Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/2/2019 5:39 PM, smitra wrote:

On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
original state.
??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
basis vector.


The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
to avoid the "M" word.)


The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
because initial conditions may make it zero.


Irrelevant to the main point.


The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
stochastic single-world model.


Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.


Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
out life insurance..

Bruce

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The 
number of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large 
that your mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going 
to be consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that 
given your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector 
should be described as a very complex superposition involving a large 
number of brain states that are entangled with the environment.


That's true.  But it waaay under estimating the number of brain states 
consistent with a thought.  The reason is that many different 
quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
only different quantum superpositions.




If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just 
transitioning from one 

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[smitra]

On 03-12-2019 03:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 12:39 PM smitra  wrote:


On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift



wrote:

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch

(stochastically)"


Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds -

theory.


We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some
instant),
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The
number
of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that
your
mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be
consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given

your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should
be
described as a very complex superposition involving a large number
of
brain states that are entangled with the environment.


My brain currently has only one state. Other states may be consistent
with my current conscious state, but these do not exist. The idea that
I am a superposition of all brain states consistent with my
consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove such
a thing?


Using the argument below



If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer.
At
all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just
transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since
consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the
computer,
replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute
anything,
which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would
move
through given some particular set of inputs, will render exactly the

same consciousness.


Yes, and so what? If my consciousness is a sequence of brain states,
anything that produces that same sequence of brain states will produce
my consciousness. Substrate independence, after all.


It cannot be due to a sequence of events given that you are conscious at 
every instant.



This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption,


It is not absurd in the least. Argument ad absurdum is not a logical
argument. What is absurd to you may be perfectly reasonable to someone
else.


Substrate independence implies that you can map any sequence of states 
to those of any other system, for example a clock.





it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals.


How can a counterfactual exist? By definition, it is counter to the
facts, hence, non-existent.



It requires a multiverse.


Clearly actions
as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for
consciousness,


But there cannot be any such thing as a counterfactual input. You
might consider "What if" scenarios. But they are not relevant for
my current brain state. It will do what it will do, whatever the
input.



If your brain is executing an algorithm and the execution of that 
algorithm is causing consciousness, then your brain doing something else 
if the input where different is relevant.



but there is no room to do that within classical single
World physics. But as I pointed out above the generic state of a
conscious involves being located not in a single branch, but being
distributed over an astronomically large number of different
branches.


Different branches are, by definition, non-interacting, so different
branches correspond to different persons. Anyway, I choose not to
accept this load of speculative rubbish.


A set of "close" branches can define both the approximate output 
resulting from the input and also the algorithm that defines the 
relationship between the two. A strict single world picture falls prey 
to the movie graph argument. At any moment in time your neurons are 
processing information in some way, but because consciousness depends 
only on the physical state, a fake brain that would always do whatever 
your brain is doing regardless of the input would render your 
consciousness of that moment.




Bruce



Saibal

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 12:39 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
> > wrote:
> >
> > "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
> >
> > Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
> > probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
> > tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
> >
> > We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
> > than one branch of the multiverse?
> >
> > Bruce
>
> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant),
> doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number
> of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your
> mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be
> consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given
> your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should be
> described as a very complex superposition involving a large number of
> brain states that are entangled with the environment.
>

My brain currently has only one state. Other states may be consistent with
my current conscious state, but these do not exist. The idea that I am a
superposition of all brain states consistent with my consciousness is just
idle speculation. How would you ever prove such a thing?

> If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate
> ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following
> paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At
> all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just
> transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since
> consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the computer,
> replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute anything,
> which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would move
> through given some particular set of inputs, will render exactly the
> same consciousness.
>

Yes, and so what? If my consciousness is a sequence of brain states,
anything that produces that same sequence of brain states will produce my
consciousness. Substrate independence, after all.

> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption,


It is not absurd in the least. Argument ad absurdum is not a logical
argument. What is absurd to you may be perfectly reasonable to someone else.

> it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals.


How can a counterfactual exist? By definition, it is counter to the facts,
hence, non-existent.


> Clearly actions
> as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for
> consciousness,


But there cannot be any such thing as a counterfactual input. You might
consider "What if" scenarios. But they are not relevant for my current
brain state. It will do what it will do, whatever the input.

> but there is no room to do that within classical single
> World physics. But as I pointed out above the generic state of a
> conscious involves being located not in a single branch, but being
> distributed over an astronomically large number of different branches.
>

Different branches are, by definition, non-interacting, so different
branches correspond to different persons. Anyway, I choose not to accept
this load of speculative rubbish.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[smitra]

On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
original state.
??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
basis vector.


The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
to avoid the "M" word.)


The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
because initial conditions may make it zero.


Irrelevant to the main point.


The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
stochastic single-world model.


Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.


Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
out life insurance..

Bruce

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number 
of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your 
mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be 
consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given 
your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should be 
described as a very complex superposition involving a large number of 
brain states that are entangled with the environment.


If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just 
transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since 
consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the computer, 
replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute anything, 
which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would move 
through given some particular 

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 2:52:05 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 12:58 PM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> > Spacetime does not really fundamentally exist. It is just a geometric 
>> representation for how qubits interact and are entangled with each other.
>>
>
> I agree it's possible Spacetime is not fundamental, it might be a 
> composite and be constructed out of something else, but if that more 
> fundamental "something else" is how Qubits interact and if there is a 
> smallest scale at which a quantum bit of information can be localized then 
> how can there be a one to one correspondence between the finite number of 
> such localized areas and the infinite number of points in smooth continuous 
> geometric spacetime that the Gamma Ray Burst results seem to indicate is 
> the way things really are?
>
>  John K Clark
>

Spacetime is an epiphenomenology of entanglement. There are several ways 
entanglement can happen. There is topological order that has no scaling, or 
where the entanglement occurs without any reference to space or distance. 
Then there are symmetry protected topological orders, where there is a 
locality. How these two are related is a matter of research, but it is a 
sort of quantum phase transition. 

An event horizon is a region where on either side there are entangled 
states. Close to the horizon there is are small regions on either side that 
are entangled. Further away these regions are larger. This has a sort of 
scaling and fractal geometry to it. As with fractals or chaos there are 
regions with regular dynamics where things are smooth and these are related 
to fractal geometry by the Feigenbaum number 4.669... . Classical spacetime 
is the a manifestation of a condensate of symmetry protected states that 
construct a surface that is smooth.

LC

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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 6:21 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 12/2/2019 3:06 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> The other major source I can refer to is the book "The Emergent
> Multiverse" by David Wallace (Oxford, 2012). This book is the most
> comprehensive account of Everettian ideas currently available. Wallace also
> ducks the issue. In sections 8.5-8.7 (pages 302-312) he gives a detailed
> account of the branching structure that arises if Alice and Bob do
> independent spin measurements at space-like separations. Then on page 310
> he gives a general entangled wave-function and points out that Alice's and
> Bob's measurements again lead to splitting. But he then says: "In this
> case, the amplitudes of the four sets of branches into which C [a central,
> neutral observer] eventually branches are not determined simply by the
> separate weights of the branchings at A and B. Nor is this to be expected:
> as I stressed previously, in Everettian quantum mechanics interactions are
> local but states are nonlocal. The entanglement between the particle at A
> and the particle at B is a nonlocal property of the forward light cone of A
> and that of B. Only in their intersection can it have locally determinable
> effects---and it does, giving rise to the branch weights which, in turn,
> give rise to the sorts of statistical results recorded in Aspect's
> experiments."
>
> This might sound good, but again, there is no detail. What exactly is
> supposed to happen at the intersection of the forward light cones from A
> and B?
>
>
> Whatever it is, it must depend on the decoherence and Zurek's envariance
> implicit in the measurement.  This is what makes the off-diagonal terms of
> the reduced density matrix go to zero and, in a sense, make Carroll's
> disappearing worlds, disappear.
>

Again, this lacks detail. In what way can decoherence after the measurement
affect what happens at the intersection of the forward light cones.
Decoherence is over in 10^{-20} sec, the light cones may not intersect
until thousands of years later?  Decoherence, envariance, and the
diagonalization of the density matrix are all associated with physical
interactions occurring with the basic measurement interaction. Turning this
into "disappearing worlds" at some later time is just fantasy stuff. Even
if you could work such magic, it would still be non-local. The weights of
the four branches at the intersection of the light cones (at C's position,
to use Wallace's notation) are given exactly by the cos^2(theta/2) and
sin^2(theta/2) terms that come from the form of the singlet wave function
at the point of measurement by A and B. Nothing ever happens to change
these original weights. Wallace's account of the branching and weights
associated with independent measurements at A and B is exactly right. And
exactly the same analysis applies to the case of entangled particles.

Prove me wrong by giving a coherent account that is different.

Bruce


There is no interaction there -- any information that is made locally
> present there was already present in the only relevant interactions, which
> are the original measurements made by A and B; any branch weights that are
> around are set there, exactly as in the case of non-entangled particles.
> Wallace started out well, but ducked out at the last minute, and he failed
> to give any comprehensible account that does not rely on simple magic.
>
> So the best authorities available fail to give a local account of the EPR
> correlations in a many-worlds setting -- they all simply duck the issue
> when the rubber hits the road. Just as you routinely do.
>
>

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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/2/2019 11:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 1:21:26 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



Counterfactual definiteness is that unmeasured variables have
definite values...something QM denies.

Brent




What do you make of this regarding indefiniteness?

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/xhE7ICd_HDs/LQslm0YFAQAJ

Thirty one years ago, Dick Feynman told me about his 'sum over
histories' version of quantum mechanics.  "The electron does anything it
likes', he said.  "It goes in any direction at any speed, forward or
backward in time, however it likes, and then you add up all the
amplitudes and it gives you the wave-function."
I said to him, "You're crazy."  But he wasn't.
  --- Freeman J. Dyson, 'Some Strangeness in the Proportion' 1980

Brent

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 12:58 PM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Spacetime does not really fundamentally exist. It is just a geometric
> representation for how qubits interact and are entangled with each other.
>

I agree it's possible Spacetime is not fundamental, it might be a composite
and be constructed out of something else, but if that more fundamental
"something else" is how Qubits interact and if there is a smallest scale at
which a quantum bit of information can be localized then how can there be a
one to one correspondence between the finite number of such localized areas
and the infinite number of points in smooth continuous geometric spacetime
that the Gamma Ray Burst results seem to indicate is the way things really
are?

 John K Clark

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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 1:21:26 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> Counterfactual definiteness is that unmeasured variables have definite 
> values...something QM denies.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
 

What do you make of this regarding indefiniteness?

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/xhE7ICd_HDs/LQslm0YFAQAJ

@philipthrift 

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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/2/2019 3:06 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 8:08 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote:


On 29 Nov 2019, at 00:50, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:27 AM Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

On 26 Nov 2019, at 22:39, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 12:27 AM Bruno Marchal
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

On 25 Nov 2019, at 22:53, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

Because, the wave-function itself is non-local -- it
contains entangled particles that are widely separated
in space. That is the definition of non-locality!


I am not sure. I use “non-locality” for “FTL physical
influence”.


That is just an abuse of language. Non-local means "not
local", i.e., not all in one place.


Then even Newton Universe is non local.


Yes Newton was aware of this.


Some attempt has been made to replace the term "non-local"
with the term "non-seperable”.


Yes, notably d’Espagnat. It avoids the confusion with the
Eisnsteinian non-locality, which requires FTL (cf the “spooky
action at a distance”), which must exist in QM + the
assumption of a unique universe.


I think we can all agree that the singlet wave function is
non-separable -- it cannot be written as a simple product of
two terms, one referring to each particle.


Yes, we agree on this.


I maintain that it is also non-local, in that the two
particles are at different locations (locales). Non-local
can have no other meaning in ordinary linguistic usage.


I invite you, and Alice, and I give you an envelop to each of
you. You are told that one contain a piece of paper with O
inscribed on it, and the other with one. Then you go in
different galaxies, say, and open it. Once you see 0 (res. 1)
you know that Alice will see 1 (res. 0). This seems non local
in your sense, where most would agree that in this case,
there is no “non-locality” issue. What I claim is that in the
Everett theory, all non-locality are of that type.


That non-loclality has a common cause explanation. Like
Bertlmann's socks, there is no mystery here. The problem is with
entangled systems, where non-separability means non-locality that
has no common cause explanation, even in many-worlds theory.


I doubt this. The MWI reduces the non-separability of the
probabilities into an equivalent with Bertlmann’s socks, still
keeping the violation of Bell’s inequality justifying the
appearance of non-locality.


The devil is in the detail. And you have still not provided any detail.


In the MWI, some particles can be entangled but without
implying any possible FTL when we do measurement on
them, except from the local point of view, due to our
ignorance of all terms of the wave. It means simply that
Alice and Bob belongs to the same branch of history/reality.


The trouble with this hope is that it no local account of
the EPR correlations been realised in any coherent
mathematics. Bell's theorem rules it out: no local hidden
variable account of the EPR correlations is possible in any
theory, whatsoever. It is a no-go theorem; it proves a
negative -- something is impossible. Many-worlds does not
subvert Bell's theorem.


That is right. But the violation of Bell’s inequality entails
FTL only when one world is assumed, with well defined outcome
for all measurement, or put in another way, assuming a unique
reality, with one Bob and one Alice, but Bell’s reasoning
does not prove FTL influence in The many-worlds, where all
outcomes are obtained, and propagate between diverse Alice
and Bob locally, leading to the apparent violation of Bell’s
inequality, but without FTL.


Bell did not assume a collapse. His is a mathematical result,
where the only assumption is locality. As usual, if you think
there is a local explanation of the EPR correlations in
many-worlds, then produce it.


We differ only on the way we interpreted the wave and the worlds.
The singlet state is … local! It does not entail any correlation
between the Alices and the Bobs. It enforces only that the Alices
and Bobs can meet only their corresponding correlated partners,
among the infinitely many Alices and Bobs (most of them being not
accessible from each others).


The singlet state is non-separable, and hence non-local when Alice and 
Bob are separated. The rest of you comment here is without meaning. 
You have 

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 11:58:13 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
>
> Spacetime does not really fundamentally exist. It is just a geometric 
> representation for how qubits interact and are entangled with each other.
>
> LC 
>



Or it could be the other way around: qubits come out of (stochastic) 
spacetime.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.04228

@philipthrift

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/2/2019 12:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In First Order Logic, Real Numbers are the one which simplifies. The 
first order theory of the real is decidable, unlike the first order 
theory of the natural numbers. The digital, or discrete, reality is 
more complex than the reals, which fits all holes, and provides (in 
the complex extensions) all roots for the polynomials.


Do you know whether Gisin's "random" numbers produce a decidable structure?

Brent

Also, Nicolas Gisin use the Aristotelian act of faith (defining “real” 
by “physical”), which requires a non Mechanist theory of mind.
With Mechanism, real number are phenomenological constructs by digital 
entities. It is real, but not ontologically real.


Bruno



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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:48:48 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 6:10 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> >> what does "discrete spacetime" mean?
>>>
>>
>> > It is a form of quotient geometry.
>>
>
> Hawking said the Entropy of a Black Hole is one quarter of it's Event 
> Horizon in areas of Planck Length squared, so Entropy is discrete. And 
> Entropy is proportional to the logarithm of the microstates that made the 
> Black Hole, so there are a discrete number of microstates.  And if there is 
> also a smallest scale that a Qubit of information can be localized at then 
> regardless of what quotient geometry and pure mathematics may say I'm 
> having a hard time attaching physical significance to the statement that 
> spacetime could still not be discreet. And if the recent results from Gamma 
> Ray Bursts do not show that Spacetime lacks graininess then what do they 
> show?
>
> John K Clark
>

Spacetime does not really fundamentally exist. It is just a geometric 
representation for how qubits interact and are entangled with each other.

LC 

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 6:10 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> what does "discrete spacetime" mean?
>>
>
> > It is a form of quotient geometry.
>

Hawking said the Entropy of a Black Hole is one quarter of it's Event
Horizon in areas of Planck Length squared, so Entropy is discrete. And
Entropy is proportional to the logarithm of the microstates that made the
Black Hole, so there are a discrete number of microstates.  And if there is
also a smallest scale that a Qubit of information can be localized at then
regardless of what quotient geometry and pure mathematics may say I'm
having a hard time attaching physical significance to the statement that
spacetime could still not be discreet. And if the recent results from Gamma
Ray Bursts do not show that Spacetime lacks graininess then what do they
show?

John K Clark

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Re: C60 Interference

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 Dec 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 3:26:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Dec 2019, at 09:51, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 2:12:38 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> It seems like a simple question aching for an answer. Why do physicists, 
>> many of them at least, prefer a baffling unintelligible interpretation of 
>> superposition, say in the case of a radioactive source, when the obvious 
>> non-contradictory one stares them in their collective faces? AG 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The fundamental and psychological problem many physicists have is that they 
>> take some mathematics  (in some particular theory) and assign physical 
>> realities to its mathematical entities.
> 
> That is the interesting problem. We use a mathematical formalism, but any 
> simple relation between that formalism and reality, to be correct, needs to 
> NOT make the superposed terms disappearing (indeed the quantum computation 
> exploits typically different terms of the superposition, like already the two 
> slits).
> 
> De Broglie defended the idea that quantum mechanics was false on distance 
> bigger than an atom, and predicted that the EPR influence is absent on any 
> macroscopic distance, advocating your idea that the formalism should not be 
> taken literally; but eventually Bell has shown this to be testable, and 
> Nature has confirmed the formalism (Aspect and followers).
> 
> So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in the 
> wave. We would lost the interference effect. The problem of how to interpret 
> the wave is not solved by distantiation with the wave formalism, as Nature 
> confirms the weirdness imposed to the formalism. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Most of them do not understand the nature of mathematics: It's a language 
>> (or collection of languages) about mathematical entities - which are thought 
>> of differently depending on one's philosophy of mathematics. (It is best to 
>> say they are fictions.) This is especially true when probability theory (as 
>> defined in mathematics) is involved.
> 
> With QM, the problem is that the amplitude of probability do interfere. In 
> arithmetic too, and for a mechanist, the conceptual problems are solved in a 
> radical way, as there is no time, nor space, only correlated minds. The 
> fiction is not in the math, but in the assumption that “physical” means 
> ontological.
> 
> 
> 
>> This hopping between physical realities and mathematical entities leads them 
>> to them being unable to distinguish between them, or to communicate to the 
>> public the true nature of physics.
> 
> 
> I would say that the problem comes from the materialists who mostly seem 
> unable to understand that the assumption of an ontological physical universe 
> is a very BIG assumption, without any evidences to sustain it, beyond the 
> natural instinctive extrapolation from simple experiences. When doing 
> metaphysics with the scientific method, it is important to be agnostic on 
> this, as it is the very subject of the research. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in the 
> wave."
> 
> There are formulations without the wave function, so - until there is more 
> that can be found out about what's "below" the quantum phenomena we've 
> observed so far - the wave function can be done without.

What I said did not depend on the formulation of quantum mechanics. All 
formulations are equivalent (in the non relativist case; in the relativist case 
Feynman’s formulation (generalising Dirac) is the correct one.



> 
> All these formulations (with or without wave functions) give the same 
> probabilities to match to experiments, but "Counterfactual indefiniteness” 
>  
> remains

In all formulations of QM, and also just with Mechanism, we have a similar 
problem.
With Mechanism, or with Everett’s formulation, the indefiniteness of the 
counterfactual admits a simple non magical explanation (as I try sometimes to 
explain intuitively with the thought experiences). The counterfactual 
indefiniteness becomes a particular case of the indefiniteness of whatever your 
“mental accessible neighbourhood” does not depend on. All personal lives are 
given by sequences of projections on the partial trace of a universal 
dovetailer, and this can be tested by comparing the logic of the quantum 
alternatives with the logic of the classical alternative seen by some “right” 
self-referential modes. There is the room there, as we get variate quantum 
logics for all first person singular and plural modes of self-references.

I recall that all modes of self-reference are given by the variant of the 
definition of knowledge by Theaetetus, which are imposed by incompleteness (cf 
p, []p, []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p). No self-referentially correct 

Re: C60 Interference

[Alan Grayson]

On Sun, Dec 1, 2019 at 3:58 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 01-12-2019 09:12, Alan Grayson wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 26, 2019 at 6:11:41 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote:
> >
> >> On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 12:10:26 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 11:01:17 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
> >>
> >> On 11/17/2019 11:07 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I forget if I raised this issue here or on another thread. I am
> >>> beginning to doubt that isolation is possible. When a particle is
> >>> created, how can it be isolated from the environment? If it cannot
> >> be
> >>> isolated, if it's never really isolated, the decoherence model
> >> fails
> >>> to establish anything. AG
> >>
> >> Interactions are quantized like everything else.  There's smallest
> >> unit
> >> of action, h.  So if the interaction is less than this it's zero.
> >> So it
> >> is possible to isolate variables.
> >>
> >> Brent
> >>
> >> But if, say, a particle is created by some process, won't it be
> >> entangled with the causal entities defining the process and
> >> therefore be initially, and forever, non-isolated? AG
> >
> > If that's too hot to handle, try this: if we write the standard
> > superposition of a decayed or undecayed radioactive atom, is there any
> > inherent problem with interpreting this superposition to mean it has a
> > probability to be in one state or the other by applying Born's rule to
> > each amplitude? Why did this interpretation apparently fall to the
> > wayside, and was substituted for the baffling interpretation of the
> > system being in both states simultaneously? AG
> >
> > It seems like a simple question aching for an answer. Why do
> > physicists, many of them at least, prefer a baffling unintelligible
> > interpretation of superposition, say in the case of a radioactive
> > source, when the obvious non-contradictory one stares them in their
> > collective faces? AG
>
> The interpretation of a superposition as representing a system that can
> be in one or the other state, is incompatible with interference
> experiments.


*Please provide more detail to support this claim. TIA, AG*


> And physicist don't care much about interpretation and the
> language used to communicate what certain concepts mean. So, many
> physicists may say that a particle in a superposition between being in
> position x and y is at x and y simultaneously, even though they know
> that's not really what a superposition means (obviously there is only
> one particle not 2). What matters is the mathematical formulation of the
> theory, not the words used to describe this.
> Saibal
>
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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 5:10:54 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
>
> Quantum physics has complementaries that are both deterministic and 
> nondeterministic. As a system of wave mechanics it is completely 
> deterministic. However, the Fourier components are amplitudes that in polar 
> form define probabilties for outcomes that occur by stochastic means. So 
> how one frames QM, either deterministic or nondeterministic, is up to the 
> choice of the analyst or how one performs an experiment or interprets the 
> outcomes of an experiment.
>
> LC 
>



Q: "So when you say that probability doesn’t exist, you mean that objective 
probability doesn’t exist."

A: "Right, it doesn’t exist as something out in the world without a 
gambling agent."
-- Christopher Fuchs [ 
https://quantamagazine.org/quantum-bayesianism-explained-by-its-founder-20150604/
 
]

So there are those who think probabilities don't exist as 
fundamental, unreducible, objective physical entities out in the world 
having nothing to do with us, and those that do. I think the former is a 
kind of religious pining (as William James said).

@philipthrift

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Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 2:19:44 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 30, 2019 at 6:11:37 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Saturday, November 30, 2019 at 4:30:28 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 4:36 PM Lawrence Crowell <
>>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> The Planck unit of length and time does not mean space or spacetime 
 is discrete. All it means is this is the smallest scale one can localize a 
 quantum bit of information. It does not mean that spacetime is somehow 
 discrete.*

>>>
>>> If discrete spacetime does not mean there is a smallest scale that a 
>>> Qubit of information can be localized then what does "discrete spacetime" 
>>> mean?
>>>
>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> It is a form of quotient geometry. For 
>>
>> 1 →  G → H → K → 1
>>
>> for G = U(1), H = U(N) and K = PSU(N) = SU(N)/Z_N this short exact 
>> sequence defines a discrete  gauge group. The projective Lie group is a 
>> Kleinian and for a manifold associated with SU(N), say AdS_5 = U(2, 
>> 2)/O(4,1) the quotient defines an underlying discretization. Of course to 
>> do this in greater generality we need to have a discrete system with 
>> polytopes that define cells. So G could be the Coxeter group for a 
>> polytope. Say for G the Coxeter group for the 4-dim icosian H the group 
>> O(3,2) ≈ AdS_4×O(3,1) then K would be this spacetime, with the Lorentz 
>> group, in a quotient with a lattice space.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.06824.pdf :
>
> One may object that this view is arbitrary as there is no natural bit 
> number where the transition from determined to random bits takes place. 
> This is correct, though not important in practice as long as this 
> transition is far away down the bit series. The lack of a natural 
> transition is due to the fact that, in classical physics, there is no 
> equivalent to the Plank constant of quantum theory. But this is quite 
> natural, as the fact is that when one looks for this transition in the 
> physical description of classical systems, one hits quantum physics.
>
> In summary, physics with all its predictive and explanatory powers can 
> well be presented as intrinsically non-deterministic. The dominant view 
> according to which classical physics is deterministic is due, first, to a 
> false impression generated by it’s huge success in astronomy and in the 
> design of clocks and other simple mechanical (integrable) systems, and, 
> second, to a lack of appreciation of its implication for (infinite) 
> information density. Finally, an indeterministic world is hospitable to Res 
> Potentia and to the passage of time.
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.03595.pdf
>
> It is argued that quantum theory is best understood as requiring an 
> ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia, where the latter is 
> understood per Heisenberg's original proposal, and the former is roughly 
> equivalent to Descartes' 'extended substance.' However, this is not a 
> dualism of mutually exclusive substances in the classical Cartesian sense, 
> and therefore does not inherit the infamous 'mind-body' problem. Rather, 
> res potentia and res extensa are proposed as mutually implicative 
> ontological extants that serve to explain the key conceptual challenges of 
> quantum theory; in particular, nonlocality, entanglement, null 
> measurements, and wave function collapse. It is shown that a natural 
> account of these quantum perplexities emerges, along with a need to 
> reassess our usual ontological commitments involving the nature of space 
> and time.
>
>
> @philipthrift 
>

Quantum physics has complementaries that are both deterministic and 
nondeterministic. As a system of wave mechanics it is completely 
deterministic. However, the Fourier components are amplitudes that in polar 
form define probabilties for outcomes that occur by stochastic means. So 
how one frames QM, either deterministic or nondeterministic, is up to the 
choice of the analyst or how one performs an experiment or interprets the 
outcomes of an experiment.

LC 

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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 8:08 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 29 Nov 2019, at 00:50, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:27 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 26 Nov 2019, at 22:39, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 12:27 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> On 25 Nov 2019, at 22:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>
>>> Because, the wave-function itself is non-local -- it contains entangled
>>> particles that are widely separated in space. That is the definition of
>>> non-locality!
>>>
>>>
>>> I am not sure. I use “non-locality” for “FTL physical influence”.
>>>
>>
>> That is just an abuse of language. Non-local means "not local", i.e., not
>> all in one place.
>>
>>
>> Then even Newton Universe is non local.
>>
>
> Yes Newton was aware of this.
>
>
>
>> Some attempt has been made to replace the term "non-local" with the term
>> "non-seperable”.
>>
>>
>> Yes, notably d’Espagnat. It avoids the confusion with the Eisnsteinian
>> non-locality, which requires FTL (cf the “spooky action at a distance”),
>> which must exist in QM + the assumption of a unique universe.
>>
>> I think we can all agree that the singlet wave function is non-separable
>> -- it cannot be written as a simple product of two terms, one referring to
>> each particle.
>>
>>
>> Yes, we agree on this.
>>
>> I maintain that it is also non-local, in that the two particles are at
>> different locations (locales). Non-local can have no other meaning in
>> ordinary linguistic usage.
>>
>>
>> I invite you, and Alice, and I give you an envelop to each of you. You
>> are told that one contain a piece of paper with O inscribed on it, and the
>> other with one. Then you go in different galaxies, say, and open it. Once
>> you see 0 (res. 1) you know that Alice will see 1 (res. 0). This seems non
>> local in your sense, where most would agree that in this case, there is no
>> “non-locality” issue. What I claim is that in the Everett theory, all
>> non-locality are of that type.
>>
>
> That non-loclality has a common cause explanation. Like Bertlmann's socks,
> there is no mystery here. The problem is with entangled systems, where
> non-separability means non-locality that has no common cause explanation,
> even in many-worlds theory.
>
>
> I doubt this. The MWI reduces the non-separability of the probabilities
> into an equivalent with Bertlmann’s socks, still keeping the violation of
> Bell’s inequality justifying the appearance of non-locality.
>

The devil is in the detail. And you have still not provided any detail.

In the MWI, some particles can be entangled but without implying any
>>> possible FTL when we do measurement on them, except from the local point of
>>> view, due to our ignorance of all terms of the wave. It means simply that
>>> Alice and Bob belongs to the same branch of history/reality.
>>>
>>
>> The trouble with this hope is that it no local account of the EPR
>> correlations been realised in any coherent mathematics. Bell's theorem
>> rules it out: no local hidden variable account of the EPR correlations is
>> possible in any theory, whatsoever. It is a no-go theorem; it proves a
>> negative -- something is impossible. Many-worlds does not subvert Bell's
>> theorem.
>>
>>
>> That is right. But the violation of Bell’s inequality entails FTL only
>> when one world is assumed, with well defined outcome for all measurement,
>> or put in another way, assuming a unique reality, with one Bob and one
>> Alice, but Bell’s reasoning does not prove FTL influence in The
>> many-worlds, where all outcomes are obtained, and propagate between diverse
>> Alice and Bob locally, leading to the apparent violation of Bell’s
>> inequality, but without FTL.
>>
>
> Bell did not assume a collapse. His is a mathematical result, where the
> only assumption is locality. As usual, if you think there is a local
> explanation of the EPR correlations in many-worlds, then produce it.
>
>
> We differ only on the way we interpreted the wave and the worlds. The
> singlet state is … local! It does not entail any correlation between the
> Alices and the Bobs. It enforces only that the Alices and Bobs can meet
> only their corresponding correlated partners, among the infinitely many
> Alices and Bobs (most of them being not accessible from each others).
>

The singlet state is non-separable, and hence non-local when Alice and Bob
are separated. The rest of you comment here is without meaning. You have to
flesh it out, and your reluctance to do so convinces me that you cannot.
You are just hoping for a miracle.



> I think it is becoming generally accepted in the physics community that
>> the entangled state is intrinsically non-local: acting on one part of it
>> affects the rest, even across the entire universe.
>>
>>
>> That would mean some FTL actions, but I very much doubt this.
>>
>
> No, there is no need of FTL. For example, in the third (2011) edition of
> his book 'Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity', Maudlin shows that Flash
> GRW theory, 

Re: C60 Interference

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 3:26:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Dec 2019, at 09:51, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 2:12:38 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> It seems like a simple question aching for an answer. Why do physicists, 
>> many of them at least, prefer a baffling unintelligible interpretation of 
>> superposition, say in the case of a radioactive source, when the obvious 
>> non-contradictory one stares them in their collective faces? AG 
>>
>
>
>
>
> The fundamental and psychological problem many physicists have is that 
> they take some mathematics  (in some particular theory) and assign physical 
> realities to its mathematical entities. 
>
>
> That is the interesting problem. We use a mathematical formalism, but any 
> simple relation between that formalism and reality, to be correct, needs to 
> NOT make the superposed terms disappearing (indeed the quantum computation 
> exploits typically different terms of the superposition, like already the 
> two slits).
>
> De Broglie defended the idea that quantum mechanics was false on distance 
> bigger than an atom, and predicted that the EPR influence is absent on any 
> macroscopic distance, advocating your idea that the formalism should not be 
> taken literally; but eventually Bell has shown this to be testable, and 
> Nature has confirmed the formalism (Aspect and followers).
>
> So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in 
> the wave. We would lost the interference effect. The problem of how to 
> interpret the wave is not solved by distantiation with the wave formalism, 
> as Nature confirms the weirdness imposed to the formalism. 
>
>
>
>
> Most of them do not understand the nature of mathematics: It's a language 
> (or collection of languages) about mathematical entities - which are 
> thought of differently depending on one's philosophy of mathematics. (It is 
> best to say they are *fictions*.) This is especially true when 
> probability theory (as defined in mathematics) is involved.
>
>
> With QM, the problem is that the amplitude of probability do interfere. In 
> arithmetic too, and for a mechanist, the conceptual problems are solved in 
> a radical way, as there is no time, nor space, only correlated minds. The 
> fiction is not in the math, but in the assumption that “physical” means 
> ontological.
>
>
>
> This hopping between physical realities and mathematical entities leads 
> them to them being unable to distinguish between them, or to communicate to 
> the public the true nature of physics.
>
>
>
> I would say that the problem comes from the materialists who mostly seem 
> unable to understand that the assumption of an ontological physical 
> universe is a very BIG assumption, without any evidences to sustain it, 
> beyond the natural instinctive extrapolation from simple experiences. When 
> doing metaphysics with the scientific method, it is important to be 
> agnostic on this, as it is the very subject of the research. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
"So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in 
the wave."

There are formulations without the wave function, so - until there is more 
that can be found out about what's "below" the quantum phenomena we've 
observed so far - the wave function can be done without.

All these formulations (with or without wave functions) give the same 
probabilities to match to experiments, but "Counterfactual indefiniteness" 
 
remains

@philipthrift

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Measuring the deviation from the superposition principle

[Philip Thrift]

https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.09143

Measuring the deviation from the superposition principle in interference 
experiments

G.Rengaraj 
, 
U.Prathwiraj 
, Surya 
Narayan Sahoo 
, 
R.Somashekhar 
, 
Urbasi 
Sinha 
(Submitted on 28 Oct 2016 (v1 ), last 
revised 20 Nov 2017 (this version, v2))

The Feynman Path Integral formalism has long been used for calculations of 
probability amplitudes. Over the last few years, it has been extensively 
used to theoretically demonstrate that the usual application of the 
superposition principle in slit based interference experiments is often 
incorrect. This has caveat in both optics and quantum mechanics where it is 
often naively assumed that the boundary condition represented by slits 
opened individually is same as them being opened together. The correction 
term comes from exotic sub leading terms in the Path Integral which can be 
described by what are popularly called non-classical paths. In this work, 
we report an experiment where we have a controllable parameter that can be 
varied in its contribution such that the effect due to these non-classical 
paths can be increased or diminished at will. Thus, the reality of these 
non-classical paths is brought forth in a classical experiment using 
microwaves, thereby proving that the boundary condition effect being 
investigated transcends the classical-quantum divide. We report the first 
measurement of a deviation (as big as 6%) from the superposition principle 
in the microwave domain using antennas as sources and detectors of the 
electromagnetic waves. We also show that our results can have potential 
applications in astronomy.

Comments: Main text: 16 pages including Methods section, 13 figures, 
Supplementary material: 3 pages, 3 figures; New experiment and analysis 
added
Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
Journal reference: New Journal of Physics, Volume 20, June 2018
Cite as: arXiv:1610.09143  [quant-ph]
  (or arXiv:1610.09143v2  [quant-ph] for 
this version)




@ohilithrift

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Re: C60 Interference

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 1 Dec 2019, at 09:51, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 2:12:38 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> It seems like a simple question aching for an answer. Why do physicists, many 
> of them at least, prefer a baffling unintelligible interpretation of 
> superposition, say in the case of a radioactive source, when the obvious 
> non-contradictory one stares them in their collective faces? AG 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The fundamental and psychological problem many physicists have is that they 
> take some mathematics  (in some particular theory) and assign physical 
> realities to its mathematical entities.

That is the interesting problem. We use a mathematical formalism, but any 
simple relation between that formalism and reality, to be correct, needs to NOT 
make the superposed terms disappearing (indeed the quantum computation exploits 
typically different terms of the superposition, like already the two slits).

De Broglie defended the idea that quantum mechanics was false on distance 
bigger than an atom, and predicted that the EPR influence is absent on any 
macroscopic distance, advocating your idea that the formalism should not be 
taken literally; but eventually Bell has shown this to be testable, and Nature 
has confirmed the formalism (Aspect and followers).

So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in the 
wave. We would lost the interference effect. The problem of how to interpret 
the wave is not solved by distantiation with the wave formalism, as Nature 
confirms the weirdness imposed to the formalism. 




> Most of them do not understand the nature of mathematics: It's a language (or 
> collection of languages) about mathematical entities - which are thought of 
> differently depending on one's philosophy of mathematics. (It is best to say 
> they are fictions.) This is especially true when probability theory (as 
> defined in mathematics) is involved.

With QM, the problem is that the amplitude of probability do interfere. In 
arithmetic too, and for a mechanist, the conceptual problems are solved in a 
radical way, as there is no time, nor space, only correlated minds. The fiction 
is not in the math, but in the assumption that “physical” means ontological.



> This hopping between physical realities and mathematical entities leads them 
> to them being unable to distinguish between them, or to communicate to the 
> public the true nature of physics.


I would say that the problem comes from the materialists who mostly seem unable 
to understand that the assumption of an ontological physical universe is a very 
BIG assumption, without any evidences to sustain it, beyond the natural 
instinctive extrapolation from simple experiences. When doing metaphysics with 
the scientific method, it is important to be agnostic on this, as it is the 
very subject of the research. 

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Nov 2019, at 00:50, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:27 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 26 Nov 2019, at 22:39, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 12:27 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 25 Nov 2019, at 22:53, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> Because, the wave-function itself is non-local -- it contains entangled 
>>> particles that are widely separated in space. That is the definition of 
>>> non-locality!
>> 
>> I am not sure. I use “non-locality” for “FTL physical influence”.
>> 
>> That is just an abuse of language. Non-local means "not local", i.e., not 
>> all in one place.
> 
> Then even Newton Universe is non local. 
> 
> Yes Newton was aware of this.
> 
>  
>> Some attempt has been made to replace the term "non-local" with the term 
>> "non-seperable”.
> 
> Yes, notably d’Espagnat. It avoids the confusion with the Eisnsteinian 
> non-locality, which requires FTL (cf the “spooky action at a distance”), 
> which must exist in QM + the assumption of a unique universe.
> 
>> I think we can all agree that the singlet wave function is non-separable -- 
>> it cannot be written as a simple product of two terms, one referring to each 
>> particle.
> 
> Yes, we agree on this.
> 
>> I maintain that it is also non-local, in that the two particles are at 
>> different locations (locales). Non-local can have no other meaning in 
>> ordinary linguistic usage.
> 
> I invite you, and Alice, and I give you an envelop to each of you. You are 
> told that one contain a piece of paper with O inscribed on it, and the other 
> with one. Then you go in different galaxies, say, and open it. Once you see 0 
> (res. 1) you know that Alice will see 1 (res. 0). This seems non local in 
> your sense, where most would agree that in this case, there is no 
> “non-locality” issue. What I claim is that in the Everett theory, all 
> non-locality are of that type.
> 
> That non-loclality has a common cause explanation. Like Bertlmann's socks, 
> there is no mystery here. The problem is with entangled systems, where 
> non-separability means non-locality that has no common cause explanation, 
> even in many-worlds theory.


I doubt this. The MWI reduces the non-separability of the probabilities into an 
equivalent with Bertlmann’s socks, still keeping the violation of Bell’s 
inequality justifying the appearance of non-locality. 



> 
> 
>> In the MWI, some particles can be entangled but without implying any 
>> possible FTL when we do measurement on them, except from the local point of 
>> view, due to our ignorance of all terms of the wave. It means simply that 
>> Alice and Bob belongs to the same branch of history/reality.
>> 
>> The trouble with this hope is that it no local account of the EPR 
>> correlations been realised in any coherent mathematics. Bell's theorem rules 
>> it out: no local hidden variable account of the EPR correlations is possible 
>> in any theory, whatsoever. It is a no-go theorem; it proves a negative -- 
>> something is impossible. Many-worlds does not subvert Bell's theorem.
> 
> That is right. But the violation of Bell’s inequality entails FTL only when 
> one world is assumed, with well defined outcome for all measurement, or put 
> in another way, assuming a unique reality, with one Bob and one Alice, but 
> Bell’s reasoning does not prove FTL influence in The many-worlds, where all 
> outcomes are obtained, and propagate between diverse Alice and Bob locally, 
> leading to the apparent violation of Bell’s inequality, but without FTL.
> 
> Bell did not assume a collapse. His is a mathematical result, where the only 
> assumption is locality. As usual, if you think there is a local explanation 
> of the EPR correlations in many-worlds, then produce it.

We differ only on the way we interpreted the wave and the worlds. The singlet 
state is … local! It does not entail any correlation between the Alices and the 
Bobs. It enforces only that the Alices and Bobs can meet only their 
corresponding correlated partners, among the infinitely many Alices and Bobs 
(most of them being not accessible from each others).



> 
> 
>> I think it is becoming generally accepted in the physics community that the 
>> entangled state is intrinsically non-local: acting on one part of it affects 
>> the rest, even across the entire universe.
> 
> That would mean some FTL actions, but I very much doubt this.
> 
> No, there is no need of FTL. For example, in the third (2011) edition of his 
> book 'Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity', Maudlin shows that Flash GRW 
> theory, as developed by Temulka, gives a perfectly relativistic account of 
> the EPR correlations without any FTL action.

This astonishes me. If you have a link I could try to see if this makes sense, 
but, to be sure, I am not enthusiast at all on the GRW theory, which is new QM 
theory. If some measurement 

Re: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

[Bruno Marchal]

In First Order Logic, Real Numbers are the one which simplifies. The first 
order theory of the real is decidable, unlike the first order theory of the 
natural numbers. The digital, or discrete, reality is more complex than the 
reals, which fits all holes, and provides (in the complex extensions) all roots 
for the polynomials.
Also, Nicolas Gisin use the Aristotelian act of faith (defining “real” by 
“physical”), which requires a non Mechanist theory of mind.
With Mechanism, real number are phenomenological constructs by digital 
entities. It is real, but not ontologically real.

Bruno


> On 30 Nov 2019, at 20:15, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06824 
> 
> (V2: several mineurs changes ) !
> 
> Indeterminism in Physics, Classical Chaos and Bohmian Mechanics. Are Real 
> Numbers Really Real?
> 
> Nicolas Gisin 
> 
> (Submitted on 19 Mar 2018 (v1 ), last 
> revised 31 May 2019 (this version, v3))
> It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems 
> with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an 
> infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can't 
> contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical 
> real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for 
> the so-called real numbers is ``random numbers'', as their series of bits are 
> truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is 
> empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only 
> finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is 
> non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way 
> similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical 
> mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in 
> such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists 
> straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they 
> attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics 
> as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no 
> physical reality.
> Comments: 8 pages. Presented at the David Bohm Centennial Symposium, 
> London, Octobre 2017 V2: several mineurs changes and additions
> Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph); History and Philosophy of Physics 
> (physics.hist-ph)
> Cite as:  arXiv:1803.06824  [quant-ph]
>   (or arXiv:1803.06824v3  [quant-ph] 
> for this version)
> 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen
>>> or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We
>>> can take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe
>>> to recover the full Hilbert space:
>>>
>>>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>>>
>>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>>>
>>>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>>>
>>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors
>>> for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>>>
>>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts
>>> over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the
>>> same 'environment' in each case, we have
>>>
>>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>>>
>>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so
>>> it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state.
>>>
>>>
>>> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.
>>> It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.
>>>
>>
>> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
>> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result of
>> the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with anything.
>> So the schematic above must represent the particle or whatever that is
>> being measured (considered of interest, if you wish to avoid the "M" word.)
>>
>>
>>
>>>   The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
>>> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because
>>> initial conditions may make it zero.
>>>
>>
>> Irrelevant to the main point.
>>
>>> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
>>> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum
>>> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>>>
>>> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained
>>> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world.
>>> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the
>>> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the
>>> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each
>>> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is
>>> not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you
>>> just have a stochastic single-world model.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
>>> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after
>>> the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying
>>> what probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation
>>> leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
>> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
>> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a single-world.
>> In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you end up on only one
>> branch (stochastically). So the other branches do no work, and might as
>> well be discarded. If you are really worried about the possibility of fully
>> decohered branches recombining, take out life insurance..
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
> "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
>
>
> Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let probabilities
> (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the tent - you might as
> well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
>

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more than one
branch of the multiverse?

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>
>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen or 
>> through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We can 
>> take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe to 
>> recover the full Hilbert space:
>>
>>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>>
>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>>
>>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>>
>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors 
>> for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>>
>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts 
>> over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the 
>> same 'environment' in each case, we have
>>
>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>>
>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so 
>> it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state. 
>>
>>
>> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.  It 
>> doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.
>>
>
> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector 
> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result of 
> the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with anything. 
> So the schematic above must represent the particle or whatever that is 
> being measured (considered of interest, if you wish to avoid the "M" word.)
>
>  
>
>>   The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry 
>> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because 
>> initial conditions may make it zero.
>>
>
> Irrelevant to the main point.
>
>> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum 
>> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum 
>> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>>
>> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained 
>> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world. 
>> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the 
>> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the 
>> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each 
>> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is 
>> not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you 
>> just have a stochastic single-world model.
>>
>>
>> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic 
>> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after 
>> the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying 
>> what probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation 
>> leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>>
>
> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In 
> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and 
> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a single-world. 
> In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you end up on only one 
> branch (stochastically). So the other branches do no work, and might as 
> well be discarded. If you are really worried about the possibility of fully 
> decohered branches recombining, take out life insurance..
>
> Bruce
>



"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)" 



Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let probabilities 
(stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the tent - you might as 
well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.



@philipthrift

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Re: C60 Interference

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 5:58:20 PM UTC-6, smitra wrote:
>
> On 01-12-2019 09:12, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > On Tuesday, November 26, 2019 at 6:11:41 AM UTC-7, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > 
> >> On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 12:10:26 PM UTC-7, Alan Grayson 
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 11:01:17 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On 11/17/2019 11:07 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> I forget if I raised this issue here or on another thread. I am 
> >>> beginning to doubt that isolation is possible. When a particle is 
> >>> created, how can it be isolated from the environment? If it cannot 
> >> be 
> >>> isolated, if it's never really isolated, the decoherence model 
> >> fails 
> >>> to establish anything. AG 
> >> 
> >> Interactions are quantized like everything else.  There's smallest 
> >> unit 
> >> of action, h.  So if the interaction is less than this it's zero. 
> >> So it 
> >> is possible to isolate variables. 
> >> 
> >> Brent 
> >> 
> >> But if, say, a particle is created by some process, won't it be 
> >> entangled with the causal entities defining the process and 
> >> therefore be initially, and forever, non-isolated? AG 
> > 
> > If that's too hot to handle, try this: if we write the standard 
> > superposition of a decayed or undecayed radioactive atom, is there any 
> > inherent problem with interpreting this superposition to mean it has a 
> > probability to be in one state or the other by applying Born's rule to 
> > each amplitude? Why did this interpretation apparently fall to the 
> > wayside, and was substituted for the baffling interpretation of the 
> > system being in both states simultaneously? AG 
> > 
> > It seems like a simple question aching for an answer. Why do 
> > physicists, many of them at least, prefer a baffling unintelligible 
> > interpretation of superposition, say in the case of a radioactive 
> > source, when the obvious non-contradictory one stares them in their 
> > collective faces? AG 
>
> The interpretation of a superposition as representing a system that can 
> be in one or the other state, is incompatible with interference 
> experiments. And physicist don't care much about interpretation and the 
> language used to communicate what certain concepts mean. So, many 
> physicists may say that a particle in a superposition between being in 
> position x and y is at x and y simultaneously, even though they know 
> that's not really what a superposition means (obviously there is only 
> one particle not 2). What matters is the mathematical formulation of the 
> theory, not the words used to describe this. 
> Saibal 
>



Of course there is not "the mathematical formulation" (like the one 
approved catechism of an orthodox denomination), but there are multiple 
mathematical formulations that can match empirical data.

@philipthrift

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