On 03 Mar 2012, at 04:44, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/29/2012 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote:On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feelany difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if yourbrain was substituted for a digital brain.Hi Quentin, OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel asconscious as you're now in your biological body, and you wouldsteel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...Hi Quentin,We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. ifthere is no "you", as Brent wrote yesterday, what isthat which is invariant with respect to substitution?As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one,which is often done, and which explains perhaps why somematerialist becomes person eliminativist.The "you" is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can seeit as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can existin many representations.And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's "seconddiagonalization" construction.It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You cancertainly construct a program D capable of doing some simpleduplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation Tthat you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with someparameters:Dx gives T(...., xx, ....),Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to aself-referential program:DD gives T(...., DD, ...). You might add "quotes" to prevent an infinite loop: Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that DD gives T(... 'DD'...).This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ...in all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, inabstract biology (see my paper "amoeba, planaria, and dreamingmachine".That define a relative "you", trivially relative to you. It is the"I" of computer science. It allows you to write a program referringto its entire code/body in the course of its execution. In someprogramming language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, forexample, it is a build in control structure called SELF.This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It ismore "my body" than my "soul", and that if why, to do the math, wehave to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notionof first person. By the non definability of truth, this "I" cannotbe defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even ifdoubly immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation withthe non definable (by the machine) truth.Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution isdone at the right level. It means that the reconstituted personwill behave the same, and feel to be the same.Dear Bruno,Forgive the obvious question, but what you wrote here should bethe "blue print" for creating an AI, no? All that needs to be doneis to create a special purpose physical machine that can implement aprogram with this structure, such that it is implemented "fastenough" to be able to interact in our world at our level.

`Yes. I wrote a self-regenerating programs, doing that. (see "amoeba,`

`planaria and dreaming machine"). But *any* programs once correct and`

`rich enough above those laws, and they can know it (in the Theaetus'`

`sense of knowing).`

Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrongsubstitution level, different from what might occur if a "digitaluploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate completecontinuity?It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack ofcontinuity... it's not binary outcome.At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has afine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am tryingto nail down the details of this idea.The details are in the mathematics of self-reference.Where? How is the "degree of resolution" or "scope" of acomputation coded in a computation? It seems that this is assumed inthe notion of computer grammars and semantics but has this questionbeen address directly in literature?

Gödel 1931.

`We can do that with programs, because from outside we already know`

`that they are program, and we know their substitution level. The`

`program cannot, but in this case we provide the information (we play`

`the role of the doctor).`

Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguousand vague, IMHO.Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substitutedwith a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitueyour brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to beinconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter isnon-computable... it is the limit of the infinities ofcomputation that goes through your consciousness current state.Can you see how this would be a problem for the entiredigital uploading argument if functional substitution cannotoccur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictlyclassical level measurement of brain structure?Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehowwrong...AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that"we are only that which is within our skin". We might finallyescape from the modular clock world of gears and levers that theParminidean and Newtonian world view entails.But comp escapes this. If "I" am a machine, then the reality,globally cannot be a machine, and from the point of view of anymachine, his 1-I cannot be a machine either, even if it *is* amachine ... from God (Truth) point of view.From what I understand of the idea, the "I" is a fixed pointtherefore is sensed as "disconnected" from everything else in anygiven 1p. Thus it seems that nothing at all within a given 1p is"machine". This is where your definition of "Free Will" makes a lotof sense, BTW. You should write more on it as it has veryinteresting implications.Here there is a quite difficult idea, made simple by the self-reference logic, which is that:G* proves that Bp is extensionally equivalent to Bp & p. (theyprove the same arithmetical p),But G, and thus the machine, does not prove that, which makes themintensionally different. The first obeys to G, and thesecond obeys to a logic of knowledge (S4Grz).OK, this is becoming more clear to me and understood, but in thesense that I just wrote. So G* is equivalent to a computation thatgenerates a simulacrum universe within which a 1p is a small portionconcentrated withing some "volume" (bounded by a surface)?

`G* knows (in the intuitive sense of producing as true) the truth about`

`the machine. S4Grz describe the machine's knowledge (1p), and G the`

`machine's science about itself (3p).`

`For example, the machine is consistent (G* proves Dt). The machine`

`cannot know or believe rationnally that she is consistent (G* proves`

`~BDt). Both the machine and the "divine intellect" knows that (both G`

`and G* proves Dt -> ~BDt).`

`And the soul find this trial: S4Grz proves Dt, but of course with Dt`

`the dual of its knowledge operator. The B and D have different meaning`

`than the B and D of G and G*.`

Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement willprevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a badthing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1pindeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire "universes"in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change ofimmortality via digital uploading.Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is stillcompatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the sameas if it was wrong...I am not so sure. I think that the way that QM systems arelinear will still allow substitution, but not in the usual way ofthinking. The problem that I see is the lack of understanding ofQM's implications.Comp does not assume QM. It is just not part of the theory. Andthen the reasoning shows that as far as QM is a physically correctlaw, it has to be derived from comp.I need more detail on this as I do not understand what you meanby "COMP does not assume QM".

? It just means that the axiom of QM is not part of the theory.

As far as I understand, COMP makes any theory of a physical world amatter of 1p contingency and choice,

`The exact contrary. COMP makes physics a theorem in arithmetic. It`

`concerns the correct inference of universal numbers on the universal`

`numbers which can support it persistently. Physics is not contingent`

`at all.`

therefore whether one is considering "the physics of the world" asequal to "Newtonian Physics" or equal to "Quantum physics" isliterally irrelevant. It seems to abandon the entire idea ofphysical world with their conservation and motion laws as somesecondary afterthought. This is to be expected for any version ofIdeal monism.

`Comp refute this. You can guess this already with just UDA. The UD`

`structure is the same for all numbers, and the statistics on`

`computations is the same for all machines.`

To understand comp, you have to abstract yourself of any *theory*on the physical reality. It is easy, if you grasp Church thesis,which makes the definition of computation general enough, andpurely arithmetical.While that it true, this "abstraction" cannot go so far as toremove you from the theory completely or one will have a theory thatis incomprehensible.

`Which theory? I am saying only that we have to abstract from the`

`physical theory, which is what we do when we do math.`

I hope Quentin will not mind too much I answered the questionaddressed to him.I hope also this helps a bit. You should try to have a completeunderstanding of the UDA, which asks only for a passiveunderstanding of Church thesis and of universal Turing machine,before digging on the more complex translation of UDA inarithmetical terms, where the billions of confusions possible arehandled by the nuances made obligatory by the subtle counter-intuitive logics of self-reference.I am interested in the long range implications of COMP, that iswhere I see the best chance of testing its veracity.

`Either the physical reality confirms the physics of the arbitrary`

`machine (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*), or it refutes it.`

I like COMP, it is very elegant and expressive but seems to haveseveral blind spots - issues that it does not even consider.

`You forget again that the goal is to express the mind-body problem in`

`the comp framework. First things to grasp: if comp is correct, then`

`physics is a branch of number theory. I just show that comp makes the`

`mind-body problem two times more difficult than usual, because now, we`

`have to justified not just the qualia, but the (appearance of) quanta`

`too. The result of UDA and AUDA are sequences of mathematical problems.`

In my humble opinion this is a problem if it is to be taken asproviding a ontological level explanation of the nature ofExistence. I have spent a lot of time investigating the problem oftime in physics and that time spent has made me very sensitive,perhaps overly so, to the ontological implications of this problem.It is my fervent hope that your beautiful result could be expandedso as to be able to address in a more focused way the problem of time.

And the problem of space, energy, gravitation, etc.

`The whole physics *is* the problem. That it is a problem *is* the`

`result.`

`I have never pretended that comp is the answer. I show that comp makes`

`possible to formulate the problem. The physical time is an entire open`

`problem, but the logic of duration can perhaps be said to be solved,`

`by the S4Grz1 logic, and its temporal arithmetic intuitionist`

`interpretation.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.