Re: The MGA revisited
On 3/28/2015 11:36 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 3/28/2015 12:33 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: As I said, conterfactual correctness has very little to do with the actual conscious moment. That is given simply by the sequence of actual brain states -- But what is a brain state. Can a part of the brain be ignored in some state but not in another? Yes. See my previous comments about brain injuries, stroke, and suchlike. this sequence does not really calculate anything. Computationalism ultimately rests on a confusion between a simulation and the calculations necessary to produce that simulation. Computationalism is just the idea that conscious thought can be instantiated by digital device that simulates the brain at some sufficiently detailed level. If such a simulation is possible then it can be realized by a program running on a universal Turing machine. But that's an abstract process in Platonia and is independent of any physics or material existence. That's what the MGA purports to show. Bruno has acknowledged that this is not what the MGA shows. MGA simply shows that his version of computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience. This cannot be seen as surprising since it is explicitly built into computationalism that physicalism is false. That's not my understanding. Bruno's argument starts with assuming that a part, or all, of your brain could be replaced by a digital AI with the same I/O and if done at a suitably low level of detail (probably neuronal) you conscious inner life would be essentially the same. That seems to me to be assuming physicalism as the basis of consciousness. The MGA is, therefore, largely irrelevant, because it does not prove anything that we didn't already know. It certainly does not show that consciousness is an abstract process in Plationia, independent of any physical process. Bruno assumes that only some special processes instantiate consciousness and these are characterized by being computations of some kind, i.e. a sequence of states that could be realized by a program running on a Universal Turing Machine (not necessarily halting). Since the consciousness computation defined this way is an abstract mathematical process in Platonia; it is equivalent to assuming consciousness is instantiated by an abstract mathematical process. Brent That was the initial asssumption, and MGA simply shows that you can't have both computationalism *and* physicalism -- not that physical supervenience is false. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 30 March 2015 at 11:43, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 29 March 2015 at 19:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But isn't it the case that your brain evolved/learned to interpret and be conscious of these stimuli only because it exists in the context of this world? That would be the anthropic explanation of why we find ourselves the people we are, certainly. I think comp simply requires consciousness to exist, then the anthropic reasoning shows that we're most likely to find ourselves existing in a particular type of state (rather than as Boltzman brains, I assume) The question as posed by Bruno, is whether you will say yes to the doctor replacing part of your brain with a digital device that has the connections to the rest of your brain/body and which implements the same input/output function for those connections. Would that leave your consciousness unchanged? This is a MORE interesting question in some ways than Bruno's yes doctor - would you, with a partial brain replacement,experience reduced consciousness in some sense - e.g. fading qualia? Personally, I imagine not (after all the brain is already modularised, so presumably it already has internal interfaces). Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 30 March 2015 at 18:40, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I was referring to the entire exchange, not just one side. It doesn't directly physically hurt anyone to be rude or abusive, but it's better not to be rude or abusive. It may cause emotional damage. In extreme cases of cyber-bullying, it's caused self-harm. I doubt that will happen here, only - at most - the emotional bit. But that can happen. I know I get upset when people use abusive language towards me online (fortunately it doesn't happen too often). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Best guess on my part. Platonia produces physicalism, via constant computation
{unproven} and yields the universe. Platonia is more real then 3 and 4 D space
that we are created from. Steinhart's theory- we are a data stream-process,
that gets promoted to another hypercomputer. Control-Alt-Delete! Aristotle
versus Plato, Berkeley versus Newton. They both win.
-Original Message-
From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sun, Mar 29, 2015 8:57 pm
Subject: Re: The MGA revisited
On 29 March 2015 at 21:04, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have not yet seen
any argument that might lead me to change my mind.
One reason that has been suggested is the unreasonable effectiveness of maths
as a description of physics. This is Max Tegmark's argument for the
Mathematical Universe Hypothesis. To take this to its logical conclusion, if
we ever formulate a theory that (as far as we know) describes everything that
exists - a real live TOE - then, Tegmark would say, what is there that
distinguishes the universe from the, by hypothesis completely accurate,
description? His conclusion is nothing, and since the maths description is
simpler than the observed universe, the scientific conclusion is that what we
observe is a part of a multiverse containing all outcomes of the TOE (this is a
bit like Russell's TON, with the equations of the TOE as the almost nothing
that actually exists) - and that assuming the universe is anything more than
just What the maths looks like from the inside is unnecessary - and
untestable - metaphysical speculation.
However we don't have such a TOE as yet, so it's possible it will turn out to
be non-mathematical, in which case Max's argument will sink without trace.
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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 29 Mar 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Quentin explained you politely the errors you made Politely?!! Yes. His explanations were clear, polite and definite (three years ago). He eventually get nervous only when you repeat your hand waving and deny for the nth time. Just look at his post of three years ago. And now, he was still polite, as lying is only insulting when false. It was an accusation, not an insult. But you accumulate evidence that you are not trying to understand, but just be negative on some person, with quite curious insinuation and invention. Like the last one: I would fear that machine could be intelligent, repeated three times, without taking into account the definition given. In science we redefine and make precise the terms before each paragraph or argument. But you don't listen, and then reinterpret everything in the way which suits your rather obscure agenda. Just the tone you are using shows how much you have prejudices. You are insulting my job since the beginning, without interruption. But thanks for doing it publicly. Usually people who have such shoulder shrugging reaction make the non relevant comments and the lies behind my back. That happened during 20 years in Brussels, and the price Le Monde has extended it in *some* academical circles in different countries, as I am often reported. I suspect you have been influenced by someone, and recently you told me that someone has some critics, but without citing it, I can't reply to it. I guess it is the same type of worldplay. As you have understood: the step 3 is trivial. You don't succeed no more in convincing anyone of the contrary. So what about step 4? (or just say: I am not interested in the problem. But then please stop claiming you have a refutation and confusing people with irrelevant remarks) Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Life in the Islamic State for women
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 3:35 AM, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 11:19 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 08:39, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/29/2015 3:55 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: Please! Hunter Gatherers - warriors is a boys' club term for it. I can accept that the term warrior glorifies something nasty, but what term to use? Hunter Gatherer is not what I mean. But that's what you are. You go to the supermarket, don't you? Sure. I am also not a warrior. I'm not sure I understand your objection here. I refer to the people who directly confront other groups in battles to the death. Them? They're just idiot warmongers like the brutes they are confronting. Takes one to know one. Usually the real warmongers don't go to war. You are simplifying the issue too much. People have gone to fight wars for all sorts of reasons. My country was at war with its former colonies until the mid 70s and several men in my family and other people from that generation I know went to fight that war. Nobody asked them if they wanted to go. They are fairly regular people, and mostly anti-war because they know how it actually looks like to be in one. As soon as you have my tribe you also unfortunately have not in my tribe. This is one of the tragedies of game theory. The problem is that, even if you reject tribalism, you have no control over what other groups do, and they will probably attack you at some point to obtain your resources. I say probably because natural selection will favour such groups. I share your desire for a world without violent conflict, but I don't think it's an easy problem to solve. Removing resource scarcity seems like the best bet, because then there's nothing to fight for. Besides, some of them only may be warriors. Most are likely twelve pound weaklings who were hit over the head in the middle of the night and told they had this brilliant career ahead of them in the armed forces. Isn't that how you raise an army? I am under the impression that the most successful armies (from the Romans to modern USA) depend a lot on special units made of highly skilled people who went through a quite stringent selection and training process. There are, of course, always openings for cannon fodder, but you I don't think you win a war with cannon fodder. I also suspect that the vast majority of a military consists of people performing logistics, engineering, etc tasks rather than directly confronting the enemy. Men are naturally more suited for this sort of thing due to endocrine system differences, that leads to bigger bodies, more muscles and more aggression. This last being in fact the dominant characteristic which means it should come at the head of your list. Men are sacks of testosterone and adrenalin. Yes, but man and women are expressions of the same species, and historically women seem to show a preference for men who are sacks of testosterone -- because the ones who did were more likely to spread they genes. This is a species issue, not a gender issue. Add to that the limited reach of human perception and you can find yourself in a pitched battle at the drop of a hat, particularly where the tension is already high. Right, but this is just the outcome of an evolutionary process that just is. Considering Darwinism, I don't think you could expect anything else. I believe we can transcend the tyranny of biology, but what's the point in blaming people for how they are, when they had no say in being one way or the other? One of the job requirements for joining ISIS is that you are able to squirt testosterone out of one ear and adrenalin out the other. What real warriors these guys are!!! I think ISIS is pure evil, but I don't think they gained control of such a large territory in such an unstable region by being idiots... I think it's silly to say warrior glorifies something nasty. Yet there may be good reasons for sending up the concept as I am doing. I mean, warriors can be good boys or bad boys. I take it that there are three kinds of warriors: good, bad and imbecilic. These are tribes too and cut across the other tribal, clan lines. You might be a lowly footsoldier, though a good and trusted son of the Empire while your commanding officer is a rapist and a murdering despot that everyone would prefer to see deposed. I also take it that the badder the boy, the better the warrior. Kind of axiomatic. I don't know. I associate the bad boy with extreme individualism, and it appears to me that the army is the opposite of individualism. Bit none of these things are simple, of course. All the guys who beat me up in the playground in Primary school later on in life became cops! Go figure. Well, they did better than mine, who mostly became supermarket cashiers. There are a lot of cops who are cops for the wrong reasons, no doubt. The militarization of certain
Re: The MGA revisited
On Monday, March 30, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com'); wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. But if that were so it would allow the above described situation, where you could lack qualia but it would make no difference to you, rendering the idea of consciousness meaningless. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Life in the Islamic State for women
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2015 at 23:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: The characteristics of a gender have been evolved by millions of years of selection, and women preferences play a role in this selection process. Not just A role but the main role, I would say. As any peahen or bowerbird can tell you, male animals (of most species) have to jump through hoops to attract females, because females have more to lose if they choose the wrong mate. This is one thing that makes me unpopular with feminists, when I mention that women have selectively bred men to be the way they are (the reverse is true, too, of course, but I would think to a lesser extent since women have more often got to choose). I agree with you. I avoided making such a strong argument because the percentage of women forced into unions, raped, kidnapped from other tribes, etc and the impact of these events in evolutionary history is highly debatable. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 3:33 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 11:57 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Ok... Well now everybody can see you as you really are, And I'm perfectly satisfied with that because that is who I really am. What? Chief of equine relations of everything list? :) No. You're not *that* good just because you've found out how to employ a couple of teenage insults/references. You have to offer something better to counter the increasing lowness of this place. I'm not an authority on the matter but think that perhaps this once, I can offer better, with tipping hat to art criticism topic that floated here for a few days some weeks back: Setting? Some German theater in the 19th century. Main figure was an extremely gifted improvising actor, who's random narrative deviations and improvisations on theater stage, drew the ire of managing powers of theater, even though the crowds loved these disruptions and found them hilarious. Naturally: Prohibition of improvisation on stage was decreed for the sake of art, honor, and decency. One day, a horse standing around in some scene that had to be acted, was featured with our actor on stage. It's easy in these situations to bring one of the more docile, obedient, predictable specimens on stage. Certain predictions are hard to predict however, such as when the horse has to go... do its business. Of course, it had to come to what everybody imagines at this point, at which our hero declared on stage: Animal, shame on you! When everybody knows perfectly well that on this stage improvisation is forbidden... If I remember correctly, he was not penalized for breaking the rule to call attention to the rule being broken, and the officials in question even laughed, I think. The End. --- Perhaps one can bring up toilet stuff, equine relations etc. without all the hate and still offer substance or a laugh at least. So a definite No! vote on your application for chief of equine relations of everything list. Almost entertaining was the post on no fair! Buuuhuuu! He called me a liar. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 30 Mar 2015, at 03:10, LizR wrote: On 29 March 2015 at 10:45, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: But if it were a world of copying machines and John K Clark says I expect to see Moscow tomorrow then who the hell knows what I means. The same is true of the MWI. We don't say I expect to see both spin up and spin down, or I expect the cat to be both dead and alive - even if we believe the MWI to be true. Yet the I who measures the spin is duplicated, as is the I who enters the Brussels teleporter. All step 3 shows is that if consciousness is digital, it can be copied and pasted. ... at different places, so that the 1p specific experiences are not predictible in advance by the one being duplicated. Just to finish your sentence, I mean, if you are describing step 3. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 30 Mar 2015, at 04:20, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 9:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: But if it were a world of copying machines and John K Clark says I expect to see Moscow tomorrow then who the hell knows what I means. The same is true of the MWI. No it is not the same. In the MWI if John Clark says tomorrow I will see the electron spin up then tomorrow there is a clear way for Liz to determine if the prediction was correct or not because the the laws pf physics guarantee that Liz will find no ambitious in the meaning of the personal pronoun I. But in the copying machine stuff if John Clark says tomorrow I will see Moscow there is no way that Liz or anybody else can determine if the prediction was correct or not because nobody knows who the hell I is. We don't say I expect to see both spin up and spin down or I expect the cat to be both dead and alive - even if we believe the MWI to be true. That true. in the MWI we don't say that, but even if we did the statement would not be gibberish it would just turn out to be wrong. But in the copying machine world I will see Moscow tomorrow is equivalent to klogknee will see Moscow tomorrow because both I and klogknee are not defined. But then you have to say already no to the doctor in step zero, and abandon teleportation in step 1. You talk like if there was an insuperable difficulty brought by the duplication. But on the contrary, with computationalism, and the quite simple definition of first person (equiavlent, in the QM setting with Everett definition of subjective), we need only to interview *all* duplicated persons. It is easy to count that almost all will say white noise in the n-iterated duplication. Of course, you might decide to predict that the W-M sequence you will live will describe the binary digits of PI. But with the definition of first person given, that is not a good prediction, because it is satisfied at stage n by only by one successor, when predicting that 'you will not be PI' is satisfied by the corresponding 2^n - 1, for all stage n. You seem to agree that a beam of photons split, on the polarizer, in two beam when prepared in the relevant superposition state. From this I can build a though experience where you are told that you will be either looking at a quantum superposition state or in classical self-duplication experience. You would not been able to see the difference, without violating computationalism. Wake up, John, the *real* difficulties are in step 7 and step 8. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 29 Mar 2015, at 19:42, John Clark wrote: snip (already answered/commented) You keep oscillating between too much simple and pompous (but correct) and incorrect or imprecise Well, that's what happens with a theory where the true parts are obvious and the non-obvious parts are not true. This does not help. What is not obvious? and are you sure you need it to move to step 4? The goal is to explain that if we are digitalisable machines, our computations are distributed in a tiny part of the arithmetical reality, which emulates the universal dovetailing. The main thing needed in step 3 is that you survive the duplication. That is also NON trivial per se, but it still follows trivially from step 1. A remind that comp might not be that obvious. But the goal is just to push the logic at his limit. I really think that you don't do the thought experience completely. Take the WM-duplication iterated duplication. You say there is a problem with pronouns, but we have already agree that the four WW, WM, MW, MM examplars of John Clark *are* John Clark. To do the thought experiments, you have only to put yourself in *each* John Clark that appears at the end. Any specific prediction is refuted by three John Clarks, and we listen to them because we did agree that they are all John-Clark-Helsinki- and-before. So in Helsinki, if John Clark writes in the diary: I predict that I will live either WW or WM or MW or MM, then all reconstitutions can say, my prediction was correct. And there is no better one, which justifies, for this protocol the P = 1/2. By the definition of the fist person experience used here (content of diaries, memories, which are taken in the cut and copy machines), a prediction is better than another if it is satisfied by more first person experience. Note the importance of knowing (by assumption) the true protocol. If we do the same experience and secretly reconstitute you (the John Clark in Helsinki before the WM duplications) in Dublin, the Dublin John Clarks know that the WW v WM v MW v MM prediction was false, after all, or at least that it can be made better with WW v WM v WD v MW v MM v MD v DW v DM v DD It is exactly that which makes the Boltzmann brain really problematical in physics (with physicalism) and the UD problematical in arithmetic (with computationalism). But if we interview the machine, the problem is (apparently, till now) solved by the non trivial constraints of computer science, and that is what I illustrate in the second part of sane04. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 29 Mar 2015, at 21:41, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote: From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of John Clark Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2015 10:47 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Quentin explained you politely the errors you made Politely?!! I alluded to the lengthy explanations that Quentin Jason, myself, even Brent, tried on John Clark, some years ago, on step 3. He made some of us nervous when he claimed recently having a refutation, and then giving again its usual play with word. Let us see if he answer the coffee question. Quentin last post to Clark were plausibly not so much diplomatical, and might be slightly non sensical (as it makes no sense to say to a liar that he/she is a liar). But it is not really an insult, especially that Quentin gave the evidences. It is defamation, mockery, bullying, and lies/insinuation. The last insinuation was particularly gross. Bruno Chris John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 30 Mar 2015, at 07:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 29 March 2015 at 05:31, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 7:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2015-03-28 19:04 GMT+01:00 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 6:01 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Is anyone else worried that the list is descending to a low place? It's interesting, Quentin The Horse Fucker has been calling me Liar Clark about every other day since December 23 2013, and yet in all those preceding 15 months there was not one word of protest over that less than flattering nickname by anyone on the list, not even by me. And yet just one day after I suggest that Quentin may engage in coitus with a mammal of the genus Equus and ask him to perform an action that may be anatomically impossible you start to worry about the list descending into a low place. I agree with you here. You can agree, yet he lied repeteadly... just one week ago about Bruno being affraid of machine... He lies continuously since he's here. So it's a nickname well deserved, john never engage into meaningful discussion, he uses insults all the times. The fact he lies, is easy to check... So I don't agree it's the same, he is the only low person on this list, trolling since the beginning... What does the list learned form John Clark except he is a troll and a liar ? nothing at all. I think that John has been arguing in bad faith, possibly trolling Bruno and the people like us who like Bruno's work. I simply agree that he has been the target of name calling himself without complaining, and nobody said anything, so maybe we should remain quiet about it when he does the same. You also didn't complain, so it's fair to assume that it doesn't matter and it's not really something that a bunch of adults on a mailing list should worry about. I was referring to the entire exchange, not just one side. It doesn't directly physically hurt anyone to be rude or abusive, but it's better not to be rude or abusive. Hmm... I am not sure why you say it does not directly physically hurt anyone like if that would made bullying or harassment into something legally acceptable. People physically hurt does rarely kill themselves, only in extreme case. People morally hurt get destroyed and very often kill themselves, ... or made gigantic discoveries or creation (but that does not justify the bullying 'course). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 9:13 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, do you think its working? I always wanted to be in a boy band and I just learned that Zayn Malik is quitting One Direction and I'm trying to get his :-) If that fails you could try for a job as the next Doctor Who. That's one of the nicest things anybody has ever said to me. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So in Helsinki, if John Clark writes in the diary: I predict that I will live either WW or WM or MW or MM, then John Clark doesn't understand Bruno Marchal's notation and doesn't know the difference between WW and WM, but it doesn't really matter because John Clark knows immediately that if I means John Clark The Helsinki Man then the prediction will turn out to be false, and if I just mean John Clark then it would still be wrong unless the word either was eliminated. John Clark is far less interested in what WM is supposed to mean than what I means in this identity scrambling context. John K Clark (aka I) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 30 Mar 2015, at 05:45, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 15:20, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 9:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: But if it were a world of copying machines and John K Clark says I expect to see Moscow tomorrow then who the hell knows what I means. The same is true of the MWI. No it is not the same. In the MWI if John Clark says tomorrow I will see the electron spin up then tomorrow there is a clear way for Liz to determine if the prediction was correct or not because the the laws pf physics guarantee that Liz will find no ambitious in the meaning of the personal pronoun I. You mean, because I will also be duplicated. That's true. Nevertheless, if the MWI is correct there is an ambiguity. I'm just not in a position to experience it. Or rather I only experience it as quantum uncertainty. But in the copying machine stuff if John Clark says tomorrow I will see Moscow there is no way that Liz or anybody else can determine if the prediction was correct or not because nobody knows who the hell I is. Well, that's the point, I think - even without copying machines, the MWI implies that our idea of what we are is wrong, or at least inadequate. if someone asks me whether I'm going to be at work tomorrow, I'd either state my intention to be, or perhaps give a probabalistic answer (e.g. yes, unless I catch cold or the ferry breaks down). I wouldn't say yes, no, and I'll be dead, and I'll also be kidnapped by aliens, and declared Ruler of the world... - even though the MWI says that I will do everything it's physically possible for me to do, in different branches. We don't say I expect to see both spin up and spin down or I expect the cat to be both dead and alive - even if we believe the MWI to be true. That true. in the MWI we don't say that, but even if we did the statement would not be gibberish it would just turn out to be wrong. But in the copying machine world I will see Moscow tomorrow is equivalent to klogknee will see Moscow tomorrow because both I and klogknee are not defined. I think the MWI version could be considered to be true - that the I who exists before the experiment turns into two people, who between them perceive both outcomes. But given that we understand that a duplication occurs in both the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment, we can see in both cases that there is an I who experiences both outcomes, which we experience from our own perspective as apparent randomness. Bruno's point is that *if* consciousness is an outcome of computation, then it could in principle be duplicated. Of course, this becomes more obvious if we're talking about a conscious AI... Bruno is considering classical (non-quantum) computation, in which it's trivially true that data and programmes can be duplicated. As far as we know, none of those programmes are conscious as yet, but there isn't any reason why a conscious programme couldn't be duplicated and one copy sent to a computer in Moscow, and another to a computer in Washington, which would (given the assumption that consciousness is the result of computation) be enough for step 3. However, the average person might have a So what? attitude to a philsophical argument based around a mere conscious computer programme, so I think the reason Bruno uses hypothetical teleporters is to make it easier for people to get to grips with. I can't agree more, and that is why term like Pompous addressed personally, when you are just trying to explain, might seem deliberately confusing. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. That would entail that indeed. But computationalism is not claiming that there is not something else involved, indeed the true relations, as in the difference between []p p and []p. This relates the machine to a non nameable first person knower. I think Brent intuit this. He use the term our world for that, and this is the t added to the []p to get a physical world (before comp which will be the restriction of the sigma_1 sentences). It is an indexical conception of world: this reality (in which I believe). Consciousness and computation are not related to the static representations but in their true relations. The sigma_1 relations, and only them, verifies p - []p, the logic avoids collapse, because p is not sigma_1. So, those sigma_1 relation collapse truth and representations, at that level, but self-reference and measurement complexifies the logic. Truth extends computability, in fact provability extends computability, in the constructive or not, transfinite. But Truth extends properly all machines' provabilities, or the locally effective sets of belief, as the machine can discover when introspecting itself (in the Gödel, Post, Kleene manner). I might need to explain to you the difference, that you might know well, but still discard from the theory, between the truth that 2 + 2 = 4, and a proof of this, for example provided by some proving machine. Then you need to understand the working of a computer, or of any universal (Turing) system, and understand how they all can implement each others. Given that elementary arithmetic is such a system, a computation can be defined by relations between numbers. At the sigma_1 (or sigma_0) level truth fuse with provability, but when machine looks at themselves the complexity crops well above the sigma_1 level, and the relations between p and []p get, well, more complicated (that is why we get 8 hypostases). Consistency (t) is Pi_1 and is the typical truth about the machine that the machine cannot justified about herself: but she can discover the fact as she can justified t - ~[]t, and actually missing []t. With the Plato lexicon this gives all Protagorean virtue including intelligence (by the definition I gave). The protagorean virtue are those which leads to the contrary when (self, or not!) asserted: they are the proposition or state attribute obeying []x - ~x. Like moral, happiness, conscience, intelligence, love, security, and also the unnameable attributes. Smullyan's Forever Undecidable is a good introduction to the logic of self-reference. By a famous succession of theorems, a simple couple of modal logic, G and G*, sums it all at the 3p propositional level. And that is enough to define the variants []p p in G (in the machine language term, or arithmetic). When the universal machine introspects, she already get contradictory intuition about reality and herself. But she can overcome them, in different ways and modes. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: No it is not the same. In the MWI if John Clark says tomorrow I will see the electron spin up then tomorrow there is a clear way for Liz to determine if the prediction was correct or not because the the laws pf physics guarantee that Liz will find no ambitious in the meaning of the personal pronoun I. You mean, because I will also be duplicated. That's true. Nevertheless, if the MWI is correct there is an ambiguity. I'm just not in a position to experience it. True, you will not experience any ambiguity. And in a world without matter copying machines the laws of physics will also ensure that John Clark will not experience any ambiguity when Liz utters the personal pronoun I. Human language need not be made more precise than the laws of physics, but it shouldn't be incompatible with them either. the MWI implies that our idea of what we are is wrong, It's not wrong it's just not the whole truth. What is? or at least inadequate. Well... it's worked pretty adequately for thousands of years. if someone asks me whether I'm going to be at work tomorrow, I'd either state my intention to be, or perhaps give a probabalistic answer And tomorrow John Clark would be able to check and see if Liz's prediction turned out to be correct; but if right after making the prediction Liz stepped into a copying machine then nothing can be checked tomorrow or at any other time because the meaning of the prediction becomes an ambiguous muddle. Bruno's point is that *if* consciousness is an outcome of computation, then it could in principle be duplicated. Of course it can be duplicated! Is that even supposed to be controversial? If that was Bruno's only point this debate would have ended years ago, or would never even started. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That true. in the MWI we don't say that, but even if we did the statement would not be gibberish it would just turn out to be wrong. But in the copying machine world I will see Moscow tomorrow is equivalent to klogknee will see Moscow tomorrow because both I and klogknee are not defined. But then you have to say already no to the doctor in step zero I have no idea who the doctor is and if I ever knew that step zero existed I've erased it long ago to leave room in my finite brain for more important matters. Wake up, John, the *real* difficulties are in step 7 and step 8. Wow, I can only imagine how dumb those must be. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com'); wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. That would entail that indeed. But computationalism is not claiming that there is not something else involved, indeed the true relations, as in the difference between []p p and []p. This relates the machine to a non nameable first person knower. I think Brent intuit this. He use the term our world for that, and this is the t added to the []p to get a physical world (before comp which will be the restriction of the sigma_1 sentences). It is an indexical conception of world: this reality (in which I believe). Consciousness and computation are not related to the static representations but in their true relations. The sigma_1 relations, and only them, verifies p - []p, the logic avoids collapse, because p is not sigma_1. So, those sigma_1 relation collapse truth and representations, at that level, but self-reference and measurement complexifies the logic. Truth extends computability, in fact provability extends computability, in the constructive or not, transfinite. But Truth extends properly all machines' provabilities, or the locally effective sets of belief, as the machine can discover when introspecting itself (in the Gödel, Post, Kleene manner). I might need to explain to you the difference, that you might know well, but still discard from the theory, between the truth that 2 + 2 = 4, and a proof of this, for example provided by some proving machine. Then you need to understand the working of a computer, or of any universal (Turing) system, and understand how they all can implement each others. Given that elementary arithmetic is such a system, a computation can be defined by relations between numbers. At the sigma_1 (or sigma_0) level truth fuse with provability, but when machine looks at themselves the complexity crops well above the sigma_1 level, and the relations between p and []p get, well, more complicated (that is why we get 8 hypostases). Consistency (t) is Pi_1 and is the typical truth about the machine that the machine cannot justified about herself: but she can discover the fact as she can justified t - ~[]t, and actually missing []t. With the Plato lexicon this gives all Protagorean virtue including intelligence (by the definition I gave). The protagorean virtue are those which leads to the contrary when (self, or not!) asserted: they are the proposition or state attribute obeying []x - ~x. Like moral, happiness, conscience, intelligence, love, security, and also the unnameable attributes. Smullyan's Forever Undecidable is a good introduction to the logic of self-reference. By a famous succession of theorems, a simple couple of modal logic, G and G*, sums it all at the 3p propositional level. And that is enough to define the variants []p p in G (in the machine language term, or arithmetic). When the universal machine introspects, she already get contradictory intuition about reality and herself. But she can overcome them, in different ways and modes. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com'); . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed
Re: The MGA revisited
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 31 March 2015 at 09:28, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com'); wrote: On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','marc...@ulb.ac.be'); wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist. Yes, exactly, partial zombies. This is sounding like Daniel Dennett's view, that consciousness etc don't really exist but are a sort of illusion or user interface or like elan vital, some mysterious ineffable property that science will do away with once we understand enough. I don't necessarily believe this, but I need more than an argument from incredulity to convince me that it's wrong. I can't think of a situation where I would be more incredulous than if someone told me I wasn't really experiencing what I thought I was experiencing. For this reason, I don't think the consciousness-deniers are really consciousness-deniers - more a type of consciousness-explainers-away. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 31 March 2015 at 05:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno's point is that *if* consciousness is an outcome of computation, then it could in principle be duplicated. Of course it can be duplicated! Is that even supposed to be controversial? If that was Bruno's only point this debate would have ended years ago, or would never even started. It's the only point of step 3, yes. Each step in a logical argument has to be small, simple, perhaps even trivial. That doesn't mean the entire chain is trivial, however - some of the best logical arguments proceed to an unexpected conclusion via small steps, each one apparently trivial in itself. And yes, apparently everyone else thinks the debate should have ended years ago. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Life in the Islamic State for women
On 30 March 2015 at 23:46, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2015 at 23:12, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: The characteristics of a gender have been evolved by millions of years of selection, and women preferences play a role in this selection process. Not just A role but the main role, I would say. As any peahen or bowerbird can tell you, male animals (of most species) have to jump through hoops to attract females, because females have more to lose if they choose the wrong mate. This is one thing that makes me unpopular with feminists, when I mention that women have selectively bred men to be the way they are (the reverse is true, too, of course, but I would think to a lesser extent since women have more often got to choose). I agree with you. I avoided making such a strong argument because the percentage of women forced into unions, raped, kidnapped from other tribes, etc and the impact of these events in evolutionary history is highly debatable. Good point. Clearly these have some impact, particularly, I would say, forced marriage which is still practiced in some cultures. Another factor is that there are various ways to induce abortions without modern medicine (mainly herbal, I think) so a rape victim, or someone who realises she's made a bad mistake has occasionally had control over whether to keep the child. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lizj...@gmail.com'); wrote: On 31 March 2015 at 01:08, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, March 30, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. But if that were so it would allow the above described situation, where you could lack qualia but it would make no difference to you, rendering the idea of consciousness meaningless. I thought the idea of fading qualia was that it *would* make a difference? Like you find yourself unable to appreciate some particular sensation as you used to? Otherwise why fading ? Obviously qualia can fade; if your ulnar nerve is damaged, then sensation in your little finger will be reduced. But the interesting idea is if comp is false and there is a decoupling between qualia and behaviour. Your ulnar nerve is damaged and it is replaced with a functionally perfect artificial nerve. This means that, for example, your speech centre, through a series of neural relays, will receive the usual input and you will declare that you have normal sensation and pass any objective test of motor and sensory function in your hand. However, it turns out that, contrary to comp/functionalism, perfect function is not enough to reproduce the qualia, so your hand is actually numb - it's just that there is no subjective or objective evidence of the numbness. But in that case, what possible meaning could be given to the word numb? This is the sort of weirdness that denial of comp can lead to. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Life in the Islamic State for women
On 30 March 2015 at 15:16, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/29/2015 7:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 14:35, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Them? They're just idiot warmongers like the brutes they are confronting. Takes one to know one. As soon as you have my tribe you also unfortunately have not in my tribe. Besides, some of them only may be warriors. Most are likely twelve pound weaklings who were hit over the head in the middle of the night and told they had this brilliant career ahead of them in the armed forces. I imagine that most of the fighting done by men throughout human evolution has been against animals. Only a few of those animals were also human. This was a dirty job, no doubt, but someone had to do it - if early humans were to survive, and get some protein in their diets. I think there's an idea that eating meat helped us on the path to big-brained dominant species that we are today (apart from all the beetles and things). Hunting and eating meat no doubt provided an ecological niche that selected for a smart, cooperative, weapon making ground ape. I agree, although since we aren't exclusively carnivores there other selection factors at work. But I guess that's obvious (sexual selection for one, of course). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 31 March 2015 at 05:47, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 9:13 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, do you think its working? I always wanted to be in a boy band and I just learned that Zayn Malik is quitting One Direction and I'm trying to get his :-) If that fails you could try for a job as the next Doctor Who. That's one of the nicest things anybody has ever said to me. I'm pleased to hear it - although I hope people say even nicer things! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 31 March 2015 at 09:28, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist. Yes, exactly, partial zombies. This is sounding like Daniel Dennett's view, that consciousness etc don't really exist but are a sort of illusion or user interface or like elan vital, some mysterious ineffable property that science will do away with once we understand enough. I don't necessarily believe this, but I need more than an argument from incredulity to convince me that it's wrong. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 31 March 2015 at 11:11, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 31 March 2015 at 01:08, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, March 30, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. But if that were so it would allow the above described situation, where you could lack qualia but it would make no difference to you, rendering the idea of consciousness meaningless. I thought the idea of fading qualia was that it *would* make a difference? Like you find yourself unable to appreciate some particular sensation as you used to? Otherwise why fading ? Obviously qualia can fade; if your ulnar nerve is damaged, then sensation in your little finger will be reduced. But the interesting idea is if comp is false and there is a decoupling between qualia and behaviour. Your ulnar nerve is damaged and it is replaced with a functionally perfect artificial nerve. This means that, for example, your speech centre, through a series of neural relays, will receive the usual input and you will declare that you have normal sensation and pass any objective test of motor and sensory function in your hand. However, it turns out that, contrary to comp/functionalism, perfect function is not enough to reproduce the qualia, so your hand is actually numb - it's just that there is no subjective or objective evidence of the numbness. But in that case, what possible meaning could be given to the word numb? This is the sort of weirdness that denial of comp can lead to. Hmm! Yes, OK - Put like that, it does seem weird. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 31 March 2015 at 05:41, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: the MWI implies that our idea of what we are is wrong, It's not wrong it's just not the whole truth. What is? or at least inadequate. Well... it's worked pretty adequately for thousands of years. Inadequate was being used, in this context, to mean not the whole truth - that there is more to the situation than we originally thought. So far we agree. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 31 March 2015 at 01:08, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, March 30, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't generated by computation. But if that were so it would allow the above described situation, where you could lack qualia but it would make no difference to you, rendering the idea of consciousness meaningless. I thought the idea of fading qualia was that it *would* make a difference? Like you find yourself unable to appreciate some particular sensation as you used to? Otherwise why fading ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 31 March 2015 at 06:02, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That true. in the MWI we don't say that, but even if we did the statement would not be gibberish it would just turn out to be wrong. But in the copying machine world I will see Moscow tomorrow is equivalent to klogknee will see Moscow tomorrow because both I and klogknee are not defined. But then you have to say already no to the doctor in step zero I have no idea who the doctor is and if I ever knew that step zero existed I've erased it long ago to leave room in my finite brain for more important matters. With respect, that just sounds like a refusal to engage with the argument. The only reasonable courses should be either to ignore the argument completely, and not engage in discussions about it, or to engage with it seriously. Anything else is just trolling, to be honest. Anyway, assuming you do want to engage seriously, step zero is when you either do or don't agree that, if a doctor replaced your brain with an electronic version that exactly duplicated the computations (hypothetically) underlying your consciousness, you would survive the replacement - that from your viewpoint, you'd go to sleep with a biological brain before the operation, and wake up afterwards with an electronic brain. Obviously this is a thought experiment, in more senses than one! But if you think that consciousness is a form of computation, then it should be possible, at least in principle. In fact, waking up after the operation as an electronic version of yourself should be no less miraculous than waking up after an operation for a hernia and finding that you are still yourself - or even waking up in the morning as yourself. In each case, the computation has been continued from where it left off. If you disagree that such a replacement, even in principle, couldn't happen, then you reject the premise of comp. Otherwise, you're asked to follow the (each almost trivial) logical steps of the argument to its rather surprising conclusion - or to find a flaw in the argument. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 31 March 2015 at 12:20, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I can't think of a situation where I would be more incredulous than if someone told me I wasn't really experiencing what I thought I was experiencing. For this reason, I don't think the consciousness-deniers are really consciousness-deniers - more a type of consciousness-explainers-away. Yes, that's my feeling on the matter too. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You talk like if there was an insuperable difficulty brought by the duplication. Engineering difficulties only, scientific breakthroughs would not be required to make a matter duplicating machine; however when such machines become commonplace the English language, and especially the way it uses personal pronouns, will need a major overhaul. You seem to agree that a beam of photons split, on the polarizer, in two beam when prepared in the relevant superposition state. Most polarizers just absorb light of one polarization and transmit the other, but Icelandic spar does create 2 beams of different polarization. From this I can build a though experience where you are told that you will be either looking at a quantum superposition state or in classical self-duplication experience. You would not been able to see the difference, without violating computationalism. As I've said before, if you want to make the people in your thought experiment analogous to photons that exhibit weird quantum effects like interference you're going to have to merge the Washington Man and the Moscow man back into one entity. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 6:32 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: step zero is when you either do or don't agree that, if a doctor replaced your brain with an electronic version that exactly duplicated the computations (hypothetically) underlying your consciousness, you would survive the replacement Well of course I'd survive the replacement, but yes doctor seems like a pretty silly term for it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Life in the Islamic State for women
On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 07:04:10AM -0400, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Well, its not the new jihadists I blame, but the (yes) leftist academics, politicians, and news thugs, that have long, empowered, and made excuses for these aggressors. My suspicion is that they see the jihadists worldwide as being able to topple their shared capitalist enemies. Why else would somebody make excuses, constantly, for jihadists, islamists, and their antidemocratic mindset, anti women, and so forth? The left in all lands serve as the Islamist enablers, and some are billionaires who lean left. Yeah, I know this is divisive, but it's sadly, accurate. Maybe, you left voters could start to vote for nationalist politicians in your countries as a push-back against the jihadist-catering pols, academics, and newsies? You could still be for social justice and spend for it, but coddling the islamists by word and deed would need to be suppressed. They do like modern weaponry, delivered into their hands by allah, to use against the Qufars (all of us). This now includes NBC weapons. In which country are the lefties apologists for jihadists and islamists? Not in mine. Almost everybody I know is a leftie, coz nobody here likes our current rightie PM, but none of them support the IS. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
2015-03-31 7:19 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 3/30/2015 10:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 3/28/2015 11:36 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno has acknowledged that this is not what the MGA shows. MGA simply shows that his version of computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience. This cannot be seen as surprising since it is explicitly built into computationalism that physicalism is false. That's not my understanding. Bruno's argument starts with assuming that a part, or all, of your brain could be replaced by a digital AI with the same I/O and if done at a suitably low level of detail (probably neuronal) you conscious inner life would be essentially the same. That seems to me to be assuming physicalism as the basis of consciousness. This contradicts what you say below about Bruno assuming that only certain special processes institute consciousness. He's trying a reductio. So he assumes physicalism - that some physical processes produce consciousness (not just any physical process) - and tried to reach the absurdity that the physical process can be a do-nothing process. I think there is an ambiguity, or uncertainty, about just what the program that is to replace part or all of your brain does. If the program is just a simulation of the actual physical brain, neuron by neuron, synapse by synapse, so that that physical laws that govern the behaviour of these brain elements are instantiated by the computer, and act on the initial data given by the state of the brain when the program is started, then there will be no essential difference between the program and the brain it replaces. In this case you might say Yes, doctor, with some confidence. The necessary programming would presumably be well understood since the brain is deterministic at the level with which we are concerned, and the physical/chemical laws can be determined. If the initial state can be ascertained with sufficient precision without killing you, then the simulated computer brain substitute acts just like the original, so should give no problems. This understanding is based on the idea that consciousness supervenes on the processes and states of the physical brain. These have been replaced by equivalent physical processes, so consciousness should remain intact. There is no appeal to computationalism here. Sure there is; it's the requirement that the computer compute the equivalent physical processes. They are equivalent in the sense of producing the same sequence of states (at whatever level they are simulated). The simulating computer has to perform many detailed calculations to carry through the operation of known physical laws on the initial data, but I don't think anyone is saying that consciousness supervenes on such calculations. I think they are. In fact didn't you say so above: ...then the simulated computer brain substitute acts just like the original, so should give no problems. Are you making some distinction between simulating the brain and simulating the physics of the brain? The other approach is to assume that the computer used to replace your brain is running a true AI program. It is not simulating the physical processes piece by piece, but running some black box program that has been shown to reproduce known brain outputs for some range of suitable inputs. The program is presumably supposed to implement the universal TM computations upon which consciousness supervenes independently of the underlying hardware/wetware. If this is the model you have in mind, then the computationalist model directly contradicts physical supervenience, right from the outset. No, as I understand it Bruno is assuming the doctor replaces all or part of your brain with a digital device (or even an analog one so long as it's function doesn't depend on infinite precision) that computes the same I/O function at it's interface with the rest of you. Now, I think the interesting question to ask is: Given these two different implementations of the brain replacing program, would you have equal confidence in both possibilities? I think the answer would, in general, be No!. The program that assumes physical supervenience can be tested element by element, so that once it has been shown to truly follow the known chemical and physical laws, and accurately reproduces the structure of your actual brain, it will be counterfactually correct, and could be trusted into the future. The alternative, computationalist model cannot be tested in this way. Basically because it is necessarily holistic. Consciousness is assumed to supervene on a particular type of computation, but is your computationalist program the same as mine? How do we know? I do not think the we could ever guarantee that such an AI device was counterfactually correct for /your/ brain. Many artificial learning programs, based on neural nets or the like, can be
Re: The MGA revisited
On 3/30/2015 10:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 3/28/2015 11:36 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno has acknowledged that this is not what the MGA shows. MGA simply shows that his version of computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience. This cannot be seen as surprising since it is explicitly built into computationalism that physicalism is false. That's not my understanding. Bruno's argument starts with assuming that a part, or all, of your brain could be replaced by a digital AI with the same I/O and if done at a suitably low level of detail (probably neuronal) you conscious inner life would be essentially the same. That seems to me to be assuming physicalism as the basis of consciousness. This contradicts what you say below about Bruno assuming that only certain special processes institute consciousness. He's trying a reductio. So he assumes physicalism - that some physical processes produce consciousness (not just any physical process) - and tried to reach the absurdity that the physical process can be a do-nothing process. I think there is an ambiguity, or uncertainty, about just what the program that is to replace part or all of your brain does. If the program is just a simulation of the actual physical brain, neuron by neuron, synapse by synapse, so that that physical laws that govern the behaviour of these brain elements are instantiated by the computer, and act on the initial data given by the state of the brain when the program is started, then there will be no essential difference between the program and the brain it replaces. In this case you might say Yes, doctor, with some confidence. The necessary programming would presumably be well understood since the brain is deterministic at the level with which we are concerned, and the physical/chemical laws can be determined. If the initial state can be ascertained with sufficient precision without killing you, then the simulated computer brain substitute acts just like the original, so should give no problems. This understanding is based on the idea that consciousness supervenes on the processes and states of the physical brain. These have been replaced by equivalent physical processes, so consciousness should remain intact. There is no appeal to computationalism here. Sure there is; it's the requirement that the computer compute the equivalent physical processes. They are equivalent in the sense of producing the same sequence of states (at whatever level they are simulated). The simulating computer has to perform many detailed calculations to carry through the operation of known physical laws on the initial data, but I don't think anyone is saying that consciousness supervenes on such calculations. I think they are. In fact didn't you say so above: ...then the simulated computer brain substitute acts just like the original, so should give no problems. Are you making some distinction between simulating the brain and simulating the physics of the brain? The other approach is to assume that the computer used to replace your brain is running a true AI program. It is not simulating the physical processes piece by piece, but running some black box program that has been shown to reproduce known brain outputs for some range of suitable inputs. The program is presumably supposed to implement the universal TM computations upon which consciousness supervenes independently of the underlying hardware/wetware. If this is the model you have in mind, then the computationalist model directly contradicts physical supervenience, right from the outset. No, as I understand it Bruno is assuming the doctor replaces all or part of your brain with a digital device (or even an analog one so long as it's function doesn't depend on infinite precision) that computes the same I/O function at it's interface with the rest of you. Now, I think the interesting question to ask is: Given these two different implementations of the brain replacing program, would you have equal confidence in both possibilities? I think the answer would, in general, be No!. The program that assumes physical supervenience can be tested element by element, so that once it has been shown to truly follow the known chemical and physical laws, and accurately reproduces the structure of your actual brain, it will be counterfactually correct, and could be trusted into the future. The alternative, computationalist model cannot be tested in this way. Basically because it is necessarily holistic. Consciousness is assumed to supervene on a particular type of computation, but is your computationalist program the same as mine? How do we know? I do not think the we could ever guarantee that such an AI device was counterfactually correct for /your/ brain. Many artificial learning programs, based on neural nets or the like, can be trained to perform with great reproducibility on the training data set,
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2015, at 10:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
OK. If all the connections and inputs remain intact, and the digital
simulation is accurate, I don't see a problem. But I might object if
the doctor plans to replace my brain with an abstract computation in
Platonia
The doctor propose a real physical computer. Either a cheap PC or a more
expensive MAC, but it is done with matter guarantied of stellar origin!
But what sort of program will it be running? A physical simulation, or
some abstract computationalist AI model? See my reply to Brent.
-- because I don't know what such a thing might be,
Nor do I.
and don't believe it actually exists absent some physical instantiation.
Do you thing prime numbers needs physics to exist? If yes, show me what
is wrong in Euclid's proof, which define and prove the mathematical
existence of the prime numbers without assuming anything physical.
I am assuming that Euclid, himself, is physical, and that he devised the
proof -- it did not drop into his lap unsought. In a phrase I have used
before, It did not spring forth fully armed, like Athena from Zeus's
brow. Numbers were a hard-won abstraction from everyday physical
reality. They do not have any independent existence. As someone has
said, you do not come across a number 5 running wild in the undergrowth.
I know that many, if not most, mathematicians report that in their
research it is as though they are exploring a landscape that exists --
they are discovering things that are already there, they are not
constructing them. Hence most mathematicians are realists about
mathematics, which is Platonism.
But I think we need to distinguish two senses in which something can be
said to exist. There is mathematical existence, Exist_{math}, and
physical existence, Exist_{phys}. These are not the same, and are not
even approximately equivalent, although it might seem that way to a
mathematician.
Exist_{math} is the set of all implications of a set of axioms and some
rules of inference. It is not necessary that everything that
exists_{math} can be proved as a theorem withing the system, or that the
completeness and/or consistency of this system can ever be established.
But it is an abstract system, and exist_{math} resides in Platonia,
outside of any physical existence.
Exist_{phys} is the hardware of the universe. It is not defined
axiomatically, but ostensively. You point and say That is a rock, cat,
or whatever. In more sophisticated laboratory settings, you construct
models to explain atomic spectra, tracks in bubble chambers, and so on.
The scientific realist would claim that the theoretical entities
entailed by his most mature and well-tested scientific theories
exist_{phys}, and form part of the furniture of the external objective
physical world. The experienced scientist, though, always recognizes
that any such claims of ontology are, at best, provisional, and are
always subject to revision on the advent of new and better date, more
general and sophistical models, and so on.
So there is a very clear difference between the mathematical and
physical worlds. One is axiomatic and subject to proof. Valid proofs are
not open to revision -- they may be abandoned as useless, but once
proved, they remain proved and transfer truth values from the premises
to the conclusions. This is not the case for physics. That is not
axiomatic, it is ultimately based on observation and experiment. Any
theories that might be constructed are always provisional and subject to
revision.
So prime numbers might exist_{math}, but they do not exist_{phys}. If we
keep this distinction clear we will avoid a lot of unnecessary confusion.
Bruce
Likewize, all computations can be proved to exists, and have some
weight, in a theory as weak as Robinson arithmetic.
The doctor will not propose an abstract immaterial brain to you. But the
problem, shown by the UD-Argument, is that you already have an infinity
of abstract immaterial brain in elementary arithmetic, and you can
detect the difference, and that leads to the necessity of justifying the
stability of the physical laws from a measure on all computation,
extending Everett methodology on Arithmetic.
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Re: The MGA revisited
meekerdb wrote: On 3/28/2015 11:36 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno has acknowledged that this is not what the MGA shows. MGA simply shows that his version of computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience. This cannot be seen as surprising since it is explicitly built into computationalism that physicalism is false. That's not my understanding. Bruno's argument starts with assuming that a part, or all, of your brain could be replaced by a digital AI with the same I/O and if done at a suitably low level of detail (probably neuronal) you conscious inner life would be essentially the same. That seems to me to be assuming physicalism as the basis of consciousness. This contradicts what you say below about Bruno assuming that only certain special processes institute consciousness. I think there is an ambiguity, or uncertainty, about just what the program that is to replace part or all of your brain does. If the program is just a simulation of the actual physical brain, neuron by neuron, synapse by synapse, so that that physical laws that govern the behaviour of these brain elements are instantiated by the computer, and act on the initial data given by the state of the brain when the program is started, then there will be no essential difference between the program and the brain it replaces. In this case you might say Yes, doctor, with some confidence. The necessary programming would presumably be well understood since the brain is deterministic at the level with which we are concerned, and the physical/chemical laws can be determined. If the initial state can be ascertained with sufficient precision without killing you, then the simulated computer brain substitute acts just like the original, so should give no problems. This understanding is based on the idea that consciousness supervenes on the processes and states of the physical brain. These have been replaced by equivalent physical processes, so consciousness should remain intact. There is no appeal to computationalism here. The simulating computer has to perform many detailed calculations to carry through the operation of known physical laws on the initial data, but I don't think anyone is saying that consciousness supervenes on such calculations. The other approach is to assume that the computer used to replace your brain is running a true AI program. It is not simulating the physical processes piece by piece, but running some black box program that has been shown to reproduce known brain outputs for some range of suitable inputs. The program is presumably supposed to implement the universal TM computations upon which consciousness supervenes independently of the underlying hardware/wetware. If this is the model you have in mind, then the computationalist model directly contradicts physical supervenience, right from the outset. Now, I think the interesting question to ask is: Given these two different implementations of the brain replacing program, would you have equal confidence in both possibilities? I think the answer would, in general, be No!. The program that assumes physical supervenience can be tested element by element, so that once it has been shown to truly follow the known chemical and physical laws, and accurately reproduces the structure of your actual brain, it will be counterfactually correct, and could be trusted into the future. The alternative, computationalist model cannot be tested in this way. Basically because it is necessarily holistic. Consciousness is assumed to supervene on a particular type of computation, but is your computationalist program the same as mine? How do we know? I do not think the we could ever guarantee that such an AI device was counterfactually correct for /your/ brain. Many artificial learning programs, based on neural nets or the like, can be trained to perform with great reproducibility on the training data set, but fail miserably once one goes outside this data set. They are not counterfactually correct, and I do not know how you could ever ensure the necessary counterfactual correctness, even if you did imagine that you knew precisely the sort of computation upon which consciousness supervened. So I would reject the computationalist program right at the start -- I would not say Yes, doctor to that sort of AI program. Bruce The MGA is, therefore, largely irrelevant, because it does not prove anything that we didn't already know. It certainly does not show that consciousness is an abstract process in Plationia, independent of any physical process. Bruno assumes that only some special processes instantiate consciousness and these are characterized by being computations of some kind, i.e. a sequence of states that could be realized by a program running on a Universal Turing Machine (not necessarily halting). Since the consciousness computation defined this way is an abstract mathematical process in
Re: The MGA revisited
On 3/30/2015 10:42 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Mar 2015, at 10:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
OK. If all the connections and inputs remain intact, and the digital simulation is
accurate, I don't see a problem. But I might object if the doctor plans to replace my
brain with an abstract computation in Platonia
The doctor propose a real physical computer. Either a cheap PC or a more expensive MAC,
but it is done with matter guarantied of stellar origin!
But what sort of program will it be running? A physical simulation, or some abstract
computationalist AI model? See my reply to Brent.
-- because I don't know what such a thing might be,
Nor do I.
and don't believe it actually exists absent some physical instantiation.
Do you thing prime numbers needs physics to exist? If yes, show me what is wrong in
Euclid's proof, which define and prove the mathematical existence of the prime numbers
without assuming anything physical.
I am assuming that Euclid, himself, is physical, and that he devised the proof -- it did
not drop into his lap unsought. In a phrase I have used before, It did not spring forth
fully armed, like Athena from Zeus's brow. Numbers were a hard-won abstraction from
everyday physical reality. They do not have any independent existence. As someone has
said, you do not come across a number 5 running wild in the undergrowth.
I know that many, if not most, mathematicians report that in their research it is as
though they are exploring a landscape that exists -- they are discovering things that
are already there, they are not constructing them. Hence most mathematicians are
realists about mathematics, which is Platonism.
But I think we need to distinguish two senses in which something can be said to exist.
There is mathematical existence, Exist_{math}, and physical existence, Exist_{phys}.
These are not the same, and are not even approximately equivalent, although it might
seem that way to a mathematician.
Exist_{math} is the set of all implications of a set of axioms and some rules of
inference. It is not necessary that everything that exists_{math} can be proved as a
theorem withing the system, or that the completeness and/or consistency of this system
can ever be established. But it is an abstract system, and exist_{math} resides in
Platonia, outside of any physical existence.
Exist_{phys} is the hardware of the universe. It is not defined axiomatically, but
ostensively. You point and say That is a rock, cat, or whatever. In more sophisticated
laboratory settings, you construct models to explain atomic spectra, tracks in bubble
chambers, and so on. The scientific realist would claim that the theoretical entities
entailed by his most mature and well-tested scientific theories exist_{phys}, and form
part of the furniture of the external objective physical world. The experienced
scientist, though, always recognizes that any such claims of ontology are, at best,
provisional, and are always subject to revision on the advent of new and better date,
more general and sophistical models, and so on.
So there is a very clear difference between the mathematical and physical worlds. One is
axiomatic and subject to proof. Valid proofs are not open to revision -- they may be
abandoned as useless, but once proved, they remain proved and transfer truth values from
the premises to the conclusions. This is not the case for physics. That is not
axiomatic, it is ultimately based on observation and experiment. Any theories that might
be constructed are always provisional and subject to revision.
So prime numbers might exist_{math}, but they do not exist_{phys}. If we keep this
distinction clear we will avoid a lot of unnecessary confusion.
I could have written that myself, Bruce. In fact I have. :-)
Brent
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