subject:"\[FRIAM\] death"

Heh, as long as you identify the particulars of the use case, then "both-and" 
is intuitive and correct.  But when someone makes an ambiguous statement with 
no particulars and makes no serious attempt to describe the context in which 
their statement is supposed to be understood, then it's definitely NOT 
"both-and".  Without the particulars, it becomes nonsense and one can only 
answer "Mu".

On 11/02/2017 11:47 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Another thing that helps me with Friam disagreements is to think in terms of 
> "both-and" rather than "either-or".  In Fiddler on the Roof, Tevya says to A, 
> "you're right".  B objects and Tevya says again, "You're right".  C says that 
> they can't both be right and Tevya says, "You're also right".

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Another thing that helps me with Friam disagreements is to think in terms
of "both-and" rather than "either-or".  In Fiddler on the Roof, Tevya says
to A, "you're right".  B objects and Tevya says again, "You're right".  C
says that they can't both be right and Tevya says, "You're also right".

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:31 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣"  wrote:

> Awesome!  I appreciate the link, though reading my DSM V entry on BPD
> muddies my water. 8^)  From your words and those of the link (Mahari), I
> can't help but think about patterns of sensory stimuli, as opposed to
> "objects", per se.  While I completely reject the imputing of object-hood
> onto the repeating patterns, I do *not* reject the idea that those who have
> trouble inducing patterns from their experiences would have trouble
> developing appropriate to their environment.
>
> In other words, I would reword what you say to something like "... when
> the familiar patterns of stimulus are not present."  I think it's useful to
> reword it that way because it would allow similar reactions to, e.g. a
> loved one's traumatic brain injury, where their personality changes in a
> fundamental way.  Although not that similar, I'm reminded of Shannon
> Allen's testimony in the Bowe Bergdahl trial:
>
> > "Instead of being his wife, I‘m his caregiver," Reuters reported she
> testified. "Which doesn’t mean I love him any less, but it’s a very
> different dynamic. We can’t even hold hands anymore without me prying open
> his hand and putting mine in."
>
> If we could abandon or soften this silly atomicity fiction, we might get a
> better handle on subtle dynamics like that.
>
> On 11/02/2017 11:16 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > Hmm.  In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces"
> when the object of their attachment isn't present.  This often causes that
> "object" to flee.  Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which
> sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.
> >
> > Frank
> >
> > Frank Wimberly
> > Phone (505) 670-9918
> >
> > On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly" > wrote:
> >
> > Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to
> be symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are
> experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
> >
> > Here is a link:
> >
> > http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/
> lack-of-object.html  typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html>
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Awesome!  I appreciate the link, though reading my DSM V entry on BPD muddies 
my water. 8^)  From your words and those of the link (Mahari), I can't help but 
think about patterns of sensory stimuli, as opposed to "objects", per se.  
While I completely reject the imputing of object-hood onto the repeating 
patterns, I do *not* reject the idea that those who have trouble inducing 
patterns from their experiences would have trouble developing appropriate to 
their environment.

In other words, I would reword what you say to something like "... when the 
familiar patterns of stimulus are not present."  I think it's useful to reword 
it that way because it would allow similar reactions to, e.g. a loved one's 
traumatic brain injury, where their personality changes in a fundamental way.  
Although not that similar, I'm reminded of Shannon Allen's testimony in the 
Bowe Bergdahl trial: 

> "Instead of being his wife, I‘m his caregiver," Reuters reported she 
> testified. "Which doesn’t mean I love him any less, but it’s a very different 
> dynamic. We can’t even hold hands anymore without me prying open his hand and 
> putting mine in."

If we could abandon or soften this silly atomicity fiction, we might get a 
better handle on subtle dynamics like that.

On 11/02/2017 11:16 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Hmm.  In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces" when 
> the object of their attachment isn't present.  This often causes that 
> "object" to flee.  Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which 
> sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.
> 
> Frank
> 
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
> 
> On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly"  > wrote:
> 
> Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be 
> symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are 
> experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
> 
> Here is a link:
> 
> 
> http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html
>  
> 

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Hmm.  In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces"
when the object of their attachment isn't present.  This often causes that
"object" to flee.  Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which
sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly"  wrote:

> Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be
> symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are
> experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
>
> Here is a link:
>
> http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/
> lack-of-object.html
>
> I believe this is psychoanalytic orthodoxy.
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Nov 2, 2017 12:01 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣"  wrote:
>
>> I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea.  But it should be clear
>> that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point
>> out.  So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem.  Witness:
>>
>> "Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes
>> the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate
>> identity and is truly a separate individual."
>>
>> In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion.
>> Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the
>> *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development?  If you
>> know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it?  Or, better yet,
>> explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more
>> useful. 8^)
>>
>> On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> > You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object
>> constancy.
>> >
>> > See
>> > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
>> >
>> > Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms
>> of object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic
>> speaking.  The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes
>> a sound is an example.
>>
>> --
>> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>>
>> 
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be
symptomatic.  If you don't believe something exists unless you are
experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.

Here is a link:

http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html

I believe this is psychoanalytic orthodoxy.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:01 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣"  wrote:

> I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea.  But it should be clear
> that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point
> out.  So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem.  Witness:
>
> "Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes
> the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate
> identity and is truly a separate individual."
>
> In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion.
> Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the
> *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development?  If you
> know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it?  Or, better yet,
> explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more
> useful. 8^)
>
> On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object
> constancy.
> >
> > See
> > https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
> >
> > Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms
> of object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic
> speaking.  The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes
> a sound is an example.
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

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Re: [FRIAM] death

I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea.  But it should be clear that 
the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point out.  
So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem.  Witness:

"Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes the 
phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate identity and is 
truly a separate individual."

In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion.  Perhaps 
there's other literature that talks specifically about how the *fiction* of 
object constancy affects/retards future development?  If you know of that 
literature, perhaps you could point to it?  Or, better yet, explain it in your 
own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more useful. 8^)

On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object 
> constancy.
> 
> See
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
> 
> Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of 
> object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking.  
> The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is an 
> example.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Right.  Of course.  But it's very telling that you put the word *purpose* last. 
 It is that purpose that sets the entire context, including the appropriateness 
of any definition in the lexicon used while engaged in the project.  You seem 
to have ignored my point about use cases and how they set the tolerances on 
discretization error.

On 11/02/2017 10:21 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks 
> which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of my 
> sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put them) and 
> that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and load them on 
> my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will use them in the 
> same mode as I did last year, only in a different location.  This all depends 
> on a strong illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and 
> woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to 
> the time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future 
> when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched on top 
> of those very same blocks again.   Of course, I may change plans mid-course 
> if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or promising qualities 
> for the purpose..

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] death

You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object
constancy.

See
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler

Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of
object constancy.  And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking.
The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is
an example.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 11:21 AM, "Steven A Smith"  wrote:

Glen ☣ -

This is a very *sophist*icated argument YOU make.  *I* can't tell, however
if *YOU* believe it, at least right this instant... perhaps *YOU* believed
it when you wrote it, but does that belief persist from the former now to
the current now?

Smart-asserry aside... Trying to take your point for what it is intended
(or useful for?)...   I believe that "atomicity" and "identity" in both
space and time are simultaneously deep illusions and highly utilitarian, at
least in the service of the is "illusory self" that appears to have memory,
intention, and will to action.   With that in mind:

I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks
which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of
my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put
them) and that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and
load them on my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will
use them in the same mode as I did last year, only in a different
location.  This all depends on a strong illusion of my "self", on the
objectness of said blocks and woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity
of "self" roughly ranging back to the time when I dismantled to the present
as I plan and scheme to the future when, in fact, I am pretty confident I
will find the woodstove perched on top of those very same blocks again.
Of course, I may change plans mid-course if I find another set of blocks
with more appropriate or promising qualities for the purpose..
- Stove

On 11/2/17 10:26 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's
preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature
registration.  Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a
lot of our problems.  We could just as easily call it a discretization
artifact.  Here, the "continuous fluid self" shines the light on the
fact that discretization problems arise in both time and space.
Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from
10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your
self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're
willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be
part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed
set of use cases to engineer toward.  But most conversations where
"self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't
particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're
well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self"
under one usage pattern is magically translated into another usage
pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.
If you want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so
be it.  But the metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there
is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".
If it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my
*instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness,
enlightenment, etc.  all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in
the instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion
of  a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by
the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of
Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits from.  Perhaps Brian
Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this?  It has
been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin
of Objects"?  Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory
temporally extended self?




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Re: [FRIAM] death

On 10/30/2017 08:34 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> Do humans become more specialized with age?  I propose that we go through 
> cycles of specialization/generalization.  Babies are optimized for two 
> things, ingesting and metabolizing nourishment (eliminating waste is a 
> sub-process this) and triggering adults to provide nourishment and protection 
> from predators and the elements.   As vertebrates go, we spend a LONG time in 
> this specialization (until weaned and diaper trained?).

Although this may sound like hair-splitting, I don't think it is.  I don't 
think babies are AT ALL specialized to ingesting, metabolism, and manipulation 
of their adults.  I think babies are maximally generalized.  They're not good 
at *any* particular thing.  Their feces isn't well processed.  They don't 
easily focus on things (faces being a well documented exception).  They can't 
really grasp things well.  Etc.  So, if they're specialized at anything, I'd 
say they're only specialists at specializing.  Why spend so long in that 
specializing phase?  (And why do we have babies that are so generalized and 
vulnerable?) Because the specialties they must learn are HARD to learn.

The semi-universality of the constructors that are humans is very difficult to 
wander into and navigate once almost-there.  When a kid finally *does* learn to 
do some particular thing, they milk it for all it's worth!  When you finally 
learn to manipulate your mom into feeding you, you'll do it as often as you can 
... because it feels good.  It doesn't just feel good to eat.  It also feels 
good to exercise your new specialty.

> As babies become ambulatory and then learn language, they become generalists. 
>   At some point in their growth into adults, they may at least dabble at 
> specialization... picking a sport or a topic of study to excel at.

Everything you say below the above (snipped) was way too focused on the 
(illusory) *mind* and *thought*.  Yes, you mention lots of specialties that 
involve motor skills and subsumption of conscious to unconscious tasks.  But 
you're talking/writing as if the mind controls the body, which is clearly not 
the case.  So my argument above, that babies are more general than toddlers are 
more general than teens are more general than adults allows a body-centric 
conception of specialization.  That mind-centric stuff is nonsense.

But that doesn't mean your main objection isn't valid.  Yes, we can, to greater 
or lesser extent, re-generalize, re-specialize, etc.  That's the essence of the 
claim that humans are the most universal of the animals as constructors.  Some 
ways this can happen are psychedelic drugs, meditation, new exercise regimens, 
as well as the typical (traumatic) events like divorce, losing a job, moving to 
a foreign land, significant illness, etc.

However, my claim would be that the universality is weakened as we age, not 
that we can't (somewhat) re-generalize at any point in our path to death, only 
that the extent to which we re-generalize lessens.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] death

2017-11-02 Thread Steven A Smith


Glen ☣ -

This is a very /sophist/icated argument YOU make.  *I* can't tell, 
however if *YOU* believe it, at least right this instant... perhaps 
*YOU* believed it when you wrote it, but does that belief persist from 
the former now to the current now?


Smart-asserry aside... Trying to take your point for what it is intended 
(or useful for?)...   I believe that "atomicity" and "identity" in both 
space and time are simultaneously deep illusions and highly utilitarian, 
at least in the service of the is "illusory self" that appears to have 
memory, intention, and will to action.   With that in mind:


I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete 
blocks which I remember to have put there when I took the large 
woodstove out of my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever 
I actually put them) and that when I find them and brush off any 
accumulated detritus and load them on my garden cart, I can haul them 
back to my house where I will use them in the same mode as I did last 
year, only in a different location. This all depends on a strong 
illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and woodstove 
and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to the 
time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future 
when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched 
on top of those very same blocks again.   Of course, I may change plans 
mid-course if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or 
promising qualities for the purpose..


- Stove

On 11/2/17 10:26 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's preemptive registration, more 
insidious, I think, than premature registration.  Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart 
of a lot of our problems.  We could just as easily call it a discretization artifact.  Here, the 
"continuous fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise 
in both time and space.  Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from 10 
generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your self, then you've got to 
discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're willing to allow some anonymous African or 
Alpha Centaurian to also be part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use cases to engineer 
toward.  But most conversations where "self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use 
cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at 
all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically 
translated into another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.  If you 
want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it.  But the 
metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If it isn't *real* it 
certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak 
awareness, enlightenment, etc.  all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but 
nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of  a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   
In fact, by the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe 
Selfness inherits from.  Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this?  It has 
been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"?  Or maybe it is 
just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Re: [FRIAM] death

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's 
preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature registration.  
Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a lot of our problems.  We 
could just as easily call it a discretization artifact.  Here, the "continuous 
fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise in 
both time and space.  Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your 
ancestors from 10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of 
your self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're 
willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be part of 
your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use 
cases to engineer toward.  But most conversations where "self" is bandied about 
willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more 
like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend 
to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically translated into 
another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.  If you 
want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it.  But the 
metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.

On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If it 
> isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous 
> self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness, enlightenment, etc.  
> all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but 
> nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of  a continuous fluid self 
> that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by the some measure, it would seem 
> that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits 
> from.  Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of 
> this?  It has been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of 
> "Origin of Objects"?  Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory 
> temporally extended self?

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Glen writes:

"The trick is, as you point out, we don't need so many from the same gene 
pool(s)!  Again, perhaps my Bastard status biases me.  The (socialist?) idea 
that we all end up rearing the kids the breeders produce was built in from the 
start.  What we need are large incentives to steer the coming generations 
according to policy.  If we want more STEM, then encourage more STEM couples to 
have more babies."

I think the computers and/or neural links will have the STEM thing covered.  
Need something more like tabu search to explore the space of weird cyborg 
tricks -- less of anything that has been seen before.

Marcus

From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of gⅼеɳ ☣ 
<geprope...@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 1:55:35 PM
To: FriAM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] death

On 10/30/2017 12:01 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Odd that some conservatives give embedded worth to lives that have 
> demonstrated none yet (pro-lifers), and change the rules as life progresses.  
>  Why the act of faith in the first place?  Why no conservatives advocating 
> one-child-per-family, or income requirements for reproduction?

Our universality depends fundamentally on babies.  In order for progress to be 
made, the old farts, with all their outdated ideas, must die so the young turds 
can do things their way.  Sure, we want to keep the old farts around and 
exploit them as best we can.  But at some point, those fossilized thoughts need 
to be forgotten.  We need those babies.  Pro-lifers never seem to be reflective 
enough to make this sort of argument against abortion.  They're so strangled by 
 their individualism.

The trick is, as you point out, we don't need so many from the same gene 
pool(s)!  Again, perhaps my Bastard status biases me.  The (socialist?) idea 
that we all end up rearing the kids the breeders produce was built in from the 
start.  What we need are large incentives to steer the coming generations 
according to policy.  If we want more STEM, then encourage more STEM couples to 
have more babies.  Never mind the income requirements, split things like the 
SAT (or IQ) tests into variously weighted incentive programs.  If you (and your 
mate) score in the top quartile in analogical thinking, you get 7 baby 
vouchers.  Good math scores gets you 5 vouchers.  Good language scores get you 
3. 8^)  And vouchers are non-transferable and temporally limited.  If you have 
more than 7 babies, then you're on your own for the remainder.

Of course, it has to be incentive based, or we'll retread some of our past 
mistakes.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Steve writes:


< Of course, the confines of a career in (big) academia
or government or industry can provide a narrowing, as can the
conveniences of modern (professional) living where one needn't repair
their own vehicles (flat tire? call AAA! oil change light?  Stop at
Jiffy Lube!) or grow their own food (that is what supermarkets are for)
or cook (prepared packaged meals, microwaves, fast-food and other
restaurants!) or build/repair/maintain their home (there are service
industries galore as well as handymen to do that for us), etc.   But
even if during the power-band of our professional careers, we give up
all extraneous activities/skills, we might return to (discover) them in
retirement, either as "hobbies" or out of financial opportunity (I can
retire early if I quit eating out, paying others to do my
maintenance/repair, etc.)  >


There's another intermediate phase that can occur, namely tenure.

Not everyone that gets that opportunity recognizes they can ease-off on the 
narrowing.

Instead some (many?) prefer to keep their focus but at a slower metabolism, 
ending at retirement at a metabolism near zero.  I don't see the appeal of that 
approach, myself.  It seems tragic, almost.


Marcus


From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> on behalf of Steven A Smith 
<sasm...@swcp.com>
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 9:34:57 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] death

I'm wondering if pupating isn't more relevant to the topic than moulting?

As for molting, I was surprised to learn that lobsters (and other
decapods?) appear to avoid/eschew cellular senescence...  and their
apparent increase in sexual reproductivity with age...   death seems to
come (if not from accident or predation) from literally out growing some
square-cube law that means the demands of molting exceeds their
resources?   There are also accumulated diseases/parasites that
aggravate this over time/age, but not senescense at the cellular level
as most multicellular life seems to have.

I suggest pupating to reference going from specialized to general. I
*think* of the larval stage of any insectoid as being more specialized
than the mature version (mostly good at just burrowing through
(hopefully) nutrient-dense material near where they were hatched)...
especially in some beetles which seem very generalized (compared to the
average larvae).   Other creatures (lipidoptera?) might seem to be going
to *more* specialized in some sense?

Do humans become more specialized with age?  I propose that we go
through cycles of specialization/generalization.  Babies are optimized
for two things, ingesting and metabolizing nourishment (eliminating
waste is a sub-process this) and triggering adults to provide
nourishment and protection from predators and the elements.   As
vertebrates go, we spend a LONG time in this specialization (until
weaned and diaper trained?).   As babies become ambulatory and then
learn language, they become generalists.   At some point in their growth
into adults, they may at least dabble at specialization... picking a
sport or a topic of study to excel at.   If they don't manage to arrest
their development by becoming professional athletes, soldiers, or
perennial students, adulthood returns them toward being generalists...
not just getting good at physical or intellectual excercises within the
confines of a set of rules (a sport, a game, a class, a field of study)
but in more "real world" settings as well as perhaps (also) excelling at
non-team sports, or mechanical skills or gardening or building or
cooking or... .  Of course, the confines of a career in (big) academia
or government or industry can provide a narrowing, as can the
conveniences of modern (professional) living where one needn't repair
their own vehicles (flat tire? call AAA! oil change light?  Stop at
Jiffy Lube!) or grow their own food (that is what supermarkets are for)
or cook (prepared packaged meals, microwaves, fast-food and other
restaurants!) or build/repair/maintain their home (there are service
industries galore as well as handymen to do that for us), etc.   But
even if during the power-band of our professional careers, we give up
all extraneous activities/skills, we might return to (discover) them in
retirement, either as "hobbies" or out of financial opportunity (I can
retire early if I quit eating out, paying others to do my
maintenance/repair, etc.)  In olden times, our elder years might
represent an opportunity to pass on the wisdom/skills gained in a
lifetime...  which could be very generalized (ask old Jake, he knows
more than a bit about just about everything!) , or very specialized
(Sally can put the finest edge on your blade with her files and stones
like nobody's business!).  Today, it is somewhat rare... cultural
shifts?   Or the details of life change so quickly that a lifetime of
"specialized skill development"

Re: [FRIAM] death

2017-10-30 Thread Steven A Smith





Roger writes:

“It seems that this sort of dead code, undead code, zombie code 
problem is fairly ubiquitous in information processing systems.  No 
matter whose system, there are always things around that don't go away 
because nobody cared to do anything about them.  They always need a 
clean reboot eventually, or a clean reinstall, or some kind of purge 
to clear the inevitable cruft of just running too long.”


This is the sort of thing I’d expect to see in a naïve approach to a 
spatially extended UTM.  Without some process to clean it up, like 
dreaming, there would be more and more agents coming to contradictory 
conclusions.   When a call is made to vote on a decision there would 
much wasted motion in the cancellations where the heat of many weak 
learners might overwhelm the light from a few strong learners.


Gee that sounds a bit like the d(r)eadlock of our polarized two-party 
system today?


Marcus




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Re: [FRIAM] death

2017-10-30 Thread Steven A Smith


I'm wondering if pupating isn't more relevant to the topic than moulting?

As for molting, I was surprised to learn that lobsters (and other 
decapods?) appear to avoid/eschew cellular senescence...  and their 
apparent increase in sexual reproductivity with age...   death seems to 
come (if not from accident or predation) from literally out growing some 
square-cube law that means the demands of molting exceeds their 
resources?   There are also accumulated diseases/parasites that 
aggravate this over time/age, but not senescense at the cellular level 
as most multicellular life seems to have.


I suggest pupating to reference going from specialized to general. I 
*think* of the larval stage of any insectoid as being more specialized 
than the mature version (mostly good at just burrowing through 
(hopefully) nutrient-dense material near where they were hatched)... 
especially in some beetles which seem very generalized (compared to the 
average larvae).   Other creatures (lipidoptera?) might seem to be going 
to *more* specialized in some sense?


Do humans become more specialized with age?  I propose that we go 
through cycles of specialization/generalization.  Babies are optimized 
for two things, ingesting and metabolizing nourishment (eliminating 
waste is a sub-process this) and triggering adults to provide 
nourishment and protection from predators and the elements.   As 
vertebrates go, we spend a LONG time in this specialization (until 
weaned and diaper trained?).   As babies become ambulatory and then 
learn language, they become generalists.   At some point in their growth 
into adults, they may at least dabble at specialization... picking a 
sport or a topic of study to excel at.   If they don't manage to arrest 
their development by becoming professional athletes, soldiers, or 
perennial students, adulthood returns them toward being generalists... 
not just getting good at physical or intellectual excercises within the 
confines of a set of rules (a sport, a game, a class, a field of study) 
but in more "real world" settings as well as perhaps (also) excelling at 
non-team sports, or mechanical skills or gardening or building or 
cooking or... .  Of course, the confines of a career in (big) academia 
or government or industry can provide a narrowing, as can the 
conveniences of modern (professional) living where one needn't repair 
their own vehicles (flat tire? call AAA! oil change light?  Stop at 
Jiffy Lube!) or grow their own food (that is what supermarkets are for) 
or cook (prepared packaged meals, microwaves, fast-food and other 
restaurants!) or build/repair/maintain their home (there are service 
industries galore as well as handymen to do that for us), etc.   But 
even if during the power-band of our professional careers, we give up 
all extraneous activities/skills, we might return to (discover) them in 
retirement, either as "hobbies" or out of financial opportunity (I can 
retire early if I quit eating out, paying others to do my 
maintenance/repair, etc.)  In olden times, our elder years might 
represent an opportunity to pass on the wisdom/skills gained in a 
lifetime...  which could be very generalized (ask old Jake, he knows 
more than a bit about just about everything!) , or very specialized 
(Sally can put the finest edge on your blade with her files and stones 
like nobody's business!).  Today, it is somewhat rare... cultural 
shifts?   Or the details of life change so quickly that a lifetime of 
"specialized skill development" is often irrelevant (how many 
carburators need rebuilding when all modern engines are fuel injected)?

Molting is a fantastic metaphor.  But do we have any species to look to that 
molts for greater generality instead of greater specialty?  I suppose we could 
argue that some species jump from one specialty to another via molting.  But 
that passes the buck to some set of processes that hold the program for 
specialty selection.

On 10/30/2017 01:52 PM, Roger Critchlow wrote:

So maybe AIs will have molting stages?




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That was a lot, forcing me to cherry-pick. 8^) I disagree with the *fairly*
quickly part. The time scales being traversed are huge, as you point out. When
you make the argument that death happens fairly abruptly you bias that comment
towards a few scales, namely the ones related to consciousness, identity, self
and the foci of human awareness. But when compared to the time scales of
cellular processes or chemical reactions versus life spans of (eg) elephants,
or even generational evolution, those time scales are not considered. In this
larger context death Doesn't Really Happen abruptly at all. It can be an
extremely long process.

To go back to the thin veneer between the living and the dead theme of Samhain, it seems to me that
most of us *begin* our death around age 40 or so. I'm sure the peak of "the hill" is
different for everyone, shows sensitivity to demographics/lifestyle/resources, and changes with
technology and things like global climate, population, etc. But the key point, which you refer to
as well, seems to be a native sense of senescence ... a kind of programmed death, like apoptosis at
the cellular layer and loss of mitochondria, or reduction in hormone production, etc. at the
organism layer. The vampires (like Thiel) seem to believe this is avoidable with trickery ... the
classic cautionary tales apply. Even when I finally crash my bike into an oncoming truck at 70
mph, my death will be nothing like instantaneous. Even if it's too quick for my "mind"
wouldn't imply it's too quick for ... like every other process in the universe. 8^) In fact, one
of my favorite arguments against atheists is to claim the afterlife is that (within epsilon) period
from when you see the oncoming truck and the last few ion channels in the various and distributed
(all over the grill) parts of your brain shut down. Like Lorentz expansion of space or contraction
of time, perhaps that period seems, subjectively, to stretch to eternity?

So, clearly, I don't think death is at all abrupt ... mostly because I don't
believe there is such a thing as a temporally extended self. You are merely
*similar* to yourself 10 minutes ago.
"History doesn't repeat itself, it rhymes, and so do I" (apologies
to S. Clemens)!

When you first brought up death, I immediately went to the very narrow
definition you reference... that of the (apparent) permanent dissolution
of personal consciousness, of mind, etc. Having watched *that* proceed
over a space of roughly 10 years, or most acutely 2-3 years, in
Alzheimer's sufferers, and having enjoyed the earlier phases of mental
senescence (fading of proper nouns going first, or most notably), even
THIS definition of "death" can be fairly long and slow from the
timescale/perspective of the mind/consciousness experiencing it.

Your "over the hill" reference is another example, I believe, of
relative point of view. Most people I know over about 25 seem to notice
*how* they are over the hill. The extreme elasticity of the body and
mind of children (through puberty and into young adulthood?) is the
first to go (from an adult perspective) it would seem. By middle age
(sometime in our 40s?) we start to notice that our bodies (and sometimes
wits) really don't have all the pizazz they once did, but if we are
lucky, we have developed a lot of skills and knowledge and habits that
not only make up for that loss, but in fact make our net effectivity
higher for most things than when we were young: "work smarter, not
harder", etc. By the onset of old age (I feel I am just teetering on
that threshold at 60), we are lucky if we've established enough momentum
intellectually, economically and maybe even physically (e.g. good
habits) to begin to really "coast". Each of these shifts is an
inflection point in this long, slow curve of "death" that is reputed to
begin at "birth"...

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self". If
it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my
*instantaneous self* often indulges in. Flow states, peak awareness,
enlightenment, etc. all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the
instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of a
continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended. In fact, by the
some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness
which I believe Selfness inherits from. Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith
has had something to say about all of this? It has been decades since I
read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"? Or maybe
it is just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?

Interesting thread as always,
- Steve

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Roger writes:

“It seems that this sort of dead code, undead code, zombie code problem is 
fairly ubiquitous in information processing systems.  No matter whose system, 
there are always things around that don't go away because nobody cared to do 
anything about them.  They always need a clean reboot eventually, or a clean 
reinstall, or some kind of purge to clear the inevitable cruft of just running 
too long.”

This is the sort of thing I’d expect to see in a naïve approach to a spatially 
extended UTM.  Without some process to clean it up, like dreaming, there would 
be more and more agents coming to contradictory conclusions.   When a call is 
made to vote on a decision there would much wasted motion in the cancellations 
where the heat of many weak learners might overwhelm the light from a few 
strong learners.

Marcus

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Molting is a fantastic metaphor.  But do we have any species to look to that 
molts for greater generality instead of greater specialty?  I suppose we could 
argue that some species jump from one specialty to another via molting.  But 
that passes the buck to some set of processes that hold the program for 
specialty selection.

On 10/30/2017 01:52 PM, Roger Critchlow wrote:
> So maybe AIs will have molting stages? 

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ


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Re: [FRIAM] death

Glen writes:

"But some conception of interruptibility  or parallelism seems necessary also.  
If a UTM couldn't stop, mid-algorithm, to work on some other problem, then 
perhaps death is still needed?"

Humans have minimal short term memory, but an extended UTM could yield any 
number of continuations.  There would be light cone considerations to get to 
data referenced by each and a lot of references could be contended by different 
computational agents in the system as they were trying to run in parallel.

Marcus

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Re: [FRIAM] death

2017-10-30 Thread Roger Critchlow

There's a funny post on Bunnie's blog today (
https://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?p=5018) about learning to use LiteX in
place of Vivado for FPGA design.  It's because Vivado wastes FPGA footprint
by rolling in circuits you don't need, because Vivado is given away for
free by Xilinx who would love you to step up to the next larger FPGA
anytime, so they have no incentive to optimize the footprint for you.  So
Bunnie is using LiteX which is a python high level design tool that outputs
low level designs for Vivado to assemble, so you can skip the Xilinx IP
with the non-optional bloat.

It seems that this sort of dead code, undead code, zombie code problem is
fairly ubiquitous in information processing systems.  No matter whose
system, there are always things around that don't go away because nobody
cared to do anything about them.  They always need a clean reboot
eventually, or a clean reinstall, or some kind of purge to clear the
inevitable cruft of just running too long.

So maybe AIs will have molting stages?  Or maybe dreaming is the way we
purge the cruft in our heads?

-- rec --

On Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 4:32 PM, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com>
wrote:

> My actual question is more like:   Is death universal or is a finite
> lifetime just a sufficient solution found by evolution (and carbon-based
> life)?   Must memories be purged for progress, or is it just that that they
> _can_ be without particular harm to the species?
>
> There was a piece on 60 minutes last night about Adolfo Kaminsky who
> forged thousands of official documents to protect Jews in France.   His
> colleagues reflected on their accomplishments and didn't reflect on danger
> in what they were doing at the time, perhaps because they were so young.
>
> It could be that the high-order aspects of wisdom are cognitively too
> costly (operationally) at some point.   Diminishing returns on complexity..
> Delays on action are as dangerous as imprudent actions.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
> Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 2:18 PM
> To: FriAM <friam@redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] death
>
> Good question.  But I tend to think the problem is less about plasticity
> and more about specialization.  As we've seen, specialized (artificial)
> intelligence is relatively easy, compare termites to humans.  So-called
> general intelligence (or universal constructors) is much harder.  The
> distance between any old TM and a UTM seems quite large.
>
> Whether, once specialized, an AI can generalize is an open question.  Will
> we *grow* general AI?  Or will we construct it from scratch to be general?
>
> On 10/30/2017 01:12 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> > But will this be true of AIs as well?   Assuming that this fossilization
> occurs, is that a human idiosyncrasy that plasticity reduces?   Perhaps it
> could be treated with drugs, electroshock therapy, stem cells, PTSD
> medication, etc.?
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Hm.  I suppose we could think of a UTM in the same way we think of an ANN.  A 
large enough ANN becomes a look up table.  A UTM could be conceived (simply?) 
as some sort of an index for all the algorithms (possible or real).  Rather 
than extending out in time (complicated, infinitely extensible tape), it's 
extended out in space and hierarchically in "orders".  (I feel sure this is 
someone else's idea, but have no idea where I got it ... sounds a bit like the 
parallel worlds interpretation of QM, though ... maybe Deutsch?)  Given a 
spatially extended UTM, (specific algorithm) death would *not* be necessary.  
But some conception of interruptibility  or parallelism seems necessary also.  
If a UTM couldn't stop, mid-algorithm, to work on some other problem, then 
perhaps death is still needed?

On 10/30/2017 01:32 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> My actual question is more like:   Is death universal or is a finite lifetime 
> just a sufficient solution found by evolution (and carbon-based life)?   Must 
> memories be purged for progress, or is it just that that they _can_ be 
> without particular harm to the species?
> 
> There was a piece on 60 minutes last night about Adolfo Kaminsky who forged 
> thousands of official documents to protect Jews in France.   His colleagues 
> reflected on their accomplishments and didn't reflect on danger in what they 
> were doing at the time, perhaps because they were so young.
> 
> It could be that the high-order aspects of wisdom are cognitively too costly 
> (operationally) at some point.   Diminishing returns on complexity.. Delays 
> on action are as dangerous as imprudent actions.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] death

My actual question is more like:   Is death universal or is a finite lifetime 
just a sufficient solution found by evolution (and carbon-based life)?   Must 
memories be purged for progress, or is it just that that they _can_ be without 
particular harm to the species?

There was a piece on 60 minutes last night about Adolfo Kaminsky who forged 
thousands of official documents to protect Jews in France.   His colleagues 
reflected on their accomplishments and didn't reflect on danger in what they 
were doing at the time, perhaps because they were so young.

It could be that the high-order aspects of wisdom are cognitively too costly 
(operationally) at some point.   Diminishing returns on complexity.. Delays on 
action are as dangerous as imprudent actions.

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 2:18 PM
To: FriAM <friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] death

Good question.  But I tend to think the problem is less about plasticity and 
more about specialization.  As we've seen, specialized (artificial) 
intelligence is relatively easy, compare termites to humans.  So-called general 
intelligence (or universal constructors) is much harder.  The distance between 
any old TM and a UTM seems quite large.

Whether, once specialized, an AI can generalize is an open question.  Will we 
*grow* general AI?  Or will we construct it from scratch to be general?

On 10/30/2017 01:12 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> But will this be true of AIs as well?   Assuming that this fossilization 
> occurs, is that a human idiosyncrasy that plasticity reduces?   Perhaps it 
> could be treated with drugs, electroshock therapy, stem cells, PTSD 
> medication, etc.?

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Good question.  But I tend to think the problem is less about plasticity and 
more about specialization.  As we've seen, specialized (artificial) 
intelligence is relatively easy, compare termites to humans.  So-called general 
intelligence (or universal constructors) is much harder.  The distance between 
any old TM and a UTM seems quite large.

Whether, once specialized, an AI can generalize is an open question.  Will we 
*grow* general AI?  Or will we construct it from scratch to be general?

On 10/30/2017 01:12 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> But will this be true of AIs as well?   Assuming that this fossilization 
> occurs, is that a human idiosyncrasy that plasticity reduces?   Perhaps it 
> could be treated with drugs, electroshock therapy, stem cells, PTSD 
> medication, etc.?

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] death

< Our universality depends fundamentally on babies.  In order for progress to 
be made, the old farts, with all their outdated ideas, must die so the young 
turds can do things their way.  Sure, we want to keep the old farts around and 
exploit them as best we can.  But at some point, those fossilized thoughts need 
to be forgotten. >

But will this be true of AIs as well?   Assuming that this fossilization 
occurs, is that a human idiosyncrasy that plasticity reduces?   Perhaps it 
could be treated with drugs, electroshock therapy, stem cells, PTSD medication, 
etc.?

Marcus


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Re: [FRIAM] death

On 10/30/2017 12:01 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Odd that some conservatives give embedded worth to lives that have 
> demonstrated none yet (pro-lifers), and change the rules as life progresses.  
>  Why the act of faith in the first place?  Why no conservatives advocating 
> one-child-per-family, or income requirements for reproduction?

Our universality depends fundamentally on babies.  In order for progress to be 
made, the old farts, with all their outdated ideas, must die so the young turds 
can do things their way.  Sure, we want to keep the old farts around and 
exploit them as best we can.  But at some point, those fossilized thoughts need 
to be forgotten.  We need those babies.  Pro-lifers never seem to be reflective 
enough to make this sort of argument against abortion.  They're so strangled by 
 their individualism.

The trick is, as you point out, we don't need so many from the same gene 
pool(s)!  Again, perhaps my Bastard status biases me.  The (socialist?) idea 
that we all end up rearing the kids the breeders produce was built in from the 
start.  What we need are large incentives to steer the coming generations 
according to policy.  If we want more STEM, then encourage more STEM couples to 
have more babies.  Never mind the income requirements, split things like the 
SAT (or IQ) tests into variously weighted incentive programs.  If you (and your 
mate) score in the top quartile in analogical thinking, you get 7 baby 
vouchers.  Good math scores gets you 5 vouchers.  Good language scores get you 
3. 8^)  And vouchers are non-transferable and temporally limited.  If you have 
more than 7 babies, then you're on your own for the remainder.

Of course, it has to be incentive based, or we'll retread some of our past 
mistakes.

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Re: [FRIAM] death

"But I think what it, ultimately devolves to is that humans come very close to 
universal constructors.  With the reflective layers of brain and opposable 
thumbs, we can do almost anything ... with the right resources, right context, 
etc."

I'm looking forward to AI companies succeeding at projects like this.. 

http://allenai.org/aristo/

Then not only will there be massive unemployment with driverless cars & trucks 
and that sort of thing, but even what it means to be intelligent will be in 
jeopardy.   Why take the SAT if there is a program on the web that can do it 
better?

Marcus

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Re: [FRIAM] death

Glen writes:



Odd that some conservatives give embedded worth to lives that have demonstrated 
none yet (pro-lifers), and change the rules as life progresses.   Why the act 
of faith in the first place?  Why no conservatives advocating 
one-child-per-family, or income requirements for reproduction?

Marcus 

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Re: [FRIAM] death

I used to argue with my parents (a lot) about whether or not humans were 
different from animals, mostly because my mom claimed animals don't have souls. 
 She's right, of course, because nobody has souls. 8^) But I think what it, 
ultimately devolves to is that humans come very close to universal 
constructors.  With the reflective layers of brain and opposable thumbs, we can 
do almost anything ... with the right resources, right context, etc.

So, at least in these arguments, it boiled down less to inherent worth (like 
depth of development) and more to productivity, but not the narrow productivity 
of, say, termites or such, but a wide productivity.  To be sure, my mom was 
more into embedded worth, whereas my dad was more "what have you done for us 
lately".  It was a good mix, though, because recessive traits can, eventually, 
come in critically handy.  (Perhaps that Trump voter knows how to play guitar 
or refine gasoline?)

In this (Christian?) context, animals like pigs and dogs are more like tools or 
articles of comfort than anything that deserves the Respect we give to humans.  
It is and always has been a disgusting way to think, to me ... perhaps the best 
confirming evidence I was adopted and have none of their biology (barring some 
shared bacteria, I suppose).  Even if I take the arguments that, as earthly 
gods, we're obliged to be good "stewards" of the creatures we OWN, it's still 
repugnant.  I can't even claim to own the tree in our backyard, which the 
government would claim we own ... a tree that's prettier and way older than I 
am.

On 10/28/2017 04:13 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> One difference between flies and pigs and humans is progressively deeper 
> development of each, if for no other reason than lifespan.   Paradoxes there 
> too:   My fondness and loyalty to my 12 year old dog was deeper than it is 
> for many humans. (Fat chance I'd send a 75-year-old, racist, redneck, 
> Joe-the-Trump voter thousands of dollars for cancer treatment.)   If it is 
> depth of development that matters, then as a society we ought to invest more 
> in retired people as their uniqueness is deeper and also more fragile.    But 
> instead we celebrate births even thought infants are mere hardware that won't 
> have consciousness for months after birth.
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Re: [FRIAM] death