RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
mother's heartbeat. – No nametag involved! In order to understand this, one has to be able to take the experiential standpoint of an embryo, then a fetus as the starting point. This is something one has to train oneself. – This skill has to be has to be acquired by training oneself . Preferably daily and for decades. CSP did so. So have I. This is a practical logical task, just as is mathematical training. -- I agree with your 'just as mathematical training' since it requires discipline and attention. I am not sure about 'practical logical' as the right term. I would call it phaneroscopic experimentation. But, maybe I do not understand what you mean. I never went into your exercises. I stopped after experiencing the "name tag" pain, not as pain, but as a tuone without a name tag. I never came at the point in which the rhythm came into clear sight, i.e. as other than just rythm. Nevertheless, it is this experience, together with the recognition that your embryo heartbeat hypothesis provides the possibility to look at the emotional attachments, interfering with the logical processing of information, as modifications of this rhythm, that makes your idea interesting for me. K: Husserl with his bracketing was simply wrong. Presenting an impossible task. But Husserl was an outgrowth of a previous error. That of taking conscience as the all there is to human mind. As far as I know neither Husserl or Kant never saw the unconscious mind as a philosophical problem. The notion is implied, however, but only through NEGATION. To Kant, there were perceptions not strong enough to deserve a place in consciousness. (Too feeble). Husserl not even that. -- AvB: Regarding Husserl, for me, you are preaching for your own parochy. K: As you know, CSP was engaged with experimental work (with Jastrow). This work he continued throughout his life in the form of everyday experimentation. (Which appears to me the primary way he gained his insight on dogs, babes, ( even slime-moulds) on the working of the instintive mind. I also started my work with experimental investigations. With a series of experiments using the Uznadze experiment. So I do have solid experimental evidence of the unity of the senses. The Tbilisi school has acquired thousands of experimental results pointing to the same effect. An effect we are not conscious of, but which can be experimentally shown beyond any doubt. Of this research of mine there are several publications in English. But not available in the internet. Out of these I then developed a method for phenomenological experimentation. Then a variety of methods. Applicapble to everyday experimentation. – BUT a word of warning: It does take time and toil. Not for minds preferring sheer play with words. CSP points out the phenomenological work takes a lot of mathematical toil. And laments that people ask him to give proof of his theory, but as he proceedes to offer it, they get bored and leave. – Too much toil! Something similar happened when I was offering a demonstration of my method in text analysis & interpretation using Kaina Stoicheia. Someone got irritated on the slowness and meticulousness. Took hurried steps forwards. – So I left the discussion. -- AvB: The last sentences are an apt example of the respective contributions of logic and emotional attachments (heartbeat) to the exchange of thought. I noticed in the home sitting cases that often all what happened was not about the child (win -win), but about the effects of the emotional attachments on the grown ups discussing the trouble of the child (zero - sum). Yours offers a good hypothesis for the germ of this possibility. My educational KiF-model as a negotiation tool is a proposed remedy. It pays attention to both: with the child I have the trikon: 1. internalization/fear (sheet oriented), 2. externalization/anger (object oriented), 3. reasoned (a trade off of self and other in the light of trying to reach the desired goal). With the grown ups I have the Trikon: 1. indifferent (plans are made, not executed, but nobody cares), 2. conflict (divergence of estimation and/or goals), 3. goal oriented (given there are different estimations, lets get a clear picture of the different options and the wholesome goals, if there is a difference in goal, lets start with the option that arguably does least harm if it fails. K: Well, enough for now. -- I agree. My best wishes, Auke van Breemen Best, Kirsti Määttänen > > > - Original Message - From: > To: "Auke van Breemen" > Cc: > Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > >> Dear Auke, >> >> I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little >> time, but I wish to share some of my tho
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Auke van Breemen" Cc: Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Dear Auke, I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it. First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings start our individual lives in the midst of chaos. Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind. All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus. But, as I have shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the experiential flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example gives a rhythm even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes the heartbeat of the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN. The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean sensse, not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies. An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind. Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher. CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave. Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by Tetens. - Nor did any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I find most peculiar). The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic division. This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud. Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De Veritate): "Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a corner stone of nominalism. However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried a very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a part and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different meaning.) As we all know CSP took back "common sense". In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God. With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER. For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the Christian overtones. It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) were secularized, that mysticism was rejected. And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's collecion of CSP's mathematical writings). Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a mystery already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance). Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later... These are very complicated issues. But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name tag. With warmest wishes! Kirsti Määttänen Thus feeling comes first. Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 23.10.2016 19:35: Dear Kirsti, As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become more clear. I will add some words between the lines. K: Dear Auke & al. It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere. -- AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree. K: Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce. This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not much to rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde conference, at Helsinki 2007. Available in internet.I have provided Eugene Halton with th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
ed thus; I make a painting, somebody cut parts > out of it, replaces them with other stuff or displaces them and > subsequently pretends that it is a joint work. > > I found one place in Peirce where he placed himself in a > Buddhist/Christian tradition. I always thought this is connected to > meditation/phaneroscopy. The 6 doors of perception mirroring the six senses. > > It is a very complicated, and I add, rewarding, issue. That can be > regarded from different angles, as your comments aptly show. I hope you > continue your comments. I agree with Jerry that (scientific) progress needs > the honest communion of minds. Alas, that is not the only game played by > mankind. But, I always was of the opinion, that it is the game you play > and I value that. > > With gratitude, > > Auke > > > -Oorspronkelijk bericht- > Van: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] > Verzonden: maandag 24 oktober 2016 15:21 > Aan: Auke van Breemen > CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Dear Auke, > > I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, > but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it. > > First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular > that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is commonly > taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings start our > individual lives in the midst of chaos. > > Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often > classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind. > > All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus. But, as I have > shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the experiential > flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example gives a rhythm > even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes the heartbeat of > the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN. > The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels > unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be > revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean sensse, > not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies. > > An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in > his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind. > Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the > notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher. > > CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave. > > Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related > conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even recognize > Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by Tetens. - Nor > did any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I find most > peculiar). > > The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic division. > This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud. > > Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in > interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De > Veritate): > > "Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a > corner stone of nominalism. > > However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried a > very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a part > and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different > meaning.) > > As we all know CSP took back "common sense". > > In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear > meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God. > With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel > and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER. > > For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek > counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the > Christian overtones. > > It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five special > senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of mysticism. - But > it was only after sciences (and humanities) were secularized, that > mysticism was rejected. > > And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are > passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone > electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About > which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's collecion > of CSP's mathematical writings).
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Dear Kirsti, Thank you for your kind reply and especially for your historical remarks and your remarks on feeling. I did not read Tetens, but I recognize the point you are making with it. Fitzgerald for instance only takes the 'feeling of recognition' when he discusses the emotional interpretant. Not 'feeling' as a technical term dealt with by Peirce: By a feeling, I mean an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may have been brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and equally present at every moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. CP 1.306. and again: Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love, etc. I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings, whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something that involves these qualities as an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily realized. CP 1.304 -- As you said: But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name tag. And, so I would add after Peirce: once gone they are gone forever. In Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man (if I remember correctly 1867, plus or minus 1) Peirce writes about the unintellectual, etc that runs in a continuous stream through our lives. Feeling (phenomenology), qualisign (sign aspects), emotional interpretant (interpretant aspect of the process of interpretation that leads to a response), designate the same phenomenon from three perspectives, in my opinion. I did not use the combination primordial chaos, but primordial soup. It is a term coined by Sarbo. The avoidance of chaos is on purpose. As you justly argued with your embryo example, it definitely is not chaos. For two reasons, lousily formulted: 1. from an analytical point of view In our opinion already in the qualisign position everything is present, but as long as we don't evolve what is involved in the primordial soup or collection of qualia, it only indistinctly is present, without its nametag and, also important, without the habits that are associated with this input in habitual interpretation, which is the rule. It is very hard phaneroscopic work to get at this basic 'material' of any interpretation. We have to get rid of, only to name the proximate interpretation moments, name (sinsign, legisign) and form (icon) that are inherent in the primordial soup. 2. from the unfolding reality point of view The world we interpret is infused with reason, if we interpret we interpret an over all orderly reality, not chaos. Here https://storyconnect.nl/glossary/knowledge-in-formation/?lang=en, ( even the image-author connections suggested for the three images, are mixed up) might reside the reason for your reading 'primordial chaos'. I assure you that the only relation between my work and these images that can be established can be expressed thus; I make a painting, somebody cut parts out of it, replaces them with other stuff or displaces them and subsequently pretends that it is a joint work. I found one place in Peirce where he placed himself in a Buddhist/Christian tradition. I always thought this is connected to meditation/phaneroscopy. The 6 doors of perception mirroring the six senses. It is a very complicated, and I add, rewarding, issue. That can be regarded from different angles, as your comments aptly show. I hope you continue your comments. I agree with Jerry that (scientific) progress needs the honest communion of minds. Alas, that is not the only game played by mankind. But, I always was of the opinion, that it is the game you play and I value that. With gratitude, Auke -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] Verzonden: maandag 24 oktober 2016 15:21 Aan: Auke van Breemen CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Dear Auke, I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it. First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular that one should get suspicios i
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within > a collection of bits of unorganized matter. > > Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing. It’s worth noting that the word ‘nothing’ is ambiguous in most western languages. An obvious example of this is the infamous debate between Heidegger and Carnap over nothing. Carnap and most positivists came away thinking Heidegger a loon because of statements like ‘the nothing nothings.’ If one reads Peirce, particularly the passages from the late 80’s that Edwina brought up, as a neoplatonist then he’s clearly much more in that Heidegger camp. The main distinction is between nothing as ‘empty set’ versus ‘not a thing.’ With the neoplatonic conception you have ‘thingness’ as ideas, soul, spirit and so forth. You then have the One which typically is a nothing that is not a thing but clearly also not an empty set. In some forms of platonism in late antiquity such as Plotinus’ you also have prime matter which is conceive of as not a thing but a place to receive things and make them possible. All of this ends up going back to the Timaeus and the notions there - especially that of chora or khora which is usually translated as receptacle or space. When you look at Peirce subject is a kind of place for predication. So chaos for him is this receptical or space. It’s very much the prime matter that was common in neoplatonism (and which obviously arose out of Aristotle as much as Plato’s Timaeus) I’d add that Duns Scotus’ conception of the ouisia of God as nothing might also be playing into Peirce’s conception. I don’t know if anyone’s done anything on that though. One of the quotes you provided also is quite platonic in its nature. If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612; 1893) This is very much a kind of relationship of prime matter to the One in neoplatonism. The big shift from Platonism is that prime matter is put first rather than the One. Although this inversion of the usual process of emanation can be found in various types of neoPlatonism as well despite its more heretical character. It’s also common in 20th century post-Husserlian phenomenology. I should add that 6.215-219 is well worth reading on this subject as well, especially relative to the Heidegger/Carnap debate. Again, let me note that this part of Peirce’s thought seems to me to be the most controversial. I’m not sure it’s necessary for his thought as a whole. > "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no existence, > no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory, no habit, no > causation, no generality--sheer nothing, blank nothing, pure nothing--and > that is precisely how he characterized mere feeling (Firstness) and action > (Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness). In other words, unless the > blackboard (Thirdness) is already in place--"theological backing, or rational > antecedent"--there can never be a spontaneous chalk mark with its whiteness > (Firstness) and boundary (Secondness) in the first place. In a similar way, I might add, to us from a platonic point of view without Soul there is nothing. Peirce’s notion of thirdness is very similar to the third emanation in Plotinus’ system of emanations. It’s interesting that for some, such as Proclus, each of these is a separate god. It’s also here that the late platonists tended to inject a lot of Stoicism into their thought. The third god who is at the level of soul is the sensible world that is able to think discursively. Going back to the Neglected Argument I should note that a lot of how Peirce talks about God parallels Proclus. But this isn’t an area I’m really that well versed. Peirce clearly is well read on these authors though. They do form an important context for a lot of his thinking. (Although shouldn’t be reduced to it) While it’s not an area I’m that well versed on, some have dealt with the issue. https://books.google.com/books?id=zHDnlYfrbMcC&pg=PA85&dq=peirce+proclus&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirysj57PPPAhVH1WMKHc-HDfgQ6AEIIDAA#v=onepage&q=peirce%20proclus&f=false The relationship of abduction to Proclus in that paper is quite interesting. (As an aside, this is the same book that Kelly Parker’s paper on Peirce as a neoPlatonist appears) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List: Thanks for clarifying. I mainly just wanted to emphasize Peirce's consistent usage, and the conclusion that he ultimately drew from it. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 9:53 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the > term 'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying > the same thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing. So, > please don't try a 'gotcha' post. > > This term, the 'absence of order' as a meaning of 'chaos, is the *popular > current meaning of *chaos. That *current usage of the term* is what I > was referring to as a response to Kirsti's post where she also was > referring also to the current very common use of the term. I was NOT > referring to Peirce's usage. And as I said - I consider the primordial as > nothing. Peirce is quite specific about that in 1.412 - and as you point > out, I refer to that quote very often. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 10:43 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Edwina, List: > > ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order > within a collection of bits of unorganized matter. > > > Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is *nothing*. > > CSP: The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in > effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really > happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888) > > CSP: The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated > feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a > powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some > are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no > relations, for relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891) > > CSP: Without going into other important questions of philosophical > architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would > appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most > ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic > Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely > remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without > connection or regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33; > 1891) > > CSP: But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as > consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the > chaos, namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893) > > CSP: If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational > antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a > state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally > absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it > is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole > of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In > itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is > everything. (CP 6.612; 1893) > > CSP: In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no > existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897) > > CSP: Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than > helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, > without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902) > > CSP: Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for > mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a > nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905) > > CSP: Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and > synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early > volumes of *The Monist* ever been written, it would have appeared how, > with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that > continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is > simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like > generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the > essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an > extra-intelligent reader might discern that the theory of those > cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than > feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where > those two elements were present,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, - to offer up a collection of quotes, via a digital search of the term 'chaos' from the Peirce collections, doesn't negate that I was saying the same thing as he was with regard to the primoridal 'nothing. So, please don't try a 'gotcha' post. This term, the 'absence of order' as a meaning of 'chaos, is the popular current meaning of chaos. That current usage of the term is what I was referring to as a response to Kirsti's post where she also was referring also to the current very common use of the term. I was NOT referring to Peirce's usage. And as I said - I consider the primordial as nothing. Peirce is quite specific about that in 1.412 - and as you point out, I refer to that quote very often. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 10:43 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Edwina, List: ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within a collection of bits of unorganized matter. Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing. CSP: The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened. (CP 1.411; 1887-1888) CSP: The first chaos consisted in an infinite multitude of unrelated feelings. As there was no continuity about them, it was, as it were, a powder of feelings. It was worse than that, for of particles of powder some are nearer together, others farther apart, while these feelings had no relations, for relations are general. (CP 8.318; 1891) CSP: Without going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic, we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning--infinitely remote--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence. (CP 6.33; 1891) CSP: But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as consequences of the only uniformity, or general fact, there was in the chaos, namely, the general absence of any determinate law. (CP 6.606; 1893) CSP: If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date. In itself, therefore, it is nothing; but in its relation to the end it is everything. (CP 6.612; 1893) CSP: In the original chaos, where there was no regularity, there was no existence. It was all a confused dream. (CP 1.175; c.1897) CSP: Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation; it is blank nothing. (CP 1.220; 1902) CSP: Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere individual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing. (CP 5.431; 1905) CSP: Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early volumes of The Monist ever been written, it would have appeared how, with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives, and thus, like generality, and more than generality, is an affair of thought, and is the essence of thought. Yet even in its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader might discern that the theory of those cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing. (CP 5.436; 1905) "Chaos" in Peirce's usage means no regularity, no determinacy, no existence, no happenings, no relations, no connection, no law, no memory, no habit, no causation, no generality--sheer nothing, blank nothing, pure nothing--and that is precisely how he characterized mere feeling (Firstness) and action (Secondness) without continuity (Thirdness). In other words, unless the blackboard (Thirdness) is already in place--"theological backing, or rational anteced
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
the embryo-fetus > is a good one. Therefore, in my view, Thirdness is not a priori or > non-immanent, as some would suggest, but, a fundamental immenent aspect of > the conversion of mass to matter. > > Edwina > > - Original Message ----- From: > To: "Auke van Breemen" > Cc: > Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Dear Auke, >> >> I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very >> little time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it. >> >> First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even >> so popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It >> is commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living >> beings start our individual lives in the midst of chaos. >> >> Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been >> often classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind. >> >> All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus. But, as I have >> shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the experiential >> flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example gives a rhythm >> even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes the heartbeat of >> the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN. The rhythm is >> primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels unanimously as >> something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be revealed and >> confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean sensse, not in the >> sense offered by European phenomenologies. >> >> An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found >> in his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of >> mind. Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted >> the notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher. >> >> CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave. >> >> Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce >> related conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would >> even recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works >> by Tetens. - Nor did any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which >> I find most peculiar). >> >> The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic division. >> This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud. >> >> Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions >> in interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas >> (De Veritate): >> >> "Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become >> a corner stone of nominalism. >> >> However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried a >> very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a part >> and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different >> meaning.) >> >> As we all know CSP took back "common sense". >> >> In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very >> clear meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God. With the teaching >> that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel and hear the voice of >> God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER. >> >> For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the >> Greek counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with >> the Christian overtones. >> >> It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the >> five special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions >> of mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) >> were secularized, that mysticism was rejected. >> >> And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we >> are passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let >> alone electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - >> About which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. >> Moore's collecion of CSP's mathematical writings). >> >> Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a >> mystery already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance). >> >> Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later... >> >> These are very complicated issues. >> >> But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with >> name tag. >> >> With warm
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Auke: > On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:27 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > > “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of > thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by > his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.” Your contention has considerable merit. In particular, it is my view, that CSP views were strongly shaped by his experiences in the chemical sciences and the logic of the chemical sciences. Unfortunately, the science of chemistry during his lifespan was merely a massive collection of empirical observations that provided a basis for reproducible experimentation and inquiry. But it lacked a coherent theory. Hence, his view of how arguments are formed, particularly the assertions about the relations between “blanks”, in the path from icons to rhema illustrates your contention very nicely. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Kirsti, list: Kirsti, I like your outlines of embryos and the 'firstness' of Feelings. [I think that more research should be done on the bonding in utero between multiple birth embryos, i.e., twins, triplets etc]. I also have a problem with the notion of primordial chaos. After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within a collection of bits of unorganized matter. But, following Peirce's 1.412, I see the primordial as - nothing. As undifferentiated mass. As 'indeterminancy' [1.409, 412] . NOT matter, but mass. As mass, which is in a mode of Firstness, it can start to take on habits - and your example of the heartbeat of the mother affecting the embryo-fetus is a good one. Therefore, in my view, Thirdness is not a priori or non-immanent, as some would suggest, but, a fundamental immenent aspect of the conversion of mass to matter. Edwina - Original Message - From: To: "Auke van Breemen" Cc: Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Dear Auke, I got very delighted by your response! Right now, I have very little time, but I wish to share some of my thoughts on and about it. First: The idea of primordial chaos is very, very popular. Even so popular that one should get suspicios in front of the popularity. It is commonly taken as granted that all human as well as other living beings start our individual lives in the midst of chaos. Even Prigogine's work Time and Change in Modern Physics has been often classified as a CHAOS theory, though it is nothing of the kind. All human beings start as embryos, developing into fetus. But, as I have shown in detail, there is no chaos necessarily involved in the experiential flow of an embryo, nor of a fetus. Heart beat, for example gives a rhythm even to the earliest modes of experiencing. First comes the heartbeat of the mother. It is something FELT, not something KNOWN. The rhythm is primordial. The syncopatic rhythm of hearbeat thus feels unanimously as something associated with eternity. (Which is fact to be revealed and confirmed by phenomenological studies)In the Peircean sensse, not in the sense offered by European phenomenologies. An utterly neglected part of CSP's conception of feeling can be found in his critical comments on Kant and his threepartite division of mind. Peirce states that Kant, in outlining the old division mistorted the notion of FEELING, he (Kant) had derived from Tetens, his teacher. CSP then states that he has retained the meaning Tetens gave. Now, during all the decades of participating in Peirce related conferences, I have never met a Peircean scholar who would even recognize Tetens. - I took the time to get a copy of main works by Tetens. - Nor did any of the Kantians I ever met know Tetens. (Which I find most peculiar). The change Kant made was to take pleasure and pain as the basic division. This mistake was later made immensely popular by Freud. Another mistake in the twists of history comes from distortions in interpreting the peripathetic axiom originating from Thomas (De Veritate): "Nihil in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu." Later to become a corner stone of nominalism. However, in medieval times the Latin "in sensu" (in the senses) carried a very different meaning than in modern times. "Sensus communis" was a part and parcel of the meaning.( Also "intellectu" carried a different meaning.) As we all know CSP took back "common sense". In medieval times, with Christianity, sensus communis had a very clear meaning. Concience, the moral sense, given by God. With the teaching that one should consult one's heart. in order to feel and hear the voice of God. - Note: to feel and hear IN THIS ORDER. For Aristotle, just as well, the sensus communis (i.e the Greek counterpart) was situated in the heart. But of course not with the Christian overtones. It was in modern times that the senses were restricted to the five special senses. And the sixth sense was doomed into oblivions of mysticism. - But it was only after sciences (and humanities) were secularized, that mysticism was rejected. And the herintance of history was then cleansed of this stuff. So we are passing on a distorted view of history. Chemistry, let alone electromagnetism were originally taken as mystical and occult. - About which CSP gives a sensible account of the why's (see e.g. Moore's collecion of CSP's mathematical writings). Electricity still remains a mystery to be solved. But it is a mystery already tackled (by Jerry L.C. Chandler, for instance). Well, this is just to get started. I hope to continue later... These are very complicated issues. But: Feelings do not classify themselves. They do not appear with name tag. With warmest wishes! Kirsti Määttänen Thus feeling comes first. Au
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
ation in communication. K: All serious, devoted Peirceans know that triadicity forms the key to all Peircean thought. No taking Secondness as the one and only. -- AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first, in that it is the triadically structured description of the process of dyadically related and interacting states and events, that must account for the response. Our KiF-model is a proposal. The relation between the two divisions of interpretants was key for me. The approach of Short and Stamper were the trigger. K: With you, Auke, I have had some rewarding exchange of communication early on, after I joined the List. This is why I take this time to comment your post. - You do as you wish. - I'll do the same after reading your response. If so happens that you'll write one. -- AvB I do thank you for your responses and wish you all the best! Auke van Breemen My very best wishes to you! Kirsti Määttänen Auke van Breemen kirjoitti 20.10.2016 13:11: Jon, Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below. With regard to sheets I suggest to read for a. Sheets of assertion: Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A Perfusion of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. b. Descriptive sheets De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscie nce.pdf [1] c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do. _The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion._ A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows: Sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc. Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. (1) Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences). (2) Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a sign (critic). (3) Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b -> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b). The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants (emotional, energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or radical subjectivist considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and normal interpretants; fruit of semiotics proper) can be established in 2. It sets of with Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no parts, but which nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts consists in this that the mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not in the first idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of destructive distillation. W6:449, CP 1.384 So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the emotional interpretant: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings (CP 5.475). From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, dynamical and normal). In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the process of interpretation. Best, Auke VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18 AAN: Auke van Breemen CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, List: AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no conclusions. Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jerry, I still fail to see the point of your remarks. I do get the impression that you don’t agree with my: “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.” Because you hold: I tend to think he succeeded but to say this is a statement of more or less. More or less, depending on to what you are looking. -- But I am not sure about this estimation of your remark. However if this is what you mean, then maybe you have the opinion that I hold to the statement that Peirce’s work was a complete failure or that he completely was on the wrong track. For me the respects in which it is more successful (sign aspects interpretant apects, the idea of a sheet, man as a sign, architectonic, X-box, both devisions of interpretants, etc) and the respect in which it is less (not connecting both divisions of interpretants, what prevented him given that all ingredients are there) are of more interest than an assessment in general terms like more or less. Best, Auke Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 23:07 Aan: Auke van Breemen CC: Peirce-L Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, list: I think what you just said is expressible by seeking explanations for same/different in the following: “Only everybody can know the truth.” ~Goethe, more or less… “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” ~Peirce ___ As to the individual/community issue, here is an excerpt from Peirce, “…the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds.”… I don’t think this has to be taken literally (since education of young and old), but it does speak to the reality of how complicated knowledge is, nowadays. Regardless, the community cannot be happy without individuals of that community; us and our neighbors. We seek to do well and by doing well, to fare well. What better than to know something of great benefit to mankind and to share it? But how to share it when a single method appears to lead to different convictions about problems and solutions? I think this is implied of your statement: “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.” I tend to think he succeeded but to say this is a statement of more or less. More or less, depending on to what you are looking. Semiotic or abduction? …Or abduction using semiotic? Or abduction using computation?... Or abduction using experimentation?… Or abduction using experimentation and computation and semiotic… Which are all ways of saying abduction…. Or experimentation… or semiosis… or science… or…. Best, Jerry R On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: Jerry, I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual (whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding. With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of the community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the indefinite truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth prevails, on the short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along that way. It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a sustem of semiotics must not only account for the scientific enterprise, but also for our day to day communication, not regulated by a knowledge ideal, but by other interests. Best, Auke Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com <mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com> ] Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27 Aan: Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > CC: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, Kirsti, list: You said: AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first… But Aristotle also said: “For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Auke, list: I think what you just said is expressible by seeking explanations for same/different in the following: “Only *everybody* can know the truth.” ~Goethe, more or less… “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.” ~Peirce ___ As to the individual/community issue, here is an excerpt from Peirce, “…*the progress of science cannot go far except by collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds*.”… I don’t think this has to be taken literally (since education of young and old), but it does speak to the reality of how complicated knowledge is, nowadays. Regardless, the community cannot be happy without individuals of that community; us and our neighbors. We seek to do well and by doing well, to fare well. What better than to know something of great benefit to mankind and to share it? But how to share it when a single method *appears* to lead to different convictions about problems and solutions? I think this is implied of your statement: “It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal.” I tend to think he *succeeded* but to say this is a statement of more or less. More or less, depending on to what you are looking. Semiotic or abduction? …Or abduction using semiotic? Or abduction using computation?... Or abduction using experimentation?… Or abduction using experimentation and computation and semiotic… Which are all ways of saying abduction…. Or experimentation… or semiosis… or science… or…. Best, Jerry R On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 3:38 PM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > Jerry, > > > > I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual > (whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding. > > > > With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just > remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of > the community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the > indefinite truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth > prevails, on the short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along > that way. It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both > strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of > semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a > sustem of semiotics must not only account for the scientific enterprise, > but also for our day to day communication, not regulated by a knowledge > ideal, but by other interests. > > > > Best, Auke > > > > *Van:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Verzonden:* zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27 > *Aan:* Auke van Breemen > *CC:* Peirce-L > *Onderwerp:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Auke, Kirsti, list: > > > > You said: > > AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of > things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I > would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first… > > > > But Aristotle also said: > > “*For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less > knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct > our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without > qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is > more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to > oneself.*” > > > > Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the > individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it > is also about the community knowing. > > > > So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the > community. This, I know. > > > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > > > On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen > wrote: > > Dear Kirsti, > > As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In > discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my > detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become > more clear. > > I will add some words between the lines. > > K: > Dear Auke & al. > > It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not > share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere. > -- > > AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree. > > > K: > Although the ma
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jerry, I don’t grasp your point. Especially the introduction of the individual (whether as a singular or an atom?) escapes my understanding. With regard to your remark about the community knowing and science, I just remark that in my opinion the community knowing is only a sub-section of the community acting in pursuit of personal and individual goals. In the indefinite truth, research being pushed far enough, it may be that truth prevails, on the short term, I myself just experienced some hazards along that way. It is my contention that although Peirce had a keen eye on both strains of thought and enterprise, he was hampered in building a system of semiotics by his preference for the communal or scientific ideal. For, a sustem of semiotics must not only account for the scientific enterprise, but also for our day to day communication, not regulated by a knowledge ideal, but by other interests. Best, Auke Van: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Verzonden: zondag 23 oktober 2016 21:27 Aan: Auke van Breemen CC: Peirce-L Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, Kirsti, list: You said: AvB: For me it is the interplay of all. After Aristotle, in the order of things firstness is first, in the order of knowledge secondness is first. I would add, in the order of understanding thirdness is first… But Aristotle also said: “For learning proceeds for all in this way-through that which is less knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself.” Moreover, Peirce’s theory is not simply about the individual, since the individual affects the multitude, but in so far as it is about science, it is also about the community knowing. So whether knowable to oneself, the individual, can even not matter to the community. This, I know. Best, Jerry Rhee On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 11:35 AM, Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: Dear Kirsti, As in our past exchanges I value your response and its tone of voice. In discussions I always try to be short as possible. Maybe this time to my detriment. I do thank you for te opportunity you offer to try to become more clear. I will add some words between the lines. K: Dear Auke & al. It seems to me that you are on the right tract, but in a way CSP did not share. And going along a tract, wich leads nowhere. -- AvB: If your criticism holds, I agree. K: Although the main interest of CSP lied in science, his starting point was "babes and suclings", (just google this) As have been mine, even before I had any knowledge whatsoever of Peirce. This is were my work, since 1970's comes in. In English their is not much to rely on. See, however, my astract for Applying Peirde conference, at Helsinki 2007. Available in internet.I have provided Eugene Halton with the handout in the conference. Which he has quoted several times. Lately in a book chapter of his. The problem with your approach, as with almost all others, lies in taking ADULTS as the starting point. And then taking science as the the more restricted starting point. - No one, however is bourn as *a Fichtean philosopher* , as Marx end Engels pointed out, nor as an adult, nor as a scientist. Firstness comes first. Both in real life, in metaphysics and in semiotics. - C.S Peirce did not cherish this händicap. -- AvB: I do not think here we disagree, at least on this level of detail of discussing matters. His animal examples show that he even didn’t confine to childhood, but extended the thought to an evolutionary scale. With his distinction between a logica utens and a logica docens and his architectonic of sciences, each of the cenoscopic sciences preceding the special sciences and being devoted to: About positive phenomena in general, such as are available to every person at every waking moment, and not about special classes of phenomena. Does not resort to special experiences or experiments in order to settle theoretical questions. What I did intend to state is that it is when we look at a sign that inscribes itself, the question of the connection between the two divisions of interpretants comes into clear sight. For, I would add now, it is then that we must ask for the connection between both trichotomies of interpretants. If Peirce wouldn't have been of the opinion that nothing is lost if we don't pay attention to the apprehension of the sign as an object, cf 8.2.1, he, as a consequence, probably could have made the same arrangement as Van Driel, which is the arrangement I propose. K: Sheets of assertion serve as ground (in the more general sense) only within teh system of exist
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
ation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc. > > > > Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the > > interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes > > between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process > > an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets > > reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system. > > This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is > > a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an > > interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. > > > > (1) Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist > > (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences). > > > > (2) Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, > > we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of > > sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system > > interprets a sign (critic). > > > > (3) Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of > > semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris > > and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter. > > Here we are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b > > -> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b). > > > > The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants > > (emotional, energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or > > radical subjectivist considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and > > normal interpretants; fruit of semiotics proper) can be established in > > 2. It sets of with > > > > Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and > > then thought together > > > > by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes > > every analysis. > > > > What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has > > no parts, but which > > > > nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts > > consists in this that the > > > > mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are > > really not in the first > > > > idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case > > of destructive distillation. > > > > W6:449, CP 1.384 > > > > So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In > > phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the > > emotional interpretant: > > > > The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by > > it > > > > [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the > > composer's > > > > musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of > > feelings (CP > > > > 5.475). > > > > From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive > > interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, > > dynamical and normal). > > > > In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the > > process of interpretation. > > > > Best, Auke > > > > VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > > VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18 > > AAN: Auke van Breemen > > CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > > ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > > Cosmology) > > > > Auke, List: > > > >> AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no > >> conclusions. > > > > Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a > > backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call > > semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907). > > > >> AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested > >> previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more > >> properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and > >> habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought." > > > > It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being > > convinced otherwise. > > > >> AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De > >> Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each > >> other according to the mature division of the sciences. > > > > I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more > > about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently > > downlo
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
is presented which in itself has > no parts, but which > > nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts > consists in this that the > > mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are > really not in the first > > idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case > of destructive distillation. > > W6:449, CP 1.384 > > So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In > phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the > emotional interpretant: > > The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by > it > > [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the > composer's > > musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of > feelings (CP > > 5.475). > > From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive > interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, > dynamical and normal). > > In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the > process of interpretation. > > Best, Auke > > VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18 > AAN: Auke van Breemen > CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Auke, List: > >> AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no >> conclusions. > > Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a > backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call > semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907). > >> AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested >> previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more >> properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and >> habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought." > > It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being > convinced otherwise. > >> AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De >> Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each >> other according to the mature division of the sciences. > > I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more > about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently > downloaded a while ago. Would you mind elaborating their specific > relevance to the current discussion, and perhaps suggest some > additional reading that I could do? > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > [3] > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Auke van Breemen > wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no >> conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of >> his other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only >> not being able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character >> the sheets of Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that >> prevented him from finishing the system. All ingredients are present. >> >> I in particular disagree with your: >> >> ." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants >> _themselves _seem to be more properly characterized as possible >> (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each >> divided into feeling/action/thought. >> >> -- >> >> This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants. >> It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De >> Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each >> other according to the mature division of the sciences. From a sign >> type perspective Shorts approach makes sense: Each sign has an >> element of feeling of action and of thought, but from a processual >> approach it is better to apply Ockham’s razor in order to find the >> system behind processes of interpretation. Peirce paved the way for >> that by his notion of involvement. The logical note books are key, in >> combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied) criticism of Peirce’s >> focus on scientific progress in developing a theory of >> interpretation. (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that >> govern comunication). >> >> Best, Auke van Breemen > > - > >
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jeff, list Thanks. That is also my impression, but I was not sure. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 22. oktober 2016 05:29 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: SB: I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? No, because mind is the more fundamental of the two--"the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24). Peirce famously said that "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), and also called it "mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); but as far as I know, he never described mind as "lively matter." Regards, Jon On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jon Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through his theory of the hidden third http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf , levels of reality and logic of the included middle http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf and http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf and he is pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics and philosophy. Best Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to do with it. Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram. In semeiotic terms, per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the "living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jeff. List My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of matter. How do we get from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem of global warming? Best Søren From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17 To: Søren Brier Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Soren, list: I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jon and list Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combinati
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
blished in 2. It sets of with Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no parts, but which nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts consists in this that the mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not in the first idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of destructive distillation. W6:449, CP 1.384 So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the emotional interpretant: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings (CP 5.475). From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, dynamical and normal). In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the process of interpretation. Best, Auke VAN: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] VERZONDEN: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18 AAN: Auke van Breemen CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ONDERWERP: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, List: AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no conclusions. Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907). AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought." It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being convinced otherwise. AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the mature division of the sciences. I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently downloaded a while ago. Would you mind elaborating their specific relevance to the current discussion, and perhaps suggest some additional reading that I could do? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Auke van Breemen wrote: Jon, As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of his other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only not being able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character the sheets of Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that prevented him from finishing the system. All ingredients are present. I in particular disagree with your: ." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants _themselves _seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought. -- This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants. It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the mature division of the sciences. From a sign type perspective Shorts approach makes sense: Each sign has an element of feeling of action and of thought, but from a processual approach it is better to apply Ockham’s razor in order to find the system behind processes of interpretation. Peirce paved the way for that by his notion of involvement. The logical note books are key, in combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied) criticism of Peirce’s focus on scientific progress in developing a theory of interpretation. (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that govern comunication). Best, Auke van Breemen - Geen virus gevonden in dit bericht. Gecontroleerd door AVG - www.avg.com [4] Versie: 2016.0.7859 / Virusdatabase: 4664/13235 - datum van uitgifte: 10/18/16 Links: -- [1] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf [2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] http://www.avg.com - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . T
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
I haven’t been following this discussion closely due to illness, but it seems to me that a lot of the trouble with the role of subjects and predicates can be alleviated in favour of predicates) by Peirce’s colocalization. The SP distinction can be reinterpreted so that the subject becomes identified by a predicate with an index, making it in itself a dicisgn (proposition). So a subject-predicate form really combines two (or more) propositions). There is an extensive discussion of this in Frederik Sternfelt, Natural Propositions, 4.2 Co-localization as the basis of syntax (pp. 108-114). Unfortunately, to fully understand what Sternfelt is saying and how it relates to Peirce requires reading a good deal more in chapter 4 as well as chapter 3. I am not sure that this solves the problem of the relation between Categories and Universes, but it did help me. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, 20 October 2016 3:15 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Jeff, List: JD: I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants. That is certainly the dominant interpretation. I only started questioning it because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates (including relations). However, I now notice that he added the caveat that whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). So I am back to being confused about the distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction. JD: As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ... Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread. Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon S, I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the basis of this division. So, we have the following classifications of signs: A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, Copulatives C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, Relatives D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self control) G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule) H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. interrogatives), Indicatives I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), Argument (Delome) J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic and triad relations is meant to work that out. --Jeff --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject:
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, list: By 'mind' being primordial, I understand in its role of governance via 'reasonable laws'. I don't see 'mind' as separate or a priori. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 11:29 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: SB: I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? No, because mind is the more fundamental of the two--"the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24). Peirce famously said that "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), and also called it "mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); but as far as I know, he never described mind as "lively matter." Regards, Jon On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Søren Brier wrote: Jon Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through his theory of the hidden third http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf , levels of reality and logic of the included middle http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf and http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf and he is pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics and philosophy. Best Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to do with it. Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram. In semeiotic terms, per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the "living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier wrote: Jeff. List My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of matter. How do we get from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem of global warming? Best Søren From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17 To: Søren Brier Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Soren, list: I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier wrote: Jon and list Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and t
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List: SB: I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? No, because mind is the more fundamental of the two--"the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24). Peirce famously said that "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25), and also called it "mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); but as far as I know, he never described mind as "lively matter." Regards, Jon On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 6:23 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > Jon > > > > Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still > somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from > which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to > imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and > fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all > matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter > like inside? But still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of > matter and mind to day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is > Basarab Nicolescu through his theory of the hidden third > http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedin > gs.pdf , levels of reality and logic of the included middle > http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf and > http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf and he > is pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum > physics and philosophy. > > Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 21. oktober 2016 16:11 > *To:* Søren Brier > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Søren, List: > > > > I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change > has to do with it. Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second > Universe of Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity > that came into Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored > mark on the whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram. In > semeiotic terms, per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's > Cosmology, it is the aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) > Interpretants--which, along with the Immediate (potential) and Final > (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the "living realities" that are the > Conclusion of the Argument. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > Jeff. List > > > > My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist > – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how > we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand > argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of matter. How do we get > from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically > real problem of global warming? > > > >Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 21. oktober 2016 01:17 > *To:* Søren Brier > *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Soren, list: > > > > I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible > without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious > subjects living in language and culture. > > > > Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this > integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, > esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism > (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic > through pragmaticism? > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > > Jon and list > > > > Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with > pure mathematics is in
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon Yes, I kind of get that, but the transitions from signs to matter is still somewhat vague for me. I can see that Peirce has a kind of Zero field from which both matter and mind arises as sort of continuum – difficult to imagine – or inside and outside, which I find easier to comprehend and fits with his development of Aristotle’s hylomorphism, meaning that all matter is alive “inside”. But does that also mean that all mind is matter like inside? But still it is pretty heavy to encompass with what we know of matter and mind to day. The only one who has made an attempt on this is Basarab Nicolescu through his theory of the hidden third http://basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_articles/ClujHiddenThird052009Proceedings.pdf , levels of reality and logic of the included middle http://www.basarab-nicolescu.fr/Docs_Notice/TJESNo_1_12_2010.pdf and http://www.metanexus.net/archive/conference2005/pdf/nicolescu.pdf and he is pretty Peirce inspired and combines that with his knowledge of quantum physics and philosophy. Best Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 16:11 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to do with it. Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram. In semeiotic terms, per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the "living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jeff. List My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of matter. How do we get from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem of global warming? Best Søren From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17 To: Søren Brier Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Soren, list: I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jon and list Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops phaneroscopic metaphysics, which develop worlds and which is again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are metaphysical? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop into worlds. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List: I am still not sure exactly what you are asking, or what climate change has to do with it. Peirce's cosmogony/cosmology conceives the second Universe of Brute Actuality (including physical matter) as a discontinuity that came into Being on the underlying continuum of potentiality--a colored mark on the whiteboard, in my recent adaptation of his famous diagram. In semeiotic terms, per my suggestion yesterday in the thread on Peirce's Cosmology, it is the aggregate of the Dynamic (actual) Interpretants--which, along with the Immediate (potential) and Final (habitual) Interpretants, constitute the "living realities" that are the Conclusion of the Argument. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 4:05 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > Jeff. List > > > > My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist > – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how > we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand > argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of matter. How do we get > from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically > real problem of global warming? > > > >Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 21. oktober 2016 01:17 > *To:* Søren Brier > *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Soren, list: > > > > I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible > without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious > subjects living in language and culture. > > > > Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this > integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, > esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism > (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic > through pragmaticism? > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > > Jon and list > > > > Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with > pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination > develops phaneroscopic metaphysics, which develop worlds and which is > again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again > combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent > of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process > semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign > is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible > without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious > subjects living in language and culture. > > > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 18:22 > *To:* Søren Brier > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Søren, List: > > > > Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes > are metaphysical? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon > > > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will > develop into worlds. > > > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 15:34 > *To:* Søren Brier > > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Søren, List: > > SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct > different universes. > > Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are > the same? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Sorry my last mail was an answer to Jerry not Jeff Søren From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17 To: Søren Brier Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Soren, list: I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jon and list Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops phaneroscopic metaphysics, which develop worlds and which is again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are metaphysical? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop into worlds. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the same? Thanks, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jeff. List My problem – probably arising from my scientific background as a biologist – is that I still do not see how Peirce explains in cosmogonical terms how we get from Peirce semiotic objective idealism with the universe as a grand argument to a physical as well as chemical theory of matter. How do we get from the three universes to the world we are in today, with its physically real problem of global warming? Best Søren From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 21. oktober 2016 01:17 To: Søren Brier Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Soren, list: I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Jon and list Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops phaneroscopic metaphysics, which develop worlds and which is again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are metaphysical? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop into worlds. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the same? Thanks, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Soren, list: I don’t see why you’re having problems with seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Could you not simply look to the best example that embodies this integration of phaneroscopic metaphysics that is combined with ethics, esthetics, logic; that is combined with tychism, ananchism, agapism (together, synechism); which supports the triadic process of semiotic through pragmaticism? Best, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > Jon and list > > > > Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with > pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination > develops phaneroscopic metaphysics, which develop worlds and which is > again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again > combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent > of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process > semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign > is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible > without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious > subjects living in language and culture. > > > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 18:22 > *To:* Søren Brier > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Søren, List: > > > > Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes > are metaphysical? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon > > > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will > develop into worlds. > > > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 15:34 > *To:* Søren Brier > > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Søren, List: > > SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct > different universes. > > Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are > the same? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon and list Difficult question. The choice of phenomenology and to combine it with pure mathematics is in itself metaphysical. Out of this combination develops phaneroscopic metaphysics, which develop worlds and which is again combined with ethic, aesthetics and logic as semiotics. This is again combined with Tychism, synechism and agapism, which are partly independent of the three categories but supports the development of the triadic process semiotics, and his pragmaticism, from which a theory of meaning of a sign is developed. But I still have problems in seeing how this is possible without a recognition of the independent reality of embodied conscious subjects living in language and culture. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 18:22 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are metaphysical? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop into worlds. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the same? Thanks, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon - OK - that makes sense. The way you were writing it, I mistook your outline for complete openness at each stage, whereas - as you point out now - the constraints at each site are immediate...a possible II can only provide a specific rather than open actual DI. What is interesting is that these sites, i.e., the Representamen and the three Interpretants can also at the same time be affected by other semiosic interactions from other sites..and so, we could have an II in Firstness in one 'thread' so to speak..that is affected by indexical information from another 'thread'..and so...the DI in the first thread might transform into a mode of Secondness or more. Again, my point is that the network is not linear but complex - at all sites or nodes. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 10:28 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Edwina, List: The idea is that the Immediate Interpretant can be a range of possible feelings, actions, or thoughts; the Dynamic Interpretant can be an occurrence of an actual feeling, action, or thought; and the Final Interpretant can be a habit of feeling, action, or thought. These are all constrained by the rule that a Possible can only determine a Possible, and a Necessitant must be determined by a Necessitant. If the Immediate Interpretant only includes possible feelings, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual feeling, and the Final Interpretant must be a habit of feeling. If the Final Interpretant is a habit of thought, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual thought, and the Immediate Interpretant must include possible thoughts. The other combinations are limited accordingly, resulting in ten arrangements from these three trichotomies. Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list: Jon wrote: My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a habitual Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. I agree, in large part, with the above, i.e., with the description of the Immediate Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant and Final. I'd add however that the Final is to my understanding, not a set of habits, but a valid correlation with the Dynamic Object. Where I remain puzzled is Jon's claim that each of these three Interpretants can be further refined within the three categories. I can see the Immediate Interpretant as functioning in the categorical modes of 1-1, 2-1 and even 3-1 but it must retain some Firstness to function as an internal 'immediate'. I can see the Dynamic Interpretant as functioning in 2-2, 2-1..and even 3-2 because it must have some Secondness to function as an Actual. I am unsure of the Final Interpretant which must include Thirdness. Is it 3-3, 3-2, 3-1...which then also bind it to the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. Note that these cross-connections filiate the three Interpretants with each other. I haven't explored these areas of 'fine-tuning' and so - can only question the supposition. I'm not sure... Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Auke van Breemen Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:31 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, List: I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday. My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a habitual Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process. Universes and Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines the three Interpretan
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Dear Jeff A marvelous answer. I agree in your great formulation of the difference between Husserl and Peirce, which hardly any of my philosophical colleagues here in Danmark understand. I too agree that you have to start in phenomenology, but I do think that from there it is difficult to establish an outer world of nature and a society of embodied conscious subjects. In cybernetics we see the problem in George Spencer Browns mathematical philosophy of distinction, which is part of the foundation of Luhmann's systems theory. Merleau-Ponty tried to work out a solution for the body and ended pretty much the same place in his Phenomenology of Perception as I do in my Cybersemiotics. It is necessary as a prerequisite for any philosophy of knowing and science to postulate not only an experiential world as the phenomenologists, but also an embodied self and other, plus something all these embodied selves are existing in and have experiences about. I can find no easy way from phenomenology alone - not even from Peirce's triadic phaneroscophy - to the reality of an outer world and other embodied conscious subjects. I do not think Peirce solves this problem. Do you? Best Søren From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:50 Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Soren, Jon S, Gary R, Soren suggests there are two problems with Peirce's semiotic theory. One problem is the phenomenological starting point--which starts with a set of mathematical reflections on formal relations. Another problem is the attempt to build a realistic ontology in the semiotic theory. Let me offer the converse argument. The real strengths of Peirce's semiotic theory--as compared to the theories of other 20th century philosophers--such as Russell and Quine or Husserl and Heidegger--are the following. First, the phenomenological theory is guided by a remarkably deep set of mathematical reflections on what is really essential as a set of elemental formal relations in the phenomena that might be observed. Husserl, for example, is working towards the same sort of end in his phenomenological theory, but his mathematical reflections are overly guided by ideas drawn from arithmetic and metrical geometries--and he misses real insights about the character of the continuous and discrete features in our observations can be drawn from graph theory and topology. As such, he (and Heidegger following him) simply do not provide the kind of phenomenological analysis of the elemental formal and material features of experience that is really needed. Our aim in generating the phenomenological account is to properly analyze the observations, articulate what is necessary for the formal elements to be well ordered, correct for the various sources of observational error, and determine how it is possible to make reasonable comparisons and apply various forms of measurement to those observations. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger provides an account of the formal elements that are essential for accomplishing these goals. One reason that Peirce does not start in the phenomenological inquiries with a division between internal experience and the outside world is that he doesn't want to prejudice the analysis. He wants to develop the tools that are needed to analyze any sort of phenomena that might be observed--regardless of whether those observations are directed inwardly or outwardly. Those who import metaphysical conceptions concerning the real nature of external objects or internal thoughts into the account will struggle to articulate those formal categories that are elemental in any sort of experience--real or imagined. Peirce's reason for setting those distinctions aside is that we don't want, at the outset, to prejudge the question of which features in our observations of the phenomena are erroneous and which are not. Rather, we want to arrive at conclusions about the character of our observational errors in a way that can be both trusted in some degree and corrected upon further inquiry. So, I do not think that the phenomenological theory of the categories starts from an assumption that realism is true and nominalism is false. Peirce seeks to develop a theory of semiotics that starts with a phenomenological analysis of the observations that are needed to develop clear explanations of the sign relations that are essential for assertions to be true or false and significant or meaningless (in the speculative grammar), and for patterns of inference to be valid or invalid (in the critical logic)--and that can be put to the test. He wants to keep open the question of whether realism or nominalism is true about any given sort of question. He seeks to answer those sorts of questions in the development of his theory of metaphysics in a manner that
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List: Are you saying that the Categories are phaneroscopic, while the Universes are metaphysical? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:07 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will > develop into worlds. > > > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 15:34 > *To:* Søren Brier > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Søren, List: > > SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct > different universes. > > Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are > the same? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jon > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
I suggest that in a phaneroscopic process ontology the categories will develop into worlds. Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 15:34 To: Søren Brier Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Søren, List: SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the same? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Søren Brier mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> wrote: Dear Gary, Jon and list I suggest that the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and the outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between inside and outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy his three categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument as a minimum conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. Thus inside the ontology of phaneroscophy I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Best Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 00:09 To: Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Gary R., List: GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression of the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. That is why I began my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. GR: To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak). As such, I think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several years. He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs." GR: Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the Prolegomena which you quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in Categories). Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context. Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes? In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates? Modalities, perhaps? Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates (possibility/actuality/habituality). Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes? What about the feasibility of constructing a 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four relations divided by Category? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jon, List, I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a break from the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression of the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a seari
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Auke, List: AB: The immediate interpretant always is specific for a given response as Short has it. That is not how I understand it. The Immediate Interpretant is internal to the Sign, and corresponds to what Peirce at least once called "the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer" (EP 2.478). Consequently, it is not tied to any *actual *response (Dynamic Interpretant) in an interpreter; rather, it defines the range of *possible *responses. "My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ... The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility" (SS 111). Analogous to the blackboard diagram in Peirce's cosmology, the Immediate Interpretant is a continuum of potentiality on which the Dynamic Interpretant is actualized, and the universal tendency to take habits then leads to the development of the Final Interpretant. AB: So, if an immediate interpretant, being involved in a dynamical interpretant, has its feeling, action and thought modalities, those very same modalities may be assumed to be present in the dynamical interpretant. The Immediate Interpretant *determines* the Dynamic Interpretant; i.e., whether the Immediate Interpretant is a Possible, Existent, or Necessitant *constrains* whether the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, Existent, or Necessitant. If the Immediate Interpretant is limited to a range of feelings, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual feeling. If the Immediate Interpretant also includes a range of actions, then the Dynamic Interpretant can be an actual action or feeling, but it cannot be an actual thought. If the Immediate Interpretant further includes a range of thoughts, then the Dynamic Interpretant can be an actual thought, action, or feeling. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 9:50 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > Jon, > > > > I agree with: > > my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the > Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible *Interpretants, the > Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual *Interpretant, and > the the Final Interpretant is the development of a *habitual *Interpretant; > i.e., a habit of interpretation. > > > > That is besides one detail. The immediate interpretant always is specific > for a given response as Short has it. However, in between a sign and its > interpretant a lot of experimentation in the imagination (as Peirce recalls > his brother gives as an explanation for an apt reaction on the occasion of > a dress catching fire) may have taken place. However, in each run through > the imagination only one immediate interpretant is present. > > > > With regard to: > > Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and > thought. In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to > classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process. Universes and > Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines > the three Interpretants in terms of modality, rather than dividing each > individual Interpretant on that basis. > > - > > > > I suggest to apply Ockham’s razor in order to get a description of the > process in which the sign aspects develop their import. In a dynamical > nterpretant aspect, an immediate interpretant aspect is involved. So, if an > immediate interpretant, being involved in a dynamical interpretant, has its > feeling, action and thought modalities, those very same modalities may be > assumed to be present in the dynamical interpretant. > > > > Best regards, > > > > Auke van Breemen > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List: The idea is that the Immediate Interpretant can be a range of possible feelings, actions, or thoughts; the Dynamic Interpretant can be an occurrence of an actual feeling, action, or thought; and the Final Interpretant can be a habit of feeling, action, or thought. These are all constrained by the rule that a Possible can only determine a Possible, and a Necessitant must be determined by a Necessitant. If the Immediate Interpretant only includes possible feelings, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual feeling, and the Final Interpretant must be a habit of feeling. If the Final Interpretant is a habit of thought, then the Dynamic Interpretant must be an actual thought, and the Immediate Interpretant must include possible thoughts. The other combinations are limited accordingly, resulting in ten arrangements from these three trichotomies. Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list: > > Jon wrote: > My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the > Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the > Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, > admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible > *Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual > *Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a > *habitual > *Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be > trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. > > I agree, in large part, with the above, i.e., with the description of the > Immediate Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant and Final. I'd add however > that the Final is to my understanding, not a set of habits, but a valid > correlation with the Dynamic Object. > > Where I remain puzzled is Jon's claim that each of these three > Interpretants can be further refined within the three categories. I can see > the Immediate Interpretant as functioning in the categorical modes of 1-1, > 2-1 and even 3-1 but it must retain some Firstness to function as an > internal 'immediate'. I can see the Dynamic Interpretant as functioning in > 2-2, 2-1..and even 3-2 because it must have some Secondness to function as > an Actual. I am unsure of the Final Interpretant which must include > Thirdness. Is it 3-3, 3-2, 3-1...which then also bind it to the Immediate > and Dynamic Interpretants. Note that these cross-connections filiate the > three Interpretants with each other. I haven't explored these areas of > 'fine-tuning' and so - can only question the supposition. I'm not sure... > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* Auke van Breemen > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:31 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Auke, List: > > I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I > reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday. My initial > response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, > Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical > Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, > admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible > *Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual > *Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a > *habitual > *Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then > be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. In my mind, this > follows the order of determination that leads to classification, as well as > the order of semeiotic process. Universes and Categories come into play > with the observation that this approach defines the three Interpretants in > terms of modality, rather than dividing each individual Interpretant on > that basis. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Auke van Breemen > wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> >> >> Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below. >> >> >> >> With regard to sheets I suggest to read for >> >> a. Sheets of assertion: >> >> Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A >> Perfusion >> >> of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. >> >> b. Descriptive sheets >> >> De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/ >> isphanscience.pdf >> >> c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do. >&
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, list: Jon wrote: My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a habitual Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. I agree, in large part, with the above, i.e., with the description of the Immediate Interpretant, Dynamic Interpretant and Final. I'd add however that the Final is to my understanding, not a set of habits, but a valid correlation with the Dynamic Object. Where I remain puzzled is Jon's claim that each of these three Interpretants can be further refined within the three categories. I can see the Immediate Interpretant as functioning in the categorical modes of 1-1, 2-1 and even 3-1 but it must retain some Firstness to function as an internal 'immediate'. I can see the Dynamic Interpretant as functioning in 2-2, 2-1..and even 3-2 because it must have some Secondness to function as an Actual. I am unsure of the Final Interpretant which must include Thirdness. Is it 3-3, 3-2, 3-1...which then also bind it to the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. Note that these cross-connections filiate the three Interpretants with each other. I haven't explored these areas of 'fine-tuning' and so - can only question the supposition. I'm not sure... Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Auke van Breemen Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:31 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, List: I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday. My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all possible Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any actual Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a habitual Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process. Universes and Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines the three Interpretants in terms of modality, rather than dividing each individual Interpretant on that basis. Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: Jon, Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below. With regard to sheets I suggest to read for a. Sheets of assertion: Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A Perfusion of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. b. Descriptive sheets De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do. The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion. A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows: Sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc. Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. (1)Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences). (2)Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a sign (critic). (3)Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we are c
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Soren, Jon S, Gary R, Soren suggests there are two problems with Peirce's semiotic theory. One problem is the phenomenological starting point--which starts with a set of mathematical reflections on formal relations. Another problem is the attempt to build a realistic ontology in the semiotic theory. Let me offer the converse argument. The real strengths of Peirce's semiotic theory--as compared to the theories of other 20th century philosophers--such as Russell and Quine or Husserl and Heidegger--are the following. First, the phenomenological theory is guided by a remarkably deep set of mathematical reflections on what is really essential as a set of elemental formal relations in the phenomena that might be observed. Husserl, for example, is working towards the same sort of end in his phenomenological theory, but his mathematical reflections are overly guided by ideas drawn from arithmetic and metrical geometries--and he misses real insights about the character of the continuous and discrete features in our observations can be drawn from graph theory and topology. As such, he (and Heidegger following him) simply do not provide the kind of phenomenological analysis of the elemental formal and material features of experience that is really needed. Our aim in generating the phenomenological account is to properly analyze the observations, articulate what is necessary for the formal elements to be well ordered, correct for the various sources of observational error, and determine how it is possible to make reasonable comparisons and apply various forms of measurement to those observations. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger provides an account of the formal elements that are essential for accomplishing these goals. One reason that Peirce does not start in the phenomenological inquiries with a division between internal experience and the outside world is that he doesn't want to prejudice the analysis. He wants to develop the tools that are needed to analyze any sort of phenomena that might be observed--regardless of whether those observations are directed inwardly or outwardly. Those who import metaphysical conceptions concerning the real nature of external objects or internal thoughts into the account will struggle to articulate those formal categories that are elemental in any sort of experience--real or imagined. Peirce's reason for setting those distinctions aside is that we don't want, at the outset, to prejudge the question of which features in our observations of the phenomena are erroneous and which are not. Rather, we want to arrive at conclusions about the character of our observational errors in a way that can be both trusted in some degree and corrected upon further inquiry. So, I do not think that the phenomenological theory of the categories starts from an assumption that realism is true and nominalism is false. Peirce seeks to develop a theory of semiotics that starts with a phenomenological analysis of the observations that are needed to develop clear explanations of the sign relations that are essential for assertions to be true or false and significant or meaningless (in the speculative grammar), and for patterns of inference to be valid or invalid (in the critical logic)--and that can be put to the test. He wants to keep open the question of whether realism or nominalism is true about any given sort of question. He seeks to answer those sorts of questions in the development of his theory of metaphysics in a manner that is well-guided by an adequate semiotic theory. Russell and Quine prejudge the answers to these questions because they import metaphysical conceptions and commitments for nominalism in some places and for idealism in others into theory formal systems of logic and into theory philosophical theories of sign relations and logical inferences. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Søren Brier Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 5:56 AM To: 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Dear Gary, Jon and list I suggest that the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and the outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between inside and outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy his three categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument as a minimum conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. Thus inside the ontology of phaneroscophy I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Best
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Søren, List: SB: I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Just to clarify--are you saying that the categories and the universes are the same? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 7:56 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > Dear Gary, Jon and list > > > > I suggest that the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his > semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the > phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and > the outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between > inside and outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy > his three categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument > as a minimum conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. > Thus inside the ontology of phaneroscophy I think it is fair to say that > the categories do form three distinct different universes. > > > >Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 20. oktober 2016 00:09 > *To:* Gary Richmond > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > > > Gary R., List: > > GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the > categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? > > Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement > here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from > phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. That is why I began > my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; > they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. > > GR: To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in > this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. > > Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over > time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak). As such, I > think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as > calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those > words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several > years. He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never > again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs." > > GR: Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you > quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes > from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in > Universes, Predicates in Categories). > > Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that > passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this > context. Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than > Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes? > > > > In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that > encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates? > Modalities, perhaps? Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they > pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the > three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates > (possibility/actuality/habituality). > > > > Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds > of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants > (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, > while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the > ontological Universes? What about the feasibility of constructing a > 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four > relations divided by Category? > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > > Jon, List, > > > > I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least > when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes > represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the > Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at > all a complete break from them. Do you agree? > > > > One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on > Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce > thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them > with entire
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Auke, List: I am familiar with the Sheet of Assertion in the Existential Graphs, and I reviewed both De Tienne's paper and yours from 2007 yesterday. My initial response is that I do not find it plausible to treat the Immediate, Dynamic, and Normal/Final Interpretants as a division of the Logical Interpretant. Instead, my current understanding--still tentative, admittedly--is that the Immediate Interpretant is the range of all *possible *Interpretants, the Dynamic Interpretant is the occurrence of any *actual *Interpretant, and the the Final Interpretant is the development of a *habitual *Interpretant; i.e., a habit of interpretation. Each of these can then be trichotomized into feeling, action, and thought. In my mind, this follows the order of determination that leads to classification, as well as the order of semeiotic process. Universes and Categories come into play with the observation that this approach defines the three Interpretants in terms of modality, rather than dividing each individual Interpretant on that basis. Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > Jon, > > > > Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below. > > > > With regard to sheets I suggest to read for > > a. Sheets of assertion: > > Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A > Perfusion > > of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. > > b. Descriptive sheets > > De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ > detienne/isphanscience.pdf > > c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do. > > *The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion.* > > > > A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows: > > Sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign -proces of > interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc. > > > > Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign. > My interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to > get a run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever > nature) must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this > interpreting system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s > dictum ‘Man is a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes > itself in an interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. > > (1)Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist > (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences). > > (2)Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, > we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of > sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a > sign (critic). > > (3)Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of > semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and > didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we > are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b -> goal of a > and b,a -> goal of b). > > The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants (emotional, > energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or radical subjectivist > considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and normal interpretants; fruit > of semiotics proper) can be established in 2. It sets of with > > > > Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then > thought together > > by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every > analysis. > > What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no > parts, but which > > nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts > consists in this that the > > mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are > really not in the first > > idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of > destructive distillation. > > W6:449, CP 1.384 > > > > So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In phaneroscopy it > is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the emotional > interpretant: > > The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it > > [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the > composer's > > musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings (CP > > 5.475). > > > > From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive > interpretants (mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, dynamical > and normal). > > > > In short: The semiotic sheet i
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Dear Gary, Jon and list I suggest that the problem is with a phenomenological foundation of his semiotics and Peirce’s attempt to build a realistic ontology. In the phenomenological view there is no basic difference between experience and the outside world because there is no fundamental distinction between inside and outside from the start. Peirce establishes in his phaneroscophy his three categories from a pure mathematical and epistemological argument as a minimum conditions for cognition in the form of semiosis to function. Thus inside the ontology of phaneroscophy I think it is fair to say that the categories do form three distinct different universes. Best Søren From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 20. oktober 2016 00:09 To: Gary Richmond Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Gary R., List: GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression of the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. That is why I began my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. GR: To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak). As such, I think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several years. He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs." GR: Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the Prolegomena which you quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in Categories). Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context. Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes? In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates? Modalities, perhaps? Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates (possibility/actuality/habituality). Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes? What about the feasibility of constructing a 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four relations divided by Category? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Jon, List, I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a break from the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression of the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review of Short's Peirce's Theory of Signs) for they consider Peirce's thought as essentially evolving over his career. To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the Prolegomena which you quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in Categories). But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions. Best, Gary R
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, Thanks for your questions. Some short answers below. With regard to sheets I suggest to read for a. Sheets of assertion: Zeman, J. (1977). Peirce's Theory of Signs. In T. A. Seboek (Ed.), A Perfusion of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. b. Descriptive sheets De Tienne: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/detienne/isphanscience.pdf c. Semiotic sheet, for a first orientation my 2007 paper will do. The relevance of the concept semiotic sheet for the current discussion. A signs gives rise to its interpretant sign. Lets picture this as follows: Sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign -proces of interpretation- interpretant/sign – I/S – I/S, etc. Short is interested in sign types and focusses on the interpretant/sign. My interest is in the intermediate processes between two signs. In order to get a run of an interpretation process an interpreting system (of whatever nature) must be assumed. Lets reserve the term ‘semiotic sheet’ for this interpreting system. This interpreting system is a sign itself, cf Peirce’s dictum ‘Man is a sign’. So, interpretation starts when a sign inscribes itself in an interpreting sign or semiotic sheet. (1)Looked at as a first, in itself, we have the radical subjectivist (Stamper) or phenomenological view (architectonic of sciences). (2)Looked at as a second, as related to a sign that inscribes itself, we have the actualist (Stamper) or semiotic view, (architectonic of sciences). But only to the extend that an interpreting system interprets a sign (critic). (3)Looked at as a thirdness, we have the rhetorical part of semiotics. Stamper, being in his 80ies, started back then from Morris and didn’t get a clear view on this communicative view on the matter. Here we are concerned with two sheets conversing with each other (a,b -> goal of a and b,a -> goal of b). The connection between the two trichotomies of interpretants (emotional, energetic and logical; fruit of phenomenological or radical subjectivist considerations) and iimmediate, dynamical and normal interpretants; fruit of semiotics proper) can be established in 2. It sets of with Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis precedes every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented which in itself has no parts, but which nevertheless is analyzed by the mind, that is to say, its having parts consists in this that the mind afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not in the first idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a case of destructive distillation. W6:449, CP 1.384 So, interpretation sets of with a collection of qualia. In phaneroscopy it is called the phaneren, in semiotics it is termed the emotional interpretant: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it [. . . ]. It [a tune; AvB] conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings (CP 5.475). >From this further interpretants may evolve. First the energetive interpretants >(mental, physical), next the logical (immediate, dynamical and normal). In short: The semiotic sheet is needed if we want to get a hold on the process of interpretation. Best, Auke Van: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Verzonden: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 21:18 Aan: Auke van Breemen CC: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Auke, List: AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no conclusions. Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907). AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought." It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being convinced otherwise. AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the mature division of the sciences. I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently downloaded a while ago. Would you mind elaborating their specific relevance to the current discussion, and perhaps suggest some additional reading that I could do? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Ph
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jeff, List: JD: I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants. That is certainly the dominant interpretation. I only started questioning it because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates (including relations). However, I now notice that he added the caveat that whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found it *unsatisfactory *to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). So I am back to being confused about the distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction. JD: As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ... Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread. Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon S, > > I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes > of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, > existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues > in the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that > consists of the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be > understood on the basis of this division. > > So, we have the following classifications of signs: > > A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign > B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, > Copulatives > C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, > Categoricals, Relatives > D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, > Collectives > E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals > F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional > (aesthetic-produce feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical > (scientific-produce self control) > G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, > metaphor), Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule) > H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives > (e.g. interrogatives), Indicatives > I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent > (Pheme), Argument (Delome) > J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and > interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form > > So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, > imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of > the sign to dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an > necessitant. How might a relation between a sign and a dynamical > interpretant have such a character? My hunch is that his long discussions > of the different kinds of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an > attempt to develop my categories from within" and in his discussions of the > nomenclature and division of dyadic and triad relations is meant to work > that out. > > --Jeff > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > -- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > List: > > While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I > noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents > of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign > itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He > then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here > called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the > order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible > can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by > nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the > three Interpretants *themselves *seem to be more properly characterized > as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each > divided into feeling/action/thought. > > Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical > Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and > (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to > me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on > what basis they were thus to be divided,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Hi Jon S, I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the basis of this division. So, we have the following classifications of signs: A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, Copulatives C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, Relatives D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self control) G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule) H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. interrogatives), Indicatives I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), Argument (Delome) J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic and triad relations is meant to work that out. --Jeff --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) List: While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought. Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on what basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive terms in each case. The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049. This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that addresses these specific questions? Thanks, Jon On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary F., List: I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument." CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capab
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Gary R., List: GR: It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? Yes; I actually see no significant inconsistency between your statement here and Jappy's hypothesis that Peirce changed theoretical frameworks from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. That is why I began my post with the six different characterizations from your PowerPoint file; they all reflect common notions of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. GR: To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. Like Ransdell, I tend to view the development of Peirce's thought over time as evolutionary, rather than catastrophic (so to speak). As such, I think that the shift from Categories to Universes is not so abrupt as calling it "a complete break" makes it sound, and Jappy never uses those words; in fact, he recognizes that the transition occurred over several years. He simply observes in a footnote that "after 1906 Peirce never again employed his categories as criteria in the classification of signs." GR: Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in Categories). Yes, I think that this is key; I somehow missed it when I read that passage right after Gary F. first brought it to my attention in this context. Am I right to think that relations are Predicates, rather than Subjects, and thus belong in Categories, rather than Universes? In light of the above--do we need to come up with a different term that encompasses both Universes of Subjects and Categories of Predicates? Modalities, perhaps? Then the three Universes would be Modalities as they pertain to Subjects (Ideas/Things-Facts/Habits-Laws-Continua), while the three Categories would be Modalities as they pertain to Predicates (possibility/actuality/habituality). Any comments on my hypothesis that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes? What about the feasibility of constructing a 66-sign classification with six correlates divided by Universe and four relations divided by Category? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least > when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes > represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the > Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at > all a complete break from them. Do you agree? > > One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on > Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce > thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them > with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical > of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review > of Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs*) for they consider Peirce's thought > as essentially *evolving* over his career. To the extent that Jappy's > analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and > Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. > > Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted, > Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from > Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, > Predicates in Categories). > > But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary >> literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint >> presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ >> menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes >> various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. >> >>- Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. >>- Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. >>- Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. >>- Existential Categories: feeling, action-reaction, thought. >>- Logical Categories: vague, specific, general; or may be, actually >>is, must be. >>- Valencies: monad, d
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, List, I'm not sure I can fully agree with Jappy's/Short's analysis, at least when the language Jappy uses seems to imply that the three Universes represent a break *from* the categories. It seems to me that the Universes are a metaphysical expression *of* the categories, and not at all a complete break from them. Do you agree? One of Short's principal theses in his work of, say, the last decade on Peirce's semiotic is that at several points in his career Peirce thoroughly rejected whole portions of his previous thinking, replacing them with entirely new theories. But scholars like Joseph Ransdell were critical of Short in this (for example, Ransdell wrote a searingly critical review of Short's *Peirce's Theory of Signs*) for they consider Peirce's thought as essentially *evolving* over his career. To the extent that Jappy's analysis suggests a complete break in this matter of Categories and Universes, I believe it confuses the issue. Nonetheless, Peirce's comments from the *Prolegomena* which you quoted, Jon, would surely seem to suggest the need to distinguish Universes from Categories in such ways as you pointed to (e.g., Subjects in Universes, Predicates in Categories). But, in truth, I've only begun to think about these distinctions. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > List: > > I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary > literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint > presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ > menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes > various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. > >- Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. >- Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. >- Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. >- Existential Categories: feeling, action-reaction, thought. >- Logical Categories: vague, specific, general; or may be, actually >is, must be. >- Valencies: monad, dyad, triad. > > I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found > to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and > Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving > Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of > which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia.edu > /TonyJappy/Papers. His book, *Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and > the Philosophy of Representation*, is coming out in December ( > http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes-o > f-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/); > unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list). > Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical > framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to > ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three > trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66 > sign classes). From the conclusion of the second paper ... > > TJ: The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had > accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest > period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad > ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to > which the sign and its correlates could be referred in the course of the > classification of a sign. The logical principles supporting this later > typological approach to signs, the fruit of an evolution in Peirce’s > conception of the object and of the rapid theoretical development that his > conception of sign-action experienced in those years between 1904 and 1906, > are, therefore, radically different from those of the earlier approach, and > it is doubtful that the two will ever be combined in a satisfactory manner > in the quest for the sixty-six classes that Peirce hoped to identify. > > > In the body of the same paper, Jappy twice quotes from "Prolegomena to an > Apology for Pragmaticism" to explain the difference between Universes and > Categories in this context. > > TJ: 1906 was the year, finally, in which Peirce explicitly introduced a > fundamental distinction between categories and universes ... making > explicit the universes to which the subjects mentioned in the extract > (RL463 26–28) quoted earlier belonged: > > CSP: Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a > Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or > class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of > Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe > the two correctly is a question for careful study.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, list 1) Agree - the DO can be in any of the three categorical modes. 2) Ah- I see your point about the categories and universes. Yes, it makes sense. I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes. 3) No - I don't see how the six categorical relations correspond to the six correlates. I understand what you are setting up - and such relations/correlates ARE possible. BUT -The Representamen can be in any mode, eg, in 1-1 Pure Firstness. The Relation between the Representamen and DO can be in any mode...and so on. That's what increases the complex adapatability of the semiosic actions. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 4:00 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Edwina, List: ET: I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.' Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe. JS: ... the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division. ET: I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here.. Suppose that the Universes pertain to subjects and the Categories pertain to predicates, as Peirce wrote in CP 4.545. I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes. Do your six relations correspond to the six correlates (1-1=S, 2-2=Od, 2-1=Oi, 3-3=If, 3-2=Id, 3-1=Ii)? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list: 1) I'm not sure where or what function the three universes have; I admit that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an ontological alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first impression is that they are quite different but again, I haven't paid enough attention to them to conclude what role the universes have. 2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or active and passive. I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the Dynamic is divided in itself into the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...] 3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division." I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here.. Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see where the three universes fits in... Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Edwina, List: ET: I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the categories [not universes]. As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) alternative to (phenomenological) Categories. However, 8.315 is from 1909, and does include the word "category" several times. CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance. The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretan
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List: Okay--in that case, please disregard the question at the end of my last post. Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 3:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list: > You'll find his outline of genuine and degenerate categories in various > places. See 5.66 and on, where he outlines the genuine and degenerate forms > of Secondness and Thirdness. It gets VERY complicated > > For example, 5.73 ..he writes: 'Of these three genera of representamens, > the *Icon* is the qualitatively degenerate, the *Index* the Reactionally > degenerate while the *Symbol* is the relatively genuine genus'. > > In 2.283 he also talks about genuine and degenerate modes. And 8.331 - > also talks about genuine and degenerate... > > So- for example, the R-O relation that acts as an *Icon* MIGHT be defined > as in a categorical mode of 3-1; the Indexical is in a categorical mode of > 3-2 and the Symbol is 3-3. But the Indexical could also be 2-2 or 2-1. And > you can do the same elsewhere...where the Representamen can be in any one > of the three categories and also, presumably, in a genuine and degenerate > mode. Same with the relation between the Representamen and the Dynamical > Interpretant - Peirce writes that it could be 'active or passive Secondness > [2-2 or 2-1]...but..couldn't it also be in a mode of Firstness? > > So- these combinations bring the ten classes up to many more. I admit I > haven't explored these complexities because the possibilities are enormous. > There ARE constraints within the categories and within the triad > [O-R-I]...butthe complexities are beyond me. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:39 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Edwina, List: > > ET: As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the > universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' > version of the categories. > > > Agreed; although again, I think that it is an open question whether Peirce > was right to *change *his theoretical framework from phenomenological > Categories to ontological Universes. > > ET: I consider that the Relations [and there are not just four] to be > predicates ... > > > As should have been clear from my earlier post, the four relations that I > have in mind are S-Od, S-Id, S-If, and S-Od-If; i.e., the last four of the > ten 1908 trichotomies. In that arrangement, Peirce seems to have moved > away from treating S-Oi and S-Ii as distinct relations, presumably because > Oi and Ii are "immediate"; i.e., internal to S. I am inclined to agree > with you that relations are predicates, rather than subjects, and thus > should be divided by Categories, rather than Universes. If this is > correct, it obviously complicates--or perhaps renders impossible--Peirce's > late and unrealized project of combining the six correlate trichotomies > that are divided by Universe with the four relation trichotomies that are > divided by Category in order to determine 66 sign classes. > > ET: ... SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. > > > I should probably know this by now, but would you mind explaining briefly > where these relations occur within the three trichotomies and ten sign > classes? > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> Jon, list: Exactly. As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same >> as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' >> version of the categories. >> >> I don't see the relevance or superiority of the 'three universes' in >> explaining the dynamics of semiosis. >> >> I disagree that the sign/representamen is a subject. It's an integral >> component of the triadic Sign [O-R-I] and has no individual agential >> capacity in itself, as it would if it were a subject. It's a process of >> mediation and transformation and requires the subject-agenda of an Object >> Relation. >> >> I consider that the Relations [and there are not 'just four] to be >> predicates and morphological functional within the three categories or >> rather, SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. >> >> Edwina >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt >> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 2:28 PM >> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categorie
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, list: You'll find his outline of genuine and degenerate categories in various places. See 5.66 and on, where he outlines the genuine and degenerate forms of Secondness and Thirdness. It gets VERY complicated For example, 5.73 ..he writes: 'Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate while the Symbol is the relatively genuine genus'. In 2.283 he also talks about genuine and degenerate modes. And 8.331 - also talks about genuine and degenerate... So- for example, the R-O relation that acts as an Icon MIGHT be defined as in a categorical mode of 3-1; the Indexical is in a categorical mode of 3-2 and the Symbol is 3-3. But the Indexical could also be 2-2 or 2-1. And you can do the same elsewhere...where the Representamen can be in any one of the three categories and also, presumably, in a genuine and degenerate mode. Same with the relation between the Representamen and the Dynamical Interpretant - Peirce writes that it could be 'active or passive Secondness [2-2 or 2-1]...but..couldn't it also be in a mode of Firstness? So- these combinations bring the ten classes up to many more. I admit I haven't explored these complexities because the possibilities are enormous. There ARE constraints within the categories and within the triad [O-R-I]...butthe complexities are beyond me. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:39 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Edwina, List: ET: As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the categories. Agreed; although again, I think that it is an open question whether Peirce was right to change his theoretical framework from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. ET: I consider that the Relations [and there are not just four] to be predicates ... As should have been clear from my earlier post, the four relations that I have in mind are S-Od, S-Id, S-If, and S-Od-If; i.e., the last four of the ten 1908 trichotomies. In that arrangement, Peirce seems to have moved away from treating S-Oi and S-Ii as distinct relations, presumably because Oi and Ii are "immediate"; i.e., internal to S. I am inclined to agree with you that relations are predicates, rather than subjects, and thus should be divided by Categories, rather than Universes. If this is correct, it obviously complicates--or perhaps renders impossible--Peirce's late and unrealized project of combining the six correlate trichotomies that are divided by Universe with the four relation trichotomies that are divided by Category in order to determine 66 sign classes. ET: ... SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. I should probably know this by now, but would you mind explaining briefly where these relations occur within the three trichotomies and ten sign classes? Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list: Exactly. As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the categories. I don't see the relevance or superiority of the 'three universes' in explaining the dynamics of semiosis. I disagree that the sign/representamen is a subject. It's an integral component of the triadic Sign [O-R-I] and has no individual agential capacity in itself, as it would if it were a subject. It's a process of mediation and transformation and requires the subject-agenda of an Object Relation. I consider that the Relations [and there are not 'just four] to be predicates and morphological functional within the three categories or rather, SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 2:28 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) List: I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. a.. Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. b.. Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. c.. Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. d.. Existential Categories:
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List: ET: I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.' Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe. JS: ... the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division. ET: I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here.. Suppose that the Universes pertain to subjects and the Categories pertain to predicates, as Peirce wrote in CP 4.545. I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes. Do your six relations correspond to the six correlates (1-1=S, 2-2=Od, 2-1=Oi, 3-3=If, 3-2=Id, 3-1=Ii)? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list: > > 1) I'm not sure where or what function the three universes have; I admit > that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an > ontological alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first > impression is that they are quite different but again, I haven't paid > enough attention to them to conclude what role the universes have. > > 2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or > active and passive. I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still > divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the Dynamic is divided in itself > into the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...] > > 3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final > division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought > division." > > I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within > such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean > here.. > > Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see > where the three universes fits in... > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Edwina, List: > > ET: I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on, > and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as > analyses of the categories [not universes]. > > > As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, > before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) > alternative to (phenomenological) Categories. However, 8.315 is from 1909, > and does include the word "category" several times. > > CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind > actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the > Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active > and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative > contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and > More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active > aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance. > > > The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," > and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I > think we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. It > seems like this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in > Peirce's later thought, the Categories correspond to the > Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the > feeling/action/thought division. > > ET: My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, > which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this > outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there > are four semiotic relations. > > > Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes > of 1903. As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of > Categories, rather than switching to Universes. I think that it is an open > question whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change > his theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List: ET: As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the categories. Agreed; although again, I think that it is an open question whether Peirce was right to *change *his theoretical framework from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes. ET: I consider that the Relations [and there are not just four] to be predicates ... As should have been clear from my earlier post, the four relations that I have in mind are S-Od, S-Id, S-If, and S-Od-If; i.e., the last four of the ten 1908 trichotomies. In that arrangement, Peirce seems to have moved away from treating S-Oi and S-Ii as distinct relations, presumably because Oi and Ii are "immediate"; i.e., internal to S. I am inclined to agree with you that relations are predicates, rather than subjects, and thus should be divided by Categories, rather than Universes. If this is correct, it obviously complicates--or perhaps renders impossible--Peirce's late and unrealized project of combining the six correlate trichotomies that are divided by Universe with the four relation trichotomies that are divided by Category in order to determine 66 sign classes. ET: ... SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. I should probably know this by now, but would you mind explaining briefly where these relations occur within the three trichotomies and ten sign classes? Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list: Exactly. As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same > as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' > version of the categories. > > I don't see the relevance or superiority of the 'three universes' in > explaining the dynamics of semiosis. > > I disagree that the sign/representamen is a subject. It's an integral > component of the triadic Sign [O-R-I] and has no individual agential > capacity in itself, as it would if it were a subject. It's a process of > mediation and transformation and requires the subject-agenda of an Object > Relation. > > I consider that the Relations [and there are not 'just four] to be > predicates and morphological functional within the three categories or > rather, SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 2:28 PM > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > List: > > I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary > literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint > presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ > menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes > various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. > >- Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. >- Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. >- Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. >- Existential Categories: feeling, action-reaction, thought. >- Logical Categories: vague, specific, general; or may be, actually >is, must be. >- Valencies: monad, dyad, triad. > > I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found > to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and > Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving > Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of > which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia.edu > /TonyJappy/Papers. His book, *Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and > the Philosophy of Representation*, is coming out in December ( > http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes-o > f-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/); > unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list). > Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical > framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to > ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three > trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66 > sign classes). From the conclusion of the second paper ... > > TJ: The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had > accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest > period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad > ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to > which the sign and its correlates could be referred in the course of the > classification of a sign. The logical principles supporting this later > typological approach to signs, the fruit of an evolution in Peirce’s > conception of the object and of the rapid theoretical development that his > conception of sign-action experienced in those years
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, list: 1) I'm not sure where or what function the three universes have; I admit that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an ontological alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first impression is that they are quite different but again, I haven't paid enough attention to them to conclude what role the universes have. 2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or active and passive. I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the Dynamic is divided in itself into the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...] 3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division." I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here.. Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see where the three universes fits in... Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Edwina, List: ET: I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the categories [not universes]. As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) alternative to (phenomenological) Categories. However, 8.315 is from 1909, and does include the word "category" several times. CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance. The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I think we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. It seems like this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in Peirce's later thought, the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division. ET: My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic relations. Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes of 1903. As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of Categories, rather than switching to Universes. I think that it is an open question whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change his theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working out the details of the second approach. Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, List I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic relations. You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I. But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings the number of Relations up to a basic Six. Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with restrictions of course. The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode of Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct contact mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in a symbolic mode. Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself which
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Auke, List: AB: As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no conclusions. Yes, Peirce was right to call himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic" (CP 5.488; 1907). AB: I in particular disagree with your: "However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought." It is a working hypothesis, at best. I am certainly open to being convinced otherwise. AB: It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the mature division of the sciences. I am not too familiar with these concepts and would like to learn more about them, so I will review your 2007 paper, which I apparently downloaded a while ago. Would you mind elaborating their specific relevance to the current discussion, and perhaps suggest some additional reading that I could do? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:34 PM, Auke van Breemen wrote: > Jon, > > > > As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no > conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of his > other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only not being > able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character the sheets of > Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that prevented him from > finishing the system. All ingredients are present. > > > > I in particular disagree with your: > > ." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants > *themselves > *seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual > (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into > feeling/action/thought. > > -- > > > > This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants. It > disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a > sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the > mature division of the sciences. From a sign type perspective Shorts > approach makes sense: Each sign has an element of feeling of action and of > thought, but from a processual approach it is better to apply Ockham’s > razor in order to find the system behind processes of interpretation. > Peirce paved the way for that by his notion of involvement. The logical > note books are key, in combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied) > criticism of Peirce’s focus on scientific progress in developing a theory > of interpretation. (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that > govern comunication). > > > > Best, Auke van Breemen > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, List: ET: I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on, and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the categories [not universes]. As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) alternative to (phenomenological) Categories. However, 8.315 is from 1909, and does include the word "category" several times. CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance. The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I think we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. It seems like this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in Peirce's later thought, the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division. ET: My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic relations. Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes of 1903. As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of Categories, rather than switching to Universes. I think that it is an open question whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change his theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working out the details of the second approach. Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, List > I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on, and > also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses > of the categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these > three ideas the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness. > > My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which > are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in > the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four > semiotic relations. > > You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I. > But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and > Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings > the number of Relations up to a basic Six. > > Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with > restrictions of course. > > The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of > Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode > of Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct > contact mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in > a symbolic mode. > > Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself > which can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I... > > But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are > SIX: We have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But > Secondness functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1. > And Thirdness functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and > 3-1. I have written on all of this... > > The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or informational > interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, D-I and > F-I. PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX > categorical modesprovides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological > semiosis. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > List: > > While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I > noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents > of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign > itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He > then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here > called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the > order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible > can determine nothing but a P
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, list: Exactly. As i said repeatedly, the categories are not the same as the universes and the universes are therefore not a 'mature' or 'better' version of the categories. I don't see the relevance or superiority of the 'three universes' in explaining the dynamics of semiosis. I disagree that the sign/representamen is a subject. It's an integral component of the triadic Sign [O-R-I] and has no individual agential capacity in itself, as it would if it were a subject. It's a process of mediation and transformation and requires the subject-agenda of an Object Relation. I consider that the Relations [and there are not 'just four] to be predicates and morphological functional within the three categories or rather, SIX categorical Relations: 1-1, 2-2, 2-1; 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 2:28 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) List: I was digging through my burgeoning collection of Peircean secondary literature this morning and came across Gary Richmond's PowerPoint presentation on "Trikonic" (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonicb.ppt). It helpfully summarizes various characterizations of the three Categories/Universes. a.. Basic Categories: unit, correlate, medium. b.. Universes of Experience: ideas, brute events, habits. c.. Universal Categories: possibility, actuality, necessity. d.. Existential Categories: feeling, action-reaction, thought. e.. Logical Categories: vague, specific, general; or may be, actually is, must be. f.. Valencies: monad, dyad, triad. I also found two papers by Tony Jappy that, upon re-reading them, I found to be relevant to this topic--"Speculative Rhetoric, Methodeutic and Peirce’s Hexadic Sign-Systems" (2014) and especially "The Evolving Theoretical Framework of Peirce's Classification Systems" (2016), both of which are available online at https://univ-perp.academia.edu/TonyJappy/Papers. His book, Peirce’s Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation, is coming out in December (http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/peirces-twenty-eight-classes-of-signs-and-the-philosophy-of-representation-9781474264839/); unfortunately, it looks like the price will be quite steep ($128 list). Jappy's hypothesis is that Peirce fundamentally changed his theoretical framework for sign classification--from phenomenological Categories to ontological Universes--during the time period between 1903 (three trichotomies, 10 sign classes) and 1908 (six or ten trichotomies, 28 or 66 sign classes). From the conclusion of the second paper ... TJ: The three categories, which, irrespective of their origin, had accompanied all his work in the classification of signs from the earliest period until approximately 1904, was superseded in 1908 by a broad ontological vision embracing three universes, receptacles with respect to which the sign and its correlates could be referred in the course of the classification of a sign. The logical principles supporting this later typological approach to signs, the fruit of an evolution in Peirce’s conception of the object and of the rapid theoretical development that his conception of sign-action experienced in those years between 1904 and 1906, are, therefore, radically different from those of the earlier approach, and it is doubtful that the two will ever be combined in a satisfactory manner in the quest for the sixty-six classes that Peirce hoped to identify. In the body of the same paper, Jappy twice quotes from "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" to explain the difference between Universes and Categories in this context. TJ: 1906 was the year, finally, in which Peirce explicitly introduced a fundamental distinction between categories and universes ... making explicit the universes to which the subjects mentioned in the extract (RL463 26–28) quoted earlier belonged: CSP: Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe the two correctly is a question for careful study. (CP 4.545, 1906) TJ: In short, the passage suggests that Peirce is turning his back on the logico-phenomenological framework within which he had established his theory of signs since the mid-1860s, and that he is evolving towards an ontological approach to classification, anticipating in this field, too, the definitions advanced in the 23 December 1908 letter ... TJ: ... The theoretical framework within which Peirce is now working is ontological in the widest sense, involving the three universes defined above, three uni
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, As Tom Short remarked about Peirce’s semiotics: much groping, no conclusions. The EP only gives a fragment of the groping. As much of his other writings gives a lot more fragments. It may be that only not being able to regard the blackboard (or in its mundane character the sheets of Assertion, description or semiotics as a sign) that prevented him from finishing the system. All ingredients are present. I in particular disagree with your: ." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought. -- This is the Short arrangement of both trichotomies of interpretants. It disregards the possibility of the sheet of description (De Tienne) and a sheet of semiosis (Breemen/Sarbo) as related to each other according to the mature division of the sciences. From a sign type perspective Shorts approach makes sense: Each sign has an element of feeling of action and of thought, but from a processual approach it is better to apply Ockham’s razor in order to find the system behind processes of interpretation. Peirce paved the way for that by his notion of involvement. The logical note books are key, in combination with Shorts (or Stampers implied) criticism of Peirce’s focus on scientific progress in developing a theory of interpretation. (Cf personal, scientific and practical needs that govern comunication). Best, Auke van Breemen Van: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Verzonden: woensdag 19 oktober 2016 16:43 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) List: While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought. Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on what basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive terms in each case. The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049. This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that addresses these specific questions? Thanks, Jon On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: Gary F., List: I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument." CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP 2.478-479) CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jon, List I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-as analyses of the categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic relations. You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I. But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings the number of Relations up to a basic Six. Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with restrictions of course. The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode of Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct contact mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in a symbolic mode. Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself which can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I... But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are SIX: We have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But Secondness functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1. And Thirdness functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and 3-1. I have written on all of this... The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or informational interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, D-I and F-I. PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX categorical modesprovides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological semiosis. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) List: While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought. Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on what basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive terms in each case. The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049. This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that addresses these specific questions? Thanks, Jon On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Gary F., List: I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument." CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Univer