Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 09 Oct 2013, at 19:23, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: [your] body-copy will be in two places, [you] can feel to be in only one place. If the copies are really identical then you feel to be in only one place (insofar as spatial position has any meaning when talking about consciousness) Which it has not. We both have agreed already on this. And the copies are identical, as bodies reconstitiuted at the right substitution level, but they are in two different place, as they will notice when opening the door. And the Hesnki man knows that in advance, so he knows that (whoever he is and will be) there is 1/2 chance to see M (or W). because you really are in only one place, regardless of how many copies are made or where those bodies are. Exactly. The question is which city will [he] observed. The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man, Yes. And it is (and can be justified entirely with math) a non constructive OR. and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he receives. Not at all. It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will have will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for all possible he's relevant). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:25, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive. This begs the question. You make a quote out of the context. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in both your view and mine. Good. So it is one that he stay alive, and so it can only be one halve that it will be W, or M. The copies are numerically identical, P(M) = P(W), and so 1/2 is the only solution. P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) events. That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno- Moscow, in the experiment will experience both simultaneously. OK. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each outcome. How could that ever be possible? experience is taken in the first person pint of view, and they can be only W, or M, not both. You need some telepathy, or you need another protocol. In the 3p view, you are right, but that was not the question asked. Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. The 1p-indeterminacy is objective and has nothing to do with a feeling. It is obtained by a reasoning. I think what is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is relevant. Yes, indeed, that is what is revolutionary (forgetting the MWI). We are in a context where we have all the information, and yet cannot predict an elementary outcome. It shows that determinacy entails objective first person indeterminacies (objective because 3p- communicable). The same can be said for Everett QM, accepting to interpret a self- superposition as a sort of self-duplication, or self-differentiation. He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than Bruno-Moscow. All this made my point. I agree. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty. But there is still an objective indeterminacy. By reasoning alone, we can see that only W V M, but I don't know which one will always be confirmed, and anything more precise will be refuted by some copies. It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's shares a relationship of identity with him. But that has to be the case from the future points of view. Like John Clark, you seem to pursue the thought experiment at the first person perspective after the duplication. This is why I say your analysis violates the yes doctor axiom. ? (see just above). This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. OK. The duplication is responsible for that ignorance. The helsinki man know that on advance, and so, knows in advance that he will not been abale to know his location before opening his eyes. You can add the principle that if I know in advance that I will be confronted to an uncertainty, then I am right now uncertain. In some lengthier explanation, I add principles like that, but they are confusing for most, so I delete such type of (too much obvious) principle. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each location. I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse. Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand waving scoffs
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10 Oct 2013, at 03:37, LizR wrote: If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin- up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life. Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the physicist). OK. However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works. The probabilities does not depend on how the universe work, but only on computer science, which does not assume anything physical (note even a physical reality). Then the (easy) probability calculus we got here is part of the explanation of how the universe works, and indeed why we are confronted with an apparent universe/multiverses, although this is part of the difficult remaining work (to get the correct hamiltonian and things like that). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10 Oct 2013, at 05:50, chris peck wrote: Hi Liz Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now. (Or then again, I won't...) Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :) Then we can be certain that we are all the same person. We all comes from the same duplicating amoeba. And I can be certain to win all games based on randomness. But the point is not on identity. It is only about predicting what I will (immediately) see when opening a door, after having pushed on a button. It is possible to rephrase the protocol in a way such that the user does not know he will be duplicated, and only evaluate the probabilities from the frequencies obtained and described in the personal diaries of the copies. In that case some iterations is useful. With the definition of 1p and 3p, given entirely in term of annihilation and reconstitution, of diaries, the 1p-indeterminacy is 3p-justifiable. In the math part, they are justifiable purely in terms of self- reference (Gödel, Löb, Solovay) logics. The indeterminacy is lived by 1p, but that very fact is completely justified in the 3p discourse. We have to be careful not confusing the points of view involved. Bruno Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of appearing in Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities, because the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a post-facto indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the extent that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI). (Which is to say, it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I know what is intended!) Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now. (Or then again, I won't...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: AUDA and pronouns
On 09 Oct 2013, at 22:02, meekerdb wrote: On 10/9/2013 12:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote: On 10/8/2013 2:51 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 07, 2013 at 10:20:14AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2013, at 07:36, Russell Standish wrote: ... and Bpp as he knows p, so the person order of the pronoun is also not relevant. Yes, you can read that in that way, but you get only the 3-view of the 1-view. Let us define [o]p by Bp p I am just pointing on the difference between B([o]p) and [o] ([o]p). Isn't B(Bp)=Bp so: Bp - B(Bp) but B(Bp) does not necessarly imply Bp. ?? That seems like strange logic. Certainly. It came as a shock. It is the shock of Gödel and Löb incompleteness results. Those are truly revolutionary. If you find this strange and shocking, it means you begin to grasp! How, in classical logic, can you prove that p is provable and yet not conclude that p is provable. I understand that the set of true propositions is bigger than the provable propositions, but I don't see that the set of provably provable propositions is smaller than the provable propositions? See below. B(Bp p) =? B(Bp p) (Bp P) Why would that be? [o](Bp p) = B(Bp p) (Bp p), but not B(Bp p), because B(Bp p) does not imply Bp p. Not that I wrote =? meaning is it equal?, not asserting it was equal, and I concluded below they were not equal. You think like that because you know that B is correct, but B does not know it. In particular, like Bf - f is true about B, but not provable by B, B(Bf)- Bf is also true about B, but not provable by B. Here B designates the machine/person having B as provability predicate. Bruno Brent Bp =? Bp p - false And so, this does not follow. (Keep in mind that Bp does not imply p, from the machine's point of view). Think about Bf, if it implies f, we would have that the machine would know that ~Bf, and knows that she is consistent. She can't, if she is correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: And the 2013 Nobel Prize in Physics goes to…
On 09 Oct 2013, at 22:22, meekerdb wrote: On 10/9/2013 12:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2013, at 23:56, LizR wrote: http://www.quantumdiaries.org/2013/10/08/and-the-2013-nobel-prize-in-physics-goes-to/ Today the 2013 Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded to François Englert (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) and Peter W. Higgs (University of Edinburgh, UK). The official citation is “for the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our understanding of the origin of mass of subatomic particles, and which recently was confirmed through the discovery of the predicted fundamental particle, by the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider.” I know him very well. I begun my work in his team, with Robert Brout. He asked me how to apply QM in cosmology, and I refer to the MWI. He added some footnote in one of his papers, just referring to Everett's original work, without any detail. He didn't like this, but somehow understood it is hard to make sense of quantum cosmology without it. I am happy that after 50 years he is recognized as one the main discover of the Higgs boson. I am happy for Higgs too. The seminal papers suggesting the higgs-field were written independently about the same time by Higgs, by Englert and Brout, and also by Kibble, Gaulnik, and Hagen. I've often thought the it came to called the higgs boson just because it's a lot easier to say higgs than englert-brout or kibble-gaulnik-hagen. I understand that Peter Higgs is a very nice, modest man and is a little embarassed by having the particle named after him, although he did develop the idea a little more than the others and is certainly deserving. But in my view, even more deserving are the thousands of engineers, technicians, and physicists who designed and built the LHC and the ATLAS and CMS detectors. Surely the most amazing machine ever built. I agree. In a forum someone asked if the Nobel prize should not be given to those who made the LHC, and the answer was that they were too many ... I find unfair also that there is no post-mortem Nobel prize, as Robert Brout deserves it too, but then he died too early. Well, the mathematician's Field medal is worse, you have to be younger than 40! But all this is vanity. François Englert said that he was happy with the Nobel prize, but that he was still more happier from having done his fundamental research. Now, the Nobel prize itself has been obscured by Obama's peace prize, like if it was giving him the right to use drones to kill civilians, or to sign the NDAA ... Englert should have refuse it, perhaps, like Sartre in France or Perelman in Russia, ... I am not really serious, as it seems than the scientific Nobel prize is more seriously attributed. Fortunately. The Nobel Peace Prize has been wielded as a tool of political influence and has thereby become almost meaningless. Obama got it for being a little less bellicose that George Bush. ... before his term! (may be we are in a Gödel rotative universe, with time loops, in which case they could give the Nobel prize of physics, also before the research is done ... :) Bruno Brent Political satire became obsolete when Henry Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. --- Tom Lehrer http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 8:30:16 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 10 October 2013 13:03, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 5:52:46 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 10 October 2013 09:47, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: It's not that computers can't do what humans do,* it's that they can't experience anything.* Mozart could dig a hole as well as compose music, but that doesn't mean that a backhoe with a player piano on it is Mozart. It's a much deeper problem with how machines are conceptualized that has nothing at all to do with humans. So you think strong AI is wrong. OK. But why can't computers experience anything, in principle, given that people can, and assuming people are complicated machines? I don't think that people are machines. A machine is assembled intentionally from unrelated substances to perform a function which is alien to any of the substances. Living organisms are not assembled, they grow from a single cell. They have no unrelated substances and all functions they perform are local to the motives of the organism as a whole. I believe that, at least in discussions such as this one, defining people as machines has nothing to do with how or why they are constructed, and eveything to do with ruling out any supernatural components. Right, but that's what I am saying is the problem. It would be like making generalizations about liquids based on water and saying that alcohol can't burn because it's a liquid. A machine and a person might both be able to say 'hello', but the machine was constructed by people who know what hello means, and the person knows what hello means because they were the ones who constructed the word. The word exists to serve their own agenda, not that of an alien programmer. Anyway, allow me to rephrase the question. I assume from the underlined comment that you think that strong AI is wrong, and that we will never be able to build a conscious computer. How do you come to that conclusion? I guess that I came to that conclusion by first trying to exhaust the other alternatives and then by coming up with a way to make sense of awareness as what I call Primordial Identity Pansensitivity. This means that physics and information are incomplete reflections within sense rather than producers of consciousness. Physics is sense experience that is alienated by entropy (spacetime) and information is sense experience which has been alienated by generalization (abstraction). Information cannot be pieced together to make an experience. No copy can be made into an original. This is not because of some special sentimental feeling about consciousness, it's rooted in an a careful consideration of the number of clues that we have about perceptual relativity, authenticity, uniqueness, polarity, multiplicity, automaticity, representation, impersonality, and significance. This is an even bigger deal if I am right about the universe being fundamentally a subdividing capacity for experience rather than a place or theater of interacting objects or forces. It means that we are not our body, rather a body is what someone else's lifetime looks like from inside of your lifetime. It's a token. The mechanisms of the brain do not produce awareness as a product, any more than these combinations of letter produce the thoughts I am communicating. What we see neurons doing is comparable to looking at a satellite picture of a city at night. We can learn a lot about what a city does, but nothing about who lives in the city. A city, like a human body, is a machine when you look at it from a distance, but what we see of a body or a city would be perfectly fine with no awareness happening at all. Insofar as I understand it, I agree with this. I often wonder how a load of atoms can have experiences so to speak. This is the so-called hard problem of AI. It is (I think) addressed by comp. If I'm right, then comp cannot address the hard problem. If we try to make it seem to address it, I think that it would have no choice but to get it exactly wrong. Comp fails because of the symbol grounding problem and the pathetic fallacy. It should be evident from Incompleteness, that no symbol can literally symbolize anything, and that all mathematical systems can only relate to isolated specifics or universal tautologies. Math cannot live because it can't change. It doesn't care. It doesn't know where it's been or where it's going. Comp is only one footprint of the absolute - the generic vacuum which divides experiences from each other. It misses presentation entirely, and so can only be a representation of representation...as Baudrillard would say, a Stage Four Simulacra: The fourth stage is pure simulation, in which the simulacrum has no relationship to any reality whatsoever. Here, signs merely reflect other signs and any claim to reality on the part
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Thu, Oct 10, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The question is will he turn into the Moscow Man or the Washington Man, Yes. Thank you! and that depends on one thing and one thing only, what information he receives. Not at all. What do you mean not at all?! The Helsinki Man has the neurons in his brain arranged in a certain way and the Moscow Man, being a exact copy, will have the neurons in his brain arranged in exactly the same manner and the two will evolve in exactly the same manner too UNLESS they receive different information, like one data stream coming from Helsinki and the other data stream coming from Moscow. Only then would they differentiate and only then would you be justified in giving them different names. It depends on the entire protocol. the information he will have will confirm or refute his prediction (written in his diary, for all possible he's relevant). As far as personal identity or consciousness or a continuous feeling of self is concerned it it totally irrelevant if that prediction, or any other prediction for that matter, is confirmed or refuted, nor does it matter if the prediction was probabilistic or absolute. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 11 October 2013 04:54, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. Wow! Molecular experiences! That seems..far out, man. Could you get me some of whatever you're taking? :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man. I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I may be missing something. Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will work. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 11 October 2013 11:37, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 10, 2013 4:32:54 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 11 October 2013 04:54, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. Wow! Molecular experiences! That seems..far out, man. Could you get me some of whatever you're taking? :) You mean can I get you some molecules to interact with the molecules of your brain :)? If we have experiences, and we are made of molecules, then what would be the logic of an arbitrary barrier beyond which non-experience suddenly turns into experience? If molecules don't need experiences to build biology, and stem cells don't need experience to build nervous systems and immune systems, then I find it pretty improbable that a particular species of animal would suddenly be the first entities to ever experience any part of the universe in any way, just because it makes it easier to to do the things that every other organism does - find food, reproduce, avoid threats. This is an interesting reversal of the usual argument of people like Daniel Dennett, which goes something like we are made of molecules, molecules can't have experiences, therefore we don't really have experiences, we just think we do. -- Obviously paraphrased to absurdity, but that's the basic idea as far as I can see. Your argument uses the same logic, inverted - we have experiences, we're made of molecules, therefore molecules have experiences! Nice, although I feel that by stopping at molecules you're denying the fact that quarks and electrons obviously have experiences too, and perhaps even free will (Shall I be spin-up or spin down today?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Thursday, October 10, 2013 6:53:18 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 11 October 2013 11:37, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Thursday, October 10, 2013 4:32:54 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 11 October 2013 04:54, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Unless a machine used living organisms, molecules would probably be the only natural things which an experience would be associated with. They don't know that they are part of a machine, but there is probably an experience that corresponds to thermodynamic and electromagnetic conditions. Experiences on that level may not be proprietary to any particular molecule - it could be very exotic, who knows. Maybe every atom of the same structure represents the same kind of experience on some radically different time scale from ours. Wow! Molecular experiences! That seems..far out, man. Could you get me some of whatever you're taking? :) You mean can I get you some molecules to interact with the molecules of your brain :)? If we have experiences, and we are made of molecules, then what would be the logic of an arbitrary barrier beyond which non-experience suddenly turns into experience? If molecules don't need experiences to build biology, and stem cells don't need experience to build nervous systems and immune systems, then I find it pretty improbable that a particular species of animal would suddenly be the first entities to ever experience any part of the universe in any way, just because it makes it easier to to do the things that every other organism does - find food, reproduce, avoid threats. This is an interesting reversal of the usual argument of people like Daniel Dennett, which goes something like we are made of molecules, molecules can't have experiences, therefore we don't really have experiences, we just think we do. -- Obviously paraphrased to absurdity, but that's the basic idea as far as I can see. Your argument uses the same logic, inverted - we have experiences, we're made of molecules, therefore molecules have experiences! Nice, although I feel that by stopping at molecules you're denying the fact that quarks and electrons obviously have experiences too, and perhaps even free will (Shall I be spin-up or spin down today?) I am more inclined to think that quarks and electrons actually *are* the experiences of atoms. When you use your body to use another collection of bodies to tell you about other bodies, what you get is something like the fairy tale of matter (except it's really an anti-fairy tale). As far as I can tell, there is no reason to assume that it is possible for anything other than experiences to exist. Something that is not experienced, and can never be experienced in any way, either directly or indirectly, is indistinguishable in every way from nothing at all. As far as free will goes, my guess is that as we move further from our own scale of perception (I call pereptual inertial frame, because that is exactly what it seems to be) down to the instant of wavefunction collapse, or out to the open ended frame of 'fate', free will and probability are fused together. The dualistic sense that we have that makes our free will seem so personal and the world's causes so impersonal (either mechanistically determined or probabilistic - either way unintentional) is that every inertial frame acts like a lens (metaphorically) to bend the image of experience into this dipole of participation. The only question to me is whether we just happen to be right smack in the middle of this continuum, in the most fertile band where the dipole has grown the most polaraized, or whether that too is a function of perceptual relativity (I call it eigenmorphism http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/) As far as the Dennett comparison, I think that's reasonable, although I think that it actually makes sense my way, and is absurd Dennet's way, where we just think that there is a such thing as thinking?? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote: Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man. I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I may be missing something. Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will work. Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level. So the process couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum state were necessary. But I don't think this is the case. Tegmark, among others, has shown that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum superpositions - so we can probably assume that classical copying is enough, with at worst a little loss of short term memory. It's interesting to consider though how accurate the copying would have to be for Bruno's question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only retained a random 10% of the H man's memories? That is the famous substitution level. However, even if it did require the quantum states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if we think the MWI is correct we can still ask the same questions using the duplication that creates. E.g. suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room and then we perform a quantum measurement, and as a result we either send the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we open one of two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we ask him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I imagine, but we know he ends up in both. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 9 October 2013 05:25, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303492504579115310362925246.html A lot of what I am always talking about is in there...computers don't understand produce because they have no aesthetic sensibility. A mechanical description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an experience. This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility, it must have aesthetic sensibility. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10 October 2013 12:25, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, etc.) to find oneself alive. This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in both your view and mine. P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) events. That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each outcome. Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I think what is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is relevant. He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty. It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your analysis violates the yes doctor axiom. This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity maintaining version of him will be in each location. I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse. Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand waving scoffs some academics here have been offering. All the best When I toss a coin, I expect to see either heads or tails but not both, and in fact I see heads or tails but not both. In a multiverse, versions of me will see both heads and tails. Should I therefore conclude that I don't live in a multiverse? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my understanding of Deutsch's version of MWI, the reason for Born probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic? On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote: Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN PRESS. ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists. http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012) ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 78(5): 976-988 ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in: ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally convincing. Richard -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 10/10/2013 5:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 11 October 2013 13:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/10/2013 1:36 PM, LizR wrote: Both M and W man would have a continuous feeling of identity with H man. I don't see that you two really have opposing viewpoints, although as usual I may be missing something. Of course if the brain can't be considered digital at any level (as Kermit suggests) then this is actually impossible, and the question doesn't arise. But personally I'm not about to embrance the idea that the universe is analogue all the way down - with the problems that causes (like the ultraviolety catastrophe) - and if it's digital at any level, this will work. Even if it's digital it can't be cloned at the quantum level. So the process couldn't be implemented if copying all the way down to the quantum state were necessary. But I don't think this is the case. Tegmark, among others, has shown that the brain is too hot to maintain quantum superpositions - so we can probably assume that classical copying is enough, with at worst a little loss of short term memory. It's interesting to consider though how accurate the copying would have to be for Bruno's question to make sense. Suppose the M and W man only retained a random 10% of the H man's memories? That is the famous substitution level. However, even if it did require the quantum states to be duplicated, which the universe doesn't allow, if we think the MWI is correct we can still ask the same questions using the duplication that creates. E.g. suppose we have Helsinki man enter a room and then we perform a quantum measurement, and as a result we either send the room to Moscow or Washington by conventional means. Or we open one of two doors, say, which lets him go to room 1 or room 2, and beforehand we ask him what are the chances you will end up in room 1? He says 50%, I imagine, but we know he ends up in both. According to the paper I posted, even if we flipped a coin, the outcome would constitute a quantum measurement. But as for knowing there's a duplication: Only if we know MWI, an interpretation we made up, is true. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
So there are infinitely many identical universes preceding a measurement. How are these universes distinct from one another? Do they divide into two infinite subsets on a binary measurement, or do infinitely many come into existence in order that some branch-counting measure produces the right proportion? Do you not see any problems with assigning a measure to infinite countable subsets (are there more even numbers that square numbers?). And why should we prefer this model to simply saying the Born rule derives from a Bayesian epistemic view of QM as argued by, for example, Chris Fuchs? Brent On 10/10/2013 6:11 PM, Pierz wrote: I'm puzzled by the controversy over this issue - although given that I'm not a physicist and my understanding comes from popular renditions of MWI by Deutsch and others, it may be me who's missing the point. But in my understanding of Deutsch's version of MWI, the reason for Born probabilities lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a single branch. Every branch of the multiverse contains an infinity of identical, fungible universes. When a quantum event occurs, that set of infinite universes divides proportionally according to Schroedinger's equation. The appearance of probability arises, as in Bruno's comp, from multiplication of the observer in those infinite branches. Why is this problematic? On Saturday, October 5, 2013 2:27:18 AM UTC+10, yanniru wrote: Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, 2013. The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics persists. British Jour. Philosophy of Science IN PRESS. ABSTRACT. Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) results in ‘multiple, emergent, branching quasi-classical realities’ (Wallace [2012]). The possible outcomes of measurement as per ‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics are, in EQM, all instantiated. Given this metaphysics, Everettians face the ‘probability problem’—how to make sense of probabilities, and recover the Born Rule. To solve the probability problem, Wallace, following Deutsch ([1999]), has derived a quantum representation theorem. I argue that Wallace’s solution to the probability problem is unsuccessful, as follows. First, I examine one of the axioms of rationality used to derive the theorem, Branching Indifference (BI). I argue that Wallace is not successful in showing that BI is rational. While I think it is correct to put the burden of proof on Wallace to motivate BI as an axiom of rationality, it does not follow from his failing to do so that BI is not rational. Thus, second, I show that there is an alternative strategy for setting one’s credences in the face of branching which is rational, and which violates BI. This is Branch Counting (BC). Wallace is aware of BC, and has proffered various arguments against it. However, third, I argue that Wallace’s arguments against BC are unpersuasive. I conclude that the probability problem in EQM persists. http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf http://www.foaddb.com/FDBCV.pdf Publications (a Ph.D. in Philosophy, London School of Economics, May 2012) ‘The Probability Problem in Everettian Quantum Mechanics Persists’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science, forthcoming ‘The Aharanov Approach to Equilibrium’, Philosophy of Science, 2011 78(5): 976-988 ‘Who is Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?’, Erkenntnis, 2010 73: 393-412, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) ‘Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account’, Synthese, 2011 179(2): 321-338, (with R. Frigg and S. Hartmann) His paper may be an interesting read once it comes out. Also available in: ‘Why I am not an Everettian’, in D. Dieks and V. Karakostas (eds): Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, 2013, (The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings), Dordrecht: Springer I think this list needs another discussion of the possible MWI probability problem although it has been covered here and elsewhere by members of this list. Previous discussions have not been personally convincing. Richard -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3609/6739 - Release Date: 10/10/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
