RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
To the quote of Lee's remark: I would try Vernumft (which may as well be similarly inaccurate for 'consciousness'). There were some German speaking souls(!) who used it quite effectively G. I try for'mind':the mentality aspect of the living complexity which says not much more if 'mentality' is not properly identified. However referring to the complexity of the 'living creatures' it points to a function which is inseparable from the substrate it goes together with (brain and the rest of the world). So I would not agree with Baum as to the 'brain' running the program for thinking, which is a tool in the complexity 'running' in concert with the rest of it. Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our mind. Living I use instead of human, of course. But that comes from my generalization trend of terms beyond our human only pretension. To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced thinking community. John M --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [Lee wrote:] Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author decides to use mind as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Aditya writes [LC]: Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of event and observer moment can't really be said to be at all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been using the term OM for years and years, and event has a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on a gray scale. Then dare I say that any Theory based on this restricted definition of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence comparable to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. I am hugely sympathetic to the point of view you are proposing, namely that theories based on OMs do have inherent weaknesses, and are quite out of line with the progress sciences has shown historically. Most of the proponents of OM-based theories will succumb to the temptation to resort to introspection as an investigation tool. Yes, some will at all times keep flexibly in mind the realization that any OM explanation must be totally consistent with its dual event-based explanation. However, it's the eternal search for ever simpler more unifying explanation that fuels the search for a way to avoid another dualism (so it seems to me), the idea that mathematics and physics are separate. That is, they want to derive everything about physics from the platonic existence of mathematical patterns. Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God that I can never hope to explain to myself. Yes, some of Wheeler's theories (e.g. an observer created universe) have this very characteristic: the observer (to me an immensely complicated machine, a johnny-come-lately in evolution) is placed at the center and deemed fundamental. But to be fair, the time-deniers (the math Platonists who seek everything explained by patterns) allow that all conscious, complex entities have non-trivial OMs. I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains consciousness in terms of something more than just interference of events on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away [coincidence] as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable entity. Yeah, well said. Lee
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell writes John M. wrote To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates? [Russell?] I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your mind is something else - an observation perhaps. [JM]: I guess whatever is observable in your brainfunctions is not the event but its reflection. The event itself is the 'occurrence' what you deem 'observation', while you observe it only as it happenned. It is quite clear as you call the brain a neural correlate, which makes it clear that it is not the originating, neither executing factor, just a correlate of such. Exactly the 'hard problem' since Kohler's Gestalt. I like the correlate, it is pointing to the inseparability of the functions as we try to decipher them. To the translations in Russell's other post: I take translation = transfiguration, I read in 5 languages and saw 'good' translations with different meanings. Nothing beats the 'original' written in a mother-tongue John M
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Hi John, Le 01-août-05, à 16:57, John M a écrit : Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our mind. Except that since Turing, Church, Godel ... we know that we don't know what is a computer. There are no theory capable of completely describing what they can or cannot do. Remember I insist that comp entails we cannot even know which machine we are, although we can bet on some substitution level in front of the doctor (for the worst or for the best). The discovery of computers makes us much more ignorant. Computers will make our lives much less easy. Hopefully more funny too but it depends in part from us (the human, here). Kind Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
John M: snip:) To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced thinking community. John M I think the name was a play the name of another book The discovery of the mind by Bruno Snell Searle's too smart to allude to literality like that. Indeed the whole book is about our lack of success in the quest. Vernumft ly yours :-) Colin
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 02:00:30PM -0700, John M wrote: I salute Lee's new subject designation. I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. Of course: I am no physicist. My apologies. To Russel's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates? Naively yours John Mikes I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your mind is something else - an observation perhaps. I'm only pointing to my understanding of these terms - I'm willing to change terminology if its useful to do so. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpEtBFYsej9F.pgp Description: PGP signature
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Russell writes John M. wrote I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. I agree: that is, so long as we can smoothly extend the concepts from daily life without conflict with other areas of knowledge. To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates? I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your mind is something else - an observation perhaps. Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author decides to use mind as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 08:09:46PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. I am surprised about that! The word der Geist sprang immediately to mind as the translation. According to my German/English disctionary, the relevant words were: die Seele (psychology) der Geist (intellect) das Gemuet (feelings) das? Lust (desire/inclination) (bsp ich habe Lust zu es machen) So Geist or Seele would in fact be the closest translations to how I used mind above. Similarly in French, the word esprit would be used. In English, these two words have become corrupted to Ghost and Spirit, meaning much the same thing as each in English, but somewhat different to the original language meanings. In Seele becomes Soul in English. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgp1fgfrotv64.pgp Description: PGP signature
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Lee wrote: Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author decides to use mind as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in more detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in ... Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chapter 2 Once again: Baum formulates a metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort but where it can appear to be that way. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[Lee wrote:] Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author decides to use mind as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[Lee wrote:] Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author decides to use mind as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[LC]: Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of event and observer moment can't really be said to be at all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been using the term OM for years and years, and event has a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on a gray scale. Then dare I say that any Theory based on this restricted definition of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence comparable to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God that I can never hope to explain to myself. I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains consciousness in terms of something more than just interference of events on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away coincidents as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable entity. -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
