Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 09.09.2011 23:06 meekerdb said the following: On 9/9/2011 1:37 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 09.09.2011 21:58 meekerdb said the following: On 9/9/2011 11:35 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 06.09.2011 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. Wouldn't those neural net face recognition programs be an example of this. They start out not knowing anyone's face. But then with training they learn to recognize Brent and distinguish him from Evgenii. Each instance of the Brent image is a little different from the other instances but it assigned the same classification for purposes of access or other action. In effect it has invented Brent and Evgenii as universals. The 'dictionary' then exists as the combined information of the program and memory. The persistent patterns in memory are analogous to dictionary entries. The imaging and actions provide the meaning of these entries. I like more to take an example with a human being rather than with a name, so let me consider a term a human being. So, after all a neural net is some map. It takes some visual, audio, tactile, etc. inputs, processes them and produces some token. What happens then? Presumably it puts this token to the dictionary that produces qualia for the homunculus in the brain (or whomever, this does not matter at this point). Now I would say that if that final qualia corresponded to a human being is the same in all brains, than this is realism. If different, then this is nominalism. Evgenii I don't think that's the distinction between realism and nominalism in their theory of universals. It's my understanding that the realist says that there really are human beings in an objective sense (where objective may really just refer to intersubjective agreement). While the nominalist says human being is just name we give to a category created arbitrarily and we could just as well have defined it as hairless bipeds and include ostriches and shaved kangaroos. Brent Yes, you are right. My interpretation is different from the conventional difference between realism and nominalism. Here one says indeed that each person has something that exists in the objective sense and this something is a human being. Well, it we treat qualia ontologically, then I guess, this will be close to realism. Yet one can imagine different scenarios. Under a conventional definition, qualia human being is tied with a physical person in the classical sense of the realism. It is necessary however then to explain how a homunculus in the brain retrieves that qualia from a physical person (quantum consciousness?). I think it is a category error to think of a token being put in a dictionary as evoking qualia. I think qualia supervene on the conscious formation (and recall) of symbolic (mostly language) narration which is put into memory (although possibly only short term). In the neural net analogy, the perception of a person activates some part of the network so that some word, e.g. Bob, gets inserted in the stream of consciousness that it is going into memory. Bob is retrieved only in the sense that some part of the network is activated. There is no homunculus. It well may be, I do not know. Anyway, in my view if we take qualia ontologically, this will be some sort of realism. As for homunculus, I also agree. Yet, frankly speaking I still do not understand (even with qualia), how a 3D world that I experience is created. Who experiences it? How qualia helps to solve such a question? Evgenii Brent The scenario that I have described is different in a sense that the communication takes place through physical processes that we know but at the end we may still think of qualia in the ontological sense. Hence one could probably state that this is also the realism (but definitely in some unconventional sense). Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 07.09.2011 13:47 Stephen P. King said the following: OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to consider how communication between observers works out. Universals = what things of one kind have in common. Evgenii On 07.09.2011 13:47 Stephen P. King said the following: On 9/6/2011 3:23 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person view? Evgenii On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic as theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?). Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers, which have special property (like the prime numbers, the universal numbers, the Löbian Universal numbers). Do they exist literally? I don't know what that means. Do they exist primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0)) exists primitively and is prime. Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the things the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this includes the physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They does not exist primitively, but their properties are still independent of the mind of any machines. This is epistemological realism. Pain exists, in that sense, for example. All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their relations and properties. This is enough to explain the appearances of mind and matter, which exist from the number's perspective (which can be defined by relation between machines' beliefs (defined axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and can be approximated from inside). Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can take combinators, Turing machines or java programs instead of the numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and matter. Bruno Hi, Does the existence of said universals act as a guarantor of the definiteness of the properties of the universals? As I see it, existence per say is neutral, it is merely the necessary possibility to be. We seem to be stuck with thinking that 3p = not-1p. What if 3p is the invariant over 1p instead? I.e. the objective world is what all observers hold as mutually non-contradictory, a sort of intersection of their 1p's. I worry that in our rush to toss out the subjective and illusory that we are discarding the essential role that an observer plays in the universe. Is it any wonder why we have such a 'hard problem' with consciousness because of this? OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to consider how communication between observers works out. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 06.09.2011 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. Wouldn't those neural net face recognition programs be an example of this. They start out not knowing anyone's face. But then with training they learn to recognize Brent and distinguish him from Evgenii. Each instance of the Brent image is a little different from the other instances but it assigned the same classification for purposes of access or other action. In effect it has invented Brent and Evgenii as universals. The 'dictionary' then exists as the combined information of the program and memory. The persistent patterns in memory are analogous to dictionary entries. The imaging and actions provide the meaning of these entries. I like more to take an example with a human being rather than with a name, so let me consider a term a human being. So, after all a neural net is some map. It takes some visual, audio, tactile, etc. inputs, processes them and produces some token. What happens then? Presumably it puts this token to the dictionary that produces qualia for the homunculus in the brain (or whomever, this does not matter at this point). Now I would say that if that final qualia corresponded to a human being is the same in all brains, than this is realism. If different, then this is nominalism. Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru Brent This was my second naive/crazy thought. It would be interesting to look how realism/nominalism is translated into the object-oriented programming. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/9/2011 11:35 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 06.09.2011 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. Wouldn't those neural net face recognition programs be an example of this. They start out not knowing anyone's face. But then with training they learn to recognize Brent and distinguish him from Evgenii. Each instance of the Brent image is a little different from the other instances but it assigned the same classification for purposes of access or other action. In effect it has invented Brent and Evgenii as universals. The 'dictionary' then exists as the combined information of the program and memory. The persistent patterns in memory are analogous to dictionary entries. The imaging and actions provide the meaning of these entries. I like more to take an example with a human being rather than with a name, so let me consider a term a human being. So, after all a neural net is some map. It takes some visual, audio, tactile, etc. inputs, processes them and produces some token. What happens then? Presumably it puts this token to the dictionary that produces qualia for the homunculus in the brain (or whomever, this does not matter at this point). Now I would say that if that final qualia corresponded to a human being is the same in all brains, than this is realism. If different, then this is nominalism. Evgenii I don't think that's the distinction between realism and nominalism in their theory of universals. It's my understanding that the realist says that there really are human beings in an objective sense (where objective may really just refer to intersubjective agreement). While the nominalist says human being is just name we give to a category created arbitrarily and we could just as well have defined it as hairless bipeds and include ostriches and shaved kangaroos. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 09.09.2011 21:58 meekerdb said the following: On 9/9/2011 11:35 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 06.09.2011 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. Wouldn't those neural net face recognition programs be an example of this. They start out not knowing anyone's face. But then with training they learn to recognize Brent and distinguish him from Evgenii. Each instance of the Brent image is a little different from the other instances but it assigned the same classification for purposes of access or other action. In effect it has invented Brent and Evgenii as universals. The 'dictionary' then exists as the combined information of the program and memory. The persistent patterns in memory are analogous to dictionary entries. The imaging and actions provide the meaning of these entries. I like more to take an example with a human being rather than with a name, so let me consider a term a human being. So, after all a neural net is some map. It takes some visual, audio, tactile, etc. inputs, processes them and produces some token. What happens then? Presumably it puts this token to the dictionary that produces qualia for the homunculus in the brain (or whomever, this does not matter at this point). Now I would say that if that final qualia corresponded to a human being is the same in all brains, than this is realism. If different, then this is nominalism. Evgenii I don't think that's the distinction between realism and nominalism in their theory of universals. It's my understanding that the realist says that there really are human beings in an objective sense (where objective may really just refer to intersubjective agreement). While the nominalist says human being is just name we give to a category created arbitrarily and we could just as well have defined it as hairless bipeds and include ostriches and shaved kangaroos. Brent Yes, you are right. My interpretation is different from the conventional difference between realism and nominalism. Here one says indeed that each person has something that exists in the objective sense and this something is a human being. Well, it we treat qualia ontologically, then I guess, this will be close to realism. Yet one can imagine different scenarios. Under a conventional definition, qualia human being is tied with a physical person in the classical sense of the realism. It is necessary however then to explain how a homunculus in the brain retrieves that qualia from a physical person (quantum consciousness?). The scenario that I have described is different in a sense that the communication takes place through physical processes that we know but at the end we may still think of qualia in the ontological sense. Hence one could probably state that this is also the realism (but definitely in some unconventional sense). Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/9/2011 1:37 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 09.09.2011 21:58 meekerdb said the following: On 9/9/2011 11:35 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 06.09.2011 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. Wouldn't those neural net face recognition programs be an example of this. They start out not knowing anyone's face. But then with training they learn to recognize Brent and distinguish him from Evgenii. Each instance of the Brent image is a little different from the other instances but it assigned the same classification for purposes of access or other action. In effect it has invented Brent and Evgenii as universals. The 'dictionary' then exists as the combined information of the program and memory. The persistent patterns in memory are analogous to dictionary entries. The imaging and actions provide the meaning of these entries. I like more to take an example with a human being rather than with a name, so let me consider a term a human being. So, after all a neural net is some map. It takes some visual, audio, tactile, etc. inputs, processes them and produces some token. What happens then? Presumably it puts this token to the dictionary that produces qualia for the homunculus in the brain (or whomever, this does not matter at this point). Now I would say that if that final qualia corresponded to a human being is the same in all brains, than this is realism. If different, then this is nominalism. Evgenii I don't think that's the distinction between realism and nominalism in their theory of universals. It's my understanding that the realist says that there really are human beings in an objective sense (where objective may really just refer to intersubjective agreement). While the nominalist says human being is just name we give to a category created arbitrarily and we could just as well have defined it as hairless bipeds and include ostriches and shaved kangaroos. Brent Yes, you are right. My interpretation is different from the conventional difference between realism and nominalism. Here one says indeed that each person has something that exists in the objective sense and this something is a human being. Well, it we treat qualia ontologically, then I guess, this will be close to realism. Yet one can imagine different scenarios. Under a conventional definition, qualia human being is tied with a physical person in the classical sense of the realism. It is necessary however then to explain how a homunculus in the brain retrieves that qualia from a physical person (quantum consciousness?). I think it is a category error to think of a token being put in a dictionary as evoking qualia. I think qualia supervene on the conscious formation (and recall) of symbolic (mostly language) narration which is put into memory (although possibly only short term). In the neural net analogy, the perception of a person activates some part of the network so that some word, e.g. Bob, gets inserted in the stream of consciousness that it is going into memory. Bob is retrieved only in the sense that some part of the network is activated. There is no homunculus. Brent The scenario that I have described is different in a sense that the communication takes place through physical processes that we know but at the end we may still think of qualia in the ontological sense. Hence one could probably state that this is also the realism (but definitely in some unconventional sense). Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/6/2011 3:23 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person view? Evgenii On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic as theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?). Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers, which have special property (like the prime numbers, the universal numbers, the Löbian Universal numbers). Do they exist literally? I don't know what that means. Do they exist primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0)) exists primitively and is prime. Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the things the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this includes the physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They does not exist primitively, but their properties are still independent of the mind of any machines. This is epistemological realism. Pain exists, in that sense, for example. All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their relations and properties. This is enough to explain the appearances of mind and matter, which exist from the number's perspective (which can be defined by relation between machines' beliefs (defined axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and can be approximated from inside). Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can take combinators, Turing machines or java programs instead of the numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and matter. Bruno Hi, Does the existence of said universals act as a guarantor of the definiteness of the properties of the universals? As I see it, existence per say is neutral, it is merely the necessary possibility to be. We seem to be stuck with thinking that 3p = not-1p. What if 3p is the invariant over 1p instead? I.e. the objective world is what all observers hold as mutually non-contradictory, a sort of intersection of their 1p's. I worry that in our rush to toss out the subjective and illusory that we are discarding the essential role that an observer plays in the universe. Is it any wonder why we have such a 'hard problem' with consciousness because of this? OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to consider how communication between observers works out. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 06 Sep 2011, at 21:23, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person view? I think we can say that. With the 'modern logic' approach we can bypass the middle-age problem of universal. For example I would say that prime number exist, and so, that the notion of being prime can exist independently of any first person. But this can be translated in first order logic with the quantification restricted to the natural numbers, for example by Ex (x is prime) with (x is prime) being an abbreviation of (y divides x - ((x ≠ 1) ((y = 1) or (y = x)) with (y divides x ) being an abbreviation of (Ez (y * z = x)) So, the existence of universal can be translated into the truth of some (arithmetical) relations. You can do the same with Ex (x is a universal number) Ex(x is a Löbian machine) Ex (x is a finite computation) or even Ex (x is the code of a possibly infinite computation) We can probably not say Ex(x is a dog), but we can say Ex(x is very plausibly a dog), without any trouble, so we can have fuzzy universal too. Those are well handled by programming technics and fuzzy set theory, for example. Bruno Evgenii On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic as theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?). Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers, which have special property (like the prime numbers, the universal numbers, the Löbian Universal numbers). Do they exist literally? I don't know what that means. Do they exist primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0)) exists primitively and is prime. Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the things the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this includes the physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They does not exist primitively, but their properties are still independent of the mind of any machines. This is epistemological realism. Pain exists, in that sense, for example. All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their relations and properties. This is enough to explain the appearances of mind and matter, which exist from the number's perspective (which can be defined by relation between machines' beliefs (defined axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and can be approximated from inside). Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can take combinators, Turing machines or java programs instead of the numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and matter. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/7/2011 4:47 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Does the existence of said universals act as a guarantor of the definiteness of the properties of the universals? As I see it, existence per say is neutral, it is merely the necessary possibility to be. ?? necessary possibility = necessity ?? We seem to be stuck with thinking that 3p = not-1p. What if 3p is the invariant over 1p instead? I.e. the objective world is what all observers hold as mutually non-contradictory, a sort of intersection of their 1p's. I think that is essentially right. From an operational point of view, objective = intersubjective agreement. Brent I worry that in our rush to toss out the subjective and illusory that we are discarding the essential role that an observer plays in the universe. Is it any wonder why we have such a 'hard problem' with consciousness because of this? OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to consider how communication between observers works out. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic as theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?). Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers, which have special property (like the prime numbers, the universal numbers, the Löbian Universal numbers). Do they exist literally? I don't know what that means. Do they exist primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0)) exists primitively and is prime. Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the things the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this includes the physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They does not exist primitively, but their properties are still independent of the mind of any machines. This is epistemological realism. Pain exists, in that sense, for example. All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their relations and properties. This is enough to explain the appearances of mind and matter, which exist from the number's perspective (which can be defined by relation between machines' beliefs (defined axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and can be approximated from inside). Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can take combinators, Turing machines or java programs instead of the numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and matter. Bruno Evgenii On 05.09.2011 18:59 Bruno Marchal said the following: Hi Evgenii, On 04 Sep 2011, at 18:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: A short remark. I have decided start with philosophy, as it is more entertaining as mathematical logic. I'm afraid you are wrong on this, with all my respect. Mathematical logic is the most entertaining thing in the world (except perhaps salvia divinorum). Of course ML asks for some work, and the initial work is a bit boring, and is the hardest part of logic (you have to understand that at some point you are asked to NOT understand or even interpret the symbols). About philosophy I have no general opinion. The word has a different meaning according to places and universities. When I was young, the prerequisite for studying philosophy consists in showing veneration and adoration for Marx. I made myself a lot of enemies by daring to be just a little bit skeptical, if only on materialism. They have never forgive me. In the country nearby, philosophy is literature, with an emphasis of being vague, non understandable, and authoritative. To get good note, you need to leak the shoes of the teacher. It is religion in disguise (pseudo-religion). So, I don't believe in philosophy, per se. I don't take people like Putnam or Maudlin, or Barnes, as philosopher, but as scientist. because they are clear and refutable. Yet in the USA it is called philosophy, but it is not: it is just fundamental serious inquiry. There is no difference between philosophy of mind and fundamental cognitive science. I don't really believe in science either. I believe in the scientific attitude, which is just an attempt toward clarity and modesty. A scientific theory is just a torch lighter on the unknown. Many confuse the torch and the unknown, or the shadows brought by the torch and reality. Right now I listen to lectures of Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (in German) http://podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content/courses?id_group=12 His title Controversy in philosophy took my attention first but he has some more offers. Say now I listen to What is philosophy. He speaks a bit too much but I have already got used to him. The half of his series on controversies has been devoted to realism vs. nominalism. If I understand correctly, your theorem proves that comp implies realism Could you define realism? For some weak-materialist (believer in primitive matter), realism is physical realism. Comp proves nothing on that, but it assumes arithmetical realism, which is believed by all mathematicians and scientists (except some of them when they do
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person view? Evgenii On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic as theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?). Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers, which have special property (like the prime numbers, the universal numbers, the Löbian Universal numbers). Do they exist literally? I don't know what that means. Do they exist primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0)) exists primitively and is prime. Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the things the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this includes the physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They does not exist primitively, but their properties are still independent of the mind of any machines. This is epistemological realism. Pain exists, in that sense, for example. All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their relations and properties. This is enough to explain the appearances of mind and matter, which exist from the number's perspective (which can be defined by relation between machines' beliefs (defined axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and can be approximated from inside). Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can take combinators, Turing machines or java programs instead of the numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and matter. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. This was my second naive/crazy thought. It would be interesting to look how realism/nominalism is translated into the object-oriented programming. Evgenii On 06.09.2011 05:13 Stephen P. King said the following: On 9/5/2011 6:32 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/5/2011 1:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Brent, On 9/5/2011 3:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/5/2011 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), I think of that as Platonism. I think of realism as just the theory that things exist independent of minds. Brent How does realism explain the means by which knowledge of these 'things that exist independent of the mind obtains? Is there some form of interaction between those 'independent things' and our minds? If so, that mechanism is this and how does it work? Those things interact with a brain which instantiates the mental processes. At least that's the theory. Brent So the mind is merely epiphenomena? OK... Are you truly satisfied with that explanation? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/6/2011 12:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I was talking about realism in a sense that universals exist (I am not sure if this could be generalized for all things). My first naive/crazy idea was that this could give some basis to produce qualia related to notation. Neurons somehow distill universals from things and report them. On the other hand, if we are to write a program that should classify objects, then this program should have some dictionary with categories. That dictionary in some sense should exist. Wouldn't those neural net face recognition programs be an example of this. They start out not knowing anyone's face. But then with training they learn to recognize Brent and distinguish him from Evgenii. Each instance of the Brent image is a little different from the other instances but it assigned the same classification for purposes of access or other action. In effect it has invented Brent and Evgenii as universals. The 'dictionary' then exists as the combined information of the program and memory. The persistent patterns in memory are analogous to dictionary entries. The imaging and actions provide the meaning of these entries. Brent This was my second naive/crazy thought. It would be interesting to look how realism/nominalism is translated into the object-oriented programming. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
Hi Evgenii, On 04 Sep 2011, at 18:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: A short remark. I have decided start with philosophy, as it is more entertaining as mathematical logic. I'm afraid you are wrong on this, with all my respect. Mathematical logic is the most entertaining thing in the world (except perhaps salvia divinorum). Of course ML asks for some work, and the initial work is a bit boring, and is the hardest part of logic (you have to understand that at some point you are asked to NOT understand or even interpret the symbols). About philosophy I have no general opinion. The word has a different meaning according to places and universities. When I was young, the prerequisite for studying philosophy consists in showing veneration and adoration for Marx. I made myself a lot of enemies by daring to be just a little bit skeptical, if only on materialism. They have never forgive me. In the country nearby, philosophy is literature, with an emphasis of being vague, non understandable, and authoritative. To get good note, you need to leak the shoes of the teacher. It is religion in disguise (pseudo-religion). So, I don't believe in philosophy, per se. I don't take people like Putnam or Maudlin, or Barnes, as philosopher, but as scientist. because they are clear and refutable. Yet in the USA it is called philosophy, but it is not: it is just fundamental serious inquiry. There is no difference between philosophy of mind and fundamental cognitive science. I don't really believe in science either. I believe in the scientific attitude, which is just an attempt toward clarity and modesty. A scientific theory is just a torch lighter on the unknown. Many confuse the torch and the unknown, or the shadows brought by the torch and reality. Right now I listen to lectures of Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (in German) http://podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content/courses?id_group=12 His title Controversy in philosophy took my attention first but he has some more offers. Say now I listen to What is philosophy. He speaks a bit too much but I have already got used to him. The half of his series on controversies has been devoted to realism vs. nominalism. If I understand correctly, your theorem proves that comp implies realism Could you define realism? For some weak-materialist (believer in primitive matter), realism is physical realism. Comp proves nothing on that, but it assumes arithmetical realism, which is believed by all mathematicians and scientists (except some of them when they do Sunday philosophy (that is non professionally)). Arithmetical realism is the belief that a number is either prime or is not prime. It is the belief that the excluded middle principle can be applied for close arithmetical statement (close = without having a variable which is not in the scope of a quantifier). and in my view your argument is a mathematical model for realism. My argument is just a proof that you cannot be rational, consistent, mechanist and weakly materialist. It is a constructive proof that if we are machine, physics cannot be the fundamental science, but that is is derivable from number theory. With the nice surprise, when we do the math, that we get a theory of qualia extending naturally a theory of quanta. It is interesting to note that Ockam was a nominalist and with his razor he wanted to strip realism away. Could you define 'nominalism'. I think nominalism needs arithmetical realism. Mechanism needs arithmetical realism (only to define what is a machine, really), but can be said to lead to some form of epistemological realism. The physical universe is an illusion, but that illusion is real, in some sense. Comp makes it 'more real' and more 'solid' than what can be brought by any observation. By the way, in the middle ages realism was quite popular as it was easier to solve some theological problems this way. At some time, one philosophy department had even two different chairs, one for realism, another for nominalism. Hence Plato's ideas have not disappeared during Christianity completely. This is true. Christians do even reject some typical point of Aristotle theology (like the mortality of the soul), and embrace a lot in Platonism. Unfortunately they have taken Aristotle doctrine of primary matter (which is certainly a quite good simplifying methodological assumption, but is just basically wrong in case we are machine). Prof Hoenen specializes in the middle ages and it gives some charm to his lectures. I might try to understand when I got more time. Although I talked German up to the age of 6, I have not practice it a lot since, and German philosophers can do very long complex sentences. Bruno On 03.09.2011 19:41 Bruno Marchal said the following: Hi Evgenii, On 02 Sep 2011, at 21:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Bruno, Thanks a lot for your answers. I have said
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. Evgenii On 05.09.2011 18:59 Bruno Marchal said the following: Hi Evgenii, On 04 Sep 2011, at 18:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: A short remark. I have decided start with philosophy, as it is more entertaining as mathematical logic. I'm afraid you are wrong on this, with all my respect. Mathematical logic is the most entertaining thing in the world (except perhaps salvia divinorum). Of course ML asks for some work, and the initial work is a bit boring, and is the hardest part of logic (you have to understand that at some point you are asked to NOT understand or even interpret the symbols). About philosophy I have no general opinion. The word has a different meaning according to places and universities. When I was young, the prerequisite for studying philosophy consists in showing veneration and adoration for Marx. I made myself a lot of enemies by daring to be just a little bit skeptical, if only on materialism. They have never forgive me. In the country nearby, philosophy is literature, with an emphasis of being vague, non understandable, and authoritative. To get good note, you need to leak the shoes of the teacher. It is religion in disguise (pseudo-religion). So, I don't believe in philosophy, per se. I don't take people like Putnam or Maudlin, or Barnes, as philosopher, but as scientist. because they are clear and refutable. Yet in the USA it is called philosophy, but it is not: it is just fundamental serious inquiry. There is no difference between philosophy of mind and fundamental cognitive science. I don't really believe in science either. I believe in the scientific attitude, which is just an attempt toward clarity and modesty. A scientific theory is just a torch lighter on the unknown. Many confuse the torch and the unknown, or the shadows brought by the torch and reality. Right now I listen to lectures of Maarten J.F.M. Hoenen (in German) http://podcasts.uni-freiburg.de/podcast_content/courses?id_group=12 His title Controversy in philosophy took my attention first but he has some more offers. Say now I listen to What is philosophy. He speaks a bit too much but I have already got used to him. The half of his series on controversies has been devoted to realism vs. nominalism. If I understand correctly, your theorem proves that comp implies realism Could you define realism? For some weak-materialist (believer in primitive matter), realism is physical realism. Comp proves nothing on that, but it assumes arithmetical realism, which is believed by all mathematicians and scientists (except some of them when they do Sunday philosophy (that is non professionally)). Arithmetical realism is the belief that a number is either prime or is not prime. It is the belief that the excluded middle principle can be applied for close arithmetical statement (close = without having a variable which is not in the scope of a quantifier). and in my view your argument is a mathematical model for realism. My argument is just a proof that you cannot be rational, consistent, mechanist and weakly materialist. It is a constructive proof that if we are machine, physics cannot be the fundamental science, but that is is derivable from number theory. With the nice surprise, when we do the math, that we get a theory of qualia extending naturally a theory of quanta. It is interesting to note that Ockam was a nominalist and with his razor he wanted to strip realism away. Could you define 'nominalism'. I think nominalism needs arithmetical realism. Mechanism needs arithmetical realism (only to define what is a machine, really), but can be said to lead to some form of epistemological realism. The physical universe is an illusion, but that illusion is real, in some sense. Comp makes it 'more real' and more 'solid' than what can be brought by any observation. By the way, in the middle ages realism was quite popular as it was easier to solve some theological problems this way. At some time, one philosophy department had even two different chairs, one for realism, another for nominalism. Hence Plato's ideas have
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/5/2011 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), I think of that as Platonism. I think of realism as just the theory that things exist independent of minds. Brent nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
Hi Brent, On 9/5/2011 3:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/5/2011 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), I think of that as Platonism. I think of realism as just the theory that things exist independent of minds. Brent How does realism explain the means by which knowledge of these 'things that exist independent of the mind obtains? Is there some form of interaction between those 'independent things' and our minds? If so, that mechanism is this and how does it work? Onward! Stephen nominalism that they are just notation and do not exist as such. It seems that this page is consistent with what Prof Hoenen says http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with universals. Please have a look. If I understand your argument correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/5/2011 1:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Brent, On 9/5/2011 3:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/5/2011 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), I think of that as Platonism. I think of realism as just the theory that things exist independent of minds. Brent How does realism explain the means by which knowledge of these 'things that exist independent of the mind obtains? Is there some form of interaction between those 'independent things' and our minds? If so, that mechanism is this and how does it work? Those things interact with a brain which instantiates the mental processes. At least that's the theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Realism, nominalism and comp
On 9/5/2011 6:32 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/5/2011 1:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Brent, On 9/5/2011 3:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/5/2011 12:02 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals (I guess that numbers could be probably considered as universals as well). A simple example: A is a person; B is a person. Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all different persons. Yet then the question would be if something universal and related to a term person exists in A and B. Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind (so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical realism and materialism), I think of that as Platonism. I think of realism as just the theory that things exist independent of minds. Brent How does realism explain the means by which knowledge of these 'things that exist independent of the mind obtains? Is there some form of interaction between those 'independent things' and our minds? If so, that mechanism is this and how does it work? Those things interact with a brain which instantiates the mental processes. At least that's the theory. Brent So the mind is merely epiphenomena? OK... Are you truly satisfied with that explanation? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
