Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 5:57:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Jun 2020, at 02:27, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 9:39:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 13:25, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 5:25:23 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> As for Hossenfelder's fav quantum mechanics semantics, she has stated 
>>> many times on her blog, it's superdeterminism.
>>>
>>>
>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462
>>>
>>>
>>> "A superdeterministic theory is one which violates the assumption of 
>>> Statistical Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are 
>>> independent of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical 
>>> Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science (never 
>>> mind physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is typically discarded 
>>> swiftly in any discussion of quantum foundations. The purpose of this paper 
>>> is to explain why the existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on 
>>> experience with classical physics and linear systems, but that this 
>>> experience misleads us. Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only 
>>> to solve the measurement problem, but also to understand the apparent 
>>> nonlocality of quantum physics. Most importantly, we will discuss how it 
>>> may be possible to test this hypothesis in an (almost) model independent 
>>> way."
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> Superdeterminism is just a form of hidden variable theory. This invariant 
>> set theory of Palmer and Hossenfelder as a means of connecting nonlinearity 
>> with QM is interesting. The approach with Cantor sets connects with 
>> incomputability.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Mandelbrot Set (its complement) has been shown indecidable, but in a 
>> vary peculiar theory of computability, which has not so many relation with 
>> Turing. It is “computability in a ring”. 
>>
>> In the Turing theory, it is an open problem if he complement of the 
>> rational-complex Mandelbrot set is undecidable. That is a conjecture in my 
>> long thesis. Penrose has come up with a similar (less precise) hypothesis.
>>
>>
>>
> The p-adic ring is what determines the trajectory of a point. where in the 
> case of a Cantor set the divisor of the quotient ring is the map from one 
> point to another. The Cantor set then has a set of orbits given by a set of 
> p-adic rings.
>
>
> Do you mean the triadic Cantor set? It is a set of reals. This play some 
> role for the isolation of the measure, thanks to relation between Baire 
> Space, Cantor triadic set. This requires ZF + Projective Determinacy (the 
> existence of some winning strategy for some infinite game). It is not 
> directly related to computability theory, except that we get them from the 
> union of all sigma_set relative to all oracles. That leads to complex set 
> theory. Here, I use only N, never R, nor bare space.
>
>
>
Yes it is that sort of construction.
 

>
> The result of Matiyaesivich is there is no global method for solving these 
> or the Diophantine equations they correspond to. This is the approach that 
> I take. 
>
>
>
> I would like to see a pair on this. Matiyasevic’s paper and books do not 
> refer to p-adic structure, nor to real numbers. There is no Church’s thesis 
> for the notion of computability with real number. Constructive reals can be 
> represented by total computable functions (with a computable modulus so 
> that + and * remain computable).
>
>
>
Matiyasevich showed the Hilbert's 10 problem can't be solved. This was the 
existence of a global single solution system for Diophantine equations. 
DIophantine equation are equivalent to p-adic sets by Robinson, Davis and 
others. 
 

>
>
> With the Mandelbrot set the "black bit" has periodic orbits or maps which 
> correspond to periods of Julius sets. The points outside are chaotic and 
> are in a sense "beyond chaos" and are not computable.
>
>
> That is proved with the notion of computability on a ring, but like you, I 
> prefer to not use such notion. I see some application in theoretical 
> numerical analysis, but not much for computability theory in general. Then 
> the measure problem is enforce to use all set of (usual) real numbers, 
> except that we can make the closed set “perfect”, which helps to neglect 
> the infinite countable set of “isolated points”, but I am not there already.
>
>
>
>
As a physicist I tend to have my heaviest foot on the side of Babylonian 
math, which is more applied and something of a tool. I have some weight on 
a foot on the Greek math side as well, which is the axiomatic, theorem and 
proof mathematics. 

As for further down, Godel's theorem works with reals. In effect Cantor 
diagonization shows the set of reals are not enumerable, and the people who 
get into set theory deeply use the concept of forcing. This takes one from 
integers or natural numbers to the reals, and the same concept can lead to 
complex n

Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jun 2020, at 02:27, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 9:39:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 13:25, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 5:25:23 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> As for Hossenfelder's fav quantum mechanics semantics, she has stated many 
>> times on her blog, it's superdeterminism.
>> 
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462 
>> 
>> "A superdeterministic theory is one which violates the assumption of 
>> Statistical Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are 
>> independent of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical 
>> Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science (never mind 
>> physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is typically discarded 
>> swiftly in any discussion of quantum foundations. The purpose of this paper 
>> is to explain why the existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on 
>> experience with classical physics and linear systems, but that this 
>> experience misleads us. Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only to 
>> solve the measurement problem, but also to understand the apparent 
>> nonlocality of quantum physics. Most importantly, we will discuss how it may 
>> be possible to test this hypothesis in an (almost) model independent way."
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> 
>> Superdeterminism is just a form of hidden variable theory. This invariant 
>> set theory of Palmer and Hossenfelder as a means of connecting nonlinearity 
>> with QM is interesting. The approach with Cantor sets connects with 
>> incomputability.
> 
> 
> The Mandelbrot Set (its complement) has been shown indecidable, but in a vary 
> peculiar theory of computability, which has not so many relation with Turing. 
> It is “computability in a ring”. 
> 
> In the Turing theory, it is an open problem if he complement of the 
> rational-complex Mandelbrot set is undecidable. That is a conjecture in my 
> long thesis. Penrose has come up with a similar (less precise) hypothesis.
> 
> 
> 
> The p-adic ring is what determines the trajectory of a point. where in the 
> case of a Cantor set the divisor of the quotient ring is the map from one 
> point to another. The Cantor set then has a set of orbits given by a set of 
> p-adic rings.

Do you mean the triadic Cantor set? It is a set of reals. This play some role 
for the isolation of the measure, thanks to relation between Baire Space, 
Cantor triadic set. This requires ZF + Projective Determinacy (the existence of 
some winning strategy for some infinite game). It is not directly related to 
computability theory, except that we get them from the union of all sigma_set 
relative to all oracles. That leads to complex set theory. Here, I use only N, 
never R, nor bare space.



> The result of Matiyaesivich is there is no global method for solving these or 
> the Diophantine equations they correspond to. This is the approach that I 
> take.


I would like to see a pair on this. Matiyasevic’s paper and books do not refer 
to p-adic structure, nor to real numbers. There is no Church’s thesis for the 
notion of computability with real number. Constructive reals can be represented 
by total computable functions (with a computable modulus so that + and * remain 
computable).




> With the Mandelbrot set the "black bit" has periodic orbits or maps which 
> correspond to periods of Julius sets. The points outside are chaotic and are 
> in a sense "beyond chaos" and are not computable.

That is proved with the notion of computability on a ring, but like you, I 
prefer to not use such notion. I see some application in theoretical numerical 
analysis, but not much for computability theory in general. Then the measure 
problem is enforce to use all set of (usual) real numbers, except that we can 
make the closed set “perfect”, which helps to neglect the infinite countable 
set of “isolated points”, but I am not there already.




>  
> 
>> I prefer a more standard definition of incomputability than what P&H appeal 
>> to. This works invariant set theory does imply a violation of statistical 
>> independence, but it does so as a hidden variable.
>> 
>> The complement of a fractal set is undecidable.
> 
> The complement of some fractal set have been shown undecidable in a theory of 
> computability on a ring. This has been shown by Blum, Smale and Shub, if I 
> remember well.
> 
> 
> 
> The incomputability if with the fractal set itself. The incomputability 
> occurs because with a finite cut off you have uncertainty whether points or 
> regions are in or outside the Mandelbrot set. In this somewhat different 
> meaning the Mandelbrot set is considered incomputable by Blum, Smale and Shub,

But only that meaning makes sense to me, and is of no use with respect to the 
problem I am working on. I have only numbers (natural numbers!), and a real 
number is (coddle by) any subset of N.



>

Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2020, at 23:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/8/2020 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 12:39, Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 5:16:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> But collapsing or not remains relevant, to make sense of the behaviour of 
>>> single particle, or more generally to get some meaning of the relative 
>>> probabilities, experimentally, or in arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> There are so many "mechanisms" so many people have come up with over many 
>>> decades now to "interpret" these "relative probabilities" that have been 
>>> experimentally recored.
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll has his "many worlds"
>>> 
>>> or (another "possibility"):
>>> 
>>> The offer wave going out in all directions and the many confirmation waves 
>>> returning are a sort of subset of the infinite number of virtual photons 
>>> traveling all possible paths between emitters and absorbers in Feynman's 
>>> "sum-over-paths" path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics. Kastner 
>>> proposes to regard the outgoing offer wave and many incoming confirmation 
>>> waves as "possible 
>>> " 
>>> transactions, only one of which indeterministically 
>>>  becomes 
>>> "actual."
>>> 
>>> Kastner is a possibilist 
>>>  who 
>>> argues that OWs and CWs are possibilities that are "real." She says that 
>>> they are less real than actual empirically measurable events, but more real 
>>> than an idea or concept in a person's mind. She suggests the alternate term 
>>> "potentia," Aristotle's that she found Heisenberg had cited. For Kastner, 
>>> the possibilities are physically real as compared to merely conceptually 
>>> possible ideas that are consistent with physical law (for example, David 
>>> Lewis 
>>> ' 
>>> "possible worlds." But she says the "possibilities" described by offer and 
>>> confirmation waves are "sub-empirical" and pre-spatiotemporal (i.e., they 
>>> have not shown up as actual in spacetime). She calls these "incipient 
>>> transactions.”
>> 
>> 
>> This looks like Popper's propensity. It leads to a dualism (and indeed, he 
>> wrote with Clles a book defending dualism in philosophy of mind).

I meant Eccles (not Clles).


> 
> I don't see that it entails dualism, even though Popper may have defended it. 
>  Have you read the propensity theory of Paul Humphreys 
> 
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/57cd/976f12b84c660a78d21c3cd207530a7fd82d.pdf
>  
> 
>  

I took a look at it just now. I tend to agree with him. 
As far as I understand “propensity”, I find rather normal that Bayes theorem 
does not apply, and that propensity is not probability. It remind me of the 
Shafer-Dempster theory of evidence, or Smets' Transferable Belief Model”. It 
might be close to the logic of []p & <>t, thanks to the lack of necessitation 
rules at the G* level. Now, all this seems to avoid the metaphysical issue. 
Popper used it to avoid the many-world, but eventually it leads to some action 
of consciousness on matter: a dualist interactionist theory, which makes not 
much sense to me.




> 
> or the book "Causality" by Judea Pearl, which takes similar approach to 
> inference?

Ah! I read many papers by Pearl when working with Smets on its belief theory 
(many years ago). Eventually the modal logic where based on the deontic axiom 
([]p -> <>p), which is recovered by the []p & <>t mode of self-reference. But I 
have not read his book on “causality”. I tend to agree with such treatment of 
inference, but not when this is used to hide the metaphysical problem.

Most of those approach avoid the metaphysical question. It is more artificial 
intelligence than philosophy of mind. 

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
>> It is conceptually more simple to consider an actuality as a possible seen 
>> from inside. Now, here, today are already indixicals,making sense.
>> That fits with the overall “everything is simpler than any thing” philosophy 
>> of this list, and is made obligatory with mechanism, except for adding ad 
>> hoc complexity or conspiracy à la Bostrom. It is definitely incompatible 
>> with Mechanism + very weak version of Occam Razor.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> ...
>>> 
>>> https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/kastner/ 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> @philipthrift
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> You received thi

Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 9:39:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Jun 2020, at 13:25, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 5:25:23 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> As for Hossenfelder's fav quantum mechanics semantics, she has stated 
>> many times on her blog, it's superdeterminism.
>>
>>
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462
>>
>>
>> "A superdeterministic theory is one which violates the assumption of 
>> Statistical Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are 
>> independent of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical 
>> Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science (never 
>> mind physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is typically discarded 
>> swiftly in any discussion of quantum foundations. The purpose of this paper 
>> is to explain why the existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on 
>> experience with classical physics and linear systems, but that this 
>> experience misleads us. Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only 
>> to solve the measurement problem, but also to understand the apparent 
>> nonlocality of quantum physics. Most importantly, we will discuss how it 
>> may be possible to test this hypothesis in an (almost) model independent 
>> way."
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> Superdeterminism is just a form of hidden variable theory. This invariant 
> set theory of Palmer and Hossenfelder as a means of connecting nonlinearity 
> with QM is interesting. The approach with Cantor sets connects with 
> incomputability.
>
>
>
> The Mandelbrot Set (its complement) has been shown indecidable, but in a 
> vary peculiar theory of computability, which has not so many relation with 
> Turing. It is “computability in a ring”. 
>
> In the Turing theory, it is an open problem if he complement of the 
> rational-complex Mandelbrot set is undecidable. That is a conjecture in my 
> long thesis. Penrose has come up with a similar (less precise) hypothesis.
>
>
>
The p-adic ring is what determines the trajectory of a point. where in the 
case of a Cantor set the divisor of the quotient ring is the map from one 
point to another. The Cantor set then has a set of orbits given by a set of 
p-adic rings. The result of Matiyaesivich is there is no global method for 
solving these or the Diophantine equations they correspond to. This is the 
approach that I take. With the Mandelbrot set the "black bit" has periodic 
orbits or maps which correspond to periods of Julius sets. The points 
outside are chaotic and are in a sense "beyond chaos" and are not 
computable.
 

>
> I prefer a more standard definition of incomputability than what P&H 
> appeal to. This works invariant set theory does imply a violation of 
> statistical independence, but it does so as a hidden variable.
>
> The complement of a fractal set is undecidable. 
>
>
> The complement of some fractal set have been shown undecidable in a theory 
> of computability on a ring. This has been shown by Blum, Smale and Shub, if 
> I remember well.
>
>
>
The incomputability if with the fractal set itself. The incomputability 
occurs because with a finite cut off you have uncertainty whether points or 
regions are in or outside the Mandelbrot set. In this somewhat different 
meaning the Mandelbrot set is considered incomputable by Blum, Smale and 
Shub,
 

>
> A fractal set is recursively enumerable, which means we can compute it in 
> a finite automata up to some point, and “in principle” a Turing machine 
> that runs eternally could compute the whole thing. 
>
>
> Yes, but it uses only the potential infinite. We get all element in the 
> enumeration after a finite time (except that here we use computability on a 
> ring, which is not so easy to compare with Turing computability). 
>
>
>
>
>
> The complement of this is not computable. The complement of a recursive 
> set is recursive, but the complement of a recursively enumerable set is not 
> recursively enumerable and is incomputable.
>
>
> You mean  “ … is not necessarily recursively enumerable”. Of course a 
> complement of a recursively enumerable set can be recursively enumerable. 
> That is always the case with recursive set.
>
>
Yes, if the RE set is recursive.
 

>
>
> The invariant set in this superdeterminism is a form of Cantor set or 
> related to a fractal. The results of Matiyasevich  showed that p-adic sets 
> have no global solution method, where p-adic sets are equivalent to 
> Diophantine equations. 
>
>
>
> I would be interested in a precise statement of this, and some link to a 
> proof. What has a p-adic set? Set of what?
>
> Cantor sets are related to self-reference in many ways. For example 
> through the topological semantic of G and S4Grz, but also through the 
> “fuzzification” of Gödel or Löb theorem, like in a paper by Grim. 
>
>
>
A p-adic set is a quotient ring with the Z_p for p a prime. The Chinese 
remainder theorem guarantees that all quotient rings are equivalent

Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/8/2020 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 7 Jun 2020, at 12:39, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 5:16:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But collapsing or not remains relevant, to make sense of the
behaviour of single particle, or more generally to get some
meaning of the relative probabilities, experimentally, or in
arithmetic.

Bruno



There are so many "mechanisms" so many people have come up with over 
many decades now to "interpret" these "relative probabilities" that 
have been experimentally recored.


Sean Carroll has his "many worlds"

or (another "possibility"):

The offer wave going out in all directions and the many confirmation 
waves returning are a sort of subset of the infinite number of 
virtual photons traveling all possible paths between emitters and 
absorbers in Feynman's "sum-over-paths" path-integral formulation of 
quantum mechanics. Kastner proposes to regard the outgoing offer wave 
and many incoming confirmation waves as "possible 
" 
transactions, only one of which indeterministically 
 becomes 
"actual."


Kastner is a possibilist 
 who 
argues that OWs and CWs are possibilities that are "real." She says 
that they are less real than actual empirically measurable events, 
but more real than an idea or concept in a person's mind. She 
suggests the alternate term "potentia," Aristotle's that she found 
Heisenberg had cited. For Kastner, the possibilities are physically 
real as compared to merely conceptually possible ideas that are 
consistent with physical law (for example, David Lewis 
' 
"possible worlds." But she says the "possibilities" described by 
offer and confirmation waves are "sub-empirical" and 
pre-spatiotemporal (i.e., they have not shown up as /actual/ in 
spacetime). She calls these "incipient transactions.”



This looks like Popper's propensity. It leads to a dualism (and 
indeed, he wrote with Clles a book defending dualism in philosophy of 
mind).


I don't see that it entails dualism, even though Popper may have 
defended it.  Have you read the propensity theory of Paul Humphreys


https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/57cd/976f12b84c660a78d21c3cd207530a7fd82d.pdf 



or the book "Causality" by Judea Pearl, which takes similar approach to 
inference?


Brent

It is conceptually more simple to consider an actuality as a possible 
seen from inside. Now, here, today are already indixicals,making sense.
That fits with the overall “everything is simpler than any thing” 
philosophy of this list, and is made obligatory with mechanism, except 
for adding ad hoc complexity or conspiracy à la Bostrom. It is 
definitely incompatible with Mechanism + very weak version of Occam Razor.


Bruno






...

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/kastner/ 



@philipthrift

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2020, at 13:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Jun 6, 2020 at 6:25 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
>  > Superdeterminism is typically discarded swiftly in any discussion of 
> quantum foundations.
> 
> Yes, and Superdeterminism is swiftly discarded for a very good reason. 
> Occam's razor says the best physics theory that explains the facts is the one 
> that's simplest, but that doesn't just mean the one that has the simplest 
> laws but also has the simplest initial conditions. The initial conditions 
> needed for Superdeterminism to work are as far from being simple as it is 
> possible to get; out of the infinite number of ways the universe could have 
> started out in only one of them is set up in exactly the right way such that 
> things are really deterministic but fool us into thinking they are not even 
> after 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution.
> 
> Theosts answer the question "why does the universe exist?" by saying "because 
> God created it", and I have a problem with that because it immediately 
> suggests another obvious question that they have no answer for, "why does God 
> exist?". I have pretty much the same problem with Superdeterminism; why did 
> the universe start out in the only initial condition in which even after 
> churning for 13.8 billion years it is still able to make fools of us? 
> Superdeterministic theory is about as useful for increasing our understanding 
> as saying things are the way they are now because things are the way they are 
> now.


I agree with most of this. Superdeterminism is like abandoning trying to 
understand. It is almost worst than “shut up and calculate”, because it is that 
idea transformed into a general principle. Superdeterlinism is a high price to 
keep on our unicity, which already makes no sense when we postulate Mechanism 
(which presupposes the elementary arithmetical truth (i.e 0 + 0 = 0, etc.) and 
entails the running of all computations (really *all* with Church’s Thesis).

To be sure, not many theologians would say that “God created the universe” is 
an explanation of the origin of the universe. An expert in both Theology and 
Astrophysics, like the bishop or priest (abbé) Lemaître insisted a lot about 
this.
When asked if his theory or “primordial atom” (which has become the Big Bang 
theory) gives a clue that the bible is correct. His answer was that to relate  
the big bang with the bible is as much dishonest in theology than in physics. 
Things are a bit more subtle than that, even in the catholic Aristotelian 
theology. I have discovered this recently. That guy was rather honest, which is 
not so frequent in the post +500 theologies. De Chardin, which I like very 
much, was not that honest apparently.

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
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> .

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2020, at 13:25, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 5:25:23 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> As for Hossenfelder's fav quantum mechanics semantics, she has stated many 
> times on her blog, it's superdeterminism.
> 
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462 
> 
> "A superdeterministic theory is one which violates the assumption of 
> Statistical Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are 
> independent of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical 
> Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science (never mind 
> physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is typically discarded swiftly 
> in any discussion of quantum foundations. The purpose of this paper is to 
> explain why the existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on 
> experience with classical physics and linear systems, but that this 
> experience misleads us. Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only to 
> solve the measurement problem, but also to understand the apparent 
> nonlocality of quantum physics. Most importantly, we will discuss how it may 
> be possible to test this hypothesis in an (almost) model independent way."
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> Superdeterminism is just a form of hidden variable theory. This invariant set 
> theory of Palmer and Hossenfelder as a means of connecting nonlinearity with 
> QM is interesting. The approach with Cantor sets connects with 
> incomputability.


The Mandelbrot Set (its complement) has been shown indecidable, but in a vary 
peculiar theory of computability, which has not so many relation with Turing. 
It is “computability in a ring”. 

In the Turing theory, it is an open problem if he complement of the 
rational-complex Mandelbrot set is undecidable. That is a conjecture in my long 
thesis. Penrose has come up with a similar (less precise) hypothesis.



> I prefer a more standard definition of incomputability than what P&H appeal 
> to. This works invariant set theory does imply a violation of statistical 
> independence, but it does so as a hidden variable.
> 
> The complement of a fractal set is undecidable.

The complement of some fractal set have been shown undecidable in a theory of 
computability on a ring. This has been shown by Blum, Smale and Shub, if I 
remember well.



> A fractal set is recursively enumerable, which means we can compute it in a 
> finite automata up to some point, and “in principle” a Turing machine that 
> runs eternally could compute the whole thing.

Yes, but it uses only the potential infinite. We get all element in the 
enumeration after a finite time (except that here we use computability on a 
ring, which is not so easy to compare with Turing computability). 





> The complement of this is not computable. The complement of a recursive set 
> is recursive, but the complement of a recursively enumerable set is not 
> recursively enumerable and is incomputable.

You mean  “ … is not necessarily recursively enumerable”. Of course a 
complement of a recursively enumerable set can be recursively enumerable. That 
is always the case with recursive set.



> The invariant set in this superdeterminism is a form of Cantor set or related 
> to a fractal. The results of Matiyasevich  showed that p-adic sets have no 
> global solution method, where p-adic sets are equivalent to Diophantine 
> equations.


I would be interested in a precise statement of this, and some link to a proof. 
What has a p-adic set? Set of what?

Cantor sets are related to self-reference in many ways. For example through the 
topological semantic of G and S4Grz, but also through the “fuzzification” of 
Gödel or Löb theorem, like in a paper by Grim. 





> This means that dynamical maps from one point to another on the Cantor set 
> are not given by the same quotient group and in general there is no single 
> decidable system for such maps. In effect this means it is not observable.

What is the relation between observable and decidable? If you study my papers, 
this is the most difficult thing to do. It is possible, and necessary, though, 
by the fact intensional variant of G and G*, which makes the logic of the 
observable/predictibvle obeying a quite different logic than G (indeed, a 
quantum logic).



> 
> So, while superdeterminism violates statistical independence this is all a 
> nonlocal hidden variable and thus unobservable. In ways this is where I 
> depart from Hossenfelder and Palmer, where Palmer uses a different concept of 
> incomputability, based on the idea of Smale et al on the need to compute a 
> fractal an infinite amount.


I thought you did this.



> I appeal to the complement of a fractal, a fractal being a recursively 
> enumerable set

Set of what?



> and computable in a standard sense, but where the complement is not 
> computable.

The complement of a creative set (the set-definition of a universal machine, 
due to Emil Post, and don

Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2020, at 12:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 5:16:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> But collapsing or not remains relevant, to make sense of the behaviour of 
> single particle, or more generally to get some meaning of the relative 
> probabilities, experimentally, or in arithmetic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
>  
> 
> There are so many "mechanisms" so many people have come up with over many 
> decades now to "interpret" these "relative probabilities" that have been 
> experimentally recored.
> 
> Sean Carroll has his "many worlds"
> 
> or (another "possibility"):
> 
> The offer wave going out in all directions and the many confirmation waves 
> returning are a sort of subset of the infinite number of virtual photons 
> traveling all possible paths between emitters and absorbers in Feynman's 
> "sum-over-paths" path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics. Kastner 
> proposes to regard the outgoing offer wave and many incoming confirmation 
> waves as "possible 
> " 
> transactions, only one of which indeterministically 
>  becomes 
> "actual."
> 
> Kastner is a possibilist 
>  who argues 
> that OWs and CWs are possibilities that are "real." She says that they are 
> less real than actual empirically measurable events, but more real than an 
> idea or concept in a person's mind. She suggests the alternate term 
> "potentia," Aristotle's that she found Heisenberg had cited. For Kastner, the 
> possibilities are physically real as compared to merely conceptually possible 
> ideas that are consistent with physical law (for example, David Lewis 
> ' 
> "possible worlds." But she says the "possibilities" described by offer and 
> confirmation waves are "sub-empirical" and pre-spatiotemporal (i.e., they 
> have not shown up as actual in spacetime). She calls these "incipient 
> transactions.”


This looks like Popper's propensity. It leads to a dualism (and indeed, he 
wrote with Clles a book defending dualism in philosophy of mind).
It is conceptually more simple to consider an actuality as a possible seen from 
inside. Now, here, today are already indixicals,making sense.
That fits with the overall “everything is simpler than any thing” philosophy of 
this list, and is made obligatory with mechanism, except for adding ad hoc 
complexity or conspiracy à la Bostrom. It is definitely incompatible with 
Mechanism + very weak version of Occam Razor.

Bruno




> 
> ...
> 
> https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/kastner/ 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:41 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 10:01 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> >> Yes, and Superdeterminism is swiftly discarded for a very good reason. 
>>> Occam's razor says the best physics theory that explains the facts is the 
>>> one that's simplest, but that doesn't just mean the one that has the 
>>> simplest laws but also has the simplest initial conditions. The initial 
>>> conditions needed for Superdeterminism to work are as far from being simple 
>>> as it is possible to get; out of the infinite number of ways the universe 
>>> could have started out in only one of them is set up in exactly the right 
>>> way such that things are really deterministic but fool us into thinking 
>>> they are not even after 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution. Theosts 
>>> answer the question "why does the universe exist?" by saying "because God 
>>> created it", and I have a problem with that because it immediately suggests 
>>> another obvious question that they have no answer for, "why does God 
>>> exist?". I have pretty much the same problem with Superdeterminism; why did 
>>> the universe start out in the only initial condition in which even after 
>>> churning for 13.8 billion years it is still able to make fools of us? 
>>> Superdeterministic theory is about as useful for increasing our 
>>> understanding as saying things are the way they are now because things are 
>>> the way they are now.
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> *Statistical non-independence is less restrictive than statistical  
>> independence *
>>
>
> What are you talking about? If at the Big Bang the position or momentum of 
> just one Quark or Gluon or Electron or Photon was out of place by even a 
> infinitesimally small amount then today after 13.8 billion years of cosmic 
> evolution the universe would be unable to fool us over and over and over 
> again into thinking things were non-deterministic or non-local or 
> non-realistic when in actuality that was not the case. That is as 
> restrictive as a universe can be! Why is the universe putting such an 
> immense effort into fooling us, what's the point of this *HUGE* cosmic 
> conspiracy?
>
>  John K Clark
>


As Hossenfelder commented on her paper

Rethinking Superdeterminism
S. Hossenfelder, T.N. Palmer
arXiv:1912.06462 [quant-ph]

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-path-we-didnt-take.html :

"Ken Wharton and Nathan Argaman (see reference [ 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.04313 ] in our paper) don't assume that a 
superdeterministic theory is deterministic."


@philipthrift

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 6:56:04 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jun 6, 2020 at 6:25 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>  > *Superdeterminism is typically discarded swiftly in any discussion of 
>> quantum foundations.*
>
>
> Yes, and Superdeterminism is swiftly discarded for a very good reason. 
> Occam's razor says the best physics theory that explains the facts is the 
> one that's simplest, but that doesn't just mean the one that has the 
> simplest laws but also has the simplest initial conditions. The initial 
> conditions needed for Superdeterminism to work are as far from being simple 
> as it is possible to get; out of the infinite number of ways the universe 
> could have started out in only one of them is set up in exactly the right 
> way such that things are really deterministic but fool us into thinking 
> they are not even after 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution.
>
> Theosts answer the question "why does the universe exist?" by saying 
> "because God created it", and I have a problem with that because it 
> immediately suggests another obvious question that they have no answer for
> , "why does God exist?". I have pretty much the same problem with 
> Superdeterminism; why did the universe start out in the only initial 
> condition in which even after churning for 13.8 billion years it is still 
> able to make fools of us? Superdeterministic theory is about as useful 
> for increasing our understanding as saying things are the way they are now 
> because things are the way they are now.
>
> John K Clark
>

As I see it and explain above, superdeterminism is just a way of 
formulating nonlocal hidden variables, This means they have no causal or 
signalling properties that can be measured. This means if one takes a 
purely epistemic view of QM there is really nothing here that physically 
exists. 

LC 

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 10:01 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>> Yes, and Superdeterminism is swiftly discarded for a very good reason.
>> Occam's razor says the best physics theory that explains the facts is the
>> one that's simplest, but that doesn't just mean the one that has the
>> simplest laws but also has the simplest initial conditions. The initial
>> conditions needed for Superdeterminism to work are as far from being simple
>> as it is possible to get; out of the infinite number of ways the universe
>> could have started out in only one of them is set up in exactly the right
>> way such that things are really deterministic but fool us into thinking
>> they are not even after 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution. Theosts
>> answer the question "why does the universe exist?" by saying "because God
>> created it", and I have a problem with that because it immediately suggests
>> another obvious question that they have no answer for, "why does God
>> exist?". I have pretty much the same problem with Superdeterminism; why did
>> the universe start out in the only initial condition in which even after
>> churning for 13.8 billion years it is still able to make fools of us?
>> Superdeterministic theory is about as useful for increasing our
>> understanding as saying things are the way they are now because things are
>> the way they are now.
>> John K Clark
>>
>
> >
> *Statistical non-independence is less restrictive than statistical
> independence *
>

What are you talking about? If at the Big Bang the position or momentum of
just one Quark or Gluon or Electron or Photon was out of place by even a
infinitesimally small amount then today after 13.8 billion years of cosmic
evolution the universe would be unable to fool us over and over and over
again into thinking things were non-deterministic or non-local or
non-realistic when in actuality that was not the case. That is as
restrictive as a universe can be! Why is the universe putting such an
immense effort into fooling us, what's the point of this *HUGE* cosmic
conspiracy?

 John K Clark

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 6:56:04 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jun 6, 2020 at 6:25 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>  > *Superdeterminism is typically discarded swiftly in any discussion of 
>> quantum foundations.*
>
>
> Yes, and Superdeterminism is swiftly discarded for a very good reason. 
> Occam's razor says the best physics theory that explains the facts is the 
> one that's simplest, but that doesn't just mean the one that has the 
> simplest laws but also has the simplest initial conditions. The initial 
> conditions needed for Superdeterminism to work are as far from being simple 
> as it is possible to get; out of the infinite number of ways the universe 
> could have started out in only one of them is set up in exactly the right 
> way such that things are really deterministic but fool us into thinking 
> they are not even after 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution.
>
> Theosts answer the question "why does the universe exist?" by saying 
> "because God created it", and I have a problem with that because it 
> immediately suggests another obvious question that they have no answer for
> , "why does God exist?". I have pretty much the same problem with 
> Superdeterminism; why did the universe start out in the only initial 
> condition in which even after churning for 13.8 billion years it is still 
> able to make fools of us? Superdeterministic theory is about as useful 
> for increasing our understanding as saying things are the way they are now 
> because things are the way they are now.
>
> John K Clark
>


Statistical non-independence is less restrictive than statistical  
independence 

   - or better -

Stochastic non-independence is less restrictive than stochastic independence

and is simpler

as argued in Huw Price's book* Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point.*

@philipthrift

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jun 6, 2020 at 6:25 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

 > *Superdeterminism is typically discarded swiftly in any discussion of
> quantum foundations.*


Yes, and Superdeterminism is swiftly discarded for a very good reason.
Occam's razor says the best physics theory that explains the facts is the
one that's simplest, but that doesn't just mean the one that has the
simplest laws but also has the simplest initial conditions. The initial
conditions needed for Superdeterminism to work are as far from being simple
as it is possible to get; out of the infinite number of ways the universe
could have started out in only one of them is set up in exactly the right
way such that things are really deterministic but fool us into thinking
they are not even after 13.8 billion years of cosmic evolution.

Theosts answer the question "why does the universe exist?" by saying
"because God created it", and I have a problem with that because it
immediately suggests another obvious question that they have no answer for,
"why does God exist?". I have pretty much the same problem with
Superdeterminism; why did the universe start out in the only initial
condition in which even after churning for 13.8 billion years it is still
able to make fools of us? Superdeterministic theory is about as useful for
increasing our understanding as saying things are the way they are now
because things are the way they are now.

John K Clark

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 5:25:23 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> As for Hossenfelder's fav quantum mechanics semantics, she has stated many 
> times on her blog, it's superdeterminism.
>
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462
>
>
> "A superdeterministic theory is one which violates the assumption of 
> Statistical Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are 
> independent of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical 
> Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science (never 
> mind physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is typically discarded 
> swiftly in any discussion of quantum foundations. The purpose of this paper 
> is to explain why the existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on 
> experience with classical physics and linear systems, but that this 
> experience misleads us. Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only 
> to solve the measurement problem, but also to understand the apparent 
> nonlocality of quantum physics. Most importantly, we will discuss how it 
> may be possible to test this hypothesis in an (almost) model independent 
> way."
>
> @philipthrift
>

Superdeterminism is just a form of hidden variable theory. This invariant 
set theory of Palmer and Hossenfelder as a means of connecting nonlinearity 
with QM is interesting. The approach with Cantor sets connects with 
incomputability. I prefer a more standard definition of incomputability 
than what P&H appeal to. This works invariant set theory does imply a 
violation of statistical independence, but it does so as a hidden variable.

The complement of a fractal set is undecidable. A fractal set is 
recursively enumerable, which means we can compute it in a finite automata 
up to some point, and “in principle” a Turing machine that runs eternally 
could compute the whole thing. The complement of this is not computable. 
The complement of a recursive set is recursive, but the complement of a 
recursively enumerable set is not recursively enumerable and is 
incomputable. The invariant set in this superdeterminism is a form of 
Cantor set or related to a fractal. The results of Matiyasevich  showed 
that p-adic sets have no global solution method, where p-adic sets are 
equivalent to Diophantine equations. This means that dynamical maps from 
one point to another on the Cantor set are not given by the same quotient 
group and in general there is no single decidable system for such maps. In 
effect this means it is not observable.

So, while superdeterminism violates statistical independence this is all a 
nonlocal hidden variable and thus unobservable. In ways this is where I 
depart from Hossenfelder and Palmer, where Palmer uses a different concept 
of incomputability, based on the idea of Smale et al on the need to compute 
a fractal an infinite amount. I appeal to the complement of a fractal, a 
fractal being a recursively enumerable set and computable in a standard 
sense, but where the complement is not computable. The fractal emerges from 
QM in a singular perturbation series and the complement comes with the dual 
of a convex set with measure L^p is L^q with 1/p + 1/q = 1. 

LC

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 5:16:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> But collapsing or not remains relevant, to make sense of the behaviour of 
> single particle, or more generally to get some meaning of the relative 
> probabilities, experimentally, or in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>

 

There are so many "mechanisms" so many people have come up with over many 
decades now to "interpret" these "relative probabilities" that have been 
experimentally recored.

Sean Carroll has his "many worlds"

or (another "possibility"):

The offer wave going out in all directions and the many confirmation waves 
returning are a sort of subset of the infinite number of virtual photons 
traveling all possible paths between emitters and absorbers in Feynman's 
"sum-over-paths" path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics. Kastner 
proposes to regard the outgoing offer wave and many incoming confirmation 
waves as "possible 
" 
transactions, only one of which indeterministically 
 becomes 
"actual."

Kastner is a possibilist 
 who 
argues that OWs and CWs are possibilities that are "real." She says that 
they are less real than actual empirically measurable events, but more real 
than an idea or concept in a person's mind. She suggests the alternate term 
"potentia," Aristotle's that she found Heisenberg had cited. For Kastner, 
the possibilities are physically real as compared to merely conceptually 
possible ideas that are consistent with physical law (for example, David 
Lewis ' 
"possible worlds." But she says the "possibilities" described by offer and 
confirmation waves are "sub-empirical" and pre-spatiotemporal (i.e., they 
have not shown up as *actual* in spacetime). She calls these "incipient 
transactions."

...

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/kastner/ 


@philipthrift

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2020, at 04:58, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/6/2020 7:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 11:29:02 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/6/2020 5:13 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
 
   
 https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1 
 
 
 
 https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112 
 
 
 Jim Baggott Retweeted
 Philip Ball @philipcball
 ·
 "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
 interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." 
 I have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim 
 has more success.
 
 Quote Tweet
 
 Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
  
 No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
 wavefunction. 
>>> 
>>> Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a {up, down} 
>>> measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state, if the wave does 
>>> not collapse. 
>>> Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that case there 
>>> is no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to be explained by 
>>> 2+2=4 & Co.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash University) 
>>> in the discussion thread:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
>>> irrelevant.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.
>> 
>> Baggott and also Hosenfelder seem to be endorsing an epistemic 
>> interpretation like QBism, but they don't directly discuss the problems with 
>> it.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> Can you list some of these problems? AG 
> 
> It makes the wave-function a description of personal knowledge of the system 
> according to the PBR theorem https://arxiv.org/abs/.3328 
> 

Making things epistemic is the right move (provably so with mechanism), but it 
does not change the “many”, except that it go from many universes (which might 
be rather heavy to conceive) to many subjective experiences, which is already 
the case in arithmetic, and is rather natural among thinking beings.

The problem is that those who make the wave physically unreal”, is that they 
continue to think in terms of "real particles”, but that is logically 
incompatible with Mechanism. They go in the right direction but not far enough 
with respect to the mechanist constrains.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 Jun 2020, at 14:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
>> 
>>   
>> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112 
>> 
>> 
>> Jim Baggott Retweeted
>> Philip Ball @philipcball
>> ·
>> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
>> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
>> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
>> more success.
>> 
>> Quote Tweet
>> 
>> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>>  
>> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
>> wavefunction. 
> 
> Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a {up, down} 
> measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state, if the wave does not 
> collapse. 
> Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that case there is 
> no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to be explained by 2+2=4 & 
> Co.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash University) in 
> the discussion thread:
> 
> 
> The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
> irrelevant.

Physical ”thing” is an oxymoron, when we take Mechanism seriously. 

But collapsing or not remains relevant, to make sense of the behaviour of 
single particle, or more generally to get some meaning of the relative 
probabilities, experimentally, or in arithmetic.

Bruno



> 
> 
> At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.
> 
> @hilipthrift
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 9:48:45 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 11:29:02 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/6/2020 5:13 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
>>>
>>>   
>>> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1
>>>
>>>
>>> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112 
>>> 
>>>
>>> Jim Baggott Retweeted
>>> Philip Ball @philipcball
>>> ·
>>> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
>>> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
>>> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
>>> more success.
>>>
>>> Quote Tweet
>>>
>>> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>>>  
>>> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
>>> wavefunction. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a {up, 
>>> down} measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state, if the wave 
>>> does not collapse. 
>>> Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that case 
>>> there is no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to be explained 
>>> by 2+2=4 & Co.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash 
>> University) in the discussion thread:
>>
>>
>> The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
>> irrelevant.
>>
>>
>> At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.
>>
>>
>> Baggott and also Hosenfelder seem to be endorsing an epistemic 
>> interpretation like QBism, but they don't directly discuss the problems 
>> with it.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Can you list some of these problems? AG 
>



As I pointed out, this is not the view Hossenfelder endorses at all, and I 
never saw Baggott endorse it.

He does like this quote though:

Thirty-one years ago, Dick Feynman told me about his 'sum over histories' 
version of quantum mechanics. "The electron does anything it likes," he 
said. "It just goes in any direction at any speed, forward or backward in 
time, however it likes, and then you add up the amplitudes and it gives you 
the wavefunction." I said to him, "You're crazy." But he isn't. 
*Freeman Dyson (1980)*


@philipthrift
 

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/6/2020 7:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 11:29:02 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 6/6/2020 5:13 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift 
wrote:


ref (article by Jim Baggott):


https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1




https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112



Jim Baggott Retweeted
Philip Ball @philipcball
·
"The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the
Copenhagen interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t
interpreted realistically." I have been trying to get this
point across for ages; I really hope Jim has more success.

Quote Tweet

Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the
collapse of the wavefunction.


Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with
a {up, down} measuring device, I am myself in a superposition
state, if the wave does not collapse.
Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In
that case there is no collapse, but also no waves needed, as
it has to be explained by 2+2=4 & Co.

Bruno




The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash
University) in the discussion thread:


The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it
collapses is irrelevant.


At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.


Baggott and also Hosenfelder seem to be endorsing an epistemic
interpretation like QBism, but they don't directly discuss the
problems with it.

Brent


Can you list some of these problems? AG


It makes the wave-function a description of personal knowledge of the 
system according to the PBR theorem https://arxiv.org/abs/.3328


Brent

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Alan Grayson]

On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 11:29:02 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/6/2020 5:13 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>> On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
>>
>>   
>> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1
>>
>>
>> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112 
>> 
>>
>> Jim Baggott Retweeted
>> Philip Ball @philipcball
>> ·
>> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
>> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
>> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
>> more success.
>>
>> Quote Tweet
>>
>> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>>  
>> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
>> wavefunction. 
>>
>>
>> Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a {up, down} 
>> measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state, if the wave does 
>> not collapse. 
>> Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that case 
>> there is no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to be explained 
>> by 2+2=4 & Co.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash University) 
> in the discussion thread:
>
>
> The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
> irrelevant.
>
>
> At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.
>
>
> Baggott and also Hosenfelder seem to be endorsing an epistemic 
> interpretation like QBism, but they don't directly discuss the problems 
> with it.
>
> Brent
>

Can you list some of these problems? AG 

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

As for Hossenfelder's fav quantum mechanics semantics, she has stated many 
times on her blog, it's superdeterminism.


https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.06462


"A superdeterministic theory is one which violates the assumption of 
Statistical Independence (that distributions of hidden variables are 
independent of measurement settings). Intuition suggests that Statistical 
Independence is an essential ingredient of any theory of science (never mind 
physics), and for this reason Superdeterminism is typically discarded swiftly 
in any discussion of quantum foundations. The purpose of this paper is to 
explain why the existing objections to Superdeterminism are based on experience 
with classical physics and linear systems, but that this experience misleads 
us. Superdeterminism is a promising approach not only to solve the measurement 
problem, but also to understand the apparent nonlocality of quantum physics. 
Most importantly, we will discuss how it may be possible to test this 
hypothesis in an (almost) model independent way."

@philipthrift 

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

['scerir' via Everything List]

Il 6 giugno 2020 alle 14.13 Philip Thrift  ha scritto:


The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash University) in 
the discussion thread:

The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
irrelevant.

At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.
@hilipthrift

--

I personally like to regard a probability wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, 
as a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for mathematical calculations … 
Quite generally, how could we rely on probability predictions if by this notion 
we do not refer to something real and objective? [It is not me, it is Max Born]



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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/6/2020 5:13 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift > wrote:


ref (article by Jim Baggott):

https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1



https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112



Jim Baggott Retweeted
Philip Ball @philipcball
·
"The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the
Copenhagen interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t
interpreted realistically." I have been trying to get this point
across for ages; I really hope Jim has more success.

Quote Tweet

Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of
the wavefunction.


Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a
{up, down} measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state,
if the wave does not collapse.
Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that
case there is no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to
be explained by 2+2=4 & Co.

Bruno




The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash 
University) in the discussion thread:



The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
irrelevant.



At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.


Baggott and also Hosenfelder seem to be endorsing an epistemic 
interpretation like QBism, but they don't directly discuss the problems 
with it.


Brent

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Lawrence Crowell]

In some ways this is a no-brainer. The Copenhagen interpretation 
is ψ-epistemic which means there is fundamentally no wave function. The 
occurrence of eigenstates or their eigenvalues under certain operators in a 
measurement is then something that really has no collapse because the wave 
function has no existential content.

LC

On Friday, June 5, 2020 at 4:36:43 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
>
>   
> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1
>
>
> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112
>
> Jim Baggott Retweeted
> Philip Ball @philipcball
> ·
> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
> more success.
>
> Quote Tweet
>
> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>  
> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
> wavefunction. 
>
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[John Clark]

On Sat, Jun 6, 2020 at 8:13 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> *The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is
> irrelevant.*


If the wavefunction is not a physical thing then it's just a useful
calculating device. OK fine, but there are times, such as when an
observation is made, when this calculating device stops producing useful
data. Why? Call it collapse or call it anything you want, how do we know
when we should stop paying attention to the calculating device called a
"wavefunction"? And most important of all, what exactly is a "measurement"?

John K Clark

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Alan Grayson]

On Friday, June 5, 2020 at 3:36:43 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
>
>   
> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1
>
>
> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112
>
> Jim Baggott Retweeted
> Philip Ball @philipcball
> ·
> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
> more success.
>
> Quote Tweet
>
> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>  
> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
> wavefunction. 
>
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
The WF transitions from a superposition of states, to an eigenstate of the 
eigenvalue measured. So it does seem to collapse whether it's "real" or 
not. AG

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, June 6, 2020 at 6:10:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
>
>   
> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1
>
>
> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112 
> 
>
> Jim Baggott Retweeted
> Philip Ball @philipcball
> ·
> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
> more success.
>
> Quote Tweet
>
> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>  
> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
> wavefunction. 
>
>
> Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a {up, down} 
> measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state, if the wave does 
> not collapse. 
> Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that case there 
> is no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to be explained by 
> 2+2=4 & Co.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> The best comment by a physicists (Associate Professor, Monash University) 
in the discussion thread:


The wavefunction is not a physical thing - so whether it collapses is 
irrelevant.


At least one physicist not  brainwashed into the current religion.

@hilipthrift

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Re: The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Jun 2020, at 23:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> ref (article by Jim Baggott): 
> 
>   
> https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1
> 
> 
> https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112 
> 
> 
> Jim Baggott Retweeted
> Philip Ball @philipcball
> ·
> "The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
> interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
> have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
> more success.
> 
> Quote Tweet
> 
> Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
>  
> No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
> wavefunction. 

Then, if I look at a spin in the 1/sqrt(2) (up + down), with a {up, down} 
measuring device, I am myself in a superposition state, if the wave does not 
collapse. 
Non collapse entails many world, or better many dreams. In that case there is 
no collapse, but also no waves needed, as it has to be explained by 2+2=4 & Co.

Bruno




> 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> -- 
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>  
> .

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The semantics of quantum mechanics, Copenhagen style

[Philip Thrift]

ref (article by Jim Baggott): 

  
https://medium.com/@MassimoPigliucci/the-copenhagen-confusion-611f31cc27e1


https://twitter.com/philipcball/status/1268950876405850112

Jim Baggott Retweeted
Philip Ball @philipcball
·
"The “collapse of the wavefunction” was never part of the Copenhagen 
interpretation because the wavefunction isn’t interpreted realistically." I 
have been trying to get this point across for ages; I really hope Jim has 
more success.

Quote Tweet

Jim Baggott @JimBaggott
 
No, the Copenhagen interpretation does not entail the collapse of the 
wavefunction. 



@philipthrift

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