Re: the redness of the red
On 31 Jan 2010, at 03:10, soulcatcher☠ wrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some help from neurosurgeon who can shape your brain in the way as mine is. 3. They are different as long as some 'code' of our brains is slightly different but you (and every machine) is potentially capable of experiencing my redness if they somehow achieve the same 'code'. 5. They are different and absolutely private - you (and anybody else, be it a human or machine) don't and can't experience my redness. 6. The question doesn't have any sense because ... (please elaborate) 7. ... What is your opinion? It is between 3 and 5, I would say. Intuitively, assuming that the mechanist substitution level being high, e may expect our qualia to differ between us, as much as the shape of our body. But then logic can explain that in such place (other's experience) intuition might not be the best adviser. My (naive) answer is (3). Our experiences are identical (would a correct term be 'ontologically identical'?) as long as they have the same symbolic representation and the symbols have the same grounding in the physical world. The part about grounding is just an un-educated guess, I don't understand the subject and have only an intuitive feeling that semantics (what computation is about) is important and somehow determined by the physical world out there. You are right. Our first person consciousness stability has to rely on the infinite computations which statistically stabilize the physical world. But the semantics will be typically a creation of the person's brain. Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. Then digital mechanism is false, or you have chosen an incorrect level of substitution, and your brain may have to include a part of the environment. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. See Jason Resch comment. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. Actually logic is more about the relation between syntax and semantics. Both syntax and semantics, and the relation in between are studied mathematically by logicians. I would suggest you to study a good introduction to mathematical logic like the book by Elliot Mendelson. See: http://www.amazon.com/Introduction-Mathematical-Fourth-Elliott-Mendelson/dp/0412808307 But logic is not a formal language. It is the informal mathematical study OF formal languages and theories together with their semantics/ meaning. (Proof theory, model theory, computability theory, axiomatic set theory, etc.) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
What would you say about this setup: Computer Simulation-Physical Universe-Your Brain That is to say, what if our physical universe were simulated in some alien's computer instead of being some primitive physical world? This setup doesn't sound very convincing to me: - I believe that simulated objects (agents) can't be conscious - I believe that I am consious = I'm not simulated and all the universe is not simulated. And another interesting thought experiment to think about: What if a baby from birth was never allowed to see the real world, but instead were given VR goggles providing a realistic interactive environment, entirely generated from a computer simulation. Would that infant be unconscious of the things it saw? This argument sound better, but still: 1. Goggles are not enough - baby learns via active interaction with the outside world, i.e. motor function matters and you should provide baby with a full-body armor that completely simulates the environment and makes interaction consistent (so haptic, proprioceptive and visual experiences don't contradict each other). But that's hard and maybe impossible - you can't (or can?) completely prevent the contaminating influence of the world - for example, you should feed the baby. 2. The most important is that baby has nervous system that evolved for a very long time and already somehow encodes external symbols. You just substituting real input with virtual input but that virtual input is already properly encoded and speaks the symbolic language that is grounded in real world and comprehensible by baby's brain. 3. Baby, itself, is real and made from matter and, maybe, real baby in VR != virtual baby in VR. In the other words, there is a special class of real Turing machine implementations that posses the meaning grounded in the environment. OK, i agree that it's very tempting to accept computationalism, but i'm still not ready, maybe gotta try harder ) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 8:05 AM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: What would you say about this setup: Computer Simulation-Physical Universe-Your Brain That is to say, what if our physical universe were simulated in some alien's computer instead of being some primitive physical world? This setup doesn't sound very convincing to me: - I believe that simulated objects (agents) can't be conscious - I believe that I am consious = I'm not simulated and all the universe is not simulated. And another interesting thought experiment to think about: What if a baby from birth was never allowed to see the real world, but instead were given VR goggles providing a realistic interactive environment, entirely generated from a computer simulation. Would that infant be unconscious of the things it saw? This argument sound better, but still: 1. Goggles are not enough - baby learns via active interaction with the outside world, i.e. motor function matters and you should provide baby with a full-body armor that completely simulates the environment and makes interaction consistent (so haptic, proprioceptive and visual experiences don't contradict each other). But that's hard and maybe impossible - you can't (or can?) completely prevent the contaminating influence of the world - for example, you should feed the baby. 2. The most important is that baby has nervous system that evolved for a very long time and already somehow encodes external symbols. You just substituting real input with virtual input but that virtual input is already properly encoded and speaks the symbolic language that is grounded in real world and comprehensible by baby's brain. 3. Baby, itself, is real and made from matter and, maybe, real baby in VR != virtual baby in VR. In the other words, there is a special class of real Turing machine implementations that posses the meaning grounded in the environment. Maybe we have definitions for what is meant by simulation. I say this because of your last comment about meaning needing to be grounded in an environment. Within realistic computer simulations there is an environment which encodes many of the same relations we are used to. Concreteness of objects, Newtonian mechanics ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ae6ovaDBiDE ), light effects ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvI1l0nAd1c ) etc. are all embedded within the code that informs the simulation how to evolve, just as the laws of physics would in a physical world. Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a pluggable module that gives you additional abilities. For example, if I had the computation power of my brain sufficient enough, I could simulate other minds entirely in my mind (in imagination, whatever) - but these imaginary minds won't be conscious, will they? In the other words: 1. I accept that computation is a description (the impretaive one) of reality, like math (declarative) or human language. 2. I don't believe (for now) that it has any meaning (and consciousness) per se. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 9:27 AM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a pluggable module that gives you additional abilities. For example, if I had the computation power of my brain sufficient enough, I could simulate other minds entirely in my mind (in imagination, whatever) - but these imaginary minds won't be conscious, will they? I think that depends on the level of resolution to which you are simulating them. The people you see in your dreams aren't conscious, but if a super intelligence could simulate another's mind to the resolution of their neurons, I think those simulated persons would be conscious. In the other words: 1. I accept that computation is a description (the impretaive one) of reality, like math (declarative) or human language. There is a difference between computation as a description (say a print out or CD containing a program's source code) and the computation as an action or process. The CD wouldn't be conscious, but if you loaded it into a computer and executed it, I think it would be. 2. I don't believe (for now) that it has any meaning (and consciousness) per se. So you think the software mind in a software environment would never question the redness of red, when the robot brain would? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why I am I?
On 28 Jan 2010, at 20:27, RMahoney wrote: On Jan 8, 12:38 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Welcome RMahoney, Nice thought experiments. But they need amnesia (like in going from you to Cruise). I tend to think like you that it may be the case that we are the same person (like those who result from a self- duplication, both refer as being the same person as the original, yet acknowledge their respective differentiation. Yes I think I understand what you mean by amnesia, you couldn't carry any rememberance of your old self when changing to Tom Cruise, but you would in the intermediary steps and gradually would lose the concept of your old self that is gradually replaced by Tom's self concept. OK. I think there is an agnosologic path from any person to any person, for example from you to a bacteria, or Peano Arithmetic, perhaps even the empty person. Agnosia is a term used for disease with deny, like people who become blind and pretend not having perceive any difference. Thing is, it is very similar to the process happening as we age. I began a journal when I was in my 20's, capturing my thoughts every time I visited this subject in my mind trips. So when I read a page from that journal today, I sometimes go wow, I was thinking that, then? I've obviously acquired a bit of amnesia. Yet I feel like I'm the same person because I've always had this body (although an aging body). What would it be like if everyone had default amnesia such that any thought older than 20 years is erased? So you wouldn't remember your earlier years but you were that person once. I could claim to have originated from Tom Cruise's childhood and it wouldn't make any difference. Sure. From a third person point of view identity is relative. But from a first person point of view it is a sort of absolute related to the way you have build your (current) self through your experiences and inheritage relatively to a normal set of computations. We are what we value, I would say, but this makes it a personal question. Note that the uda reasoning is made in a way which prevents the need for clarifying those considerations, albeit very interesting. Just like I don't believe it makes any difference to say why I am I? and not you?, as we are we, simultaneously, and we are they, all those who lived past lives, etc. ... and future lives, alternate lives, and states. OK, especially if you see that such a view prevent relativism. When the 'other' makes a mistake, in the past, or the present, (or the future!) the question is how could *I* be wrong, how could *I* have been wrong, how could *I* help for being less wrong. Such an attitude encourages the dialog and the appreciation of the other(s), despite (or thanks to) its relative unknown nature. Eventually this can help to develop some faith in the unknown, together with the lucidity on the hellish paths, which can then be seen as mostly the product of certainty idolatry, and security idolatry. It is a natural price of consciousness: by knowing they are universal, Lobian machine know that they can crash. And being never satisfied, they will complain for more memory space and time to their most probable local universal neighbors, up, for some, to their universal recognizance, and so quite happy to dispose of what 'God' (arithmetical truth) can offer them (and has already offer them). Knowing you are the other is a reason to embellish the relation with the many possible and probable universal neighbor(s). The computationalist good cannot make the bad disappears, but it may be able to confine it more and more in the phantasms and fantasies, or second order, virtual, dreamed realities. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
I think those simulated persons would be conscious. The possibility of superintelligence that creates worlds in its dreams kinda freaks me out :) So you think the software mind in a software environment would never question the redness of red, when the robot brain would? No, I think that good enough simulation of me must question the redness of the red simply by definition - because I'm questioning and it simulates my behavior. Nevertheless, I think that this simulation won't be conscious and has only descriptive power, like a reflection in the mirror (bad example but confers the idea). But I can't tell what exactly is the difference, what is that obscure physicalist principle that I meant speaking about symbol grounding in the real world and that makes me (and not my simulation) conscious. ok, suppose we'll record a day in the life of my simulation and then replay it - will it still be conscious? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A Question...
I am subscribed to this list but I am very well-versed, there is a PDF or something I can read as an introduction, I've ready read the introduction by Jürgen Schmidhuber to computable universes: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/html.html but I need more introductory reading... Thanks! José Ignacio. On Thu, Jan 28, 2010 at 3:58 AM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: Hey There, I love reading the posts on this group, and I find a lot of the ideas mindblowing (and more than occasionally over my head) but I was wondering if anyone could clarify this question(s): 1) Is QI implied by UDA and comp? 2) Is QI implied by ASSA/RSSA? More generally, what is the existential/phenomenological import of all these crazy (meant in a totally respectful way) ideas? Curious, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
soulcatcher? wrote: Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a pluggable module that gives you additional abilities. For example, if I had the computation power of my brain sufficient enough, I could simulate other minds entirely in my mind (in imagination, whatever) - but these imaginary minds won't be conscious, will they? In the other words: 1. I accept that computation is a description (the impretaive one) of reality, like math (declarative) or human language. 2. I don't believe (for now) that it has any meaning (and consciousness) per se. I would say that it gets its meaning (interpretation) from you. The meaning you assign it comes from your internal model of the world you interact with. This is partly hardwired by evolution and partly learned from your experience. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 12:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: I think those simulated persons would be conscious. The possibility of superintelligence that creates worlds in its dreams kinda freaks me out :) Carl Sagan in Cosmos said that in the Hindu religion, there are an infinite number of Gods, each dreaming their own universe: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E-_DdX8Ke0 So you think the software mind in a software environment would never question the redness of red, when the robot brain would? No, I think that good enough simulation of me must question the redness of the red simply by definition - because I'm questioning and it simulates my behavior. Nevertheless, I think that this simulation won't be conscious and has only descriptive power, like a reflection in the mirror (bad example but confers the idea). But I can't tell what exactly is the difference, what is that obscure physicalist principle that I meant speaking about symbol grounding in the real world and that makes me (and not my simulation) conscious. ok, suppose we'll record a day in the life of my simulation and then replay it - will it still be conscious? I don't think your recording will be conscious. It lacks the causal relations that give meaning to its symbols. I believe the symbols are grounded and related to each other through their interactions in the processing by the CPU/Turing machine/physical laws. Do you think the redness of red is a physical property of red light or an internal property of you (the organization of neurons in your brain)? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.comwrote: Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. When I play a video game I am conscious. Presumably I would still be conscious even using a fully immersive system like the vertebrain system described on this page ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard8.htm ). If that is true, and you agree with me so far, do you think a brain in a vat ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat ) would be conscious? Would it be conscious whether its optic nerve were connected to a webcam or connected to the TV/OUT port of a video game? What about a human brain that spent its whole life as a brain in a vat from the time it was born (assuming it were given a robot body for input, or assuming it was given a computer game realistic reality)? I am curious at what point you think the consciousness would cease. If you agree that the brain in the vat would be conscious in all cases (even when given input from a video game) and you agree that a robot body with a software brain would be conscious, why would it stop working when you put a software brain in the same position as the brain in a vat? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the redness of the red
Jason Resch wrote: On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.com mailto:soulcatche...@gmail.com wrote: Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your symbols. 2. simulate a red rose 3. feed rose data into my simulated brain. I think (more believe than think) that this simulated brain won't see my redness - in fact, it won't see nothing at all cause it isn't conscious. But if you: 1. make a robot that simulates my brain in my symbols i.e. behaves (relative to the physical world) in the same ways as I do 2. show a rose to the robot I think that robot will experience the same redness as me. Would be glad if somebody suggests something to read about 'symbols grounding', semantics, etc., I have a lot of confusion here, I've always thought that logic is a formal language for a 'syntactic' manipulation with 'strings' that acquire meaning only in our minds. When I play a video game I am conscious. Presumably I would still be conscious even using a fully immersive system like the vertebrain system described on this page ( http://marshallbrain.com/discard8.htm ). If that is true, and you agree with me so far, do you think a brain in a vat ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat ) would be conscious? Would it be conscious whether its optic nerve were connected to a webcam or connected to the TV/OUT port of a video game? What about a human brain that spent its whole life as a brain in a vat from the time it was born (assuming it were given a robot body for input, or assuming it was given a computer game realistic reality)? I am curious at what point you think the consciousness would cease. I think that if the brain in a vat had sufficient efferent/afferent nerve connections so that it was able to both perceive and and act in the world (either real or virtual) then it would be conscious. If it were very restricted, e.g. it only go to play the same virtual video game over and over, it's consciousness would be similarly limited (I think there are degrees of consciousness). And if it were too limited it would crash. Brent If you agree that the brain in the vat would be conscious in all cases (even when given input from a video game) and you agree that a robot body with a software brain would be conscious, why would it stop working when you put a software brain in the same position as the brain in a vat? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: measure again '10
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime and hence have different viewpoints and experiences. No, that's incorrect. I don't know where you got that idea but I'd best put that misconception to rest first. When I talk about copies I mean the same thing as the others on this list - beings who not only start out as the same type but also receive the same type of inputs and follow the same type of sequence of events. Note: They follow the same sequence because they use the same algorithm but they must operate independently and in parallel - there are no causal links to enforce it. If there are causal links forcing them to be in lockstep I might say they are shadows, not copies. Such copies each have their own, separate consciousness - it just happens to be of the same type as that of the others. It is not redundancy in the sense of needless redundancy. Killing one would end that consciousness, yes. In philosophy jargon, they are of the same type but are different tokens of it. --- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Total utilitarianism advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the total utility of its members. Average utilitarianism, on the other hand, advocates measuring the utility of a population based on the average utility of that population. I basically endorse total utilitarianism. (I'm actually a bit more conservative but that isn't relevant here.) I would say that average utilitarianism is completely insane and evil. Ending the existence of a suffering person can be positive, but only if the quality of life of that person is negative. Such a person would probably want to die. OTOH not everyone who wants to die has negative utility, even if they think they do. --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: if there were a million copies of me in lockstep and all but one were destroyed, then each of the million copies would feel that they had continuity of consciousness with the remaining one, so they are OK with what is about to happen. Suppose someone killed all copies but lied to them first, saying that they would survive. They would not feel worried. Would that be OK? It seems like the same idea to me. Your measure-preserving criterion for determining when it's OK to kill a person is just something you have made up because you think it sounds reasonable, and has nothing to do with the wishes and feelings of the person getting killed. First, I should reiterate something I have already said: It is not generally OK to kill someone without their permission even if you replace them. The reason it's not OK is just that it's like enslaving someone - you are forcing things for them. This has nothing particularly to do with killing; the same would apply, for example, to cutting off someone's arm and replacing it with a new one. Even if the new one works fine, the guy has a right to be mad if his permission was not asked for this. That is an ethical issue. I would make an exception for a criminal or bad guy who I would want to imprison or kill without his permission. That said, as my example of lying to the person shows, Stathis, your criterion of caring about whether the person to be killed 'feels worried' is irrelevant to the topic at hand. Measure preservation means that you are leaving behind the same number of people you started with. There is nothing arbitrary about that. If, even having obtained Bob's permission, you kill Bob, I'd say you deserve to be punished if I think Bob had value. But if you also replace him with Charlie, then if I judge that Bob and Charlie are of equal value, I'd say you deserve to be punished and rewarded by the same amount. The same goes if you kill Bob and Dave and replace them with Bob' and Dave', or if you kill 2 Bobs and replace them with 2 other Bobs. That is measure preservation. If you kill 2 Bobs and replace them with only one then you deserve a net punishment. Suppose there is a guy who is kind of a crazy oriental monk. He meditates and subjectively believes that he is now the reincarnation of ALL other people. Is it OK to now kill all other people and just leave alive this one monk? No, because the people who are killed won't feel that they have continuity of consciousness with the monk, unless the monk really did run emulations of all of them in his mind. They don't know what's in his mind either way, so what they believe before being killed is utterly irrelevant here. We can suppose for arguments' sake that they are all good peasants, they never miss giving their rice offerings, and so they believe anything the monk tells them. And he believes what he says. Perhaps what you were trying to get at is that _after_they
Re: measure again '10
Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime and hence have different viewpoints and experiences. No, that's incorrect. I don't know where you got that idea but I'd best put that misconception to rest first. When I talk about copies I mean the same thing as the others on this list - beings who not only start out as the same type but also receive the same type of inputs and follow the same type of sequence of events. Note: They follow the same sequence because they use the same algorithm but they must operate independently and in parallel - there are no causal links to enforce it. If there are causal links forcing them to be in lockstep I might say they are shadows, not copies. I see don't that as possible except possibly by realizing the two copies in two virtual realities so that whole environment is simulated. And the simulated worlds would have to be completely deterministic - no quantum randomnes. Such copies each have their own, separate consciousness - it just happens to be of the same type as that of the others. It is not redundancy in the sense of needless redundancy. Killing one would end that consciousness, yes. In philosophy jargon, they are of the same type but are different tokens of it. Philosophy jargon doesn't require that two of the same type be the same in every respect, e.g. A and A are two tokens of the same type, but they are not identical (one is the left of the other for example). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
