Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/31/2012 11:11 AM, David Nyman wrote: The alternative to this analysis is to abandon MWI (or comp) as inconsistent with the empirical facts. This is the tack Kent in fact adopts, proposing a mechanism for the pruning of all but one of the alternative branches, I think he just proposes pruning the density matrix cross-terms by some mechanism. Once they are gone then the realized branch is just 'selected' stochasitcally per the Born rule. I've often contemplated such a move based on the idea that there be a smallest non-zero quantum of probability; but I've not seen a way to make that work. Brent in the absence of which he clearly feels the empirical facts cannot be justified. I don't happen to agree with his reasons, but such a proposal is consistent with his view of the likely subjective consequences of duplication. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 1 April 2012 07:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think he just proposes pruning the density matrix cross-terms by some mechanism. Once they are gone then the realized branch is just 'selected' stochasitcally per the Born rule. I've often contemplated such a move based on the idea that there be a smallest non-zero quantum of probability; but I've not seen a way to make that work. Thanks for that clarification. That being said, he is nevertheless explicit that the crucial distinction between what he wants to suggest and MWI is that only one branch can be considered as having been actualised. Given his scepticism about Wallace's analysis of the probable subjective consequences of duplication, this is what he feels he needs for his scheme to be plausible in the face of the empirical facts. By the way, the reasons he gives for that scepticism seem to me to imply some sort of individuated crypto-dualism. For example, he says that Wallace doesn't address the possibility that future copies might be subjectively discontinuous with the you that exists presently; consequently that particular you could be consigned to subjective oblivion. He concedes that, whether considered physically or informationally, the copies possess every feature that presently determines your empirical self-identification. The conjunction of these two stipulations suggests that, despite everything, some personal essence is not copied; rather, each doppelganger acquires its own freshly minted personal self-hood, and yours is annihilated. I've attempted to conceive how one might put this to the test, even in imagination, but I've not come up with anything. This kind of rampant confusion over pronouns is the chief reason I favour the universal mind heuristic as a way of conceiving the subjective state of affairs. In terms of this heuristic, I always denotes the unique but discontinuous subjectivity of an infinity of self-ordering personal histories. Since the subjective locus is not itself subject to change, every perspective is mine, but not all perspectives are associated with David Nyman. It may seem strange at first, but it unravels surprisingly many of the conceptual puzzles. David On 3/31/2012 11:11 AM, David Nyman wrote: The alternative to this analysis is to abandon MWI (or comp) as inconsistent with the empirical facts. This is the tack Kent in fact adopts, proposing a mechanism for the pruning of all but one of the alternative branches, I think he just proposes pruning the density matrix cross-terms by some mechanism. Once they are gone then the realized branch is just 'selected' stochasitcally per the Born rule. I've often contemplated such a move based on the idea that there be a smallest non-zero quantum of probability; but I've not seen a way to make that work. Brent in the absence of which he clearly feels the empirical facts cannot be justified. I don't happen to agree with his reasons, but such a proposal is consistent with his view of the likely subjective consequences of duplication. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is my observational perspective associated with my brain? It's only a mystery out of nothing if you have already accepted as unproblematic the primitive existence of my brain. Even given the assumption of a primitive micro-physicality, we lack any purely PHYSICAL principle capable of making a fundamental ontological distinction between the generalised ensemble in its entirety, and any specifically-isolated composite object. The ascription of composite brain-hood to some domain of the micro-physical ensemble is an a posteriori ascription from an already-established observational perspective. Hence to attribute said perspective to an epiphenomenon of such an ascription amounts to putting the ontological cart before the epistemological horse. David On 3/30/2012 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 30 March 2012 19:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: The problem with all this (as Kent makes explicit) is that there is nothing in the mathematics of the game physics that corresponds to this kind of momentary selection of subjective localisation. Unfortunately, his own proposal doesn't really solve the underlying problem, because although it can account, given the experimental situation, for my seeing spin-up and not spin-down (because the other doesn't objectively exist any longer) it cannot account for why the experience is of David making this observation rather than Brent It does if you think experience is an epiphenomena of physics. Brent and David are different physical systems and only one is looking at the system. Sure, but even if one believes that to be the case, it is still taken entirely for granted that there is some natural principle for the selection of THIS physical system from the class of all such systems. ?? I guess I don't understand the question. If my experience is a process in my brain then what more selection is required? To appeal, a posteriori, to the fact that one's observational perspective is apparently associated with this particular system and not any other is merely to argue in a circle; since that is what we are trying to explain we cannot adduce it as the explanation. That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is my observational perspective associated with my brain? Brent As I said before, the requirement for some principle of selection, in this sense, is rarely made explicit, but nonetheless implicitly relied on. More often than not our particular localisation in space and time has been consigned to the realm of psychology or illusion, as in Einstein's reputed remark, as though it were somehow possible to disarm this inconvenient observational fact with scare quotes. So what intrigued me about Hoyle's idea (and according to Gribbin it was rather more than a fictional conceit for him) was precisely that his making it explicit exposed an elephant in the room that few others were prepared to acknowledge. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed with an incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute. Harry tells Dick that the replacement has been entirely successful: After the operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now. My memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever. Dick is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong Kong) but over a period of several months of careful observation he finds he can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new clockwork personality and his former self. Their friendship is undiminished. This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors - Dick is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain condition. Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as Harry? He is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of Harry's successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the doctor shows him several other before and after videos with equally convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but the doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented sophistication and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is rather persuaded by the computational theory of mind. Trouble is, the doctor is not of this persuasion. He tells Dick that the goal of the operation is only to substitute a clockwork analogue for the electro-chemical mechanisms of his organic brain, and that on this basis Dick can confidently expect that the same inputs will reliably elicit the same responses as before. Hearing this, Dick is now worried that, however successful the replacement of Harry's brain has been behaviourally, his friend is now essentially a mindless clockwork mechanism. Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed with an incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute. Harry tells Dick that the replacement has been entirely successful: After the operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now. My memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever. Dick is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong Kong) but over a period of several months of careful observation he finds he can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new clockwork personality and his former self. Their friendship is undiminished. This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors - Dick is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain condition. Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as Harry? He is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of Harry's successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the doctor shows him several other before and after videos with equally convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but the doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented sophistication and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is rather persuaded by the computational theory of mind. Trouble is, the doctor is not of this persuasion. He tells Dick that the goal of the operation is only to substitute a clockwork analogue for the electro-chemical mechanisms of his organic brain, and that on this basis Dick can confidently expect that the same inputs will reliably elicit the same responses as before. Hearing this, Dick is now worried that, however successful the replacement of Harry's brain has been behaviourally, his friend is now essentially a mindless clockwork mechanism. Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David It seems to me the question is if someone should bet in COMP. If Dick had trouble assigning consciousness to Harry because Dick was a solipsist then he might have a hard time betting on COMP. Of course, your post does not suggest that Dick had such an opinion, but it is just one of many unfalsifiable viewpoints (since one cannot know of any other consciousness than their own), but not something which we think is likely (by induction on observed behavior and its similarity to our internal states). If Dick thinks mechanism (COMP) is true, that is, the subjective experience that he has corresponds to the inside view of some abstract structure or process which is implemented in his brain. That is, that his brain does not have any magical properties that make it conscious and the fact that conscious experience that one has appear to place us relative to a physical brain (by induction). By induction we can also observe that changing our brain through medicine or drugs or other methods (for example, consider a thought experiment about the nature of consciousness when only small parts change: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ) also changes our conscious experience, but it shouldn't if whatever we change doesn't change our functionality. Not accepting that will result in all kinds of strange partial philosophical zombies, which to many people don't make sense, but Dick would have to decide for himself if they make sense for him or not - maybe even experiment on himself, after all, the COMP doctor is available. Dick should also consider the UDA and the proof that mechanism is incompatible with materialism (since Dick assumes the existence of mind and consciousness by default, I'm not considering that option here). If Dick thinks COMP is worth betting on, he now only has to worry about one thing: did his doctor choose the right substitution level? If the
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
David, acw, On 01 Apr 2012, at 16:36, acw wrote: On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed with an incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute. Harry tells Dick that the replacement has been entirely successful: After the operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now. My memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever. Dick is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong Kong) but over a period of several months of careful observation he finds he can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new clockwork personality and his former self. Their friendship is undiminished. This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors - Dick is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain condition. Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as Harry? He is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of Harry's successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the doctor shows him several other before and after videos with equally convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but the doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented sophistication and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is rather persuaded by the computational theory of mind. Trouble is, the doctor is not of this persuasion. He tells Dick that the goal of the operation is only to substitute a clockwork analogue for the electro-chemical mechanisms of his organic brain, and that on this basis Dick can confidently expect that the same inputs will reliably elicit the same responses as before. Hearing this, Dick is now worried that, however successful the replacement of Harry's brain has been behaviourally, his friend is now essentially a mindless clockwork mechanism. Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David It seems to me the question is if someone should bet in COMP. David, I agree with acw. If you bet in comp, it does not matter the computer is run with clockworks, or with the chinese population, abstracting to the facts that the artificial brains run in real time, which means relatively to us and the neighborhood. So the real question, admitting the truth of comp, will rely in the choice of the substitution level. Now, it seems to me Dick should ask Harry and Harry's wife and friends if everything is fine with him. Then it is will be only a matter of personal conviction, and bet on the level of substitution. (abstracting from the fact that the real choice will be between some PC or APPLE, with different price, and softs, and the applications for the galactic-net, on which you can download yourself with reasonable self-quantum cryptographical protection. If Dick had trouble assigning consciousness to Harry because Dick was a solipsist then he might have a hard time betting on COMP. Of course, your post does not suggest that Dick had such an opinion, but it is just one of many unfalsifiable viewpoints (since one cannot know of any other consciousness than their own), but not something which we think is likely (by induction on observed behavior and its similarity to our internal states). If Dick thinks mechanism (COMP) is true, that is, the subjective experience that he has corresponds to the inside view of some abstract structure or process which is implemented in his brain. That is, that his brain does not have any magical properties that make it conscious and the fact that conscious experience that one has appear to place us relative to a physical brain (by induction). By induction we can also observe that changing our brain through medicine or drugs
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a sort of zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry and his doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he bet on comp, the nature of the ultimate consituants of what do the computation, relatively to its usual environments, does not matter. Yes, once one has bet on comp, the distinction between software and hardware is one of relative level rather than fundamental ontology. You appear to confirm my thought that the best evidence that the replacement brain implements the right computation is its behaviour, and hence that of the recipient. So Dick can only rely on his assessment of Harry's behaviour to give him confidence for his own bet on this particular doctor's expertise. However, given the potential for getting the substitution level wrong in some way, and the finite nature of any possible test, just how much can Dick trust that his friend hasn't been affected in some hard-to-detect way, despite all his assurances to the contrary? As you observe, this may well become a pragmatic, as opposed to merely philosophical, issue in the not-too-distant future. Suffice it to say, I'm unlikely to be an early adopter! David David, acw, On 01 Apr 2012, at 16:36, acw wrote: On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed with an incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute. Harry tells Dick that the replacement has been entirely successful: After the operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now. My memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever. Dick is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong Kong) but over a period of several months of careful observation he finds he can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new clockwork personality and his former self. Their friendship is undiminished. This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors - Dick is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain condition. Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as Harry? He is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of Harry's successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the doctor shows him several other before and after videos with equally convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but the doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented sophistication and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is rather persuaded by the computational theory of mind. Trouble is, the doctor is not of this persuasion. He tells Dick that the goal of the operation is only to substitute a clockwork analogue for the electro-chemical mechanisms of his organic brain, and that on this basis Dick can confidently expect that the same inputs will reliably elicit the same responses as before. Hearing this, Dick is now worried that, however successful the replacement of Harry's brain has been behaviourally, his friend is now essentially a mindless clockwork mechanism. Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David It seems to me the question is if someone should bet in COMP. David, I agree with acw. If you bet in comp, it does not matter the computer is run with clockworks, or with the chinese population, abstracting to the facts that the artificial brains run in real time, which means relatively to us and the neighborhood. So the real question, admitting the truth of comp, will rely in the choice of the substitution level. Now, it seems to me Dick should ask Harry and Harry's wife and friends if
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
Hello Stephen, On 31 Mar 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/31/2012 3:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp is just the assumption that we are machine, to said it shortly. Then it is shown as a consequence that not only we cannot neglect the physical reality, but that we have to retrieve it from arithmetic, without using any probabilistic *selection*. Comp is the problem, not the solution. Only the materialist believe wrongly that comp solves the mind problem, and *they* take matter for granted. Pretending that comp neglects problem is contrary to the facts, because comp just shows precisely where the problems come from (the taking granted of the physical reality). Bruno Dear Bruno, I wish I could feel comfortable with such a focused area so that we can neglect all other considerations. I agree with your judgement about materialists, but am not so sanguine about the idealist as having all the answers. Nobody said that the idealist has all answers. If comp is true, he has only all questions, really, so to speak. What is said is that IF comp is true, then we are necessarily lead to arithmetical (or equivalent) idealism. That's the result. Idealism is not part of the comp assumption. It is part of the theorem. Comp has to be idealist. If you belief, for whatever reason, that idealism is false, then COMP is false. You can't survive with a digital, even material, brain, by virtue of a physical computer emulating your brain at some level. My motivations are different from yours. I am wrestling with the ontological implications of physics and so our interests cross in many places. Only if comp is part of your theory. I have not yet seen any real, precise, non comp theory, so I cannot judge them. I have proposed an alternative ontology theory that appears to solve the mind-body problem without having to resort to epiphenomena, which by your own admission infects both materialism and idealism. You forget many of our discussions. Comp, + the usual Occam, leads to the disappearance of matter. Matter does not become an epiphenomenon, for its observation becomes a psychological or biological or (better imo) theological phenomenon. There are no epiphenomena. Materialists which are not eliminating consciousness makes often it into an epiphenomenon, because they admit it exists. But comp makes primitive matter into pure and simple non existence. You can reintroduce it logically, and that would make it into an epinoumenon, like invisible horses driving car, or ether, or phlogistic. That's different. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On 01 Apr 2012, at 18:12, David Nyman wrote: On 1 April 2012 16:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: David, if Dick does not have the impression that Harry has became a sort of zombie of some kind, for a time, I would suggest he trusts Harry and his doctor. If he is prepared to bet on comp. Once he bet on comp, the nature of the ultimate consituants of what do the computation, relatively to its usual environments, does not matter. Yes, once one has bet on comp, the distinction between software and hardware is one of relative level rather than fundamental ontology. You appear to confirm my thought that the best evidence that the replacement brain implements the right computation is its behaviour, and hence that of the recipient. So Dick can only rely on his assessment of Harry's behaviour to give him confidence for his own bet on this particular doctor's expertise. Yes, I am afraid that this will be all we have to rely on. And the situation might be difficult with the first artificial brain, with people saying after some month that they have survive but that something is different, without being able to be precise on what it is, like explaining the effect of a slight alcohol buzz to someone having never drank. If you assume comp, you should not be afraid to be mechanical at some level, because that is what is stipulated at the start. But you might fear that the doctor is enough close to the right level for having a behavior close to normal, but with slight difference, which might, or not matter. Would you say yes to Harris doctor, to get the same model of artificial brain, in case Harris behave very differently, but still say that he is glad having done the transplant. What if Harris says to Dick, look, it is not as good as my organic brain, but I still enjoy a lot of things, and it seems to me better than being dead, so I would suggest you go for it Hard question. But not unrelated to deciding to suicide or not after a dramatic accidents. Real life is full of very hard questions. Comp will leads to more and more hard question of that type. However, given the potential for getting the substitution level wrong in some way, and the finite nature of any possible test, just how much can Dick trust that his friend hasn't been affected in some hard-to-detect way, despite all his assurances to the contrary? As you observe, this may well become a pragmatic, as opposed to merely philosophical, issue in the not-too-distant future. Suffice it to say, I'm unlikely to be an early adopter! Very wise decision. The pioneer of terrestrial immortality might suffer indeed, first from the inadequacy of the first artificial brains, including not quite correct choice of level, second from the inadequacy of the secret encryption making them prone to be reconstituted by the soul pirates of the future. An artificial brain is like a password, you better have to keep it hidden. Bruno David David, acw, On 01 Apr 2012, at 16:36, acw wrote: On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed with an incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute. Harry tells Dick that the replacement has been entirely successful: After the operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now. My memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever. Dick is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong Kong) but over a period of several months of careful observation he finds he can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new clockwork personality and his former self. Their friendship is undiminished. This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors - Dick is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain condition. Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as Harry? He is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of Harry's successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the doctor shows him several other before and after videos with equally convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but the doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented sophistication and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is rather
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On 4/1/2012 6:33 AM, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. Suppose Dick's friend Harry, having been previously diagnosed with an incurable brain cancer, has had an artificial brain installed. The doctor tells Dick that he has replaced Harry's brain with a (very sophisticated!) battery-driven clockwork substitute. Harry tells Dick that the replacement has been entirely successful: After the operation I felt a little woozy at first, but I feel great now. My memory is excellent - if anything better than before - and my appreciation of the finer things in life is as vivid as ever. Dick is a bit sceptical at first (his faith in clockwork has been prejudiced by a rather unreliable fake Rolex he bought in Hong Kong) but over a period of several months of careful observation he finds he can't distinguish any difference whatsoever between Harry's new clockwork personality and his former self. Their friendship is undiminished. This turns out to be just as well, because - horror of horrors - Dick is shortly afterwards also diagnosed with a terminal brain condition. Should he now be willing to submit to the same procedure as Harry? He is still a little sceptical of clockwork, but the evidence of Harry's successful transformation is very difficult to discount, and the doctor shows him several other before and after videos with equally convincing outcomes. The artificial brains may be clockwork, but the doctor assures him it is clockwork of unprecedented sophistication and precision, unheard of even in the hallowed halls of Swiss horology. Dick has stumbled across the Everything List, and is rather persuaded by the computational theory of mind. Trouble is, the doctor is not of this persuasion. He tells Dick that the goal of the operation is only to substitute a clockwork analogue for the electro-chemical mechanisms of his organic brain, and that on this basis Dick can confidently expect that the same inputs will reliably elicit the same responses as before. Hearing this, Dick is now worried that, however successful the replacement of Harry's brain has been behaviourally, his friend is now essentially a mindless clockwork mechanism. Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David Go for it. The important thing is the computational interaction with the world (including one's own body). If the world is analog fine. Bruno thinks a digital substitution will work because a digital computation can emulate an analog to any specified precision - but they are not identical. If the world is digital the converse works too, the analog clockwork can emulate the digital. Although I think that upsets some of Bruno's inferences that depend on provability. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive, micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line. No argument from me on that! But, in the light of epistemology first, can you make any sense of the notion of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of its own constructions? David On 4/1/2012 4:55 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is my observational perspective associated with my brain? It's only a mystery out of nothing if you have already accepted as unproblematic the primitive existence of my brain. Even given the assumption of a primitive micro-physicality, we lack any purely PHYSICAL principle capable of making a fundamental ontological distinction between the generalised ensemble in its entirety, and any specifically-isolated composite object. The ascription of composite brain-hood to some domain of the micro-physical ensemble is an a posteriori ascription from an already-established observational perspective. Hence to attribute said perspective to an epiphenomenon of such an ascription amounts to putting the ontological cart before the epistemological horse. David I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive, micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)
On 4/1/2012 1:28 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 1 April 2012 21:02, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive, micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line. No argument from me on that! But, in the light of epistemology first, can you make any sense of the notion of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of its own constructions? No sure. But if I do succeed in that, starting from being conscious of stuff, I can follow the chain back to consciousness. I don't need to forget where I came from. Brent Hence a Reality, yes. But not necessarily a physical reality. Here is the logical dependence: NUMBERS - MACHINE DREAMS - PHYSICAL - HUMANS - PHYSICS - NUMBERS. --- Bruno Marchal David On 4/1/2012 4:55 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 31 March 2012 01:09, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote: That seems like conjuring a mystery out of nothing. Is your question why is my observational perspective associated with my brain? It's only a mystery out of nothing if you have already accepted as unproblematic the primitive existence of my brain. Even given the assumption of a primitive micro-physicality, we lack any purely PHYSICAL principle capable of making a fundamental ontological distinction between the generalised ensemble in its entirety, and any specifically-isolated composite object. The ascription of composite brain-hood to some domain of the micro-physical ensemble is an a posteriori ascription from an already-established observational perspective. Hence to attribute said perspective to an epiphenomenon of such an ascription amounts to putting the ontological cart before the epistemological horse. David I'm all in favor of epistemology first. But that means point-of-view comes first, and only some things happen comes second. The primitive, micro-physical ensemble is an ontological assumption way down the line. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. ... Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David Counter intuitively, he should say no to the doctor, regardless of whether he believes in COMP or not-COMP. If COMP is true, COMP immortality is true, and Dick will survive the cancer whether he gets his brain replaced or not. If COMP is not true, then he is committing suicide. Cheers. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On 4/2/2012 00:43, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. ... Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David Counter intuitively, he should say no to the doctor, regardless of whether he believes in COMP or not-COMP. If COMP is true, COMP immortality is true, and Dick will survive the cancer whether he gets his brain replaced or not. If COMP is not true, then he is committing suicide. I don't think it's that simple. COMP immortality would mean that he would survive, but the real question isn't if he will experience continuity to a state where he survives, but what is the probability that he well experience a future state where he doesn't become amnesiac or lose details he doesn't want to lose. A substitution at the right level (with the cancer removed) would let most of his continuations be those where he survives without amnesia. Him betting on COMP immortality (without doctor's help, only relying on white rabbits) might work, but the measure of him surviving unchanged or in a manner that he would prefer might be smaller than that with a correct digital substitution. However, the practical question is indeed if the doctor got the details right. If the doctor got it very wrong, he should still expect to survive the operation in some really unusual way (with or without digital brain). Cheers. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains
On 4/1/2012 4:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about game physics got me thinking about this distinction, if indeed there is one. ... Since he certainly doesn't want to suffer such an indignity, should he say no to the doctor? The question that troubles Dick is whether, assuming comp, he should accept a genuinely behaviourally-indistinguishable body, irrespective of its brain being organic or clockwork, as an equivalent avatar according to the rules of the comp game-physics. If so, Dick should have no reason not to accept a behaviourally-indistinguishable, clockwork-equipped body as enabling his continued manifestation relative to the familiar environments to which he has become so emotionally attached. Time is short, and he must act. What should he do? David Counter intuitively, he should say no to the doctor, regardless of whether he believes in COMP or not-COMP. If COMP is true, COMP immortality is true, and Dick will survive the cancer whether he gets his brain replaced or not. If COMP is not true, then he is committing suicide. Which may be preferable to dying of brain cancer. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
