Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 03 Mar 2012, at 04:44, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/29/2012 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/28 Stephen P. King On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain. Hi Quentin, OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all... Hi Quentin, We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there is no "you", as Brent wrote yesterday, what is thatwhich is invariant with respect to substitution? As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one, which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some materialist becomes person eliminativist. The "you" is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see it as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist in many representations. And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's "second diagonalization" construction. It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can certainly construct a program D capable of doing some simple duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some parameters: Dx gives T(, xx, ), Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a self-referential program: DD gives T(, DD, ...). You might add "quotes" to prevent an infinite loop: Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that DD gives T(... 'DD'...). This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ... in all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in abstract biology (see my paper "amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine". That define a relative "you", trivially relative to you. It is the "I" of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring to its entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some programming language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for example, it is a build in control structure called SELF. This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is more "my body" than my "soul", and that if why, to do the math, we have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion of first person. By the non definability of truth, this "I" cannot be defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if doubly immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with the non definable (by the machine) truth. Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is done at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person will behave the same, and feel to be the same. Dear Bruno, Forgive the obvious question, but what you wrote here should be the "blue print" for creating an AI, no? All that needs to be done is to create a special purpose physical machine that can implement a program with this structure, such that it is implemented "fast enough" to be able to interact in our world at our level. Yes. I wrote a self-regenerating programs, doing that. (see "amoeba, planaria and dreaming machine"). But *any* programs once correct and rich enough above those laws, and they can know it (in the Theaetus' sense of knowing). Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong substitution level, different from what might occur if a "digital uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome. At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail down the details of this idea. The details are in the mathematics of self-reference. Where? How is the "degree of resolution" or "scope" of a computation coded in a computation? It seems that this is assumed in the notion of computer grammars and semantics but has this question been address directly in literature? Gödel 1931. We can do that with programs, because from outside we already know that they are program, and we know their substitution level. The program cannot, but in this case we provide the information (we play the role of the doctor). Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO. Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, bec
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On 03 Mar 2012, at 00:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Mar 2, 2:49 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: A sentence is not a program. Okay, "WHILE program > 0 DO program. Program = Program + 1. END WHILE" Does running that program (or one like it) create a 1p experience? Very plausibly not. It lacks self-reference and universality. Why isn't a WHILE loop self-referential? It will depend on the procedure that you accept for the , and in "while ". Self-reference does not need universality but sub-universality, and so will be quickly rich enough for self-reference to occur, but not universality. Unless the action is rich enough, again. But this is a distracting issue given that your point is that NO program ever can give a computation able to manifest consciousness. We are relatively manifested by the function of our brain. "we" are not function. That seems to make 'functionalism' a misnomer. Yes. For many reasons, including that function can be seen as extensional objects, defined by their inputs-outputs, or as intensional objects, by taking into account how they are computed with some details, or by taking into account modalities, resource, etc. Putnam's functionalism was fuzzy on the choice of level, leading him and its followers to some confusion. In my early writing I define comp by "it exists a level such that functionalism is right at that level". That "existence" is not constructive (and thus the need of the act of faith), and that allow some clarification on what comp can mean. If so, that objection evaporates when we use a symmetrical form <> content model rather than a cause >> effect model of brain-mind. Form and content are not symmetrical. The dependence of content to form requires at least universal machine. What if content is not dependent on form and requires nothing except being real? Define "real". I think that content and form are anomalous symmetries inherent in all real things. It is only our perspective, as human content, that makes us assume otherwise. Objectively, form and content are different aspects of the same thing - one side a shape of matter in space, the other a meaning through time. Except that it is usually not symmetrical. Form are 3p describable and content are not. Also that contradicts what you say above, that content might be independent to form. Then, even if that where true, why would that not apply to machine? Your non attribution of consciousness to the machine might comes from the fact that you believes that the machines is only handled by the 3p Bp, but it happens that the machine, and its universal self- transformation has self-referential correct fixed point, and who are you to judge if she meant them or not? If you define consciousness by the restriction of the Bp on the such true fixed point, the PA baby machine will already not be "satisfied" if you call her a zombie. Take for example how a computer writes compared to a person. If you blow up a character from a digital font enough, you will see the jagged bits. If you look at a person's hand writing you will see dynamic expressiveness and character. No two words or letters that a person writes will be exactly the same. A computer of course, produces only identical characters, and its text has no emotional connection to the author. There will never be a computer who signs it's John Hancock any differently than any other computer - unless programmed specifically to do so. All machines have the same personality by default (which is no personality). This is a good example of how we can project our own perceptions on an inanimate, unconscious canvas and see our own reflection in it. These letters only look like letters to us, but to a computer, they look like nothing whatsoever. You confuse the proposition "could a computer" think, with the question "could today's man-made computers think". Reducing consciousness into mathematical terms Which comp precisely does not. Comp might be said theologicalist, even if 99% mathematicalist. can yield only a mathematical sculpture that reminds us of consciousness. It is an inside out approach, a reverse engineering of meaning by modeling grammar and punctuation extensively. There is much more to awareness than Bp & p. You could refute plasma physics by saying that plasma have nothing to do with ink and papers, which typically appears in book on plasma physics. Ironically this is, in the language of the Löbian machine, a confusion very similar to the confusion between Bp and Bp & p. But I think that you need to invest more time in the technics for appreciating this, to be honest. If you were able to make a living zygote large enough to walk into, it wouldn't be like that. Structures would emerge spontaneously out of circulating fluid and molecules acting spontaneously and simultaneously, not just in chain reaction. It doesn't really make sense to
Re: COMP theology
On 3/3/2012 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: comp can never be proved Yes. or disproved False. By UDA. so there is no point in worrying about it. I just assume it's true because I could not function otherwise Which is a nonsense. Nobody use the hypothesis that the brain is a machine in their everyday life. If tomorrow comp is refuted, you will not feel a difference. Just that both matter and mind will be more mysterious. In fact most people are unreflective dualists. They assume they have a magic soul so that if their brain were replaced by a computer 'they' would become a philosophical zombie while their 'real self' would be teletransported to heaven (or Platonia if they happen to be mathematicians :-) ). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 3/3/2012 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I understand that seems possible. That is why I avoid in the thought experience, both amnesia, death, or anything which would prevent the persons, before he opens the reconstitution box, in W and M, to feel any different from the person in Helsinki, apart from finding themselves in a box, and not knowing where they are. In such case, to believe that you don't survive would prevent you to believe that you can survive teleportation, and comp would be refuted. But that seems to be equivocation on 'you'. 'I' have a certain continuity of thought and more distant memories. The hypothetical teleportation would necessarily (nomologically) produce a discontinuity in thought, so my identity would depend on my memories. Small changes in memory would still allow 'me' to identify myself with the Helsinki person, but large ones, e.g. I remember living in Brussels not Helsinki, would make 'me' a different person. 'I' am an inference, or a construct, from my memory (including unconscious habit/memory). So the question as to which probability I have finding myself in M or W is ill posed; it assumes that there is one 'I' and we can ask where this 'I' finds himself. But there is no 'I' in this sense. I don't think that affects the idea of 1p uncertainty though. If you believe QM is correct you already believe there is 1p uncertainty; even if you like Copenhagen. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 3/3/2012 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: comp can never be proved Yes. or disproved False. By UDA. so there is no point in worrying about it. I just assume it's true because I could not function otherwise Which is a nonsense. Nobody use the hypothesis that the brain is a machine in their everyday life. If tomorrow comp is refuted, you will not feel a difference. Just that both matter and mind will be more mysterious. In fact most people are unreflective dualists. They assume they have a magic soul so that if their brain were replaced by a computer 'they' would become a philosophical zombie while their 'real self' would be teletransported to heaven (or Platonia if they happen to be mathematicians :-) ). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
John K Clark, you argue with a lot of sense. I never managed to deepen my
teeth low enough into Bruno's texts to put out a professional argument,
just paraphrased my own thoughts if I 'thought' them to be different.
Let me insert into your post my remarks in BOLD ITALICS.
General remark: I discard "thought-experiments" as artifacts constructed to
press a point otherwise insensible. Q-transfers I disregard because in the
instant of such (thought-of) transfer the copy lives a different life from
the original circumstances and so is NOT comparable. I consider it a good
game.
I am agnostic, meaning IN MY BELIEF the world ('everything', 'totality') is
some infinite(!) complexity of what? we CANNOT KNOW from the 'universe'
among many and different(!) others - as we think only within the
'model-world' "WE" made up of topical concepts/processes we already know of
(different today from 1000AD or 2500BC etc.) so the 'rest of the world' -
influencing the model content is unknowable. I consider ALL WE CAN SPEAK
ABOUT as figments of the human mind - including numbers and arithmetic -
within our HUMAN logic - not necessarily the only one that gives.
The 'infinite complexity' may not include topics and processes like
our model does, it may have (changing?) relations of aspects in some
'higher' dynamics.
That ignorance makes our conventional scientific results only "almost"
good.
Even the 'universal number' is human idea (sorry, Bruno).
With my early-age brainwashing into natural sciences I 'believe' in
constant change so 'ontology' seems like an artifact of a snapshot.
Epistemology, however, continually adds to our (misunderstood?)
knowledge-base (see the above dates as examples) adjusted by everybody's
PERSONALIZED genetic tool (brain?) and accumulated personal experiential
material. Accordingly no two people have identical image for the 'world'. I
call that after Colin Hales our "mini-solipsism".
I am ready for "I dunno" - or: "I am wrong".
John Mikes
On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 4:08 PM, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > The question is "If I throw a coin, what is the probability that I see
>> it becoming a flying pig". In front of the UD, that question is not
>> trivial.
>>
>
> In this thought experiment the meaning of the word "I" is not obvious and
> in fact the entire point of the exercise is supposed to be to make clear
> exactly what "I" means, and yet you throw out the word as if the meaning is
> already clear.
>
*My returning question is also "who is "I" or "SELF"? I also DENY the
validity of a probability, absolutely dependent upon the boundaries of the
system to be observed (just as a statistical 'truth'). *
> In one sense there is zero probability because if you became a flying pig
> you would not be Bruno Marchal anymore. And in some sense there is zero
> probability the Helsinki man will be the Moscow man because the Moscow
> experiences is what transformed the Helsinki man into the Moscow man so
> that although he may remembers being him he is not the Helsinki man
> anymore. So the answer to the question "If I change what is the probability
> I will remain the same?" is zero. And that's why I think this first person
> indeterminacy stuff is just silly.
>
> *I agree: There is ONLY first person. If somebody else communicates
> anything it is accepted in the sense of my general remark as MY "1st p."
> understanding (incl. sciences, books, belief systems etc.) *
>
*It has no comparative to make it indeterministic.*
> > Comp is just "I can survive with a digital brain". It is about me, my
>> consciousness, my body
>>
>
> Fine, but then how does that square with your comment "Comp makes
> arithmetic a theory of everything". Consciousness is not everything.
>
> > comp makes matter into an appearance in the mind of universal numbers
>> only.
>>
>
> Comp can certainly make a mind that through virtual reality can experience
> matter that does not in fact exist, but even if the rock the mind feels
> like he is holding does not exist other matter does in the form of the
> computer that is simulating the rock, and the mind too. You claim you have
> proven that a computer made of matter is not necessary to do a simulation
> like this but I'll be damned if I can see where you did this. In
> Aristotle's metaphysics the potential and the actual are somehow one, but
> is this really true? I don't know.
> *Whenever I can, I do not go back to the 'oldies' who were wise but of a
> much smaller inventory of (rightly or wrongly) observed natural phenomena
> (indeed: the (math based?) explenation of such). *
>
*You sound as having a clear definition about 'consciousness'. I feel it
is a process and have a hard time to separate it from 'life' in a much
wider view than the C-based(?) bio ignorance of conventional science. *
*(Everything that changes has a 'life' (even without Metabolism-Repair)*
*if 'responding' to known or unknown relations). *
>
>
> > OK. So you see that there is a 1p-
Re: COMP theology
On 03 Mar 2012, at 18:27, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > "I" (first person) is rather easy, in that situation. If you agree that there is no problem surviving the drinking coffee experience, you have already grasp it. I agree that drinking a cup a coffee changes me but in my opinion I still survive, drinking a cup of cyanide would change me even more than the coffee did and it would change me so much that in my opinion I would not survive; I understand that seems possible. That is why I avoid in the thought experience, both amnesia, death, or anything which would prevent the persons, before he opens the reconstitution box, in W and M, to feel any different from the person in Helsinki, apart from finding themselves in a box, and not knowing where they are. In such case, to believe that you don't survive would prevent you to believe that you can survive teleportation, and comp would be refuted. So what you say might be correct, but is not relevant in the reasoning. however this is all a matter of degree not of kind. This does not mean there can not be a huge difference between the two, there is no sharp dividing line between day and night either but the difference between the two is as big as, well , day and night. Exactly. > Arithmetic is about me, my consciousness, my body, the matter which seems to constitute me, all apparent matter, the laws of physics. Comp makes arithmetic a theory of consciousness including matter's appearance, without ontological matter. Do you think the moon exists when you are not looking at it? This is a very ambiguous question, which is far to premature at this stage of the reasoning. If your answer is "yes" then comp is not a theory of everything. If by moon you mean a primitively physical object, then the anwer WILL be "no". It does not exist even when we look at it. But discussing this before understanding the reversal between physics and numbers' bio-psych-theo-logy would make no sense. > It is not "if you change then you are not the same", It is "if you do that experience, what is the probability you feel to get this or that result The probability is 100% that if you receive sights and sounds from Moscow and not Washington you will become the Moscow man and not the Washington man. But the question which was asked is avoided here. What if you know in advance that 3-you will be both in M and in W, knowing that with comp the 1-you will not feel to be at both place. > when assuming comp so that you agree already that the probability of surviving with a digital brain is 1, despite the big change. And that's another problem if you're trying to construct a rigorous proof as you are; there is no clear procedure for determining if a change is so large it is incompatible with survival. Most may agree at the extreme ends of the spectrum just as we agree that a 80 pound man is thin and a 800 pound man is fat, but exactly where a thin man turns into a fat man is a matter of opinion. In the real world nature rarely draws a sharp line between things, she draws a grey blob. This is avoided in the reasoning, because, by construction we make the reconstituted persons at the right level. When just reconsituted in W and M, they are numerically 3-identifical to the person in Helsinki, at the right level. > So you do agree with the first person indeterminacy. I neither agree nor disagree, the concept is not well formed. Then defend the case of deterlinacy, and tell me how to dtermine with certainty the experience that you will live when doing the experiences in any of the protocols given. In UDA the first person is defined (partially) by the content of the diary which is taken by the person in the teleportation box. Basically it is the personal memory, in that protocol. If you disagree with indeterminacy, it is up to you to give an algorithm of prediction. To say, when imagining yourself in Helsinki, that you neither agree or disagree with the indeterminacy illustrates that you are indeterminate on the outcome you will live. That's the indeterminacy. In AUDA, the first person will be defined by the knower, and implemented by the Theaetetus' idea, which works in the arithmetical setting. But you don't need that to understand the necessity of the reversal. But AUDA helps to see how comp will make everything precise at some stage, and it illustrates how to proceed for the derivation of physics from arithmetic. Including a tiny part. UDA just shows that *we have to* derive physics from arithmetic. > as a logician, and in the fundamental matter, it remains important to understand that we, the comp people, does not know the truth of comp. I agree, Good. comp can never be proved Yes. or disproved False. By UDA. so there is no point in worrying about it. I just as
Re: COMP theology
On 03 Mar 2012, at 18:09, meekerdb wrote: On 3/3/2012 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But he is still the same guy in the same sense that I am the same guy after drinking a cup of coffee. But also he is a different guy in the same sense. One remembers drinking coffee and one doesn't. One remembers seeing Moscow and one doesn't. Yes, sure. If that was not the case, the first person indeterminacy would not make sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Yes Doctor circularity
On Mar 3, 1:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > I understand your argument from the very beginning. I debate people > > about it all week long with the same view exactly. It's by far the > > most popular position I have encountered online. It is the > > conventional wisdom wisdom position. There is nothing remotely new or > > difficult to understand about it. > > I know that you understand the claim, but what you don't understand is > the reasoning behind it. I understand the reasoning very well. As I say - I used to believe it myself for 20 years. The problem isn't the reasoning, it's the initial assumptions. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > "I" (first person) is rather easy, in that situation. If you agree that > there is no problem surviving the drinking coffee experience, you have > already grasp it. > I agree that drinking a cup a coffee changes me but in my opinion I still survive, drinking a cup of cyanide would change me even more than the coffee did and it would change me so much that in my opinion I would not survive; however this is all a matter of degree not of kind. This does not mean there can not be a huge difference between the two, there is no sharp dividing line between day and night either but the difference between the two is as big as, well , day and night. > Arithmetic is about me, my consciousness, my body, the matter which seems > to constitute me, all apparent matter, the laws of physics. Comp makes > arithmetic a theory of consciousness including matter's appearance, without > ontological matter. > Do you think the moon exists when you are not looking at it? If your answer is "yes" then comp is not a theory of everything. > It is not "if you change then you are not the same", It is "if you do > that experience, what is the probability you feel to get this or that result > The probability is 100% that if you receive sights and sounds from Moscow and not Washington you will become the Moscow man and not the Washington man. > when assuming comp so that you agree already that the probability of > surviving with a digital brain is 1, despite the big change. > And that's another problem if you're trying to construct a rigorous proof as you are; there is no clear procedure for determining if a change is so large it is incompatible with survival. Most may agree at the extreme ends of the spectrum just as we agree that a 80 pound man is thin and a 800 pound man is fat, but exactly where a thin man turns into a fat man is a matter of opinion. In the real world nature rarely draws a sharp line between things, she draws a grey blob. > So you do agree with the first person indeterminacy. > I neither agree nor disagree, the concept is not well formed. > as a logician, and in the fundamental matter, it remains important to > understand that we, the comp people, does not know the truth of comp. > I agree, comp can never be proved or disproved so there is no point in worrying about it. I just assume it's true because I could not function otherwise and it gives me time to think about other things; as I said comp isn't everything. > By using the word God, we show respect to our predecessor > But that's another problem, you're giving the word "God" and the people who think the word is sacred far more respect than they deserve. > Unlike Everett QM, we must justifies BOTH the Born rule AND the SWE, > If somebody could derive either of those things starting from nothing but pure numbers and prove that nothing else would be logically consistent it would be the greatest discovery in the history of science, but unfortunately I don't see anything like that happening very soon. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 3/3/2012 1:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But he is still the same guy in the same sense that I am the same guy after drinking a cup of coffee. But also he is a different guy in the same sense. One remembers drinking coffee and one doesn't. One remembers seeing Moscow and one doesn't. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)
On 03 Mar 2012, at 01:56, Joseph Knight wrote: On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki, to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2. My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is [2/3]. Why is that? But I am not sure of this. What do you think? My intuition is that the probability should be 2/3 in either case. Thanks for answering. I will comment asap (busy week-end!). But so I let also the others to think on the matter before I explain. The question is more subtle than it looks. I don't have the answer in local situations, but in front of the UD, it might be a little more simple, but still hard. I can give you another problem, equivalent to a question found by Bostrom, which can give an hint: Suppose you are again read and cut in Helsinki, and reconstituted in Moscow and Washington, but now you are told in advance that in W you will have an artificial brain made of big wires, and in W the artificial brain will use thin wires. The level is correct, by assumption. Also, the thin wires are solid and works perfectly from a 3p pov. What is the probability that you will find yourself in W? Another way to handle this question is just to count the 1p experiences, but this will not work (this leads to white noises, do you see why?), so we have to separate the different 3-computations, like you did, but not as much as leading to an absurdity in the situation described by Bostrom (although he seems to defend it ...) Bruno PS I have to go, and I might be unable to comment before Monday afternoon. I will comment Craig and Stephen asap, which means later, sorry. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 02 Mar 2012, at 22:08, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The question is "If I throw a coin, what is the probability that I see it becoming a flying pig". In front of the UD, that question is not trivial. In this thought experiment the meaning of the word "I" is not obvious and in fact the entire point of the exercise is supposed to be to make clear exactly what "I" means, Not at all. "I" (first person) is rather easy, in that situation. If you agree that there is no problem surviving the drinking coffee experience, you have already grasp it. and yet you throw out the word as if the meaning is already clear. In one sense there is zero probability because if you became a flying pig you would not be Bruno Marchal anymore. You are right, the question would be silly if it was "what is the probability that I become a flying pig". But the question was <> And the "it" refer to the coin, not me. I have to put "I see" before "it" to make clear that I am not asking about the probability that the coin becomes a pig, but only of my seeing of the coin becoming a pig. The probability bears on my future *first person* experience. you have read the sentence above too much quickly. And in some sense there is zero probability the Helsinki man will be the Moscow man because the Moscow experiences is what transformed the Helsinki man into the Moscow man so that although he may remembers being him he is not the Helsinki man anymore. But he is still the same guy in the same sense that I am the same guy after drinking a cup of coffee. If you were right, then the probability that *I* see head (or tail) in *any* throwing of the coin would be zero. All probability that I see or feel something after some laps of time would be zero. In particular, the probability that you survive with an artificial brain would be zero, and that would make comp false. So the answer to the question "If I change what is the probability I will remain the same?" is zero. And that's why I think this first person indeterminacy stuff is just silly. Not, it is just "if I do that experience, what is the probability that I feel to get that result". > Comp is just "I can survive with a digital brain". It is about me, my consciousness, my body Fine, but then how does that square with your comment "Comp makes arithmetic a theory of everything". Consciousness is not everything. That's my point. Arithmetic is about me, my consciousness, my body, the matter which seems to constitute me, all apparent matter, the laws of physics. Comp makes arithmetic a theory of consciousness including matter's appearance, without ontological matter. Arithmetic is also a theory of numbers to start with, and matter becomes a first person plural appearance, obeying some laws that we can deduce in arithmetic, and then compare with what we see, making the comp hypothesis testable. > comp makes matter into an appearance in the mind of universal numbers only. Comp can certainly make a mind that through virtual reality can experience matter that does not in fact exist, but even if the rock the mind feels like he is holding does not exist other matter does in the form of the computer that is simulating the rock, and the mind too. The point of the reasoning is that this does not work. But you have to follow cautiously the whole reasoning to grasp this by yourself. You claim you have proven that a computer made of matter is not necessary to do a simulation like this but I'll be damned if I can see where you did this. In Aristotle's metaphysics the potential and the actual are somehow one, but is this really true? I don't know. Yes. It follows from UDA. It is the part of Aristotle's theory which remains correct in both Plotinus and in the theory of matter of the machine. > OK. So you see that there is a 1p- indetermination. I don't even think "1p- indetermination" has a clear meaning except "if you change then you are not the same"; well yes I can see that, it's true but not very profound. You have still not get the point. It is not "if you change then you are not the same", It is "if you do that experience, what is the probability you feel to get this or that result, when assuming comp so that you agree already that the probability of surviving with a digital brain is 1, despite the big change. > the question does not bear on where he will be, but on where he will feels to be. If I receive sense inputs from Washington I will feel like I'm in Washington if I receive sights and sounds from Moscow I will feel like I'm in Moscow. You may ask "why are you the Moscow man and not the Washington man?", and my answer is because I received inputs from Moscow not Washington. So a legitimate question and a proper use of probabilities would be "What is the probability I will receive sigh
