divine selection versus natural selection
Hi Bruno Marchal According to the Bible, belief is a product of faith or trust, and that trust does not come from you, it is a gift from God. We have nothing to do with it, at least that isa what we Lutherns believe. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-19, 08:26:10 Subject: Re: The I Ching, a cominatorically complete hyperlinked semanticfield(mind). On 19 Aug 2012, at 11:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: The barrier between religion and ordinary life, like the one that suppossedly exist between gods and ordinary life is conventiona. If it is true that men have an instinct for religion, this is not governed by a switch that is put on when in a temple or when it is reading esoteric teachings. It is on all the time and in everyone. I agree. I make a case that all correct machine are theological. The reason is that such machine, when looking inward (as they can do by self-reference) can guess that there is something transcending them. What produces this need of the soul or this innate instinct of the human nature?. It may produce organized relgion, but also politics and ideology. The brain areas excited by the appearance of the Pope in a group of believers are the same that are excited in ecologists when Al Gore appears. In the past there were no separation between both phenomena. This is an mostly Occidental division. But it is also a natural division. When machine get theological, from their perspective it looks like those kind of things are different. And at some level they are. I think that the conflict is already reflected in the left brain / right brain difference. Perhaps between woman and man, east and west, yin and yang. Take any machine, she will develop those two poles. the schizophreny appears only when one pole believes to be more right than the other pole. The cult of personality in socialist countries and the sectarian movements (either political or religious) are new editions of the fundamentally Unitarian nature of religion and politics. So, then, gods and adivines have been and will be here forever. I concur. When a name for them is discredited, they appear with new names and within new organization. Absolutely. Some atheists sects can copy some clergy ritual at the level of the microcospic details, and also the authoritative arguments. I am thinking to some atheist masonic lodges (not all). The modern Global warming alarmism is an episode of adivination by makin illegitimate use of science. the Marxism was a scholastic school of Masters of Reality that claimed predicitive powers over the story of Humanity. The gigantic photographs of Marx Lenin in the URSS parliament is an example of religious temple of Atheism. But also the small photograph or a loving one in the dormitory carries out a religious sense, Specially if it passed away and it was a greath influence in our lives. Religion is everywhere and forever. OK. But it can progress. The authoritative argument in science and religion is a rest of our mammals reflex. Dogs and wolves needs leaders, for reason of a long biological past story. It makes sense for short term goal, like it makes sense to obey to orders in the military situation. But it is really an handicap for the long run. And that means that authoritative arguments will disappear, in the long run, or we will disappear, like the dinosaurs. Natural selection can select good things for the short terms, and throw them away later. What will not disappear is science and religion. Religion and spirituality will be more and more prevalent, and play a role of private goal, and science will be more and more understood as the best tool to approximate that spiritual goal. I think. To fight fundamentalism in religion, theology should go back to the academy (which like democracy is the worst institution except for all others!). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The logic of agendas
Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy and all The logic of an Agenda is purposeful or goal-oriented, what Aristotle called final causation. where an object is PULLED forward by a goal. By what should be. This is the opposite of efficient causation, as in determinism, in which objects are PUSHED forward. By what is. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-19, 15:14:47 Subject: Re: On puppet governors On Sun, Aug 19, 2012 at 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Aug 2012, at 17:55, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 14:46, Roger wrote: But humans are not entirely governed from outside, they have their own agendas. We have a top level agenda: maximise self-satisfaction, and minimize self-dissatisfaction. This can be programmed in very few lines, but needs a very long time to bring sophisticated being like us.? But doesn't concept or computation of self makes this statement on self's agenda much less clear than it looks? Is self some conceptual cartoon or program, like individual isolated humanist bag-of-flesh + brain soup, a consumer in a market with bank account, a career, set of personal experiences, a class idea, is it a tribal idea, or is it some esoteric notion of Gaian world soul, a family notion etc.? It is more like a control structure. The self is really defined by the ability of some program to refer to their own code, even in the course of a computation, like an amoeba can build another similar amoeba. Or like when you look into a mirror and recognize yourself. It is the third person self, like in I have two legs. Then the math shows that a non nameable deeper self is attached with it, and obeys a different logic (the soul). Satisfying oneself, in nature, is mainly drinking when thirsty, eating when hungry, mating, peeing, etc.? But with its big neocortex, the man has made things more complex. By incompleteness (or akin) he is never fully satisfied, want more, get addicted, refer to authorities, and then to forget how happiness is easy. Convincing, but I am less sure. Particularly because 1p perspective has apparently many selves (the list I mentioned: bag of flesh, consumer, career, family, citizen etc.) and the distinction between self and other is subject to transformation. Sometimes boundaries are insurmountable and sometimes they vanish. Time influences this perhaps. But according to you, building on incompleteness, if we forget/ignore G?el and comp enough, happiness is easier :) This is not good marketing. m ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
Hi Stephen P. King Mereology is part and parcel of Leibniz's system, to use a limp pun. 1) Although unproven, but because God is good while the world is contingent (imperfect, misfitting), Leibniz, like Augustine and Paul, believed that things as a whole work for good, but unfortunately not all parts have to be equally good. This is essentially his theodicy. 2). Everything is nonlocal: The monads are arranged like a tree structure leading up to the Supreme Monad, above which is God, causing all things to happen and perceiving all things. Now Man, being near the top of the Great Chain of Being, and the perceptions of each monad are being constantly and instantly updated to reflect the perceptions all of the other monads in the universe, So, to the degree of their logical distance from one another, their intelligence, and clarity of vision, each monad is omniscient. Personally I use the analogy of the holograph, each part contining the whole, but wqith limited resolution. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-18, 17:34:30 Subject: Re: Monads as computing elements Dear Roger, From what I have studied of Leibniz' Monadology and commentary by many authors, it seems to me that all appearances of interactions is given purely in terms of synchronizations of the internal action of the monads. This synchronization or co-ordination seems very similar to Bruno's Bpp idea but for an apriori given plurality of Monads. I identify the computational aspect of the Monad with a unitary evolution transformation (in a linear algebra on topological spaces). I have been investigating whether or not it might be possible to define the mereology of monads in terms of the way that QM systems become and unbecome entangled with each other. Have you seen any similar references to this latter idea? On 8/18/2012 11:58 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, as Leibniz puts it, you couldn't tell the difference, they would seem to have windows, but actually, since substances, being logical entities, cannot actually interact, they all must communicate instead through the supreme monad, (the CPU) which presumably reads and writes on them. I think they are like subprograms, with storage files, which can't do anything by themselves, but must be operated on by the CPU according to their current perceptions (stored state data) which reflect all of the other stored state date in the universe of monads. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the best possible solution.
Hi Stephen P. King The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the best possible solution. And contain absolute as well as contingent truths. Thus there must be some sort of mereology involved in the modalities. Maybe a new type of copula insuring this situation to hold ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-20, 01:02:41 Subject: Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense On 8/19/2012 6:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2012 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/19/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I understand that 2+2 = 4. I still cannot explain how and why I understand 2+2 = 4. 2+2=4 is easy. I understand 2+2=4 is quasi infinitely more complex. Dear Bruno, As I see it, the quasi-infiitely more complex aspect of I understand that 2+2=4 follows, at least, from the requirement that many entities capable of making such statements can point to examples of 2+2=4 and communicate about such statements with each other however far away in space and time they are from each other. We can ignore the fact that there is a collection of entities to whom the statement I understand that 2+2=4 has a meaning. You need to get a grip on the nature of meaningfulness. Searle has tried to do this with his Chinese Room idea but failed to communicate the concept. :_( Maybe Bruno will introduce a new modality to his logic Up=Understands p. :-) Brent -- Hi Brent, That would be wonderful if possible. AFAIK, understanding is contingent on demonstrability, e.g. I understand p if and only if I can demonstrate that p implies q and q is not trivial and q is true in the same context as p. I think that Bruno's idea of interviewing a machine is a form of demonstration as I am trying to define it here. In my thesis, demonstrability requires that the model to be demonstrated is actually implemented in at least one possible physical world (i.e. satisfies thermodynamic laws and Shannon information theory) otherwise it could be used to implement a Maxwell Demon. BTW, it was an analysis of Maxwell's Demon that lead me to my current ideas, that abstract computation requires that at least one physical system actually can implement it. This is not ultrafinitism since I am allowing for an uncountable infinity of physical worlds, but almost none of them are accessible to each other (there exist event horizons, etc.). Consider the case where a computation X is generating an exact simulation of the behavior of molecules in a two compartment tank with a valve and there exists a computer Y that can use the output of X to control the valve. We can easily see that X could be a subroutine of Y. If the control of Y leads to an exact partition of the fast (hot) and slow (cold) molecules and this difference can be used to run Y then some might argue that we would have a computation for free situation. The problem is that for the hot/cold difference to be exploited to do work the entire apparatus would have to be coupled to a heat reservoir that would absorb the waste energy generated by the work. Heat Reservoirs are interesting beasts If your computer simulation is acting as Maxwell's demon then you don't need a heat reservoir. Hi Brent, Good point. I stand corrected! But did my remark about understanding make any sense to you? I am trying to work out the implication of the idea of Boolean algebras as entities capable of evolving and interacting as it is a key postulate of the idea that I am researching. The Maxwell Demon is just a nice and handy toy model of this idea, IMHO. Could the Maxwell Computational Demon understand what it is doing? We could add the capacity to have a self-model as a subroutine and thus a way to gauge its actual efficiency against a theoretical standard as a way to implement a choice mechanism... See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehno85yI-sA for a discussion of this self-modeling idea. The demon makes one tank hot an the other cold so a heat engine runs on the difference. Yes, the demon would act in a cycle: Compute the simulation to operate the valve to segregate the hot from cold and then use the heat engine to charge a battery, discharging the difference in temperatures. Can this run forever? No, given real world things like friction and the wearing out of parts, but in the idea case it might seem to be able to run for ever. Unfortunately this is impossible because such a simulation would require defining the initial state of the particle's position and momentum in the two tanks. This is not available for free. To determine it by measurement takes at least as much free energy as can be recovered after implementing Maxwell's demon. The idea case would shift the
Godel and Leibniz's contingent world
Hi Stephen P. King Ah so. I can point leibniz's critics to Godel. And to the contingency of the world. What did you expect ? A rose garden ? Leibniz sort of sensed Godel's theorem by his recognition that while things must be perfect in Heaven, down here things were contingent, iffy, troublesome, imperfectly fitting and imperfect in the small, but optimal in the large. There were reaslons behind each event, but they needn't entirely jibe with one another. And even the reasons were mutually contingent. What a mess. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-18, 17:37:52 Subject: Re: Russell's possibly defective understanding of Leibniz. Or was itLeibniz's fault ? On 8/18/2012 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Aug 2012, at 16:41, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? Admittedly, the more I dig into Leibniz, the more questions I have. But I won't abandon him yet, thinking I misunderstood one of his statements.? Or perhaps Russell misunderstood what Leibniz meant. ? According to Russell, Complete set of predicates means?sufficient,?omplete?n a minimal sense. Like sufficient reason I suppose. Or Occam's razor. Or the truth should be simple. Thus Socrates was a man?s? proposition which is, as a proposition, thus a substance. This is tied into necessary reason, always either true or false. So I think the better definition is Complete and unchanging set of predicates ? So because The horse was lame may not always have been true, it is possibly contingent (is only a current fact), so?s a proposition it cannot be a substance as far as we know.? ? None of this can be true, however, since?ost things will change with time. The conclusion is that Russell may be wrong,?hat nothing?be a substance.? Yet Leibniz says the universe is made up entirely of monads, and monads are substances by definition. ? For Leibniz, the universe is made up of an infinite number of simple substances ... ? Perhaps Leibniz meant the world I refer to in my philosophy... He did not count time and space for excample as monads. Russell was still believing that the mathematical reality was axiomatizable.? G?el did not just destroyed Hilbert's program, but also a large part of the antic conception of platonism, including a large part of Russelm's conception. After G?el and Turing, after Post and Kleene, we know that the arithmetical Platonia is *full* of life, but also typhoons, black holes, and many things.? There is a Skolem paradox, which needs model theory to be made precise: arithmetic is enumerable, nevertheless, when seen by machines from inside, it is not. It is *very* big. I respect a lot people like Leibniz and Russell. Leibniz, by many token, was closer to the discovery of the universal numbers/machines than Russell, despite Babbage. Comp is still close to Russell's philosophy of numbers but departs from his philosophy of sets. Leibniz needs just to be relativized, imo, by allowing accessibilty relations, or neighborhood relations between worlds/realities (shared dream/vido-game, somehow). Comp does not let much choice in the matter, anyway. We are confronted with a big problem, but we can, actually we have to, translate it in arithmetic, once we assume comp. Bruno Dear Bruno, ?? I think that Leibniz' Monads can be relativized by defining the equivalence relation in their mereology with a bisimulation function. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
Hi meekerdb All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier. Heaven is what should be, down here is what is. This conflict earns preachers a nice life. The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by resurrecting Him. IMHO. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-18, 15:04:00 Subject: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy? Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk. Abstract: David Hume argued that values are the projections of natural human desires, and that moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of society. Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour and neuroscience explain why humans have such desires, and hence provide support for a Humean approach to moral psychology and moral philosophy. However, few philosophers have been willing to pursue this naturalistic approach to ethics for fear that it commits something called ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that none of them present an obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical naturalism. http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep04234247.pdf Brent On 8/18/2012 8:08 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism, and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is ought to be and Aristotle is is in fact. There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven (thy Kingdom come.). This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between is and should be. He said he knew of no way to go from is to should be. Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker so ihe's worth quoting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739): In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.[1] Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly can an ought be derived from an is? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible.[2] This complete severing of is from ought has been given the graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine.[3] Implications The apparent gap between is statements and ought statements, when combined with Hume's fork, renders ought statements of dubious validity. Hume's fork is the idea that all items of knowledge are either based on logic and definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then ought statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and non-cognitivism work with such conclusions. The is–ought problem has been recognised as an important issue for the validity of secular ethics and their defense from criticism—often religiously inspired.[4] Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/18/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following
Re: Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume
In evolutionary terms, is and ougth reflect the double nature of a social being which has not lost is individuality, as individual and as a member of a bigger whole. Both are in tension. The social whole is also in our instinctive individual nature,and appear to the conscious trough intuitions and feelings of duty. The Ought are our long term rules for survival as individuals as member of a society trough generations, which is accesibe trough intuition. The IS is more inmediate to our intuition (when social things are ok). But both are given, but are adapted to the social circunstances : We would not be here if our ancestors would not have been egoistic. Neither we would be here too if they would not attend their social duties and repress the deleterious part of their selfish behaviours. For this reason,John Maynard Smith, an evolutionist http://meaningoflife.tv/ said that the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy, because the Ough is in an IS no less IS than the IS of our ordinary selfish behaviour, with some matizations. is in concordance with the Christian notion of the human nature of a man in permanent tension between the god (which he have knowledge thanks to his Soul or his Nous) and the evil of his socially and individually deleterous selfish impulses. This tension between deletereous individuality that endangers the common good appears in all the scales of evolution. there are parasite molecules, parasite genes, parasite intracellular organules, parasite tissues and parasite individuals against which the whole has a set of countermeasures. The transitions from a level to the next never is complete. The tension between individuality and sociality is ethernal, but in the human being this conflict is not only is carried out externally, but in its own conscience. 2012/8/20 Roger rclo...@verizon.net Hi meekerdb All's well in Heaven, but down here on earth things are a little messier. Heaven is what should be, down here is what is. This conflict earns preachers a nice life. The Christian solution to this dilemma is that God solved it a long time ago by allowing his son to be crucified and proved it by resurrecting Him. IMHO. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-18, 15:04:00 *Subject:* Re: On comp and the is-ought problem of Hume Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy? Oliver Curry, Centre Research Associate, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, UK WC2A 2AE, UK; Email: o.s.cu...@lse.ac.uk. Abstract: David Hume argued that values are the projections of natural human desires, and that moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of society. Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour and neuroscience explain why humans have such desires, and hence provide support for a Humean approach to moral psychology and moral philosophy. However, few philosophers have been willing to pursue this naturalistic approach to ethics for fear that it commits something called ‘the naturalistic fallacy’. This paper reviews several versions of the fallacy, and demonstrates that none of them present an obstacle to this updated, evolutionary version of Humean ethical naturalism. http://www.epjournal.net/wp-content/uploads/ep04234247.pdf Brent On 8/18/2012 8:08 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is probably just my ignorance of what comp is, but there seems to be a discrepancy between comp, which fits with Plato or Platonism, and real life, which actually fits more with Aristotle. Plato is ought to be and Aristotle is is in fact. There is a troubling dualism between the two, that while we live in the Kingdom of Earth, we strive for the Kingdom of Heaven (thy Kingdom come.). This is unreconciliable dualism Hume pointed out between is and should be. He said he knew of no way to go from is to should be. Hume is a great prose stylist and thinker so ihe's worth quoting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his work, *A Treatise of Human Naturehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature * (1739): In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last
Re: The logic of agendas
Hi Roger, That's just too trivial as a solution, although nothing finally is: the attractor of dynamical systems and phase space are fascinating, although I fail to see how the discussion advances through them. There is something difficult about power/control, even speaking restricting to linguistic frame. Whether one looks to Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Don Kulick... yes, these guys have political axes to grind at times, but I agree that power/will to control can mask itself as anything and the work of these linguists is to document and expose how this marks discourse. Say somebody comes to you with a set of hundreds of problems and you lend a listening ear. It's ambiguous linguistically speaking whether: 1) This somebody really needs your help with his jarring list of problems, and is prepared to sincerely tackle them, taking your advice into deep consideration. 2) This somebody is barraging you with messages, out of desire/power/insecurity, and before one problem has been tackled, has already jumped to the next because the problems themselves don't really matter: she/he just wants to be taken seriously and feel control, with you jumping though all of their problems and questions, necessitated by solidarity, respect, politeness expectations of discourse. Number 2) according to most linguists I've read, is force and harm onto others, publicly, through the media for instance, as well as in private discourse/messages, and marks its somewhat violent control agenda by no significant concern for answers or the problems themselves, pretend follow-up to answers, half listening, and half answering. But it gets devious/cruel when agenda 2) poses more convincingly as 1). Thus for now, I remain convinced that the ins and outs of the control structure self, as Bruno put it, make agendas inaccessible because notions of self, are as semantically slippery as they have always been. My aesthetic sense/intuition/taste, computational or not, doesn't really consider this to be a problem. It just tells me in Nietzsche style: No. 1 is beautiful and No.2 is ugly. If you can't distinguish, then you have no taste- or at least lack some taste, a sense of style and should acquire some or more, if you want some measure on such problems. Of course, I take this with a large grain of salt. But any comments on self, agendas, control welcome. Thanks Robert and Bruno for yours. On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 12:25 PM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy and all The logic of an Agenda is purposeful or goal-oriented, what Aristotle called final causation. where an object is PULLED forward by a goal. By what should be. This is the opposite of efficient causation, as in determinism, in which objects are PUSHED forward. By what is. Hi Roger, It's hard to convince myself of that as a solution, although the attractor concept of dynamical systems and phase space are fascinating. But I fail to see how the discussion advances through them. There is something difficult about power/control, even limiting ourselves to linguistic frame, barring that we have access to the total set of possible computations running through our 1p state at any one time. Whether one looks to Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Don Kulick... yes, these guys have political axes to grind at times, but I am somewhat convinced that power/will to control can mask itself as anything and the work of these linguists is to document and expose how this marks discourse. Say somebody comes to you with a set of hundreds of problems and you lend a listening ear. It's ambiguous linguistically speaking whether: 1) This somebody really needs your help with his jarring list of problems, and is prepared to sincerely tackle them, taking your advice into deep consideration. 2) This somebody is barraging you with messages, out of desire/power/insecurity, and before one problem has been tackled, has already jumped to the next because the problems themselves don't really matter: she/he just wants to be taken seriously and feel control, with you jumping though all of their problems and questions, necessitated by solidarity, respect, politeness expectations of discourse. Number 2) according to most linguists I've read, is force and harm onto others, publicly, through the media for instance, as well as in private discourse/messages, and marks its somewhat violent control agenda by no significant concern for answers or the problems themselves, pretend follow-up to answers, half listening, and half answering. But it gets devious/cruel when agenda 2) poses more convincingly as 1). Thus for now, I remain convinced that the ins and outs of the control structure self, as Bruno put it, make agendas inaccessible because notions of self, are as semantically slippery as they have always been. My aesthetic sense/intuition/taste, computational or not, doesn't really consider this to be a problem. It just tells me in Nietzsche style: No. 1 is beautiful and
Re: divine selection versus natural selection
Roger, Divine selection and natural selection are sourced, however at differing levels of information integration, in the universal CYM monad subspace. Belief can also be a product of science. I believe science. Richard On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 5:29 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal According to the Bible, belief is a product of faith or trust, and that trust does not come from you, it is a gift from God. We have nothing to do with it, at least that isa what we Lutherns believe. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-19, 08:26:10 *Subject:* Re: The I Ching, a cominatorically complete hyperlinked semanticfield(mind). On 19 Aug 2012, at 11:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: The barrier between religion and ordinary life, like the one that suppossedly exist between gods and ordinary life is conventiona. If it is true that men have an instinct for religion, this is not governed by a switch that is put on when in a temple or when it is reading esoteric teachings. It is on all the time and in everyone. I agree. I make a case that all correct machine are theological. The reason is that such machine, when looking inward (as they can do by self-reference) can guess that there is something transcending them. What produces this need of the soul or this innate instinct of the human nature?. It may produce organized relgion, but also politics and ideology. The brain areas excited by the appearance of the Pope in a group of believers are the same that are excited in ecologists when Al Gore appears. In the past there were no separation between both phenomena. This is an mostly Occidental division. But it is also a natural division. When machine get theological, from their perspective it looks like those kind of things are different. And at some level they are. I think that the conflict is already reflected in the left brain / right brain difference. Perhaps between woman and man, east and west, yin and yang. Take any machine, she will develop those two poles. the schizophreny appears only when one pole believes to be more right than the other pole. The cult of personality in socialist countries and the sectarian movements (either political or religious) are new editions of the fundamentally Unitarian nature of religion and politics. So, then, gods and adivines have been and will be here forever. I concur. When a name for them is discredited, they appear with new names and within new organization. Absolutely. Some atheists sects can copy some clergy ritual at the level of the microcospic details, and also the authoritative arguments. I am thinking to some atheist masonic lodges (not all). The modern Global warming alarmism is an episode of adivination by makin illegitimate use of science. the Marxism was a scholastic school of Masters of Reality that claimed predicitive powers over the story of Humanity. The gigantic photographs of Marx Lenin in the URSS parliament is an example of religious temple of Atheism. But also the small photograph or a loving one in the dormitory carries out a religious sense, Specially if it passed away and it was a greath influence in our lives. Religion is everywhere and forever. OK. But it can progress. The authoritative argument in science and religion is a rest of our mammals reflex. Dogs and wolves needs leaders, for reason of a long biological past story. It makes sense for short term goal, like it makes sense to obey to orders in the military situation. But it is really an handicap for the long run. And that means that authoritative arguments will disappear, in the long run, or we will disappear, like the dinosaurs. Natural selection can select good things for the short terms, and throw them away later. What will not disappear is science and religion. Religion and spirituality will be more and more prevalent, and play a role of private goal, and science will be more and more understood as the best tool to approximate that spiritual goal. I think. To fight fundamentalism in religion, theology should go back to the academy (which like democracy is the worst institution except for all others!). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.+everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. +unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message
Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
Wiki: Mereology has been axiomatized in various ways as applications of predicate logic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_logic to formal ontologyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ontology, of which mereology is an important part. A common element of such axiomatizations is the assumption, shared with inclusion, that the part-whole relation orders http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partial_orderits universe, meaning that everything is a part of itself (reflexivityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflexive_relation), that a part of a part of a whole is itself a part of that whole ( transitivity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_relation), Richard: These assumptions apply to the Indra Pearl's of Chinese Buddhism and to Liebniz's monads. And more importantly superstring theory requires that tiny balls of 6-dmensional space exist which turn out to have the properties of reflexivity and transitivity, and therefore are candidates to be the pearls and monads. Wiki: and that two distinct entities cannot each be a part of the other ( antisymmetry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisymmetric_relation). Richard: It seems that neither the pearls, or monads, and certainly not the CYMs have this property. So its strickly not mereology that applies to monads and the rest. On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 6:48 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Mereology is part and parcel of Leibniz's system, to use a limp pun. 1) Although unproven, but because God is good while the world is contingent (imperfect, misfitting), Leibniz, like Augustine and Paul, believed that things as a whole work for good, but unfortunately not all parts have to be equally good. This is essentially his theodicy. 2). Everything is nonlocal: The monads are arranged like a tree structure leading up to the Supreme Monad, above which is God, causing all things to happen and perceiving all things. Now Man, being near the top of the Great Chain of Being, and the perceptions of each monad are being constantly and instantly updated to reflect the perceptions all of the other monads in the universe, So, to the degree of their logical distance from one another, their intelligence, and clarity of vision, each monad is omniscient. Personally I use the analogy of the holograph, each part contining the whole, but wqith limited resolution. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-18, 17:34:30 *Subject:* Re: Monads as computing elements Dear Roger, From what I have studied of Leibniz' Monadology and commentary by many authors, it seems to me that all appearances of interactions is given purely in terms of synchronizations of the internal action of the monads. This synchronization or co-ordination seems very similar to Bruno's Bpp idea but for an apriori given plurality of Monads. I identify the computational aspect of the Monad with a unitary evolution transformation (in a linear algebra on topological spaces). I have been investigating whether or not it might be possible to define the mereology of monads in terms of the way that QM systems become and unbecome entangled with each other. Have you seen any similar references to this latter idea? On 8/18/2012 11:58 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, as Leibniz puts it, you couldn't tell the difference, they would seem to have windows, but actually, since substances, being logical entities, cannot actually interact, they all must communicate instead through the supreme monad, (the CPU) which presumably reads and writes on them. I think they are like subprograms, with storage files, which can't do anything by themselves, but must be operated on by the CPU according to their current perceptions (stored state data) which reflect all of the other stored state date in the universe of monads. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the best possible solution.
My belief based on string theory is that monad logic gets applied to produce the best possible world at the level of quantum particle interactions where the best of several quantum states is chosen in every interaction in the universe by the ,monads. Richard Ruquist PhD On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 6:54 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the best possible solution. And contain absolute as well as contingent truths. Thus there must be some sort of mereology involved in the modalities. Maybe a new type of copula insuring this situation to hold ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-20, 01:02:41 *Subject:* Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense On 8/19/2012 6:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2012 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/19/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I understand that 2+2 = 4. I still cannot explain how and why I understand 2+2 = 4. 2+2=4 is easy. I understand 2+2=4 is quasi infinitely more complex. Dear Bruno, As I see it, the quasi-infiitely more complex aspect of I understand that 2+2=4 follows, at least, from the requirement that many entities capable of making such statements can point to examples of 2+2=4 and communicate about such statements with each other however far away in space and time they are from each other. We can ignore the fact that there is a collection of entities to whom the statement I understand that 2+2=4 has a meaning. You need to get a grip on the nature of meaningfulness. Searle has tried to do this with his Chinese Room idea but failed to communicate the concept. :_( Maybe Bruno will introduce a new modality to his logic Up=Understands p. :-) Brent -- Hi Brent, That would be wonderful if possible. AFAIK, understanding is contingent on demonstrability, e.g. I understand p if and only if I can demonstrate that p implies q and q is not trivial and q is true in the same context as p. I think that Bruno's idea of interviewing a machine is a form of demonstration as I am trying to define it here. In my thesis, demonstrability requires that the model to be demonstrated is actually implemented in at least one possible physical world (i.e. satisfies thermodynamic laws and Shannon information theory) otherwise it could be used to implement a Maxwell Demon. BTW, it was an analysis of Maxwell's Demon that lead me to my current ideas, that abstract computation requires that at least one physical system actually can implement it. This is not ultrafinitism since I am allowing for an uncountable infinity of physical worlds, but almost none of them are accessible to each other (there exist event horizons, etc.). Consider the case where a computation X is generating an exact simulation of the behavior of molecules in a two compartment tank with a valve and there exists a computer Y that can use the output of X to control the valve. We can easily see that X could be a subroutine of Y. If the control of Y leads to an exact partition of the fast (hot) and slow (cold) molecules and this difference can be used to run Y then some might argue that we would have a computation for free situation. The problem is that for the hot/cold difference to be exploited to do work the entire apparatus would have to be coupled to a heat reservoir that would absorb the waste energy generated by the work. Heat Reservoirs are interesting beasts If your computer simulation is acting as Maxwell's demon then you don't need a heat reservoir. Hi Brent, Good point. I stand corrected! But did my remark about understanding make any sense to you? I am trying to work out the implication of the idea of Boolean algebras as entities capable of evolving and interacting as it is a key postulate of the idea that I am researching. The Maxwell Demon is just a nice and handy toy model of this idea, IMHO. Could the Maxwell Computational Demon understand what it is doing? We could add the capacity to have a self-model as a subroutine and thus a way to gauge its actual efficiency against a theoretical standard as a way to implement a choice mechanism... See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehno85yI-sA for a discussion of this self-modeling idea. The demon makes one tank hot an the other cold so a heat engine runs on the difference. Yes, the demon would act in a cycle: Compute the simulation to operate the valve to segregate the hot from cold and then use the heat engine to charge a battery, discharging the difference in temperatures. Can this run forever? No, given real world things like friction and the wearing
Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
Hi Roger, On 8/20/2012 6:48 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Mereology is part and parcel of Leibniz's system, to use a limp pun. I like puns! They show us that existence does not just have one side/form/pattern/perspective... 1) Although unproven, but because God is good while the world is contingent (imperfect, misfitting), Leibniz, like Augustine and Paul, believed that things as a whole work for good, but unfortunately not all parts have to be equally good. This is essentially his theodicy. OK, I agree with the spirit of this statement but I am trying to find the canonical mereology of the monads. We can get lost in the many rabbit trails of concepts chains that this idea can lead off to... In the words of Red Leader Stay on Target! ;-) 2). Everything is nonlocal: The monads are arranged like a tree structure leading up to the Supreme Monad, above which is God, causing all things to happen and perceiving all things. Yes, but I think that it is a non-Archimedean http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Archimedean arrangement and, to be specific, an ultrametric http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultrametric_space that can be represented as a Bethe lattice http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bethe_lattice. Bethe lattice Each node represents a monad and the edges represent connections to other monads that it is partly bisimilar to. All composition is given in terms of relative wholes, as there are no parts in the Archimedean sense in a monadology. The guiding principle is all things are monads or parts of a monad. The parts here is a perspective issue that occurs when one monad has only a partial simulation of another... In more theological terms we might say that the Godhead is immanent in all monads as it is all of its aspects. Now Man, being near the top of the Great Chain of Being, and the perceptions of each monad are being constantly and instantly updated to reflect the perceptions all of the other monads in the universe, Yes, exactly, but this being constantly and instantly updated is not a communication scheme as we think in classical terms with signals traveling to and fro; it is the moving in and out of synchrony of monads. The key is that there is no exact and finitely representable orchestration of this movement (Bohm's implicate order was an attempt to capture this idea, but Bohm missed the non-archemedean aspect and thus misunderstood the mereology problem!!), there is only finite and inexact approximations. So, to the degree of their logical distance from one another, their intelligence, and clarity of vision, each monad is omniscient. Yes, and this omniscience, I believe, is captured by the superposition aspect of a QM wavefuction. I use the Net of Indra concept to illustrate this. Each monad, like the jewels in Indra's net, is a reflection (simulation!) of all others but never exactly as exact reflection would be identity (exact bisimilarity). Personally I use the analogy of the holograph, each part contining the whole, but with limited resolution. Yes exactly (pun!), this does a good job representing the phase angle canonical form of this idea. It must be understood that there is no one true picture of this. We have to consider all of the versions of it as we see the properties of objects are dependent on the means with which we observe them. This is the implication of the saying: Nature (God) does not have a preferred observational basis. What we need to define this mathematically is to find the canonical form http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canonical_form. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-18, 17:34:30 *Subject:* Re: Monads as computing elements Dear Roger, From what I have studied of Leibniz' Monadology and commentary by many authors, it seems to me that all appearances of interactions is given purely in terms of synchronizations of the internal action of the monads. This synchronization or co-ordination seems very similar to Bruno's Bpp idea but for an apriori given plurality of Monads. I identify the computational aspect of the Monad with a unitary evolution transformation (in a linear algebra on topological spaces). I have been investigating whether or not it might be possible to define the mereology of monads in terms of the way that QM systems become and unbecome entangled with each other. Have you seen any similar references to this latter idea? On 8/18/2012 11:58 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In the end, as Leibniz puts it, you couldn't tell the difference, they would seem to have
Re: The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the best possible solution.
On 8/20/2012 6:54 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King The modal logic needs to aim purposefully toward the best possible solution. Hi Roger, But the best possible can only be defined infinitely (and thus impossible to know) or finitely in a error-prone or approximate way. And contain absolute as well as contingent truths. I agree. Thus there must be some sort of mereology involved in the modalities. Yes. The actuals are mutually consistent aspects or modes of the possibilities. The key is the frame of reference of the observer. There is no finitely knowable 3p, there is is only finitely approximative 1p. Thus we choose a point of view tat allows for measurement/observation that can be converted into communicable representations. This is the canonical form! Maybe a new type of copula insuring this situation to hold ? Copula? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copula ? Please elaborate... Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/20/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-20, 01:02:41 *Subject:* Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense On 8/19/2012 6:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2012 2:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/19/2012 4:30 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I understand that 2+2 = 4. I still cannot explain how and why I understand 2+2 = 4. 2+2=4 is easy. I understand 2+2=4 is quasi infinitely more complex. Dear Bruno, As I see it, the quasi-infiitely more complex aspect of I understand that 2+2=4 follows, at least, from the requirement that many entities capable of making such statements can point to examples of 2+2=4 and communicate about such statements with each other however far away in space and time they are from each other. We can ignore the fact that there is a collection of entities to whom the statement I understand that 2+2=4 has a meaning. You need to get a grip on the nature of meaningfulness. Searle has tried to do this with his Chinese Room idea but failed to communicate the concept. :_( Maybe Bruno will introduce a new modality to his logic Up=Understands p. :-) Brent -- Hi Brent, That would be wonderful if possible. AFAIK, understanding is contingent on demonstrability, e.g. I understand p if and only if I can demonstrate that p implies q and q is not trivial and q is true in the same context as p. I think that Bruno's idea of interviewing a machine is a form of demonstration as I am trying to define it here. In my thesis, demonstrability requires that the model to be demonstrated is actually implemented in at least one possible physical world (i.e. satisfies thermodynamic laws and Shannon information theory) otherwise it could be used to implement a Maxwell Demon. BTW, it was an analysis of Maxwell's Demon that lead me to my current ideas, that abstract computation requires that at least one physical system actually can implement it. This is not ultrafinitism since I am allowing for an uncountable infinity of physical worlds, but almost none of them are accessible to each other (there exist event horizons, etc.). Consider the case where a computation X is generating an exact simulation of the behavior of molecules in a two compartment tank with a valve and there exists a computer Y that can use the output of X to control the valve. We can easily see that X could be a subroutine of Y. If the control of Y leads to an exact partition of the fast (hot) and slow (cold) molecules and this difference can be used to run Y then some might argue that we would have a computation for free situation. The problem is that for the hot/cold difference to be exploited to do work the entire apparatus would have to be coupled to a heat reservoir that would absorb the waste energy generated by the work. Heat Reservoirs are interesting beasts If your computer simulation is acting as Maxwell's demon then you don't need a heat reservoir. Hi Brent, Good point. I stand corrected! But did my remark about understanding make any sense to you? I am trying to work out the implication of the idea of Boolean algebras as entities capable of evolving and interacting as it is a key postulate of the idea that I am researching. The Maxwell Demon is just a nice and handy toy model of this idea, IMHO. Could the Maxwell Computational Demon understand what it is doing? We could add the capacity to have a self-model as a subroutine and thus a way to gauge its actual
Re: Godel and Leibniz's contingent world
On 8/20/2012 7:04 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Ah so. I can point leibniz's critics to Godel. And to the contingency of the world. What did you expect ? A rose garden ? Leibniz sort of sensed Godel's theorem by his recognition that while things must be perfect in Heaven, down here things were contingent, iffy, troublesome, imperfectly fitting and imperfect in the small, but optimal in the large. There were reaslons behind each event, but they needn't entirely jibe with one another. And even the reasons were mutually contingent. What a mess. Hi Roger, I agree with your remarks here 100%! snip -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
On 8/20/2012 11:36 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: Mereology has been axiomatized in various ways as applications of predicate logic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_logic to formal ontology http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ontology, of which mereology is an important part. A common element of such axiomatizations is the assumption, shared with inclusion, that the part-whole relation orders http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partial_orderits universe, meaning that everything is a part of itself (reflexivity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflexive_relation), that a part of a part of a whole is itself a part of that whole (transitivity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_relation), Richard: These assumptions apply to the Indra Pearl's of Chinese Buddhism and to Liebniz's monads. And more importantly superstring theory requires that tiny balls of 6-dmensional space exist which turn out to have the properties of reflexivity and transitivity, and therefore are candidates to be the pearls and monads. Wiki: and that two distinct entities cannot each be a part of the other (antisymmetry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisymmetric_relation). Richard: It seems that neither the pearls, or monads, and certainly not the CYMs have this property. So its strickly not mereology that applies to monads and the rest. Hi Richard, I agree with all with a small exception: I have a big problem with the superstring theory's use of a fixed background spacetime into which it embeds the compactified manifolds. It violates general covariance in doing this! -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is convergence a unique test for pi ?
On 19 Aug 2012, at 17:22, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 18 Aug 2012, at 17:19, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, you can square the square root of any number to test its accuracy, but there are a variety of algorithms used to calculate pi. Which is correct ? See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi The value obtained is assumed to be true if the infinite series used to calculate pi converges. But I would think that many if not most infinite series should converge. Which one is the right one ? Is there a unique solution ? Most series would not converge. In this case they all converge to Pi, as they have been designed for that. Some just converge more quickly than others. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ And even divergent series can be resummed to yield a finite answer, sometimes even using just a few terms. And there are many notions of convergence. Searching a job in England Ramanujan, just to show his ability to compute, said that he could compute the sum of all the natural numbers 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + ... which gives: -1/12, of course :) (*) The crazy thing is that when you compute mass of a photon in string theory, you are naturally lead to a sum of two terms, the first one giving 1/12, and the second being 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + ... Bruno (*) It is the value of the analytical continuation of the Rieman Zeta function on -1. But it follows also naturally from convergence criteria not involving the zeta function. Zeta(s) is the sum of all 1/ n^s, with n natural number ≠ 0, and it is equal to the product of all 1/(1-1/p^s)) with p primes, by a famous relation of Euler. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
Hi Stephan, I do not think that string theory requires a fixed background. Otherwise string theory could not be a prospective ToE. Richard On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 12:27 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 8/20/2012 11:36 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: Mereology has been axiomatized in various ways as applications of predicate logic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_logic to formal ontologyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ontology, of which mereology is an important part. A common element of such axiomatizations is the assumption, shared with inclusion, that the part-whole relation orders http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partial_orderits universe, meaning that everything is a part of itself (reflexivityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflexive_relation), that a part of a part of a whole is itself a part of that whole ( transitivity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_relation), Richard: These assumptions apply to the Indra Pearl's of Chinese Buddhism and to Liebniz's monads. And more importantly superstring theory requires that tiny balls of 6-dmensional space exist which turn out to have the properties of reflexivity and transitivity, and therefore are candidates to be the pearls and monads. Wiki: and that two distinct entities cannot each be a part of the other (antisymmetry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisymmetric_relation). Richard: It seems that neither the pearls, or monads, and certainly not the CYMs have this property. So its strickly not mereology that applies to monads and the rest. Hi Richard, I agree with all with a small exception: I have a big problem with the superstring theory's use of a fixed background spacetime into which it embeds the compactified manifolds. It violates general covariance in doing this! -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Neurolaw
I have listened to Philosophy of Science: Bolinda Beginner Guides by Geoffrey Gorham. The author has mentioned about a new discipline, neurolaw and I believe that could be useful for the ongoing discussion on the free will. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurolaw Neurolaw is an emerging field of interdisciplinary study that explores the effects of discoveries in neuroscience on legal rules and standards. Drawing from neuroscience, philosophy, social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and criminology, neurolaw practitioners seek to address not only the descriptive and predictive issues of how neuroscience is and will be used in the legal system, but also the normative issues of how neuroscience should and should not be used. The most prominent questions that have emerged from this exploration are as follows: To what extent can a tumor or brain injury alleviate criminal punishment? Can sentencing or rehabilitation regulations be influenced by neuroscience? Who is permitted access to images of a person’s brain? Neuroscience is beginning to address these questions in its effort to understand human behavior, and will potentially shape future aspects of legal processes. Evgenii -- Geoffrey Gorham: Philosophy of Science http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-science.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
On 8/20/2012 1:40 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hi Stephan, I do not think that string theory requires a fixed background. Otherwise string theory could not be a prospective ToE. Richard Hi Richard, I had the very same reaction, but research it for yourself. Look at the literature, the trick is the use of fiber bundles which require a base space. They get away with it because they are using the entire space-time manifold (like the frozen ice block idea) as the base space, so it appears to be OK. But this leads to the landscape problem because they have to consider the theory of all possible space-time manifolds. The fundamental problem that I see with the entire exercise is the assumption of primitive matter (here in the form of primitive space-time manifolds that are fibered with a plenum of orbifolds), the very same problem that Bruno is pointing out. The entire idea that substance is fundamental needs to be re-evaluated and seen as just a basis of observation and not something ontologically a priori. On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 12:27 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/20/2012 11:36 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: Mereology has been axiomatized in various ways as applications of predicate logic http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_logic to formal ontology http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_ontology, of which mereology is an important part. A common element of such axiomatizations is the assumption, shared with inclusion, that the part-whole relation orders http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partial_orderits universe, meaning that everything is a part of itself (reflexivity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflexive_relation), that a part of a part of a whole is itself a part of that whole (transitivity http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitive_relation), Richard: These assumptions apply to the Indra Pearl's of Chinese Buddhism and to Liebniz's monads. And more importantly superstring theory requires that tiny balls of 6-dmensional space exist which turn out to have the properties of reflexivity and transitivity, and therefore are candidates to be the pearls and monads. Wiki: and that two distinct entities cannot each be a part of the other (antisymmetry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisymmetric_relation). Richard: It seems that neither the pearls, or monads, and certainly not the CYMs have this property. So its strickly not mereology that applies to monads and the rest. Hi Richard, I agree with all with a small exception: I have a big problem with the superstring theory's use of a fixed background spacetime into which it embeds the compactified manifolds. It violates general covariance in doing this! -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Stephen and Bruno
Hi Bruno and Stephen I want to inform you that you are wrong in all of your writings. Please understand how very incorrect you are about everything you post! Why are you so wrong. Roger -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen and Bruno
On 8/20/2012 5:16 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno and Stephen I want to inform you that you are wrong in all of your writings. Please understand how very incorrect you are about everything you post! Why are you so wrong. Roger I glad Roger cleared that up. :-) Brent Shut up he explained. --- Ring Lardner -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Unreality of Time
On Tue, Jul 31, 2012 at 2:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/31/2012 10:48 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: The problem is to explain also why the entropy of the early universe was so low. If you just accept that this is the case and also don't bother about the very distant future, there is no problem. But if you assume that time goes on from the infinite distant past and/or to the infinite distant future, you have a problem, because smaller local low entropy states are then more likely than the whole observable universe being in some low entropy state. That make me think about the people that try to discover the whys of the arrow of time by taking concepts like beginning of the universe. That presuposses the arrow of time that he is trying to demonstrate how it arises in the first place. this is a circular reasoning. No, it's not circular. Beginning is just the low entropy state. All that he can demonstrate empirically is that it follows entropy, an then, he is puzzled by the fact that entropy was so low at the beginning The interesting question is why there is there uniformity in the different 'arrows of time'. Brent, You may enjoy these musings on that question: http://www.sidis.net/ANIMContents.htm I don't know how accurate it is, but it was written by someone regarded as one of the smartest of people from recent history. In any event, I found it quite interesting, and would be interested to hear other's thoughts about his ideas. Jason Why does the local increase in thermodynamic entropy match the expansion of the universe? Why does the radiation AoT match the quantum branching of MWI? but if we take the idea of a block universe shaped as a four dimensional bell with a singularity in the left ( see the figure that I linked), there is no arrow of time here. is our life that goes along very short segments from left to right in the middle of this figure. what we do is to extrapolate this sort segment to the whole figure. But this is not right. first, time is local, according with general relativity. How we extrapolate it? by assuming that time progress in the universe in the direction that we perceive causality, that is, in the direction of entropy increase. but even so, there is not a single arrow of time where entropy increases. there are infinite lines of entropy increase/arrows of time departin from the singularity, which diverge radially trough the bell and extend to the right in the figure. If i´m right, the existence of a gradient of entropy and, thus the existence of a singularity with maximum entropy somewhere, at a point which we consider origin of the universe, is a pre-requisite for natural selection and life. Natural selection (as I said before) select good correlations which deal with macroscopical events, to design life and observers. That is why we see this universe with such unavoidable notion of beginning and not other in other ways. A boltzman brain is just a curiosity, unless the bolzman fluctionation create not a single brain but a local portion of the universe that develop in a way that maintain intellgent beings. In this case, it is indistinguishable if the universe is or not the product of a boltzman fluctuation. The problem is that statistical mechanical estimates of probabilities favor the random occurrence of the curiosity over the universe. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
