Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 4:57 PM, John Mikes  wrote:

> Jason,
> you asked 8 questions only. Some of them require volumes to discuss and I
> appreciate your
> open mind to concentrate your questionnaire to these 8 only.
>

Thank you.


> First: what would you call "physical"? it is our defined meaning according
> to that limited tiny
> experience we have about the world.
>

My set of eight questions were meant to elucidate details of John Clark's
proposition that "physics is necessary for computation", and to show that
his requirement of a "physical universe" can quickly break down into what
is essentially a self-existing computation, for sufficiently flexible
concepts of "physical" universes.

My definition of universe would be something like a causally closed system,
but even this definition I think is blurred, as simulation allows us to
explore other universes, and for events in those other universes to
manifest effects within our own. Turing machines are telescopes that can
peer into other universes.


> My agnosticism accepts infinite possibilities, pro and con, it sure
> includes what you would call "physical' (whatever that may be).
> I liked to play with the 2D version as well, however I started with the 1D
> alternative. There was
> a book on that, I may find it, if necessary.
>

Is it rule 110? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_110


>
> Our mind is restricted, we cannot even 'imagine' the varieties the
> infinite may have. Not to deny.
>
> Thanks for entertaining my words
>

Always.

Jason


>
> John Mikes
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 4:35 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> ​>> ​
> mathematics is the best language for describing physics, but the point
> is mathematics is a *language*
> *​ *​
> and
> ​ ​
> physics isn't, physics just *is*.


 ​> ​
 I give an example, with arithmetic.
 ​ ​
 You have a language, that is, symbols and grammar.
 ​ [blah blah]​
 Then you have the semantics
 ​


>>> ​But semantics is about meaning, you've got to give those symbols a
>>> meaning, otherwise you're ​just talking about squiggles. And by the way,
>>> "=" is just another squiggle. The way we get around this problem and the
>>> reason mathematics and other languages are not just silly squiggle games is
>>> that we can point to a squiggle and then point to something in the real
>>> PHYSICAL world and people get the connection. Using symbols is good way to
>>> think about something if you can make that connection, but without the
>>> physical there are no semantics, its just squiggles, i
>>> t's literally meaningless.
>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 Then you have the theories,

>>>
>>> ​And to be worth a damn theories have to be about something not just
>>> squiggles ​
>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Robinson Arithmetic
>>> ​ [...]
>>>
>>> Squiggles.​
>>>
>>>
>>>
 ​> ​
 And we are not obsessed
 ​ [by consciousness]​
 . We might be tired of its being pushed under the rug.

>>>
>>> ​For every sentence about how intelligent behavior ​works there are a
>>> thousand about how consciousness works because theorizing about
>>> consciousness is many orders of magnitude easier than theorizing about
>>> intelligence due to the fact that intelligence theories actually have to
>>> perform while a consciousness theory doesn't need to do anything.
>>>
 ​>> ​
> Whatever consciousness is one thing is very clear, it can't be
> produced entirely from the
> ​stuff at the ​
> fundamental level of reality,


 ​> ​
 Ah! Glad you saw this.

>>>
>>> ​So you agree with me that even if mathematics is the most fundamental
>>> thing you still need matter to produce intelligence and consciousness.
>>>  ​
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 The notion of computation belongs to arithmetic. Only a physical
 implementation of a computation needs physical assumptions.

>>>
>>> ​So you agree that arithmetic ​
>>> ​alone is not sufficient for physical computations; therefore physics
>>> must have something that arithmetic doesn't.
>>>
>>
>> John,
>>
>> 1. Would you say other physical universes are possible having completely
>> different physical laws and without atoms and molecules as we know them in
>> our universe?
>>
>> 2. Would you agree that one such possible physical has 2 spatial
>> dimensions, unlike our universe with its 3 spatial dimensions?
>>
>> 3. Would you agree that one possible physical world is an infinite 2
>> dimensional plane, each with cells which either does or does not contain a
>> particle?
>>
>> 4. Would you agree a possible physical world is a 2 dimensional plane
>> with cells containing particles where from one time to the next, cells
>> update their state (of having or not having a particle) according to some
>> 

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Jason Resch]

You chopped so much out of my e-mail I can't make sense of it, nor of your
responses.

Jason

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 1:37 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 9:25 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>>  "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
>>> ​ ​
>>> And "nothing" is anything that is
>>> infinite
>>> ​,​
>>> unbounded
>>> ​, and​
>>> homogeneous
>>> ​​
>>> ​ in both space and time.​
>>>
>>>
>> ​> ​
>>  a Game of Life computation qualifies as a physical universe,
>>
>
> ​Yes, provided that the game is played on a ​physical computer or a
> physical checkerboard or on anything else that is not nothing.
>
>
> ​> ​
>>  When we envision (imagine) a GoL emulation, we interpret it as a grid
>> of cells
>
>
> ​You talk about "cells" in the plural, so there is more than ​
> one, so they must be both *bounded* and *finite*, so they are not
> nothing, so they are physical.
> ​
>
> ​> ​
>> with changing states
>
>
> ​So the cells are *not homogeneous* in the time dimension, so that is yet
> another reason they are not nothing. Not nothing aka physical.​
>
>
>
> ​> ​
> an equally consistent view would be to imagine the grid as a binary
> number, whose bits flip from one step to another according to finite rules.
> ​
>
>  Finite stuff flipping around and changing = physical.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> can anyone truly differentiate a "physically existing GoL universe" from
>> a "platonically existing recursive computation"
>> ​?​
>> ​
>>
>
> ​Yes. I can.​
>
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
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LIGO

[John Clark]

 A new analysis in the journal Nature by Krzysztof Belczynski predicts that
when LIGO reaches full sensitivity in 3 to  4 years it will see Black Hole
mergers in the 20 to 80 solal mass range about once every 9 hours ,
assuming the Black Holes came from dead stars and not from the first
nanosecond of the Big Bang , if some Black Holes are primordial it would
happen more often. Since it's pretty easy to determine from how far away
the gravitational waves came and with at  least a thousand new data points
a year we should be able map out the entire universe, including both dark
matter and regular matter, with unprecedented detail.

Unfortunately Belczynski also predicts we'll only see about one collision
between 2 neutron stars a year because of their much weaker gravitational
waves. Oh well you can't have everything.


John K Clark

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 6:05 PM, John Mikes  wrote:

JKC: you wrote
> *Atoms are more fundamental than molecules but molecules have properties
> than atoms don't have, and molecules are more fundamental than life but
> life has properties that molecules don't have; in the same way
> consciousness needs intelligent behavior and intelligent behavior needs
> computation and computation need​s​physics.​  *
>

​Yes I wrote that

*  --  then:*
>
> ​>> ​
>> Would you care to tell how you define 'life'?
>>
>
> ​
> ​> ​
> No, I would not care to do so..​
>
>
>
>> ​>> ​
>> or: 'intelligent behavior'?
>>
>
> ​> ​
> ​No.
>

​Yes, I wrote that too.​

​> ​
> so the content of your diatribe is not meaningful for you?
>

​No.​

​ How in the world did you come to that conclusion? If I didn't know better
I'd say you almost sound like you believe the ultimate source of meaning
comes from definitions, but I don't want to insult anybody
by accusing anyone of being that foolish.

John K Clark​

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 24 Jun 2016, at 03:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 12:55 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:34 AM, Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>> ​>> ​
 ​I would say it would have to have *SOMETHING* physical as we know it
 or it wouldn't be another physical universe as we know it. ​

>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> So according to you, does every physical universe has to have hadrons,
>>> electrons and photons, and 3 spatial dimensions?
>>>
>>
>> ​No, according to ​me every physical universe must have something
>> physical in it or it wouldn't be a physical universe.
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> What in your mind delineates the physical from the mathematical?
>>
>>
>> ​"Mathematics" is the best language minds have for thinking about the
>> physical universe.
>> And "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
>> And "nothing" is anything that is
>> infinite
>> ​,​
>> unbounded
>> ​, and​
>> homogeneous
>> ​​
>> ​ in both space and time.​
>>
>>
> So if a Game of Life computation qualifies as a physical universe, I am
> guessing so would other cellular automata systems would. Some linear
> cellular automata systems are even Turing universal:
> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/UniversalCellularAutomaton.html
>
> When we envision (imagine) a GoL emulation, we interpret it as a grid of
> cells with changing states, but an equally consistent view would be to
> imagine the grid as a binary number, whose bits flip from one step to
> another according to finite rules. For example, the game tic-tac-toe
> (a.k.a. naughts and crosses) is often envisioned as completing a line, or
> diagonal with X's or O's, but a mathematically equivalent view of the game
> is the players complete for selecting unique numbers from 1 to 9, such that
> the sum of their selected numbers adds to 15 (
> https://www.mathworks.com/moler/exm/chapters/tictactoe.pdf ).
>
> All this is to say that a "physically existing GoL universe" is from the
> inside of that world, no different (in any testable way) from a recursive
> function operating on an integer. So can anyone truly differentiate a
> "physically existing GoL universe" from a "platonically existing recursive
> computation" when both are  equivalent and for all intents and purposes
> identical--sharing all the same internal relations isomorphically?
>
> If a GoL universe exists and contains a Turing machine executing the
> universal dovetailer, no conscious entities within the programs executed by
> the universal dovetailer could ever know their ultimate substrate happens
> to be a GoL universe.
>
>
> That would even have no sense, as here the GOL would only be a tool for us
> to have some precise view of the UD. In fact we could not distinguish the
> UD made by that GOL from the UD made by a GOL made by a UD made by a
> Diophantine polynomial. Fortunately, the measure is formalism independent.
> We need one, but anyone will do. Then it happens that we all believe, in
> the relevant sense, in one of them, when we decide to not take our kids at
> school when a teacher told them that there are infinitely many primes.
>

Wouldn't different formalisms lead to different frequencies of occurrences
of different programs? It is not immediately clear to me that it wouldn't.


>
> Note that physics cannot been a priori Turing emulable, as it is given by
> a first person limit on the FPI on the whole universal deployment (entirely
> determined by a tiny part of the arithmetical reality). The miracle here is
> that an infinite addition leads to subtraction of probabilities, a bit like
> with Ramanujan sum. The explanation of this is in the math of
> self-reference.
>

Is this without assuming imaginary measures? Or do imaginary numbers
somehow fall out of the infinities?

Jason



>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Jason
>
>
>
>> ​>>​
 ​Cells and particles are physical.​


>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Would you say it is a particle even when the particles have only 1 bit
>>> of information associated with them "exists in this cell"
>>>
>>
>> ​Yes I would and that's why you're not talking about nothing, you're
>> talking about something, you're talking about the physical. You use plural
>> words like "particles" and "them". So there is more than one. So neither
>> particles nor cells can be infinite, unbounded, and homogeneous in both
>> space and time. So it can't be nothing. So it must be physical.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Mikes]

JKC: you wrote


*Atoms are more fundamental than molecules but molecules have properties
than atoms don't have, and molecules are more fundamental than life but
life has properties that molecules don't have; in the same way
consciousness needs intelligent behavior and intelligent behavior needs
computation and computation need​s​physics.​  *

* John K Clark*
*--*
*  --  then:*

Would you care to tell how you define 'life'?
>

​No, I would not care to do so..​




> or: 'intelligent behavior'?
>

​No.

John K Clark

so the content of your diatribe is not meaningful for you? and I selected
only SOME from the
7 items you used.
JM


On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:41 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 John Mikes  wrote:
>
>
> Would you care to tell how you define 'life'?
>>
>
> ​No, I would not care to do so..​
>
>
>
>
>> or: 'intelligent behavior'?
>>
>
> ​No.
>
> John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
> --
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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Mikes]

Jason,
you asked 8 questions only. Some of them require volumes to discuss and I
appreciate your
open mind to concentrate your questionnaire to these 8 only.
First: what would you call "physical"? it is our defined meaning according
to that limited tiny
experience we have about the world.
My agnosticism accepts infinite possibilities, pro and con, it sure
includes what you would call "physical' (whatever that may be).
I liked to play with the 2D version as well, however I started with the 1D
alternative. There was
a book on that, I may find it, if necessary.

Our mind is restricted, we cannot even 'imagine' the varieties the infinite
may have. Not to deny.

Thanks for entertaining my words

John Mikes



On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 4:35 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>
>> ​>> ​
 mathematics is the best language for describing physics, but the point
 is mathematics is a *language*
 *​ *​
 and
 ​ ​
 physics isn't, physics just *is*.
>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> I give an example, with arithmetic.
>>> ​ ​
>>> You have a language, that is, symbols and grammar.
>>> ​ [blah blah]​
>>> Then you have the semantics
>>> ​
>>>
>>>
>> ​But semantics is about meaning, you've got to give those symbols a
>> meaning, otherwise you're ​just talking about squiggles. And by the way,
>> "=" is just another squiggle. The way we get around this problem and the
>> reason mathematics and other languages are not just silly squiggle games is
>> that we can point to a squiggle and then point to something in the real
>> PHYSICAL world and people get the connection. Using symbols is good way to
>> think about something if you can make that connection, but without the
>> physical there are no semantics, its just squiggles, i
>> t's literally meaningless.
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> Then you have the theories,
>>>
>>
>> ​And to be worth a damn theories have to be about something not just
>> squiggles ​
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Robinson Arithmetic
>> ​ [...]
>>
>> Squiggles.​
>>
>>
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> And we are not obsessed
>>> ​ [by consciousness]​
>>> . We might be tired of its being pushed under the rug.
>>>
>>
>> ​For every sentence about how intelligent behavior ​works there are a
>> thousand about how consciousness works because theorizing about
>> consciousness is many orders of magnitude easier than theorizing about
>> intelligence due to the fact that intelligence theories actually have to
>> perform while a consciousness theory doesn't need to do anything.
>>
>>> ​>> ​
 Whatever consciousness is one thing is very clear, it can't be produced
 entirely from the
 ​stuff at the ​
 fundamental level of reality,
>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Ah! Glad you saw this.
>>>
>>
>> ​So you agree with me that even if mathematics is the most fundamental
>> thing you still need matter to produce intelligence and consciousness.
>>  ​
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> The notion of computation belongs to arithmetic. Only a physical
>>> implementation of a computation needs physical assumptions.
>>>
>>
>> ​So you agree that arithmetic ​
>> ​alone is not sufficient for physical computations; therefore physics
>> must have something that arithmetic doesn't.
>>
>
> John,
>
> 1. Would you say other physical universes are possible having completely
> different physical laws and without atoms and molecules as we know them in
> our universe?
>
> 2. Would you agree that one such possible physical has 2 spatial
> dimensions, unlike our universe with its 3 spatial dimensions?
>
> 3. Would you agree that one possible physical world is an infinite 2
> dimensional plane, each with cells which either does or does not contain a
> particle?
>
> 4. Would you agree a possible physical world is a 2 dimensional plane with
> cells containing particles where from one time to the next, cells update
> their state (of having or not having a particle) according to some rules,
> e.g. as according to Conway's game of life?
>
> 5. Would you accept that in such physical universes, which operate
> according to Conway's game of life, that Turing machines might exist?
>
> 6. Would you also accept that such a Turing machine, if running a
> computation equivalent to the operation of your brain below its
> substitution level, would be just as conscious as the computation performed
> by your brain composed of electrons and quarks?
>
> 7. Is this not an example of computation not based on "matter as we know
> it"?
>
> 8. Can you imagine even simpler "physical universes" where nonetheless
> computation occurs?
>
> Jason
>
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Fwd: numeracy

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno should approve.

Brent

 Forwarded Message 

"The only math we should teach children is arithmetic."

http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?id=4150

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> Read the definition in the literature, it does not involve physical
> assumption.


​A definition will tell you absolutely positively 100% NOTHING about the
underlying nature of mathematics or physics, it will just tell you things
about human mathematical notation and language. ​You learn about nature
from examples not from definitions, even the writers of dictionaries know
that.

​>> ​
>> in fact nothing is ​Turing emulable
>> ​, not even arithmetic, UNLESS the Turing Machine in question is
>> physical. ​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> The sigma_1 part of arithmetic is Turing emulable,
>

​Don't tell me show me, don't give me another definition give me an
example, calculate 2+2 without using anything physical,  ​
​or if that's too hard try 1+1. Do that and
 I'll concede the argument
​,​
​ and immediately after that I'll get on the phone to Silicon Valley.   ​


> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> If there was only one thing in the physical world mathematicians wouldn't
>> have the slightest intuition about what numbers mean, they'd just be
>> playing with squiggles. Of course if there was only one thing in the
>> physical world mathematicians couldn't even exist, but never mind. ​
>
>
> ​> ​
> You confuse
>

​No I don't confuse.​



> ​> ​
> the mathematics developed by the humans, which are very plausibly inspired
> by the observation of nature, and the reality of some mathematical facts.
>


​You admit that to a mathematician who had no experience with anything
physical a equation would just mean a sequence of squiggles that had a "="
 ​squiggle somewhere in it, and that's all it would mean. That's it. But if
pure mathematics is the most fundamental science and contains profound
truths independent of the physical world why does the mathematician need
physics to give his equations meaning?

Stephen Hawking
​ once asked:​


*​"What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe
for them to describe? The usual approach of science of constructing a
mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there should be a
universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to all the
bother of existing?​"​*

​Hawking is saying a ​
mathematical model
​can't explain why the physical exists, but I think a physical model (like
a brain) can explain why mathematics exists.

​Higher levels can not be expected to explain the ​existence of more
fundamental levels, but more fundamental levels can explain higher levels,
and physics is more fundamental than mathematics.

John K Clark

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2016 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 24/06/2016 3:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:

But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly 
different physics.


Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is 
only one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant 
here: the physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from the 
physics on earth).


In that case computationalism is in conflict with several current 
physical theories. The theory of eternal inflation, for example, 
would predict an infinity of physical worlds, each with its own 
fundamental constants and possibly different physical laws. In fact, 
this is a currently popular way to explain why the natural constants 
have their observed values:  all values are realized in some world or 
another, and anthropic arguments are used to explain why we are in a 
world that is consistent with our existence. (Another form of FPI 
perhaps, except that this theory requires that there are worlds in 
which life, and consciousness, are not possible. It does not seem 
that computationalism would allow the existence of such worlds.)


See Vic Stenger for a critic of such anthropic argument.

Then computationalism allows, well all computations, most of which 
will not been associated with any relative Löbian self-reference, and 
so will not have consciousness. 


"Associated with" is very vague.  As I understand it Lobianity is a 
*/potential/* for self-reference.  So is it a property of an algorithm, 
or class of algorithms, the UD is executing or is it a property of some 
sequences of execution?  Do you think human thought is 
self-referential?  ...all the time?



Now the physical is phenomenological so a physical reality without 
consciousness makes sense only as a possibility relatively to us, but 
not a concrete things ever accessible in any sense.


This can leads to interesting question and problem, but keep in mind 
that the physical requires only the consciousness of the "rich enough" 
relative numbers, not human consciousness.







Physics is a sum on all worlds.


What do you mean by "all worlds" here? All possible worlds? Or only 
all worlds consistent with our existence?



I meant all computations going through my actual state.


What does it mean "may actual state"?  Is that a class of states of the 
TM tape?




(Then technically I can differentiate the consistent extensions, the 
true extensions, and the justifiable, by using incompleteness, cf []p, 
[]p & p, []p & <>t & p).






Reality is the sum of all fictions. Physics is unique and entirely 
determined by the theology of the universal machine. The pther 
worlds are differe,t only on accidental facts, like opening the door 
and seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin state of the electron and 
seeing it up.


If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the 
universe,


I do not assume a universe.




that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the 
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is itself 
seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are necessarily 
in superposition,



Yes, it is part of the multiverse, and partially part of the UD, but 
the real things is seen only through the FPI limit on all computations.




and most of these alternative worlds will have different physics from 
that of the world we inhabit.



If it makes sense to say that we inhabit in some physical world. But 
that is what remains to be proven by the computationalist. 


Materialists consider the physical world to be the best explanation for 
our conscious experiences.  It explains their consistency and regularity 
without assuming solipism.


Brent

At some point it can be up to you to explain what you mean by "world". 
That term is not obvious, assuming computationalism, and no more 
obvious empirically after QM.





So if the only physics you can derive is unique, your account of FPI 
is not completely equivalent to Everettian quantum mechanics.


Indeed. That is why we should deepened the testing. Everett assumes a 
universal wave. I assume only elementary arithmetic (and TC + 
yes-doctor at the intuive meta-level), so we get a bigger and more 
complex measure problem, and that is why it is nice than when we just 
listen to what the machines already say about this, we get (a) quantum 
logic(s) at the place where we need an equivalent of Gleason theorem.


Bruno






Bruce

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 9:25 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​>> ​
>>  "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
>> ​ ​
>> And "nothing" is anything that is
>> infinite
>> ​,​
>> unbounded
>> ​, and​
>> homogeneous
>> ​​
>> ​ in both space and time.​
>>
>>
> ​> ​
>  a Game of Life computation qualifies as a physical universe,
>

​Yes, provided that the game is played on a ​physical computer or a
physical checkerboard or on anything else that is not nothing.


​> ​
>  When we envision (imagine) a GoL emulation, we interpret it as a grid of
> cells


​You talk about "cells" in the plural, so there is more than ​
one, so they must be both *bounded* and *finite*, so they are not nothing,
so they are physical.
​

​> ​
> with changing states


​So the cells are *not homogeneous* in the time dimension, so that is yet
another reason they are not nothing. Not nothing aka physical.​



​> ​
an equally consistent view would be to imagine the grid as a binary number,
whose bits flip from one step to another according to finite rules.
​

 Finite stuff flipping around and changing = physical.


> ​> ​
> can anyone truly differentiate a "physically existing GoL universe" from a
> "platonically existing recursive computation"
> ​?​
> ​
>

​Yes. I can.​


​ John K Clark​

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2016, at 22:09, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>> ​you've got to give those symbols a meaning, otherwise  
you're ​just talking about squiggles. And by the way, "=" is just  
another squiggle. The way we get around this problem and the reason  
mathematics and other languages are not just silly squiggle games is  
that we can point to a squiggle and then point to something in the  
real PHYSICAL world and people get the connection.


​> ​The theory of model is a branch of pure mathematics. Model =  
semantic,


 ​As I said, without examples from the physical world ​"=" is  
just another squiggle​.​


​> ​To prove that the euclid axiom on parallel is not derivable  
from euclid geometry, mathematicians discovered this with the non  
riemannian geometry,


​Without space and physical things in it ​mathematicians would  
have discovered neither euclidean geometry nor riemannian geometry  
and "parallel" would just be another squiggle standing for nothing.



Without the DNA polymerase enzyme, bacteria nor physicist would have  
discovered anything, but that does not made physics into a branch of  
molecular biology.







​> ​Physicalism might be true, but my point is that it is  
incompatible with the assumption that the brain is Turing emulable.


​The brain is NOT ​Turing emulable​,


The material brain is not, indeed, but it probably does not exist per  
se. It is an idea, all in our head :)




in fact nothing is ​Turing emulable​, not even arithmetic, UNLESS  
the Turing Machine in question is physical. ​


The sigma_1 part of arithmetic is Turing emulable, and actually Turing  
universal. The rest of the arithmetical hierarchy is not Turing  
emulable.


Read the definition in the literature, it does not involve physical  
assumption.








​> ​Arithmetic is about numbers. We develop intuition (and thus  
informal semantics) well before developing theories.


​If there was only one thing in the physical world mathematicians  
wouldn't have the slightest intuition about what numbers mean,  
they'd just be playing with squiggles. Of course if there was only  
one thing in the physical world mathematicians couldn't even exist,  
but never mind. ​



You confuse the mathematics developed by the humans, which are very  
plausibly inspired by the observation of nature, and the reality of  
some mathematical facts.


You just repeat your commitment in physicalism, but science begins by  
doubting.


Bruno




​> ​That would contradict the UDA conclusion.

​And that would contradict the IHHA axiom.

 John K Clark ​



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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Jun 2016, at 08:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jun 2016, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

.  if physics can be seen as possible a simulation run by some  
alien civilization, then physics is certainly Turing emulable.


Which is not the case. The alien can fail us only for a finite time.


Prove that without assuming computationalism. What in our physical  
world is not Turing emulable?



Consciousness, and the appearance of primary matter (probably the  
phenomenological "collapse").






 What could not be simulated by an alien running a simulation on a  
physical computer? Prove that we are not brains-in-a-vat.


If Nature satisfies qZ1*, then we can take that as an evidence we are  
at the physical bottom, which means we are in infinitely many "brain  
in a vat" in arithmetic.


If Nature violate qZ1*, then: either computationalism is wrong, of we  
are in a brain in vat made by people closer to the bottom.




Or maybe computationalism is the same as brains-in-a-vat --  
consciousness and the physical world are both merely illusions.


Consciousness is certainly not an illusion, as it is a form of  
knowledge, linked to truth by definition. And that mirrors the fact  
that we cannot doubt being conscious, given than a genuine doubt  
require consciousness. Consciousness can be defined by []p & p, with p  
= t, at least for a first approximation, and this makes it non  
definable in arithmetic, yet unavoidable for all universal numbers,  
and this knowingly so for the Löbian numbers. The physical is an  
illusion, if you want, but a lawful persistent one, and we can compare  
its structure with what we actually observe.


Bruno






Bruce

I explain that to Brett Hall: but computationalism makes it  
possible to see if we are in a normal emulation, or at the physical  
bottom, the things which is the first person sum on all emulations  
(by the FPI).
The phenomenal physics is not entirely Turing emulable, but that  
might be no more than the presence of a random oracle on some near- 
equivalent computations.


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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Of course, like Bohm, you can assume that there are particles, and  
conspiratorial potential, but that looks like Ptolemeaus epicycles,  
and worst, they prevent the computationalist theory of  
consciousness to apply. Scientists don't do that. Only blind  
believers do.


Bohmian mechanics is just pure Schrödinger wave equation -- simply  
interpreted in a slightly different way from Everett. In fact, it is  
generally recognized that Bohmian mechanics is equivalent to a many  
worlds interpretation. (Another illustration of the fact that non- 
locality is inherent in QM -- not even Everett avoids non-locality.)



Bohm = Everett + an infinity of zombies with spooky non-local telepathy.

Everett get rid of the zombies and of the telepathy by extracting the  
possible talks from the formalism applied democratically to every body.


Only problem: he uses computationalism, so his task is just not  
finished, the wave itself must be derived from self-reference/computer- 
science/number-theory. It works, and we get trace of a core  
symmetrical object, which suggests a shape for the hamiltonian.


Why would not the material appearances have an explanation/reason  
simpler that "It exists".


Bruno





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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Jun 2016, at 04:06, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 24/06/2016 3:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:08, Brent Meeker wrote:

But this would include many worlds besides this one with vastly  
different physics.


Come Brent, the total beauty of computationalism is that there is  
only one physics (well, actually three, but that is not relevant  
here: the physics of hell and heaven are slightly different from  
the physics on earth).


In that case computationalism is in conflict with several current  
physical theories. The theory of eternal inflation, for example,  
would predict an infinity of physical worlds, each with its own  
fundamental constants and possibly different physical laws. In fact,  
this is a currently popular way to explain why the natural constants  
have their observed values:  all values are realized in some world  
or another, and anthropic arguments are used to explain why we are  
in a world that is consistent with our existence. (Another form of  
FPI perhaps, except that this theory requires that there are worlds  
in which life, and consciousness, are not possible. It does not seem  
that computationalism would allow the existence of such worlds.)


See Vic Stenger for a critic of such anthropic argument.

Then computationalism allows, well all computations, most of which  
will not been associated with any relative Löbian self-reference, and  
so will not have consciousness. Now the physical is phenomenological  
so a physical reality without consciousness makes sense only as a  
possibility relatively to us, but not a concrete things ever  
accessible in any sense.


This can leads to interesting question and problem, but keep in mind  
that the physical requires only the consciousness of the "rich enough"  
relative numbers, not human consciousness.







Physics is a sum on all worlds.


What do you mean by "all worlds" here? All possible worlds? Or only  
all worlds consistent with our existence?



I meant all computations going through my actual state.

(Then technically I can differentiate the consistent extensions, the  
true extensions, and the justifiable, by using incompleteness, cf []p,  
[]p & p, []p & <>t & p).






Reality is the sum of all fictions. Physics is unique and entirely  
determined by the theology of the universal machine. The pther  
worlds are differe,t only on accidental facts, like opening the  
door and seeing Moscow, or looking at the spin state of the  
electron and seeing it up.


If we restrict quantum mechanics only to the late phases of the  
universe,


I do not assume a universe.




that understanding of other worlds might be equivalent to the  
Everettian many worlds interpretation. But if the Big Bang is itself  
seen as a quantum event, then all possible Big Bangs are necessarily  
in superposition,



Yes, it is part of the multiverse, and partially part of the UD, but  
the real things is seen only through the FPI limit on all computations.




and most of these alternative worlds will have different physics  
from that of the world we inhabit.



If it makes sense to say that we inhabit in some physical world. But  
that is what remains to be proven by the computationalist. At some  
point it can be up to you to explain what you mean by "world". That  
term is not obvious, assuming computationalism, and no more obvious  
empirically after QM.





So if the only physics you can derive is unique, your account of FPI  
is not completely equivalent to Everettian quantum mechanics.


Indeed. That is why we should deepened the testing. Everett assumes a  
universal wave. I assume only elementary arithmetic (and TC + yes- 
doctor at the intuive meta-level), so we get a bigger and more complex  
measure problem, and that is why it is nice than when we just listen  
to what the machines already say about this, we get (a) quantum  
logic(s) at the place where we need an equivalent of Gleason theorem.


Bruno






Bruce

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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Jun 2016, at 03:25, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 12:55 PM, John Clark   
wrote:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:34 AM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


​>> ​​I would say it would have to have SOMETHING physical as  
we know it or it wouldn't be another physical universe as we know  
it. ​


​> ​So according to you, does every physical universe has to have  
hadrons, electrons and photons, and 3 spatial dimensions?


​No, according to ​me every physical universe must have something  
physical in it or it wouldn't be a physical universe.


​> ​What in your mind delineates the physical from the  
mathematical?


​"Mathematics" is the best language minds have for thinking about  
the physical universe.

And "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
And "nothing" is anything that is infinite​,​ unbounded​,  
and​ homogeneous​​​ in both space and time.​



So if a Game of Life computation qualifies as a physical universe, I  
am guessing so would other cellular automata systems would. Some  
linear cellular automata systems are even Turing universal: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/UniversalCellularAutomaton.html


When we envision (imagine) a GoL emulation, we interpret it as a  
grid of cells with changing states, but an equally consistent view  
would be to imagine the grid as a binary number, whose bits flip  
from one step to another according to finite rules. For example, the  
game tic-tac-toe (a.k.a. naughts and crosses) is often envisioned as  
completing a line, or diagonal with X's or O's, but a mathematically  
equivalent view of the game is the players complete for selecting  
unique numbers from 1 to 9, such that the sum of their selected  
numbers adds to 15 ( https://www.mathworks.com/moler/exm/chapters/tictactoe.pdf 
 ).


All this is to say that a "physically existing GoL universe" is from  
the inside of that world, no different (in any testable way) from a  
recursive function operating on an integer. So can anyone truly  
differentiate a "physically existing GoL universe" from a  
"platonically existing recursive computation" when both are   
equivalent and for all intents and purposes identical--sharing all  
the same internal relations isomorphically?


If a GoL universe exists and contains a Turing machine executing the  
universal dovetailer, no conscious entities within the programs  
executed by the universal dovetailer could ever know their ultimate  
substrate happens to be a GoL universe.


That would even have no sense, as here the GOL would only be a tool  
for us to have some precise view of the UD. In fact we could not  
distinguish the UD made by that GOL from the UD made by a GOL made by  
a UD made by a Diophantine polynomial. Fortunately, the measure is  
formalism independent. We need one, but anyone will do. Then it  
happens that we all believe, in the relevant sense, in one of them,  
when we decide to not take our kids at school when a teacher told them  
that there are infinitely many primes.


Note that physics cannot been a priori Turing emulable, as it is given  
by a first person limit on the FPI on the whole universal deployment  
(entirely determined by a tiny part of the arithmetical reality). The  
miracle here is that an infinite addition leads to subtraction of  
probabilities, a bit like with Ramanujan sum. The explanation of this  
is in the math of self-reference.


Bruno






Jason


​>>​​Cells and particles are physical.​

​> ​Would you say it is a particle even when the particles have  
only 1 bit of information associated with them "exists in this cell"


​Yes I would and that's why you're not talking about nothing,  
you're talking about something, you're talking about the physical.  
You use plural words like "particles" and "them". So there is more  
than one. So neither particles nor cells can be infinite, unbounded,  
and homogeneous in both space and time. So it can't be nothing. So  
it must be physical.


 John K Clark





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Re: R: Re: Aristotle the Nitwit (an old quote)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jun 2016, at 08:26, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:


"In all cases, Knowledge implies a combination of Thoughts and Things.
Without this combination, it would not be Knowledge.
Without Thoughts, there could be no connexion;
without Things, there could be no reality.
Thoughts and Things are so intimately combined in our Knowledge,
that we do not look upon them as distinct."

---William Whewell (1840)


Yes, that's the (Theaetetus' idea), if you interpret "thought" by  
"belief", and things by true or real.


It is a very old idea. Socrates (and Gerson) refuted it, but Church  
thesis and/or incompleteness refutes Socrates' and Gerson's  
refutation. I don't know of any other theory which remains coherent  
with the antic dream or simulation argument.


Of course, using the term "things" in this context is probably a trace  
of Aristotelianism, with the belief that there is a reality made up of  
things. Both computationalism and quantum mechanics suggest a more  
relational view of reality.


Bruno






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Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jun 2016, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:

.  if physics can be seen as possible a simulation run by some 
alien civilization, then physics is certainly Turing emulable.


Which is not the case. The alien can fail us only for a finite time.


Prove that without assuming computationalism. What in our physical world 
is not Turing emulable?  What could not be simulated by an alien running 
a simulation on a physical computer? Prove that we are not brains-in-a-vat.


Or maybe computationalism is the same as brains-in-a-vat -- 
consciousness and the physical world are both merely illusions.


Bruce

I explain that to Brett Hall: but computationalism makes it possible 
to see if we are in a normal emulation, or at the physical bottom, the 
things which is the first person sum on all emulations (by the FPI).
The phenomenal physics is not entirely Turing emulable, but that might 
be no more than the presence of a random oracle on some 
near-equivalent computations.


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