Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 9:49:02 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 6:51:45 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:06:08 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
 versus epistemological *
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is 
>>> no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental 
>>> picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday 
>>> expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will 
>>> never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre 
>>> it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre 
>>> facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns 
>>> out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger 
>>> is.
>>>
>>>  John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> There is no decision procedure to determine if QM is ψ-epistemic 
>> or ψ-ontic. It is not provable either way.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> Occam's Razor. AG 
>
>>  
>>
>
Allowing the ψ-epistemic  is equivalent to"scientifically" positing that 
all there is (all reality - whether one calls it the cosmos,  nature, the 
universe-in-toto, ...) is a product of "mind".

It's laughable that those - physicists I guess - who believe the 
ψ-epistemic are some of the ones decrying "postmodernism". This is 
basically the Deepak Chopra philosophy that he has seminars on.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 2:06:08 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
>> versus epistemological *
>
>
> It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is 
> no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental 
> picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday 
> expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will 
> never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre 
> it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre 
> facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns 
> out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger 
> is.
>
>  John K Clark
>

Applying an epistemological interpretation doesn't guarantee that 
everything in nature will be explained; rather, it avoids the worst 
interpretations that egregiously depart from common sense. It's not that I 
insist on ordinary experience being affirmed; rather, I prefer to avoid 
unnecessary assumptions and conclusions which, on their face, seem 
extremely bizaare and unwarranted. Apply Occam's Razor. AG

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 6:51:45 PM UTC-7, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:06:08 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
>>> versus epistemological *
>>
>>
>> It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is 
>> no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental 
>> picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday 
>> expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will 
>> never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre 
>> it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre 
>> facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns 
>> out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger 
>> is.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>
> There is no decision procedure to determine if QM is ψ-epistemic 
> or ψ-ontic. It is not provable either way.
>
> LC
>

Occam's Razor. AG 

>  
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:06:08 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
>> versus epistemological *
>
>
> It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is 
> no epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental 
> picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday 
> expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will 
> never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre 
> it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre 
> facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns 
> out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger 
> is.
>
>  John K Clark
>

There is no decision procedure to determine if QM is ψ-epistemic 
or ψ-ontic. It is not provable either way.

LC
 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 10:27 PM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

*> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological
> versus epistemological *


It is a ontological fact that Bell's inequality is violated and there is no
epistemological explanation for that fact. You keep wanting a mental
picture of the quantum world that conforms with your common sense everyday
expectations of how things should work, I'd like that too but our wish will
never be granted. I like Many Worlds because although it's very bizarre
it's the least bizarre quantum interpretation that fits the hyper bizarre
facts; but the universe doesn't care what I think is strange so if it turns
out Many Worlds is not true then we would know that something even stranger
is.

 John K Clark

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Re: Distinguishing between dreams and "real world"

2019-11-15 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 4:50 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

*> What would be a sure phenomenon that can help us distinguish between
> dreams and "real world" ?*
>

There is no sure fire method but there are useful rules of thumb, dreams
tend to be far far simpler than the real world.


> *> Because no matter how illogical a dream world might be, this doesn't
> make us realize that we are in a dream.*
>

And that is another asymmetry, we tend to be far far stupider in the dream
world than than we are in the real world. When awake in the real world we
can see the obvious logical contradictions in the dream world but when
sleeping we don't recognize the many absurdities in that world and are too
stupid to even remember what the real world is like at all.

John K Clark

>
>

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Re: Distinguishing between dreams and "real world"

2019-11-15 Thread Eva
@Lawrence Crowell 

Schisophrenic voices etc. are illusory, sure, but they are not dreams.

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Re: Distinguishing between dreams and "real world"

2019-11-15 Thread Eva
Schisophrenic voices etc. are illusory, sure, but they are not dreams. 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List


> Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 11.57 Alan Grayson  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:48:44 AM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > > > > Il 14 novembre 2019 alle 23.25 Alan Grayson < 
> > agrays...@gmail.com> ha scritto:
> > > 
> > > The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my 
> > > conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, 
> > > perhaps most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; 
> > > namely the wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and 
> > > ridiculous models and conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two 
> > > positions at the same time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously 
> > > decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf gives us information about 
> > > the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > "The question of whether the waves are something 'real' or a 
> > fiction to describe and predict phenomena in a convenient way is a matter 
> > of taste. I personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 
> > 3N-dimensional space, as a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for 
> > mathematical calculations. For it has the character of an invariant of 
> > observation; that means it predicts the results of counting experiments, 
> > and we expect to find the same average numbers, the same mean deviations, 
> > etc., if we actually perform the experiment many times under the same 
> > experimental condition. Quite generally, how could we rely on probability 
> > predictions if by this notion we do not refer to something real and 
> > objective ?" -M. Born, 1949, p. 105-106
> > 
> > 
> > https://archive.org/stream/naturalphilosoph032159mbp/naturalphilosoph032159mbp_djvu.txt
> >  
> > https://archive.org/stream/naturalphilosoph032159mbp/naturalphilosoph032159mbp_djvu.txt
> > 
> > > 
> It seems to me that Born is going down a slippery slope. I see the wf as 
> "real" in an epistemological sense; it tells us what we know about a system. 
> But if it's "real" in an ontological sense, I think it leads to nonsensical 
> interpretations of superpositions, and reality, as I described above. AG
> 
"The underlying error may be the conviction that the system itself has to be 
represented in order to represent our actions upon it. In quantum theory we 
represent actual operations and the relations among them, not a hypothetical 
reality on which they act. Quantum theory is a theory of actuality, not 
reality. I have taken this term from Whitehead's writings." -David Finkelstein, 
in 'The State of Quantum Physics'.

"Unfortunately, quantum theory is incompatible with the proposition that 
"measurements" are processes by means of which we discover some unknown but 
preexisting reality." -Asher Peres, "What is a state vector?" , Am. J. Phys. 52 
(7), July 1984

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 4:57:16 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:48:44 AM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
>>
>> Il 14 novembre 2019 alle 23.25 Alan Grayson  ha 
>> scritto: 
>>
>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after 
>> many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute 
>> ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads 
>> to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- 
>> such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive 
>> sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf 
>> gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to 
>> disappoint. AG 
>>
>> "The question of whether the waves are something 'real' or a fiction to 
>> describe and predict phenomena in a convenient way is a matter of taste. I 
>> personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, 
>> as a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for mathematical 
>> calculations. For it has the character of an invariant of observation; that 
>> means it predicts the results of counting experiments, and we expect to 
>> find the same average numbers, the same mean deviations, etc., if we 
>> actually perform the experiment many times under the same experimental 
>> condition. Quite generally, how could we rely on probability predictions if 
>> by this notion we do not refer to something real and objective ?" -M. Born, 
>> 1949, p. 105-106
>>
>>
>> https://archive.org/stream/naturalphilosoph032159mbp/naturalphilosoph032159mbp_djvu.txt
>>
>
> It seems to me that Born is going down a slippery slope. I see the wf as 
> "real" in an epistemological sense; it tells us what we know about a 
> system. But if it's "real" in an ontological sense, I think it leads to 
> nonsensical interpretations of superpositions, and reality, as I described 
> above. AG 
>



If one wants to posit a "probability wave" as a "wave of propensities", why 
not?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations#Propensity

Propensity theorists think of probability as a physical propensity, or 
disposition, or tendency of a given type of physical situation to yield an 
outcome of a certain kind or to yield a long run relative frequency of such 
an outcome.

Propensities, or chances, are not relative frequencies, but purported 
causes of the observed stable relative frequencies. Propensities are 
invoked to explain why repeating a certain kind of experiment will generate 
given outcome types at persistent rates, which are known as propensities or 
chances. Frequentists are unable to take this approach, since relative 
frequencies do not exist for single tosses of a coin, but only for large 
ensembles or collectives (see "single case possible" in the table 
above).[2] In contrast, a propensitist is able to use the law of large 
numbers to explain the behavior of long-run frequencies. This law, which is 
a consequence of the axioms of probability, says that if (for example) a 
coin is tossed repeatedly many times, in such a way that its probability of 
landing heads is the same on each toss, and the outcomes are 
probabilistically independent, then the relative frequency of heads will be 
close to the probability of heads on each single toss. This law allows that 
stable long-run frequencies are *a manifestation of invariant single-case 
probabilities*. In addition to explaining the emergence of stable relative 
frequencies, the idea of propensity is motivated by the desire to make 
sense of single-case probability attributions in quantum mechanics, such as 
the probability of decay of a particular atom at a particular time.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:48:44 AM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
>
> Il 14 novembre 2019 alle 23.25 Alan Grayson  > ha scritto: 
>
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after 
> many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute 
> ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads 
> to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- 
> such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive 
> sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf 
> gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to 
> disappoint. AG 
>
> "The question of whether the waves are something 'real' or a fiction to 
> describe and predict phenomena in a convenient way is a matter of taste. I 
> personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, 
> as a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for mathematical 
> calculations. For it has the character of an invariant of observation; that 
> means it predicts the results of counting experiments, and we expect to 
> find the same average numbers, the same mean deviations, etc., if we 
> actually perform the experiment many times under the same experimental 
> condition. Quite generally, how could we rely on probability predictions if 
> by this notion we do not refer to something real and objective ?" -M. Born, 
> 1949, p. 105-106
>
>
> https://archive.org/stream/naturalphilosoph032159mbp/naturalphilosoph032159mbp_djvu.txt
>

It seems to me that Born is going down a slippery slope. I see the wf as 
"real" in an epistemological sense; it tells us what we know about a 
system. But if it's "real" in an ontological sense, I think it leads to 
nonsensical interpretations of superpositions, and reality, as I described 
above. AG 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List
> Il 14 novembre 2019 alle 23.25 Alan Grayson  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after 
> many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute 
> ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads 
> to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- 
> such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive 
> sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf 
> gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to 
> disappoint. AG
> 

"The question of whether the waves are something 'real' or a fiction to 
describe and predict phenomena in a convenient way is a matter of taste. I 
personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, as 
a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for mathematical calculations. For 
it has the character of an invariant of observation; that means it predicts the 
results of counting experiments, and we expect to find the same average 
numbers, the same mean deviations, etc., if we actually perform the experiment 
many times under the same experimental condition. Quite generally, how could we 
rely on probability predictions if by this notion we do not refer to something 
real and objective ?" -M. Born, 1949, p. 105-106

https://archive.org/stream/naturalphilosoph032159mbp/naturalphilosoph032159mbp_djvu.txt

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:15:31 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:57:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:21:19 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:06:22 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
>>> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
>>> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
>>> wf. 
>>> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
>>> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
>>> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and 
>>> undecayed, 
>>> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system 
>>> and 
>>> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in 
>> a language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who 
>> jump 
>> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their 
>> skis.
>>
>> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
>> Ronald N. Giere
>>
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality
>>
>> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation 
>> of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
>> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
>> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue 
>> that 
>> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
>> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models 
>> to 
>> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
>> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
>> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
>> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
>> both hypotheses and generalizations.
>>
>> @philipthrift. 
>>
>
> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
> as our present understanding? AG 
>

 I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
 versus epistemological in the context of superposition and wf's. But this 
 is where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so 
 prevalent today. AG 

>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There is no "epistemology" without human-level consciousness, and 
>>> quantum stuff happens without humans. 
>>>
>>
>> So does everything else; what we call the Laws of Physics or the Laws of 
>> Nature. AG
>>  
>>
>>> Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you have to ask that weird cult 
>>> of physicists who got into that.
>>>
>>
>> If the wf were ontological, we could see one directly. What does one look 
>> like? AG 
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>>
>>>
> There are no "laws" (how did that word get into science?) and there is no 
> wave function.
>

What's to be gained by splitting hairs? By "laws" we mean patterns which 
can be relied upon to make predictions, usually in the form of mathematical 
formulas. WF's are solutions of differential equations. Any further 
questions? ;-). AG 

 

>
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2382
> https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0610204
>
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15819/1/Allori-Ex-nat-metaph-OUP-latest-draft.pdf
>
> https://www.quantamagazine.org/quantum-theory-rebuilt-from-simple-physical-principles-20170830/
>
>
> @philipthrift
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 4:02:57 AM UTC-6, scerir wrote:
>
>
>
> Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 1.20 Lawrence Crowell  > ha scritto: 
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after 
> many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute 
> ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads 
> to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- 
> such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive 
> sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf 
> gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to 
> disappoint. AG 
>
>
> As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays 
> and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat 
> it is neither.  
>
> LC  
>
> "Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and 
> thus it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the 
> many-worlds interpretation makes it easier to think about the research 
> you’re doing in April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to 
> think about the research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen 
> interpretation is not going to smite you for praying to the many-worlds 
> interpretation. At least I hope it won’t, because otherwise I’m in big 
> trouble." -Peter Shor
>



His (Peter Shor @PeterShor1 *Discovered Shor's algorithm for prime 
factorization on quantum computers*) algorithm is very clever, but it's 
bizarre that a quantum "interpretation" is to some either Many Worlds or 
"Copenhagen".


@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:57:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:21:19 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:06:22 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
>> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
>> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
>> wf. 
>> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
>> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
>> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, 
>> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system 
>> and 
>> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
>>
>
>
>
>
> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a 
> language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump 
> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their 
> skis.
>
> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
> Ronald N. Giere
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality
>
> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation 
> of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue 
> that 
> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models 
> to 
> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
> both hypotheses and generalizations.
>
> @philipthrift. 
>

 I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
 progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
 really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
 as our present understanding? AG 

>>>
>>> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
>>> versus epistemological in the context of superposition and wf's. But this 
>>> is where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so 
>>> prevalent today. AG 
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>> There is no "epistemology" without human-level consciousness, and quantum 
>> stuff happens without humans. 
>>
>
> So does everything else; what we call the Laws of Physics or the Laws of 
> Nature. AG
>  
>
>> Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you have to ask that weird cult 
>> of physicists who got into that.
>>
>
> If the wf were ontological, we could see one directly. What does one look 
> like? AG 
>
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>>
There are no "laws" (how did that word get into science?) and there is no 
wave function.


https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2382
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0610204
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15819/1/Allori-Ex-nat-metaph-OUP-latest-draft.pdf
https://www.quantamagazine.org/quantum-theory-rebuilt-from-simple-physical-principles-20170830/


@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 3:02:57 AM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
>
>
>
> Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 1.20 Lawrence Crowell  > ha scritto: 
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after 
> many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute 
> ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads 
> to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- 
> such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive 
> sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf 
> gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to 
> disappoint. AG 
>
>
> As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays 
> and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat 
> it is neither.  
>
> LC  
>
> "Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and 
> thus it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the 
> many-worlds interpretation makes it easier to think about the research 
> you’re doing in April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to 
> think about the research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen 
> interpretation is not going to smite you for praying to the many-worlds 
> interpretation. At least I hope it won’t, because otherwise I’m in big 
> trouble." -Peter Shor
>

Friend; I sent you an email about a week ago.  As for the MWI, it fits what 
Nietzsche said about Plato; the great viaduct of corruption. AG

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:34:40 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:20:07 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:09:15 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/14/2019 3:56 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not as accurate because it's not as "true". If the Earth had 
>> approximately the same mass as the Sun, the most accurate model would be 
>> different. But that's not the reality. It's because the Sun is so much more 
>> massive than the Earth, that we use the Sun centered model. All models are 
>> not equal; some are truer than others. That was my point. AG
>>
>
> Did you ever read philosophy, I mean technically, even like SEP articles 
> on things like truth?
>
>   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ 
>
> I don't mean having taking formal courses in philosophy, but read 
> something of a technical nature [ e.g. 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html ] on the subject.
>
>   
> Are you formulating your own theory of truth?
>
> Some might call that BS, just winging it on their own.
>
> (I cite articles written by well-known philosophers. Who do you cite?)
>
> @philipthrift 
>

Those seeking a Theory of Everything implicitly believe in the possiblity 
that our models are progressing towards a description of the external 
world. That's all I am saying. But I see getting lost in technical jargon 
about "truth" obscures this basic pov of most seeking it. AG 

>  
>>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List


> Il 15 novembre 2019 alle 1.20 Lawrence Crowell 
>  ha scritto:
> 
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> > > The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my 
> conclusion after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps 
> most, attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
> wf. This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, 
> radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so 
> forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and nothing 
> more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
> > 
> > > 
> As I see it the wave function is epistemological on Mondays, Wednesdays 
> and Fridays, but ontological on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. On Shabbat 
> it is neither. 
> 
> LC 
> 

"Interpretations of quantum mechanics, unlike Gods, are not jealous, and thus 
it is safe to believe in more than one at the same time. So if the many-worlds 
interpretation makes it easier to think about the research you’re doing in 
April, and the Copenhagen interpretation makes it easier to think about the 
research you’re doing in June, the Copenhagen interpretation is not going to 
smite you for praying to the many-worlds interpretation. At least I hope it 
won’t, because otherwise I’m in big trouble." -Peter Shor

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:23:07 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:08:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:03:14 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:56:33 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
>> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
>> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
>> wf. 
>> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
>> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
>> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, 
>> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system 
>> and 
>> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
>>
>
>
>
>
> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a 
> language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump 
> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their 
> skis.
>
> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
> Ronald N. Giere
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality
>
> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation 
> of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue 
> that 
> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models 
> to 
> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
> both hypotheses and generalizations.
>
> @philipthrift. 
>

 I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
 progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
 really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
 as our present understanding? AG 

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One is much better than another* truthiness*-wise. 
>>>
>>> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you 
>>> find it.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift  
>>>
>>
>> Don't put words in my mouth. All physical models are provisional, but I 
>> don't accept what I consider philosophical BS that you posted here 
>> previously. AG 
>>
>
>
> It's models up and down, as Vic would say.
>
> @philipthrift 
>

Vic was out of central casting -- for the "shut up and calculate" school. 
AG 

>  
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Alan Grayson


On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:21:19 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:06:22 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
> wf. 
> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, 
> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and 
> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
>




 Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a 
 language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump 
 from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their 
 skis.

 *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
 Ronald N. Giere

 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality

 Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation 
 of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
 entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
 reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue 
 that 
 we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
 basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to 
 represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
 terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
 models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
 designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
 both hypotheses and generalizations.

 @philipthrift. 

>>>
>>> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
>>> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
>>> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
>>> as our present understanding? AG 
>>>
>>
>> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological 
>> versus epistemological in the context of superposition and wf's. But this 
>> is where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so 
>> prevalent today. AG 
>>
>
>  
>
>
>
> There is no "epistemology" without human-level consciousness, and quantum 
> stuff happens without humans. 
>

So does everything else; what we call the Laws of Physics or the Laws of 
Nature. AG
 

> Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you have to ask that weird cult 
> of physicists who got into that.
>

If the wf were ontological, we could see one directly. What does one look 
like? AG 

>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:20:07 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:09:15 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/14/2019 3:56 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> It's not as accurate because it's not as "true". If the Earth had 
> approximately the same mass as the Sun, the most accurate model would be 
> different. But that's not the reality. It's because the Sun is so much more 
> massive than the Earth, that we use the Sun centered model. All models are 
> not equal; some are truer than others. That was my point. AG
>

Did you ever read philosophy, I mean technically, even like SEP articles on 
things like truth?

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ 

I don't mean having taking formal courses in philosophy, but read something 
of a technical nature [ e.g. https://plato.stanford.edu/index.html ] on the 
subject.

  
Are you formulating your own theory of truth?

Some might call that BS, just winging it on their own.

(I cite articles written by well-known philosophers. Who do you cite?)

@philipthrift 

>  
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:08:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:03:14 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:56:33 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
> wf. 
> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, 
> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and 
> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
>




 Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a 
 language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump 
 from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their 
 skis.

 *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
 Ronald N. Giere

 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality

 Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation 
 of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
 entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
 reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue 
 that 
 we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
 basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to 
 represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
 terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
 models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
 designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
 both hypotheses and generalizations.

 @philipthrift. 

>>>
>>> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
>>> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
>>> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
>>> as our present understanding? AG 
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> One is much better than another* truthiness*-wise. 
>>
>> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you 
>> find it.
>>
>> @philipthrift  
>>
>
> Don't put words in my mouth. All physical models are provisional, but I 
> don't accept what I consider philosophical BS that you posted here 
> previously. AG 
>


It's models up and down, as Vic would say.

@philipthrift 
 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:06:22 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:56:33 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

 The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
 after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
 attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. 
 This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
 conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
 time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, 
 and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system and 
 nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a 
>>> language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump 
>>> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their skis.
>>>
>>> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
>>> Ronald N. Giere
>>>
>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality
>>>
>>> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of 
>>> the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
>>> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
>>> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that 
>>> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
>>> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to 
>>> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
>>> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
>>> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
>>> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
>>> both hypotheses and generalizations.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift. 
>>>
>>
>> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
>> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
>> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
>> as our present understanding? AG 
>>
>
> I notice you habitually avoid discussing the problem of ontological versus 
> epistemological in the context of superposition and wf's. But this is 
> where, IMO, the rubber hits the road for the fantasies which are so 
> prevalent today. AG 
>

 



There is no "epistemology" without human-level consciousness, and quantum 
stuff happens without humans. Where the epistemology stuff got into QM you 
have to ask that weird cult of physicists who got into that.


@philipthrift


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