low measure. The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure. Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that is basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or contingnet in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them. OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller than every possible universe. If you died today and just by accident a possible next moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future. That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP universe. But I never do. Not just as easily. If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington. What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every configuration of matter. (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where I'm in Washington, configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in Narnia. There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me in Moscow, 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in Platonia. (That's the mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse is an entirely different matter). Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What would expect to experience in the next moment? (a) nothing (b) everything (c) something (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next moment your head explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working (sorry), as long as there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain conscious. (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still counts as an individual with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an experience of everything simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones - is different to no experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more information than a blank page. Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What is it that you might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you experience if no measure is defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure? It is a real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed to a physical multiverse. Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match observation. But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness implemented in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would be impossible to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not
