Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Edwina, List,


I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely triadic 
relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said that, some 
signs have the character of necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, 
arguments. For signs that have these three characteristics, do they have the 
internal structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the 
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they 
are the first correlate of a further triadic relation.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was 
Continuity...

Edwina, List:

Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of these 
terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant (CP 
2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or "Sign" and 
"Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He never--not once--used "Sign" 
for a triad, since a triad is always a relation, while a Sign is always a 
correlate.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am 
talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the Representamen, 
of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between the two and even 
to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad.

Edwina

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, List,


I recommend adding Emerson's essay "The Poet" to your list of resources on 
trinitarianism.


On a personal note, I was once asked to give a few presentations to a Unitarian 
Universalist congregation when they were without a pastor. I offered to give 
one on a defense of trinitarianism based on Emerson's remarks in "The Poet". 
One reason I wanted to give a presentation on that topic is that Emerson, 
himself, was a Unitarian minister. He gave up that ministry, in part, because 
of his attraction to certain patterns concerning what appears to be first, 
second and third in a number of different cultural traditions. As such, I 
thought it would be fun to explore his ideas on the topic.


Here is one particularly interesting passage from "The Poet":


For the Universe has three children, born at one time, which reappear under 
different names in every system of thought, whether they be called cause, 
operation and effect; or, more poetically, Jove, Pluto, Neptune; or, 
theologically, the Father, the Spirit and the Son; but which we will call here 
the Knower, the Doer and the Sayer. These stand respectively for the love of 
truth, for the love of good, and for the love of beauty. These three are equal. 
Each is that which he is, essentially, so that he cannot be surmounted or 
analyzed, and each of these three has the power of the others latent in him and 
his own, patent.


The poet is the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is a sovereign, and 
stands on the centre. For the world is not painted or adorned, but is from the 
beginning beautiful; and God has not made some beautiful things, but Beauty is 
the creator of the universe. Therefore the poet is not any permissive 
potentate, but is emperor in his own right.


For better or worse, my offer to give a presentation on that topic was turned 
down by the committee.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 9:45:11 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, 
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

Jon, Gary f, Jeff, John, Edwina, List,

In this message I would once again like to suggest that the idea of trinity 
'properly understood'--by which I mean understood in a Peircean 
semeiotic/metaphysical sense--has the potential to contribute to a shared 
understanding which could facilitate that rapprochement of science and religion 
which Peirce imagined was yet possible. However, it seems important before 
attempting to go further with that challenging project that some other not 
unrelated work on trinity be considered as background.

I earlier mentioned Richard Rohr https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rohr
Richard Rohr
en.wikipedia.org
Richard Rohr (born 1943) is an American author, spiritual writer, and 
Franciscan friar based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He was ordained to the 
priesthood...


as a contemporary of advocate of trinitarian thinking. Commenting on the work 
of another trinitarian of some note, Rohr wrote:

Raimundo (or Raimon) Panikkar (1918–2010). born to a Spanish Roman Catholic 
mother and an Indian Hindu father. . .  saw Trinity not as a uniquely Christian 
idea but as the very structure of reality. For him the Trinity overcame the 
challenges of monism (undifferentiated oneness), dualism (separation of sacred 
and profane), and pantheism (God and creation are indistinguishable). Richard 
Rohr, Newletter Archive, https://cac.org/category/daily-meditations/
Daily Meditations Archives — Center for Action and 
Contemplation
cac.org
Over the course of the 2019 Daily Meditations, Richard Rohr mines the depths of 
his Christian tradition through his Franciscan and contemplative lens. Each 
week builds on previous topics, but you can join at any time! Learn more about 
this year’s theme—Old and New: An Evolving Faith—watch a short intro, and 
explore recent reflections. Scroll down to read the most recent post. Sign up 
to receive Fr. Richard’s free messages in your email Inbox every day or at 
the end of each week. Select the email frequency that works best for you Please 
select... Daily Meditations Weekly Meditation Summary Monthly Newsletter First 
Name Last Name Email Re-Enter Email Phone Numbers only; no punctuation Country 
Please select... Afghanistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola 
Anguilla Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia 
Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize 
Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana B



As I recently noted, Cynthia Bourgeault commenting on Ranikkar's idea of 
Cosmotheandric, writes:

Cosmotheandric is the term Panikkar invents to describe this dynamic relational 
ground. The word i

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Gary f, Jeff, John, Edwina, List,

In this message I would once again like to suggest that the idea of trinity
'properly understood'--by which I mean understood in a Peircean
semeiotic/metaphysical sense--has the potential to contribute to a shared
understanding which could facilitate that rapprochement of science and
religion which Peirce imagined was yet possible. However, it seems
important before attempting to go further with that challenging project
that some other not unrelated work on trinity be considered as background.

I earlier mentioned Richard Rohr https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rohr as
a contemporary of advocate of trinitarian thinking. Commenting on the work
of another trinitarian of some note, Rohr wrote:


*Raimundo (or Raimon) Panikkar **(1918–2010). born to a Spanish Roman
Catholic mother and an Indian Hindu father. . . ** saw Trinity not as a
uniquely Christian idea but as the very structure of reality. For him the
Trinity overcame the challenges of monism (undifferentiated oneness),
dualism (separation of sacred and profane), and pantheism (God and creation
are indistinguishable). Richard Rohr, Newletter Archive,
**https://cac.org/category/daily-meditations/
*


As I recently noted, Cynthia Bourgeault commenting on Ranikkar's idea of
Cosmotheandric, writes:

*Cosmotheandric *is the term Panikkar invents to describe this dynamic
relational ground. The word itself is the fusion of *cosmos *(world),
*theos *(God), and *andros* (man) and suggests a continuous
intercirculation among these three distinct planes of existence in a single
motion of self-communicating love.

For Panikkar, "the Trinity is pure relationality":

CB: Panikkar is emphatic that “being is a verb, not a substance,” and the
Trinity is the indivisible expression of the mode of this [verbal]
beingness. All speculation on the “substance” of the individual divine
persons (as has dominated Western metaphysics for more than fifteen hundred
years) thus starts off on a fundamental misperception; for, as Panikkar
sees it, “the Trinity is pure relationality" (Cynthia Bourgeault, Raimon
Panikkar, *Christophany: The Fullness of Man *(Orbis Books: 2004), 116.

I read Panikkar in my 30's when I was studying comparative religion and
inter-religion,  and was participating in interfaith dialogue. While
Panikkar was not to my knowledge aware of Peirce's work, yet his writings
on trinity show some intriguing similarities to Peirce's when one considers
the cosmos (or, kosmos, as Panikkar would have it to include not only the
scientists' cosmos, but the kosmos write large, that is, metaphysically),
while even differences in their approach may prove to be valuable in the
present discussion. However they might differ in their approaches--and in
some ways the difference is considerable--I think that both Peirce and
Panikkar can contribute to our understanding of a trinitarian kosmos.

I should add that I tend to agree with Jon Alan Schmidt's "Semeiotic
Argumention" even as he and I seem not to agree on a panethentistic view in
consideration of the notion of the 'Cosmic Christ' (the second person of
the Trinity theologically speaking 'writ large', in my opinion).

One of Panikkar's last books was his reworking of the Gifford Lectures he'd
written 20 years prior and which he then titled *The Dwelling of the Divine
in the Contemporary World* (1989). He apparently found that title too
"theological" and, as such, less relevant than his new "orientation" for
the "overall situation of the contemporary man in our world." His revision
of those lectures was retitled *The Rhythm of Being*.  One can find
summaries of each of the lectures on this page:

https://www.giffordlectures.org/news/books/rhythm-being

In the last few years I've been reading as much as I can find on trinity
(and the Trinity), especially that which seems to me either not
incompatible with some of Peirce's trichotomic ideas (as applied to
semeiotic/metaphysics) and, even if differing from some of Peirce's
conceptions, of potential value in deepening our understanding of trinity.
For example, Stephen P Smith's, *Trinity: The Scientific Basis of Vitalism
and Transcendentalism* makes many references to Peirce's writings on
especially the categories and semeiotic. Here,  find a brief summary:
https://www.amazon.com/Trinity-Scientific-Basis-Vitalism-Transcendentalism/dp/0595420230
  While I'd eventually like to discuss some of the ideas set forth in
Smith's book, in this post I'll limit myself to summarizing two of
Panikkar's fundamental notions.
In Chapter 5, Panikkar introduces what he considers to be the universal
"triadic myth":


From the editorial gloss on Chapter 5: The Triadic Myth

. . . Trinity is not a Christian monopoly, although the rationalism of
monotheistic monarchy has obscured this principle of relations in Christian
thought: “The Trinity is pure relationship.” [Panikkar] gives examples of
the triadic mythos: Chaldea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  Kant gives objections to the traditional versions of the ontological,
cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God. Out of
curiosity, is the "semiotic" argument for the reality of God immune to
these Kantian objections?


If you could summarize what those objections are, and especially how you
see them bearing on my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God, then
I would be glad to consider them.  However, the upshot of my approach is
not that it somehow "proves" the Reality of God, but rather that the
Reality of God *follows necessarily* from certain basic tenets of Peirce's
Semeiotic.  Someone who is unfamiliar with or takes exception to the latter
will obviously not find my approach even remotely persuasive.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> John S, Gary F, Jon S, Edwina, Gary R, List,
>
> In addition to the suggestions John Sowa has offered for
> profitably reading textual fragments that pertain to difficult
> philosophical questions--such as questions about the common sense belief
> in God--I would add the following.
>
> As we all know, Peirce often is directly engaging with the history of
> philosophy. Over the course of his writings, he is explicitly responding to
> the arguments of classical philosophers (e.g., Plato and
> Aristotle), medieval philosophers (e.g., Scotus and Ockham) and modern
> philosophers (e.g., Leibniz, Hume, Berkeley) on a wide range of questions
> that bear on the legitimacy of the common sense  notion of God. As such, we
> should try to reconstruct the development of Peirce's ideas on these big
> questions as being responsive to the various arguments other philosophers
>  have made.
>
> Here is one such historical strand I'd like to trace out a bit further. If
> one were to treat aesthetic, ethical and logical ideals that Peirce tries
> to give expression to in the normative sciences as being (1) perfect and
> (2) real, what would be the status of something--call it what you
> will--that is perfect in all three respects? As perfect, it would appear
> that such a unitary "thing" would not be immanent in the universe  as it is
> found at any time in its history. This holds both for (a) the three
> universes of the experience of cognitive beings like us and (b) for the
> real universe as it is independent of the way we might represent it at some
> point in our inquiries. The three universes of experience would not measure
> up because each is less than perfect. So, too, with the real universe as
> exists at any time.  In its actuality, it is clearly less than perfect.
> What is more, if the real laws of nature are all evolving, none are
> perfect. As perfect and ideal, that "thing" would appear to be timeless, in
> some sense. Kant follows the Latin tradition (e.g., of Aquinas) in calling
> the notion of what is perfect as the most encompassing Ideal an *ens
> necessarium*.
>
> There are different ways of trying to explicate the idea that God is not
> immanent in the space and time of our universe. One such way is to suggest
> that God is somewhere else--perhaps in a different, more heavenly,
> universe. Another way of coming at the question, Kant suggests, is to note
> how the laws of logic apply to different sorts of things. Normally, we
> say that, for an individual  subject, any given predicate or its opposite
> must apply. Kant points out that, for some things, there is a third
> possibility. There are some things (e.g., those that are taken to be
> infinite) to which the logical laws of non-contradiction and excluded
> middle do not apply in the normal way. Instead of saying of a thing that
> it is X or that it is not X, we say that the predicate X does not apply.
> Might such a point hold for predicates that involve temporal and spatial
> location? That which is infinite and perfect may be the kind of thing to
> which the representation of time and space as a whole does not apply.
>
> Like Kant, Peirce affirms the need for a Platonic notion of one thing that
> is perfect and paradigmatic in its character as the full realization of
> truth, beauty and goodness. Like Plato, Kant and Peirce treat our Idea of
> such a perfect "thing" as a hypothesis. Kant argues that a hypothesis
> concerning what is most ideal is essential for schematizing the regulative
> principles that guide our lives. In effect, we need an iconic
> representation as a hypotyposis of the regulative Ideas. The hypotyposis is
> required as a standard for correctly applying regulative principles to
> individual cases.
>
> If Peirce goes further than Kant in treating the ideal of what is most
> perfect as metaphysically real, then how can it be causally efficacious? 
> Drawing
> on Aristotle's classification of different types of causes, i

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of
these terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or
"Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He never--*not
once*--used "Sign" for a triad, since a triad is always a *relation*, while
a Sign is always a *correlate*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am
> talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
> Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between
> the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

"God" and "nature" are *not *interchangeable in that passage ...

CSP:  Shall we not conclude then that the conduct of men is the sole
purpose and sense of thinking, and that if it be asked *why *should the
human stock be continued, the only answer is that that is among the
inscrutable purposes of God or the virtual purposes of nature which for the
present remain secrets to us?
So it would seem. But this conclusion is too vastly far-reaching to be
admitted without further examination. Man seems to himself to have some
glimmer of co-understanding with God, or with Nature. The fact that he has
been able in some degree to predict how Nature will act, to formulate
general "laws" to which future events conform, seems to furnish inductive
proof that man really penetrates in some measure the ideas that govern
creation. Now man cannot believe that creation has not some ideal purpose.
(CP 8.211-212; c. 1905)


... and they are certainly not interchangeable when it comes to immanence.

CSP:  But I had better add that I do *not *mean by God a being merely
"immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content
of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and
the world of all minds, without any exception whatever. (R 843:26)


As previously discussed, based on Peirce's own definition of "immanent,"
this statement entails that Nature is neither *identical *to God nor a *part
*of God.

ET:  I recall Peirce's outline of the emergence of our universe [1.412] and
the description is most clearly an action of self-organization.


No, it is not; and even if it were, Peirce later described that account as
"faulty," as I discuss in my online paper
.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:22 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS
>
> I keep referring to the notion of 'self-organization' - and my
> understanding of God or Nature [and I note that Peirce uses the terms
> interchangeably - see 8.210, 211] is that the Universe self-organizes these
> necessary modal categories.
>
> God/Nature is not 'immanent' in or caused by any of the three categories
> --[matter 2ns, Mind 3ns, Ideas 1ns] but is a principle of self-organization
> within the Universe of semiosis that requires all three categories.
>
> That is, I see the semiosic function as self-organizing - I recall
> Peirce's outline of the emergence of our universe [1.412] and the
> description is most clearly an action of self-organization.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen.
I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the
Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate
between the two and even to acknowledge the vital role of the full
semiosic triad.
Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19  7:05 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign.
 It is not my definition, it is Peirce's.  If you do not believe me,
then just read through the Commens Dictionary  entry [1], or Robert
Marty's compilation [2] of "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S.
Peirce."
 ET:  My understanding of a Sign ... is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws. 
 This is not Peirce's definition--i.e., not any of his many
definitions--it is yours.  I have repeatedly acknowledged our
longstanding disagreement about this, and have repeatedly expressed a
desire not to rehash it; so why keep bringing it up?
  ET:  I disagree with your reductionism.
 I disagree with your characterization, which is a tiresome
rhetorical ploy with no basis in anything that I have actually
advocated.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:32 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
  JAS list
 1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical
things can be signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock
is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily
construct a  different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of
something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it.  I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a  trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a  morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in
itself. No- not merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the
site of buried treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of
raw data [sand, chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as
mediatively formed by the laws which-form-rocksinto the
Interpretant  which is that particular Rock. 
2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails
that the entire Universe constitutes one Sign.  For more on that,
please see what I just posted in the other thread, including the fact
that Peirce explicitly stated, "the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected" 

I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires
connection; this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be
iconically [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the
Universe is also diverse and many instantiations do NOT share
commonalities. What is common to the Universe is the process of
semiosis - generating morphological instances within laws. But the
results are diverse and open to chance and differentiation.

Edwina  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/sign
[2] http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS

I keep referring to the notion of 'self-organization' - and my
understanding of God or Nature [and I note that Peirce uses the terms
interchangeably - see 8.210, 211] is that the Universe self-organizes
these necessary modal categories. 

God/Nature is not 'immanent' in or caused by any of the three
categories --[matter 2ns, Mind 3ns, Ideas 1ns] but is a principle of
self-organization within the Universe of semiosis that requires all
three categories. 

That is, I see the semiosic function as self-organizing - I recall
Peirce's outline of the emergence of our universe [1.412] and the
description is most clearly an action of self-organization. 

Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19  6:29 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  There is nothing in Peirce where he writes about any reality
outside of the Universe ...
 Except, of course, where he writes that God is "in my belief Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434;
1908) and "a Being  not immanent in the Universes of Matter, Mind,
and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them without
exception" (R 843:15; 1908).
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:19 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

1] With regard to"  It is that  if any signs are connected, no
matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign; " - my
interpretation is that the Signs - multiple Signs -  [the triad of
O-R-I] can be connected within the similarity of their common
mediating Representamen laws or iconically or indexically - as for
example, all individuals are the members of one species; or a
photocopy of a document or a network of vines growing together. And
this results in a SYSTEM of connected individuals which share a key
attribute. But this does not reduce them to ONE individual Sign; it
merely explains their commonality as one semiosic Sign. 

2] You state that "an Argument is the  most complex kind of Sign
that there is!  Nevertheless, like any other Sign, it must be
determined by an Object other than itself."

I disagree; an Argument is not the term for only the Representamen
but for a full triadic semiosic function; an
'Argument-Symbolic-Legisign. The relation to the Object is Symbolic
and is a part/correlate of the semiosic triad, the full Sign.

3] You wrote: "The word "therefore" implies that this is the
conclusion of an argumentation.  What are the premisses from which it
 necessarily follows that the Universe is self-organizing, and that
there is nothing outside of it?"

The Universe as an Argument contains within it the full semiosic
triad of O-R-I. As such, it is complete in itself, and within itself,
it is 'perfused with sign' - by which I understand that the Universe
is constantly generating signs [understood as 'individualities' in
the format of O-R-I] which interact with other signs [understood as
individualities in the format of O-R-I]. I consider that the habits
of 3ns are self-organizing within these Signs -  Peirce has explained
the generation and evolution of habits quite well. 

There is nothing in Peirce where he writes about any reality outside
of the Universe, and - with regard to my readings in physics etc, I
can find no evidence of such

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign.


It is not *my *definition, it is *Peirce's*.  If you do not believe me,
then just read through the Commens Dictionary entry
, or Robert Marty's compilation
 of "76
Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce."

ET:  My understanding of a Sign ... is that it is a *morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws*.


This is not *Peirce's *definition--i.e., not *any *of his *many
*definitions--it
is *yours*.  I have repeatedly acknowledged our longstanding disagreement
about this, and have repeatedly expressed a desire not to rehash it; so why
keep bringing it up?

ET:  I disagree with your reductionism.


I disagree with your characterization, which is a tiresome rhetorical ploy
with no basis in anything that I have actually advocated.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:32 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS list
>
> 1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can
> be signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the Sign,
> it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily construct a different 
> scenario
> in which the rock is a Sign of something else--perhaps a treasure that is
> buried below it.  I have acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything
> is a Sign of itself in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something
> else (Object) to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between
> two other correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
>
> I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
> understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
> irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a morphological instantiation
> of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in itself. No- not
> merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the site of buried
> treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of raw data [sand,
> chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as mediatively formed by
> the laws which-form-rocksinto the Interpretant which is that
> particular Rock.
>
> 2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
> Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails that the
> entire Universe constitutes one Sign.  For more on that, please see what
> I just posted in the other thread, including the fact that Peirce explicitly
> stated, "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought
> to be more or less connected"
>
> I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires connection;
> this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be iconically
> [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the Universe is also
> diverse and many instantiations do NOT share commonalities. What is common
> to the Universe is the process of semiosis - generating morphological
> instances within laws. But the results are diverse and open to chance and
> differentiation.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Edwina Taborsky]

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS
list
 1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical
things can be signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock
is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily
construct a  different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of
something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it.  I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign"
I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. My
understanding of a Sign - and again, I stress that I mean the full
irreducible triad of O-R-I - is that it is a morphological
instantiation of data as mediated by laws. So, a Rock IS a Sign in
itself. No- not merely when it is used in a symbolic sense for 'the
site of buried treasure' - but, in itself, as a chemical compound of
raw data [sand, chemicals etc] which are the Object, and then as
mediatively formed by the laws which-form-rocksinto the
Interpretant which is that particular Rock. 

2] And, you wrote: "Moreover, if the entire Universe is composed of
Signs, then Peirce's theorem of the science of semeiotics entails
that the entire Universe constitutes one Sign.  For more on that,
please see what I just posted in the other thread, including the fact
that Peirce explicitly stated, "the entire body of all thought is a
sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected"

I disagree with your reductionism. A 'common Sign' requires
connection; this can be by commonality of mediative laws; it can be
iconically [photocopy]; it can be indexically [plant vines] but - the
Universe is also diverse and many instantiations do NOT share
commonalities. What is common to the Universe is the process of
semiosis - generating morphological instances within laws. But the
results are diverse and open to chance and differentiation.

Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19  5:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
  JAS:  If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is
being taken out of context, then that person has the burden of 
showing that this is the case, not merely asserting it.
 JFS:  Absolutely!  That is an essential part of the methodeutic.
 I am glad that we agree about this, but then ...
 JFS:  No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full
context. 
 This is yet another bald assertion, with no supporting argumentation
from Peirce's writings
 JFS:  Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are
physical things. 
 Please provide a few of those examples to clarify and substantiate
this claim.
 JFS:  Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce
defined for the Century Dictionary. 
 I would be glad to do so, if you would be so kind as to quote them.
 JFS:  Each one defines 'sign' as a physical thing.  None of them
mentions the word 'percept'. 
 That seems dubious, since Peirce clearly considered Qualisigns/Tones
and Legisigns/Types to be Signs, not just Sinsigns/Tokens; and he
stated quite plainly that a Seme is a Sign and a Percept is a Seme
(cf. CP 4.537-539; 1906), which entails that a Percept is a Sign.
  JFS:  Wait a minute.  In the paragraph above, you denied that
physical things can be signs.  And in this one, you claim that the
physical universe is a sign.  You can't have it both ways.
 Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can be
signs"?  In your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the
Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily construct a 
different scenario in which the rock is a Sign of something
else--perhaps a treasure that is buried below it.  I have
acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a Sign of itself
in a trivial sense, but unless it represents something else (Object)
to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., mediates between two other
correlates--it is not properly called a Sign.
  JFS:  In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with
signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448).  The
word 'perfuse' is rare:  it only occurs once in CP.  The clause
beginning with 'if' is tentative, and being composed of signs is not
the same as being a sign. 
 I agree that Peirce did not assert in the quoted statement (CP
5.448n1p5, EP 2:394; 1906) that the Universe is composed of Signs,
only that it is perfused with Signs, although the sentence
construction implies that he would not have been surprised one bit if
it turned out to be "composed exclusively of signs" after all.  Note
also which universe Peirce had in mind--"not merely the universe of
existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to
refer to as 'the truth.'"  That is reminisce

Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  There is nothing in Peirce where he writes about any reality outside
of the Universe ...


Except, of course, where he writes that God is "in my belief Really creator
of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908) and "a
Being *not *immanent in the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the
Sole Creator of every content of them without exception" (R 843:15; 1908).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 5:19 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> 1] With regard to"  It is that if any signs are connected, no matter how,
> the resulting system constitutes one sign; " - my interpretation is that
> the Signs - multiple Signs -  [the triad of O-R-I] can be connected within
> the similarity of their common mediating Representamen laws or iconically
> or indexically - as for example, all individuals are the members of one
> species; or a photocopy of a document or a network of vines growing
> together. And this results in a SYSTEM of connected individuals which share
> a key attribute. But this does not reduce them to ONE individual Sign; it
> merely explains their commonality as one semiosic Sign.
>
> 2] You state that "an Argument is the most complex kind of Sign that
> there is!  Nevertheless, like any other Sign, it must be determined by an
> Object other than itself."
>
> I disagree; an Argument is not the term for only the Representamen but
> for a full triadic semiosic function; an 'Argument-Symbolic-Legisign. The
> relation to the Object is Symbolic and is a part/correlate of the semiosic
> triad, the full Sign.
>
> 3] You wrote: "The word "therefore" implies that this is the conclusion of
> an argumentation.  What are the premisses from which it necessarily
> follows that the Universe is self-organizing, and that there is nothing
> outside of it?"
>
> The Universe as an Argument contains within it the full semiosic triad of
> O-R-I. As such, it is complete in itself, and within itself, it is
> 'perfused with sign' - by which I understand that the Universe is
> constantly generating signs [understood as 'individualities' in the format
> of O-R-I] which interact with other signs [understood as individualities in
> the format of O-R-I]. I consider that the habits of 3ns are self-organizing
> within these Signs -  Peirce has explained the generation and evolution of
> habits quite well.
>
> There is nothing in Peirce where he writes about any reality outside of
> the Universe, and - with regard to my readings in physics etc, I can find
> no evidence of such
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

1] With regard to"  It is that  if any signs are connected, no
matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign; " - my
interpretation is that the Signs - multiple Signs -  [the triad of
O-R-I] can be connected within the similarity of their common
mediating Representamen laws or iconically or indexically - as for
example, all individuals are the members of one species; or a
photocopy of a document or a network of vines growing together. And
this results in a SYSTEM of connected individuals which share a key
attribute. But this does not reduce them to ONE individual Sign; it
merely explains their commonality as one semiosic Sign.

2] You state that "an Argument is the  most complex kind of Sign
that there is!  Nevertheless, like any other Sign, it must be
determined by an Object other than itself."

I disagree; an Argument is not the term for only the Representamen
but for a full triadic semiosic function; an
'Argument-Symbolic-Legisign. The relation to the Object is Symbolic
and is a part/correlate of the semiosic triad, the full Sign.

3] You wrote: "The word "therefore" implies that this is the
conclusion of an argumentation.  What are the premisses from which it
necessarily follows that the Universe is self-organizing, and that
there is nothing outside of it?"

The Universe as an Argument contains within it the full semiosic
triad of O-R-I. As such, it is complete in itself, and within itself,
it is 'perfused with sign' - by which I understand that the Universe
is constantly generating signs [understood as 'individualities' in
the format of O-R-I] which interact with other signs [understood as
individualities in the format of O-R-I]. I consider that the habits
of 3ns are self-organizing within these Signs -  Peirce has explained
the generation and evolution of habits quite well.

There is nothing in Peirce where he writes about any reality outside
of the Universe, and - with regard to my readings in physics etc, I
can find no evidence of such
Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19  5:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  Again, I think one can get entrapped in the differentiation
between a Representamen, understood as the mediating node of the
triad of O-R-I and the Sign, understood as the full triad - AND - the
use of the term 'sign' to refer only to the mediating Representamen. 
 Again, I disagree with this particular use of terminology and the
associated model of semeiosis, but I see no need to revisit that
well-worn path.  In Peirce's usage, either a Sign is a Representamen
with a mental Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP
2:291; both 1903) or the two terms are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).
  ET:  Therefore, the Universe is self-organizing; it has no
boundaries or horizons and there is nothing 'outside of it'.
 The word "therefore" implies that this is the conclusion of an
argumentation.  What are the premisses from which it necessarily
follows that the Universe is self-organizing, and that there is
nothing outside of it?
  ET:  Furthermore, I question the idea that, so to speak, 'if there
is a Sign connected to another Sign, then all Signs are 'as one'.
[Please provide a reference].
 I must admit some mild frustration at this request, because I have
given the citation many times before, and only omitted it in this
case because I assumed that it was unnecessary by now.  Nevertheless,
here is a longer excerpt to provide both the context and Peirce's own
explication of the key statement.
 CSP:  The process [of semeiosis] rather reminds one of the
reproduction of a population,--sufficiently so, indeed, to furnish a
convenient store of metaphors requisite for the expression of its
relations.  Naturally, such metaphors, greatly serviceable though
they are, are like edge-tools, not to be entrusted to babies or to
fools or to the immature.  There is a science of semeiotics whose
results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those
of mathematics, and one of its theorems increases the aptness of that
simile.  It is that  if any signs are connected, no matter how, the
resulting system constitutes one sign; so that, most connections
resulting from successive pairings, a sign frequently interprets a
second in so far as this is "married" to a third.  Thus, the
conclusion of a syllogism is the interpretation of either premiss as
married to the other; and of this sort are all the principal
translation-processes of thought.  In the light of the above theorem,
we see that the entire thought-life of any one person is a sign; and a
considerable part of its interpretation will result from marriages
with the thoughts of other persons.  So the thought-life of a social
group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a sign,
supposing all thought to be more or less connected. (R
1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904, bold added) 
 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, Gary F, Jon S, Edwina, Gary R, List,


In addition to the suggestions John Sowa has offered for profitably reading 
textual fragments that pertain to difficult philosophical questions--such as 
questions about the common sense belief in God--I would add the following.


As we all know, Peirce often is directly engaging with the history of 
philosophy. Over the course of his writings, he is explicitly responding to the 
arguments of classical philosophers (e.g., Plato and Aristotle), medieval 
philosophers (e.g., Scotus and Ockham) and modern philosophers (e.g., Leibniz, 
Hume, Berkeley) on a wide range of questions that bear on the legitimacy of the 
common sense  notion of God. As such, we should try to reconstruct the 
development of Peirce's ideas on these big questions as being responsive to the 
various arguments other philosophers have made.


Here is one such historical strand I'd like to trace out a bit further. If one 
were to treat aesthetic, ethical and logical ideals that Peirce tries to give 
expression to in the normative sciences as being (1) perfect and (2) real, what 
would be the status of something--call it what you will--that is perfect in all 
three respects? As perfect, it would appear that such a unitary "thing" would 
not be immanent in the universe  as it is found at any time in its history. 
This holds both for (a) the three universes of the experience of cognitive 
beings like us and (b) for the real universe as it is independent of the way we 
might represent it at some point in our inquiries. The three universes of 
experience would not measure up because each is less than perfect. So, too, 
with the real universe as exists at any time.  In its actuality, it is clearly 
less than perfect. What is more, if the real laws of nature are all evolving, 
none are perfect. As perfect and ideal, that "thing" would appear to be 
timeless, in some sense. Kant follows the Latin tradition (e.g., of Aquinas) in 
calling the notion of what is perfect as the most encompassing Ideal an ens 
necessarium.


There are different ways of trying to explicate the idea that God is not 
immanent in the space and time of our universe. One such way is to suggest that 
God is somewhere else--perhaps in a different, more heavenly, universe. Another 
way of coming at the question, Kant suggests, is to note how the laws of logic 
apply to different sorts of things. Normally, we say that, for an individual  
subject, any given predicate or its opposite must apply. Kant points out that, 
for some things, there is a third possibility. There are some things (e.g., 
those that are taken to be infinite) to which the logical laws of 
non-contradiction and excluded middle do not apply in the normal way. Instead 
of saying of a thing that it is X or that it is not X, we say that the 
predicate X does not apply. Might such a point hold for predicates that involve 
temporal and spatial location? That which is infinite and perfect may be the 
kind of thing to which the representation of time and space as a whole does not 
apply.


Like Kant, Peirce affirms the need for a Platonic notion of one thing that is 
perfect and paradigmatic in its character as the full realization of truth, 
beauty and goodness. Like Plato, Kant and Peirce treat our Idea of such a 
perfect "thing" as a hypothesis. Kant argues that a hypothesis concerning what 
is most ideal is essential for schematizing the regulative principles that 
guide our lives. In effect, we need an iconic representation as a hypotyposis 
of the regulative Ideas. The hypotyposis is required as a standard for 
correctly applying regulative principles to individual cases.


If Peirce goes further than Kant in treating the ideal of what is most perfect 
as metaphysically real, then how can it be causally efficacious? Drawing on 
Aristotle's classification of different types of causes, it would seem to 
function as a final and formal cause and not as an efficient or material cause. 
In making such a metaphysical claim, I would expect Peirce's arguments for the 
legitimacy of such a hypothesis to be responsive to the objections Kant 
develops in the Dialectic of the first Critique. In that section, Kant gives 
objections to the traditional versions of the ontological, cosmological and 
teleological arguments for the existence of God. Out of curiosity, is the 
"semiotic" argument for the reality of God immune to these Kantian objections?


When reading the NA, my interpretative strategy is to anticipate various sorts 
of consonance between Peirce's points and the positive arguments Kant offers 
for treating God as a practical postulate in the second Critique and as an 
aesthetic and teleological hypothesis in the third Critique. On this sort of 
reading, Peirce is starting with a close and sustained examination at the 
observational basis for the common sense ideas that appear to be wrapped up in 
traditional conceptions of God.


These common-sense ideas include the no

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Just a few brief clarifications ...

GR:  I would say that there are those ... who see this Cosmic Christ as
active in the Kosmos today and, indeed, always and forever, from the
beginning to the end of time--and so, as some commentators have argued,
even before the man, Jesus, appeared in the world. It seems to me that at
least aspects of this idea find a place in certain schools of Christian
theology as well.


Yes, I did not mean to imply that Christ had no role in the Universe prior
to the Incarnation.  On the contrary, as the New Testament and traditional
creeds repeatedly affirm, He is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father and
the Holy Spirit, and all three have participated in creating and sustaining
the Universe from the beginning.

GR:  It is in the second person of the Trinity, Christ, that "we live and
move and have out being" in the trinitarians view.


The Apostle Paul quoted that line from Greek poetry, in context referring
to "The God who made the world and everything in it."  Again, I do not
believe that we can limit this to only one Person.

GR:  Again, we're getting into traditional theology when we say that the
accounts of the God come from the "many trusted accounts of those who knew
God personally, who had direct Collateral Experience of Him."


Understood; I am hoping that Gary F. will explain why he finds it
problematic that our acquaintance with God is entirely mediated by Signs,
even though that is just as true of our acquaintance with Peirce or just
about anything else.

GR:  All such genuine relations, while three in one, yet differentiate
between the characters of their 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.


Yes, but differentiation does not entail subordination.

GR:  I would like to suggest that ... [when] speaking of the Trinity in the
Christian theological sense that we use the article, 'the', and capitalize
'Trinity'. But in consideration of the sense of the word which means to
extend its meaning beyond Christianity ... that we omit the article and not
capitalize 'trinity'. Does that make sense?


Yes, I will try to keep this in mind going forward--and also try to refrain
from further theological nitpicking accordingly. :-)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 4:32 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> JAS: I drafted this post last night, only to see this morning your comment
> that you "would prefer not to get into theological discussions as such," so
> I hope that you will bear with my responses that fall into that category.
>
>
> I too 'lapsed' into theology in my second post to Mary L. last night, a
> bit of theological diagramming meant to suggest that the person of the
> Spirit could and ought figure more prominently in theological discussions,
> might even--as some have suggested (yet I would tend to strongly agree with
> you, incorrectly) be associated with Mary as the Mother of God. I should
> have sent that message to Mary L. off-list. I would indeed like to keep
> this as non-theological a discussion as is possible, although I'm beginning
> to see how difficult, perhaps impossible to do.
>
>
> JAS: Again, Peirce defined (and rejected) the "doctrine of an immanent
> deity" as the proposition that the Universe either *is* God or *is in* God;
> i.e., the Universe is either *identical to* God or *part of* God, "in
> organic connection with" Him.  Traditional Christian theology likewise
> *denies *this, instead affirming that God is transcendent, but also* in
> the Universe*--i.e., omnipresent--which is why it is possible to become
> *acquainted* with God to some degree through "contemplation and study of
> the physico-psychical universe" (CP 6.502; c. 1906).
>
>
> I guess this particular exchange will have to be at least in part a
> theological discussion as your post was written in that vein and I will
> respond in kind.
>
> I would say that there are those, and not only Christians, who are willing
> to entertain the idea of the Cosmic Christ--who see this Cosmic Christ as
> active in the Kosmos today and, indeed, always and forever, from the
> beginning to the end of time--and so, as some commentators have argued,
> even before the man, Jesus, appeared in the world. It seems to me that at
> least aspects of this idea find a place in certain schools of Christian
> theology as well.
>
> You have already strongly suggested that you are more than hesitant to
> seriously entertain the idea of the Cosmic Christ, indeed I have a strong
> sense that you reject it on conservative Christian theological grounds.
> But, if one does sees the Trinity as strongly suggesting that, while the
> first person of the Trinity, the Creator, God the Father, is *not *immanent,
> yet the second person, Christ *is*, then the notion of traditional
> theology that "God is transcendent, but also* in the Universe*
> -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

I have always had trouble with Peirce's universes. I am awash in theories
and accounts and descriptions from everywhere because I spend time
listening to and reading this and that. Multiple universes. Untold size of
all. I sense Peirce could be talking about universe in a sense of a pocket
or area of this or that. If that is so that is simply a way of talking
about relative things. I could say Tolerance Helpfulness and Democracy are
not simply terms I suggest to suggest a range of ethical reflection but
universes of human response to the elements of this Ethics triad. Universe
implies all and I can live with universality as the All  we can approach
but not fully fathom, etc. But when Peirce posits three I wonder what he
means. I really pass them by.


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On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 3:51 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/18/2019 12:30 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being
> > taken out of context, then that person has the burden of showing
> > that this is the case, not merely /asserting/ it.
>
> Absolutely!  That is an essential part of the methodeutic.
>
> > what I see is a Percept that has no parts, which I then interpret
> > by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects to formulate
> > the Propositional Judgment, "That is a rock.
>
> No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full context.
> Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are
> physical things.
>
> Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce
> defined for the Century Dictionary.  Each one defines 'sign'
> as a physical thing.  None of them mentions the word 'percept'.
>
> If Peirce's technical sense of the word 'sign' were inconsistent
> with *every* sense by everybody (including himself in nontechnical
> usage), that would be a gross violation of his ethics of terminology.
>
> > if the entire Universe--i.e., all three Universes of Experience,
> > taken together--is a Sign, then what is its Object?  Clearly it
> > cannot be anything within any or all of the three Universes,
> > so it must be something outside them.
>
> Wait a minute.  In the paragraph above, you denied that physical things
> can be signs.  And in this one, you claim that the physical universe is
> a sign.  You can't have it both ways.
>
> In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with signs, if
> it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448).  The word 'perfuse'
> is rare:  it only occurs once in CP.  The clause beginning with 'if'
> is tentative, and being composed of signs is not the same as being
> a sign.   Nothing about that quotation is clear, and Peirce did not
> mention God or any aspect of God in the surrounding context.
>
> Finally, since 5.448 is silent about God, a Satanist could take your
> argument, replace every occurrence of the word 'God' with the word
> 'Satan' and conclude that Satan is the creator.  The ability to
> derive two contradictory propositions Q and not-Q from P is a
> reductio ad absurdum that demonstrates the falsehood of P.
>
> > To make bald assertions without offering any supporting
> > argumentation violates every principle of responsible scholarship.
>
> I'm delighted that you agree.
>
> And as we have seen, there is no supporting argumentation
> for the claim that CP 5.448 implies that God is the creator.
>
> As Stephen said, "Enough already."
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

 JAS:  If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being
taken out of context, then that person has the burden of *showing *that
this is the case, not merely *asserting *it.

JFS:  Absolutely!  That is an essential part of the methodeutic.


I am glad that we agree about this, but then ...

JFS:  No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full context.


This is yet another bald assertion, with no supporting argumentation from
Peirce's writings

JFS:  Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are
physical things.


Please provide a few of those examples to clarify and substantiate this
claim.

JFS:  Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce defined
for the Century Dictionary.


I would be glad to do so, if you would be so kind as to quote them.

JFS:  Each one defines 'sign' as a physical thing.  None of them mentions
the word 'percept'.


That seems dubious, since Peirce clearly considered Qualisigns/Tones and
Legisigns/Types to be Signs, not just Sinsigns/Tokens; and he stated quite
plainly that a Seme is a Sign and a Percept is a Seme (cf. CP 4.537-539;
1906), which entails that a Percept is a Sign.

JFS:  Wait a minute.  In the paragraph above, you denied that physical
things can be signs.  And in this one, you claim that the physical universe
is a sign.  You can't have it both ways.


Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can be signs"?  In
your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the Sign, it is the Object
of the Sign; but we could easily construct a *different *scenario in which
the rock is a Sign of something else--perhaps a treasure that is buried
below it.  I have acknowledged on multiple occasions that anything is a
Sign of itself in a *trivial *sense, but unless it *represents *something
else (Object) to something else (Interpretant)--i.e., *mediates *between
two other correlates--it is not properly called a *Sign*.

JFS:  In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with signs,
if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448).  The word 'perfuse'
is rare:  it only occurs once in CP.  The clause beginning with 'if' is
tentative, and being composed of signs is not the same as being a sign.


I agree that Peirce did not *assert *in the quoted statement (CP 5.448n1p5,
EP 2:394; 1906) that the Universe is *composed *of Signs, only that it
is *perfused
*with Signs, although the sentence construction implies that he would not
have been surprised one bit if it turned out to be "composed exclusively of
signs" after all.  Note also *which *universe Peirce had in mind--"not
merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing
the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all
accustomed to refer to as 'the truth.'"  That is reminiscent of the
following.

CSP:  The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact,
will be *that Universe in its aspect as a sign*, the "Truth" of being. The
"Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is *the ultimate
interpretant of every sign*. (EP 2:304; 1904, bold added)


Moreover, if the entire Universe *is *composed of Signs, then Peirce's
theorem of the science of semeiotics entails that the entire Universe
constitutes *one *Sign.  For more on that, please see what I just posted in
the other thread, including the fact that Peirce *explicitly *stated, "the
entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or
less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).

JFS:  Nothing about that quotation is clear, and Peirce did not mention God
or any aspect of God in the surrounding context.


I never claimed otherwise.  At most, that particular statement only
provides partial warrant for my minor premiss, which is that the entire
Universe is a Sign.

JFS:  Finally, since 5.448 is silent about God, a Satanist could take your
argument, replace every occurrence of the word 'God' with the word 'Satan'
and conclude that Satan is the creator.


God only enters my Semeiotic Argumentation *after *its deductive
conclusion, which is that the entire Universe is determined by an Object
other than itself.  Anyone is welcome to claim that Satan (or anything
else) is that Object, but thereby accepts the burden of making a case for
it based on the *attributes *that such an Object *must *have.  I suspect
that it would amount to nothing more than *equating *the proper names
"Satan" and "God."

JFS:  And as we have seen, there is no supporting argumentation for the
claim that CP 5.448 implies that God is the creator.


By itself, of course not; again, only to the extent that it serves as one
of *several *premisses in a supporting argumentation that I have now
presented, expounded, and defended at considerable length.  Taking my own
statements out of context is just as inappropriate as doing so with
Peirce's statements.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosop

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

You wrote:

JAS: I drafted this post last night, only to see this morning your comment
that you "would prefer not to get into theological discussions as such," so
I hope that you will bear with my responses that fall into that category.


I too 'lapsed' into theology in my second post to Mary L. last night, a bit
of theological diagramming meant to suggest that the person of the Spirit
could and ought figure more prominently in theological discussions, might
even--as some have suggested (yet I would tend to strongly agree with you,
incorrectly) be associated with Mary as the Mother of God. I should have
sent that message to Mary L. off-list. I would indeed like to keep this as
non-theological a discussion as is possible, although I'm beginning to see
how difficult, perhaps impossible to do.


JAS: Again, Peirce defined (and rejected) the "doctrine of an immanent
deity" as the proposition that the Universe either *is* God or *is in* God;
i.e., the Universe is either *identical to* God or *part of* God, "in
organic connection with" Him.  Traditional Christian theology likewise
*denies *this, instead affirming that God is transcendent, but also* in the
Universe*--i.e., omnipresent--which is why it is possible to become
*acquainted* with God to some degree through "contemplation and study of
the physico-psychical universe" (CP 6.502; c. 1906).


I guess this particular exchange will have to be at least in part a
theological discussion as your post was written in that vein and I will
respond in kind.

I would say that there are those, and not only Christians, who are willing
to entertain the idea of the Cosmic Christ--who see this Cosmic Christ as
active in the Kosmos today and, indeed, always and forever, from the
beginning to the end of time--and so, as some commentators have argued,
even before the man, Jesus, appeared in the world. It seems to me that at
least aspects of this idea find a place in certain schools of Christian
theology as well.

You have already strongly suggested that you are more than hesitant to
seriously entertain the idea of the Cosmic Christ, indeed I have a strong
sense that you reject it on conservative Christian theological grounds.
But, if one does sees the Trinity as strongly suggesting that, while the
first person of the Trinity, the Creator, God the Father, is *not *immanent,
yet the second person, Christ *is*, then the notion of traditional theology
that "God is transcendent, but also* in the Universe*--i.e., omnipresent"
takes on a nuanced, perhaps very different meaning. Similarly, this
Biblical phrase you quoted will have a radically different meaning from
traditional Christian theology from the trinitarian perspective:

JAS: Yet he is actually not far from each one of us, for "In him we live
and move and have our being." (Acts 17:24-28)


It is in the second person of the Trinity, Christ, that "we live and move
and have out being" in the trinitarians view.

I won't get further into a theological discussion by reflecting here on the
several Old and New Testament passages you've cited in support of the
traditional notion that we know God through the prophets, and especially
through his Son, Jesus, who lived amongst us for a time. The idea that we
also know God through reflections on nature does have resonance for the
trinitarian option especially when we consider it in light of science, and
especially Peirce's sciences of semeiotic and metaphysics.

Jon quoted me and then commented.

GR:  For there are many trusted accounts (plus adjunct records, deeds,
marriage licenses, etc.) of those who *did* know Peirce personally, did
have direct collateral knowledge of him.


JAS: This does not change the fact that *our* knowledge of Peirce *today* is
entirely dependent on *indirect* experience *mediated* by Signs.  Besides,
there are many trusted accounts of those who knew *God* personally, who had
direct Collateral Experience of *Him*; those who trust those accounts call
them Scriptures, and many even today would also claim to have had, and to
continue having, such experiences.  I understand Peirce's "Humble Argument"
to rely on this.


Again, we're getting into traditional theology when we say that the
accounts of the God come from the "many trusted accounts of those who knew
*God* personally, who had direct Collateral Experience of *Him."  *Not only
is this not necessarily the precise view of even those Christians who do
not subscribe to traditional theological views, but to hold strictly to it
doesn't allow for the trinitarian option to apply even more universally,
beyond traditional Christian theology; and not only to those Christians who
are not traditionalists but, beyond that, to those who would entertain the
trinitarian view as potentially helping to bridge the gap between all
religion and science.

JAS: The Blackboard represents the primordial reality, what you have
sometimes called the "ur-continuity" (3ns).  The Whiteboard is a melded
group of white marks *on *t

Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  Again, I think one can get entrapped in the differentiation between a
Representamen, understood as the mediating node of the triad of O-R-I and
the Sign, understood as the full triad - AND - the use of the term 'sign'
to refer only to the mediating Representamen.


Again, I disagree with this particular use of terminology and the
associated model of semeiosis, but I see no need to revisit that well-worn
path.  In Peirce's usage, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental
Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903) or the
two terms are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).

ET:  Therefore, the Universe is self-organizing; it has no boundaries or
horizons and there is nothing 'outside of it'.


The word "therefore" implies that this is the conclusion of an
argumentation.  What are the premisses from which it *necessarily follows *that
the Universe is self-organizing, and that there is nothing outside of it?

ET:  Furthermore, I question the idea that, so to speak, 'if there is a
Sign connected to another Sign, then all Signs are 'as one'. [Please
provide a reference].


I must admit some mild frustration at this request, because I have given
the citation many times before, and only omitted it in this case because I
assumed that it was unnecessary by now.  Nevertheless, here is a longer
excerpt to provide both the context and Peirce's own explication of the key
statement.

CSP:  The process [of semeiosis] rather reminds one of the reproduction of
a population,--sufficiently so, indeed, to furnish a convenient store of
metaphors requisite for the expression of its relations.  Naturally, such
metaphors, greatly serviceable though they are, are like edge-tools, not to
be entrusted to babies or to fools or to the immature.  There is a science
of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion
than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems increases the aptness
of that simile.  It is that *if any signs are connected, no matter how, the
resulting system constitutes one sign*; so that, most connections resulting
from successive pairings, a sign frequently interprets a second in so far
as this is "married" to a third.  Thus, the conclusion of a syllogism is
the interpretation of either premiss as married to the other; and of this
sort are all the principal translation-processes of thought.  In the light
of the above theorem, we see that the entire thought-life of any one person
is a sign; and a considerable part of its interpretation will result from
marriages with the thoughts of other persons.  So the thought-life of a
social group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a sign,
supposing all thought to be more or less connected. (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c.
1904, bold added)


The illustrative example that Peirce provided is an Argument--specifically,
a syllogism--and he went on to state explicitly that "the entire body of
all thought is a sign" (singular).  Since we seem to agree that every Sign
is determined by an Object other than itself, what could be the Object of
"the entire body of all thought"?

ET:  I question the ability of the Universe to actually reduce its
complexity to ONE Sign - given that the Universe operates within not one
categorial mode/universe [ie of Thirdness] but within THREE modes:
Firstness, Secondness AND Thirdness.


Treating the Universe--or for that matter, "the entire body of all
thought"--as *one *Sign does not at all "reduce its complexity."  Consider
what Peirce went on to say about the Universe immediately after calling it
"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities."

CSP:  Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices
of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions
and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the
Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP
2:193-194; 1903)


3ns always *involves *2ns and 1ns.  Every Symbol *involves *Indices and
Icons.  Every Argument *involves *Propositions and Semes.  Calling the
Universe a Symbol and an Argument (both singular) does not in any way *reduce
*its complexity, but rather *recognizes *its complexity--an Argument
is the *most
complex* kind of Sign that there is!  Nevertheless, like any other Sign, it
must be determined by an Object other than itself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 2:35 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> Again, I think one can get entrapped in the differentiation between a
> Representamen, understood as the mediating node of the triad of O-R-I and
> the Sign, understood as the full triad - AND - the use of the term 'sign'
> to refer only to the mediating Representamen.
>
> Peirce's comment is that 'the universe is a vast repre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[John F Sowa]

On 5/18/2019 12:30 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

If someone wishes to claim that a particular statement is being
taken out of context, then that person has the burden of showing
that this is the case, not merely /asserting/ it.


Absolutely!  That is an essential part of the methodeutic.


what I see is a Percept that has no parts, which I then interpret
by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects to formulate
the Propositional Judgment, "That is a rock.


No. That claim is another example of ignoring the full context.
Note that the great majority of Peirce's examples of signs are
physical things.

Also look at the eleven senses of the word 'sign' that Peirce
defined for the Century Dictionary.  Each one defines 'sign'
as a physical thing.  None of them mentions the word 'percept'.

If Peirce's technical sense of the word 'sign' were inconsistent
with *every* sense by everybody (including himself in nontechnical
usage), that would be a gross violation of his ethics of terminology.


if the entire Universe--i.e., all three Universes of Experience,
taken together--is a Sign, then what is its Object?  Clearly it
cannot be anything within any or all of the three Universes,
so it must be something outside them.


Wait a minute.  In the paragraph above, you denied that physical things
can be signs.  And in this one, you claim that the physical universe is
a sign.  You can't have it both ways.

In any case, Peirce said "all this universe is perfused with signs, if
it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448).  The word 'perfuse'
is rare:  it only occurs once in CP.  The clause beginning with 'if'
is tentative, and being composed of signs is not the same as being
a sign.   Nothing about that quotation is clear, and Peirce did not
mention God or any aspect of God in the surrounding context.

Finally, since 5.448 is silent about God, a Satanist could take your
argument, replace every occurrence of the word 'God' with the word
'Satan' and conclude that Satan is the creator.  The ability to
derive two contradictory propositions Q and not-Q from P is a
reductio ad absurdum that demonstrates the falsehood of P.


To make bald assertions without offering any supporting
argumentation violates every principle of responsible scholarship.


I'm delighted that you agree.

And as we have seen, there is no supporting argumentation
for the claim that CP 5.448 implies that God is the creator.

As Stephen said, "Enough already."

John

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Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

Again, I think one can get entrapped in the differentiation between
a Representamen, understood as the mediating node of the triad of
O-R-I and the Sign, understood as the full triad - AND - the use of
the term 'sign' to refer only to the mediating Representamen. 

Peirce's comment is that 'the universe is a vast representamen, a
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" 5.119and goes on to further define the Universe as 'an
argument' [5.119] and "The Universe as an argument is necessarily a
great work of art, a great poem" 5.119

My reading of the above is that the Universe is most certainly not
'just' the mediative node of the Representamen in the triad of O-R-I,
for as I've said, the Representamen has no existentiality of its own
but operates within a triad - but the Universe is - as he states, as
a whole - an Argument, composed of all three nodes of the
Object-Representamen-Interpretant within a mode of Thirdness, i.e., a
rational process of Mind interacting with Objects [which are also
functioning in their own semiosic triads] and producing
Interpretants...which become Objects and so on. Within this vast
Argument, all the other classes of semiosis are operating.

Therefore, the Universe is self-organizing; it has no boundaries or
horizons and there is nothing 'outside of it'. Therefore, I don't
agree with the view of JAS that the Universe has boundaries and that
God is a reality outside of it.

Furthermore, I question the idea that, so to speak, 'if there is a
Sign connected to another Sign, then all Signs are 'as one'. [Please
provide a reference].

 Most certainly, the reality of the process of semiosis is 'the
tendency to take habits' i.e., to generalize, which leads to the
result that all instances of this generalized law are somewhat
similar Signs [triads]. So, all members of one species are 'somewhat
similar'. BUT, at the same time, the facts of Nature are that another
reality of the process of semiosis is the action of instantiation
where the individual 'token' of the 'type' emerges in its haecceity
of 'here and now'. AND another reality of the process of semiosis is
the function of Firstness with its deviation from the law. 

That is - I question the ability of the Universe to actually reduce
its complexity to ONE Sign - given that the Universe operates within
not one categorial mode/universe [ie of Thirdness] but within THREE
modes: Firstness, Secondness AND Thirdness. Therefore - I don't see
how the Universe, which is a constant process of generating triadic
Signs [O-R-I] can reduce this process to either the Representamen [
as JAS seems to suggest with its need for the external Object] or
even, to one triadic Sign.  

Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19  2:16 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon, Edwina, List,
 Jon wrote:
 JAS: Again, besides stating plainly that "the Universe is a vast
representamen" . . . Peirce affirmed that "if any signs are
connected, no matter how, the resulting  system constitutes one sign"
. . . calling this a theorem of the science of semeiotics.  Any
Argument is a Sign, and it is also a continuous process of semeiosis;
the two labels are not mutually exclusive. 
 Let's also recall that Peirce would refer to such things as a
complete play (say, Hamlet) or a novel (say, War and Peace) as a
Symbol. I have little doubt that he would see even the 11 volumes of
Will and Ariel Durant's Story of Civilization taken together as a
single Symbol and it many translations into languages other than
English as replicas of that Symbol. 
 Indeed, Peirce would write that even an entire language, including
its modifications and evolution over centuries is a Symbol. The
Universe as Symbol is for Peirce but, shall we say, the ultimate
Symbol, and the ultimate "continuous process of semeiosis" (JAS).
 Best,
  Gary R
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
 [1]
Virus-free. www.avg.com 
 On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 1:04 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Edwina, List: 
 ET:  I deny that the Universe is a Sign.  My view is that Peirce did
not say that the "Universe is a Sign'.
 I sincerely appreciate this straightforward acknowledgement, and I
understand your position while continuing to disagree with it.
 Again, besides stating plainly that "the Universe is a vast
representamen" (which you interpret as metaphorical), Peirce affirmed
that "if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting  system
constitutes one sign" (emphasis mine), calling this a theorem of the
science of semeiotics.  Any Argument is a Sign, and it is also a
continuous process of semeiosis; the two labels are not mutually
exclusive.  Moreover, calling the Universe a Sign is in no way
treating it as a "thing," sin

Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, List,

Jon wrote:

JAS: Again, besides stating plainly that "the Universe is a vast
representamen" . . . Peirce affirmed that "if any signs are connected, no
matter how, the resulting *system* constitutes one sign" . . . calling this
a *theorem *of the science of semeiotics.  Any Argument is a Sign, and it
is also a continuous *process *of semeiosis; the two labels are not
mutually exclusive.


Let's also recall that Peirce would refer to such things as a complete play
(say, *Hamlet*) or a novel (say, *War and Peace*) as a Symbol. I have
little doubt that he would see even the 11 volumes of Will and Ariel
Durant's *Story of Civilization* *taken together* as a single Symbol and it
many translations into languages other than English as replicas of that
Symbol.

Indeed, Peirce would write that even *an entire language*, including its
modifications and evolution over centuries is a Symbol. The Universe as
Symbol is for Peirce but, shall we say, the ultimate Symbol, *and* the
ultimate "continuous process of semeiosis" (JAS).

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*





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On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 1:04 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  I deny that the Universe is a Sign.  My view is that Peirce did not
> say that the "Universe is a Sign'.
>
>
> I sincerely appreciate this straightforward acknowledgement, and I
> understand your position while continuing to disagree with it.
>
> Again, besides stating plainly that "the Universe is a vast representamen"
> (which you interpret as metaphorical), Peirce affirmed that "if any signs
> are connected, no matter how, the resulting *system* constitutes one
> sign" (emphasis mine), calling this a *theorem *of the science of
> semeiotics.  Any Argument is a Sign, and it is also a continuous *process
> *of semeiosis; the two labels are not mutually exclusive.  Moreover,
> calling the Universe a Sign is in no way treating it as a "thing," since
> after all, "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904).  Our further
> disagreements about the nature of semeiosis, the definition of
> "Representamen," and whether "Sign" designates a triad or a correlate are
> well-documented; so we need not rehash them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:23 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> I am going to only focus on the meaning of 'sign' and 'semiosis. That is,
>> I will refer only to one of JAS's comment below:
>>
>>  " Do you therefore deny that the Universe is a Sign?  Or do you view
>> something other than God as its Object?  Or do you simply think that Peirce
>> was wrong about every Sign being strictly passive in relation to its
>> Object?  Rejecting the impassibility of God leaves only those three
>> options, as far as I can tell."
>>
>> ET: I  deny that the Universe is a Sign. My view is that Peirce did not
>> say that the "Universe is a Sign' . He wrote: "the entire universe - not
>> merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing
>> the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all
>> accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused
>> with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" 5.449f.
>>
>> I read the above phrase of 'perfused with signs'  to refer to the dynamic
>> irreducible semiosic process of transforming data from objects, via the
>> representamen, into interpretants. This constant plethora of triadic
>> processes, IS the universe.
>>
>> I don't reduce this action of semiosis to a 'thing'; i.e., I don't reduce
>> this triadic semiosis process to ONE Sign. And I think we also have to be
>> careful of what is meant by the term of 'sign'. Do we mean the full triad
>> of O-R-I? Or, the mediative process of the Representamen? So- if we are, by
>> the term of 'Sign' meaning the full triad, then, I don't reduce the
>> plethora of signs to ONE triad. And if we mean the Representamen, then,
>> again, I don't reduce the mediative action to ONE action. I agree that the
>> Representamen is passive to the Object, but it transforms this input data
>> into an Interpretant information - which triad is a Sign.
>>
>> The step that JAS takes, - which is, I consider, regressive and
>> reductionist, does reduce the whole 'perfusion of signs' - to not merely
>> one sign, but to a conclusion that the Universe IS a Sign [full triad or
>> representamen? - I'm guessing - Representamen].
>>
>> Can one really conclude that the Unive

Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I deny that the Universe is a Sign.  My view is that Peirce did not
say that the "Universe is a Sign'.


I sincerely appreciate this straightforward acknowledgement, and I
understand your position while continuing to disagree with it.

Again, besides stating plainly that "the Universe is a vast representamen"
(which you interpret as metaphorical), Peirce affirmed that "if any signs
are connected, no matter how, the resulting *system* constitutes one sign"
(emphasis mine), calling this a *theorem *of the science of semeiotics.
Any Argument is a Sign, and it is also a continuous *process *of semeiosis;
the two labels are not mutually exclusive.  Moreover, calling the Universe
a Sign is in no way treating it as a "thing," since after all, "a sign is
not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904).  Our further disagreements about the
nature of semeiosis, the definition of "Representamen," and whether "Sign"
designates a triad or a correlate are well-documented; so we need not
rehash them.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:23 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I am going to only focus on the meaning of 'sign' and 'semiosis. That is,
> I will refer only to one of JAS's comment below:
>
>  " Do you therefore deny that the Universe is a Sign?  Or do you view
> something other than God as its Object?  Or do you simply think that Peirce
> was wrong about every Sign being strictly passive in relation to its
> Object?  Rejecting the impassibility of God leaves only those three
> options, as far as I can tell."
>
> ET: I  deny that the Universe is a Sign. My view is that Peirce did not
> say that the "Universe is a Sign' . He wrote: "the entire universe - not
> merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing
> the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all
> accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused
> with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" 5.449f.
>
> I read the above phrase of 'perfused with signs'  to refer to the dynamic
> irreducible semiosic process of transforming data from objects, via the
> representamen, into interpretants. This constant plethora of triadic
> processes, IS the universe.
>
> I don't reduce this action of semiosis to a 'thing'; i.e., I don't reduce
> this triadic semiosis process to ONE Sign. And I think we also have to be
> careful of what is meant by the term of 'sign'. Do we mean the full triad
> of O-R-I? Or, the mediative process of the Representamen? So- if we are, by
> the term of 'Sign' meaning the full triad, then, I don't reduce the
> plethora of signs to ONE triad. And if we mean the Representamen, then,
> again, I don't reduce the mediative action to ONE action. I agree that the
> Representamen is passive to the Object, but it transforms this input data
> into an Interpretant information - which triad is a Sign.
>
> The step that JAS takes, - which is, I consider, regressive and
> reductionist, does reduce the whole 'perfusion of signs' - to not merely
> one sign, but to a conclusion that the Universe IS a Sign [full triad or
> representamen? - I'm guessing - Representamen].
>
> Can one really conclude that the Universe is not a full triadic process
> but is instead, only the mediative process - which requires an external
> Object to even exist as such? After all, the Representamen, that mediative
> process, does not exist per se, it functions only within the triadic
> semiosic process. Is the Universe only the mediative process? That seems
> illogical. Even if, in its generalizing nature, the sign/representamen
> generalizes among many other signs/representamens to coalesce into a
> commonality - this still doesn't mean that it 'exists on its own'.
>
> The way I read Peirce's statement is that the entire Universe is NOT a
> SIGN; it is a semiosic process generating a plethora of triadic signs- and
> even, different representamens/laws. Therefore, there is no external realm
> to the Universe; it is self-sufficient and self-generating.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  This is not Peirce's account.  It is a JAS account that has no basis
in anything that Peirce wrote.


I have provided ample evidence from Peirce's writings that on his account,
a Sign has *no effect at all* on its (Dynamic) Object.  If you believe that
I am somehow misrepresenting him, then please make your case accordingly.

JFS:  Please see my response in the other thread.


Ditto.

JFS:  To put words in Peirce's mouth violates every principle of
responsible scholarship.


To make bald assertions without offering any supporting argumentation
violates every principle of responsible scholarship.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 10:00 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/18/2019 10:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > On Peirce's account, if the Universe has /any effect at all/ on God,
> > then it /cannot/ be a Sign whose Object is God.  Do you therefore deny
> > that the Universe is a Sign?  Or do you view something other than God as
> > its Object?  Or do you simply think that Peirce was /wrong/ about every
> > Sign being strictly passive in relation to its Object?  Rejecting the
> > impassibility of God leaves only those three options, as far as I can
> tell.
>
> This is not Peirce's account.
>
> It is a JAS account that has no basis in anything that Peirce wrote.
>
> Please see the note on methodeutic.
>
> To put words in Peirce's mouth violates every principle of
> responsible scholarship.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  The practice of quoting clouds of words out of context is useless for
resolving any questions about what Peirce meant.


It is not feasible in an e-mail discussion, or even in a scholarly paper of
reasonable length, to provide extensive excerpts that include the complete
context of every quote.  If someone wishes to claim that a particular
statement is being taken out of context, then that person has the burden of
*showing *that this is the case, not merely *asserting* it.

JFS:  When you see a rock, the thing you see is a sign that it exists where
you happen to see it.


No, what I *see *is a Percept that has no parts, which I then *interpret *by
prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects to formulate the
Propositional Judgment, "That is a rock."

JFS:  The sign you see is the form of a rock.


No, the Form is not the Sign itself; rather, the Form is what is *communicated
*from the Object (rock) through the Sign (Percept) to the Interpretant
(Perceptual Judgment).

JFS:  Neither the predicate nor the index nor the proposition is the rock.


Right, and *none *of those Signs has *any effect whatsoever* on the rock
itself, which is the Dynamic Object that determines them.

JFS:  It shows that nothing in Peirce's semeiotic justifies the assumption
that any sign about anything in the universe of actuality implies anything
outside that universe.


Maybe, but if the *entire *Universe--i.e., *all three* Universes of
Experience, taken together--is a Sign, then what is *its *Object?  Clearly
it cannot be anything *within *any or all of the three Universes, so it
must be something *outside *them.  The only alternative is to deny, *contra
*Peirce, that the Universe is a Sign.

JFS:   But the claim that anything in Peirce's semeiotic implies anything
pro or con about God is unjustified.


On the contrary, my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God
*demonstrates
*otherwise, unless there is another candidate to be the Object of the
Universe as a Sign--something *external *to it, *independent *of it,
and *unaffected
*by it.  Again, as with any deductive argumentation, anyone who rejects the
conclusion is *rationally required* to deny at least one of the
premisses--each of which Peirce *explicitly *affirmed.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:08 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Jon,
>
> ET
> > And again - all we are doing is quoting the same passages to each
> > other, and interpreting them in different ways. I suggest we allow
> > each other the 'grace' to do this - rather than insisting that one
> > or the other is 'right' - and the other is a 'misinterpretation.
>
> Yes.  The practice of quoting clouds of words out of context
> is useless for resolving any questions about what Peirce meant.
> To avoid endless debates, I suggest a methodeutic for analyzing
> the quotations and determining their relevance.
>
> For Peirce, logic and mathematics are a solid and dependable
> foundation.  If there is any dispute of any kind, translate the
> interpretation to EGs as a check.  If the dispute is about EGs,
> translate the EGs to Peirce's algebraic notation and/or the
> equivalent in any of the more recent notations.
>
> Finally, if the dispute is about Peirce's technical terminology,
> translate the questions to ordinary language and use commonsense
> examples that can be stated without any of his technical terms.
> Analyze those examples without those terms.  Then determine how
> and whether those terms could clarify the issues.
>
> JAS
> > Whether or how any particular Instance of a Sign is actually
> > interpreted has no bearing whatsoever on what its Dynamic
> > object is.  Different Dynamic Interpretants can...
> >
> > CSP:  In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is
> > to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an
> > effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected.
> > (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>
> This is just one of eight short quotations, all taken out of contexts
> in which Peirce never denies the obvious:  When you see a rock, the
> thing you see is a sign that it exists where you happen to see it.
> That is the commonsense example.
>
> For the context, note the continuation of EP 2:544n22:  "That which
> is communicated from the object through the Sign to the Interpretant
> is the Form."  The sign you see is the form of a rock.  That form
> defines a monadic predicate.  The direction of your gaze determines
> an index of the rock's position.  That index, combined with the
> predicate, determines the proposition "There is a rock at the
> location and position where I'm looking."
>
> Neither the predicate nor the index nor the proposition is the rock.
> But parts of the statement of the proposition (in English or an EG)
> refer to the rock and to its location.  That kind of knowledg

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[John F Sowa]

On 5/18/2019 11:47 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:

There is the All or the Infinite (Dodson) or God or any other
name for an inner light in each one of us which is connected to
the absolute. Anything else complexifies, or even worse, erects
a route by which enlightenment must be attained with reference
to things that are not absolute but claimed to be.


I agree.  Buddhists use the analogy of a finger pointing to the
moon.  The writings are like the finger.  If you concentrate too
hard on the finger, you won't see the moon.

Many years ago, I attended an informal seminar with Houston Smith
as the speaker.  HS was a professor of religion who had written
books comparing different traditions.  Buddhism was one of his
specialties.

In the talk, he described a summer that he and his wife had spent
at a Buddhist monastery in Japan.  But he admitted that his wife had
attained Enlightenment (as certified by the head of the monastery),
but he didn't.  HS himself, with his deep scholarship, may have been
captivated by the finger.


One reason it is difficult to arrive at unanimity is that often
words or phrases become absolutes when they are patently not.
Enough already.


I very strongly agree.

John

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Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
am going to only focus on the meaning of 'sign' and 'semiosis. That
is, I will refer only to one of JAS's comment below:

 " Do you therefore deny that the Universe is a Sign?  Or do you
view something other than God as its Object?  Or do you simply think
that Peirce was wrong about every Sign being strictly passive in
relation to its Object?  Rejecting the impassibility of God leaves
only those three options, as far as I can tell."

ET: I  deny that the Universe is a Sign. My view is that Peirce did
not say that the "Universe is a Sign' . He wrote: "the entire
universe - not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider
universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe
which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this
universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of
signs" 5.449f.

I read the above phrase of 'perfused with signs'  to refer to the
dynamic irreducible semiosic process of transforming data from
objects, via the representamen, into interpretants. This constant
plethora of triadic processes, IS the universe. 

I don't reduce this action of semiosis to a 'thing'; i.e., I don't
reduce this triadic semiosis process to ONE Sign. And I think we also
have to be careful of what is meant by the term of 'sign'. Do we mean
the full triad of O-R-I? Or, the mediative process of the
Representamen? So- if we are, by the term of 'Sign' meaning the full
triad, then, I don't reduce the plethora of signs to ONE triad. And
if we mean the Representamen, then, again, I don't reduce the
mediative action to ONE action. I agree that the Representamen is
passive to the Object, but it transforms this input data into an
Interpretant information - which triad is a Sign.

The step that JAS takes, - which is, I consider, regressive and
reductionist, does reduce the whole 'perfusion of signs' - to not
merely one sign, but to a conclusion that the Universe IS a Sign
[full triad or representamen? - I'm guessing - Representamen].

Can one really conclude that the Universe is not a full triadic
process but is instead, only the mediative process - which requires
an external Object to even exist as such? After all, the
Representamen, that mediative process, does not exist per se, it
functions only within the triadic semiosic process. Is the Universe
only the mediative process? That seems illogical. Even if, in its
generalizing nature, the sign/representamen generalizes among many
other signs/representamens to coalesce into a commonality - this
still doesn't mean that it 'exists on its own'. 

The way I read Peirce's statement is that the entire Universe is NOT
a SIGN; it is a semiosic process generating a plethora of triadic
signs- and even, different representamens/laws. Therefore, there is
no external realm to the Universe; it is self-sufficient and
self-generating. 

Edwina
 On Sat 18/05/19 10:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 I drafted this post last night, only to see this morning your
comment that you "would prefer not to get into theological
discussions as such," so I hope that you will bear with my responses
that fall into that category. 
 GR:  ...  one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while
Christ (the Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know
God the Father through God the Son.
 Again, Peirce defined (and rejected) the "doctrine of an immanent
deity" as the proposition that the Universe either is God or is in
God; i.e., the Universe is either  identical to God or part of God,
"in organic connection with" Him.  Traditional Christian theology
likewise denies this, instead affirming that God is transcendent, but
also in the Universe--i.e., omnipresent--which is why it is possible
to become acquainted with God to some degree through "contemplation
and study of the physico-psychical universe" (CP 6.502; c. 1906).
  The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims
his handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night
reveals knowledge. There is no speech, nor are there words, whose
voice is not heard. Their voice goes out through all the earth, and
their words to the end of the world. (Psalm 19:1-4) 
 The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of
heaven and earth, does not live in temples made by man, nor is he
served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself
gives to all mankind life and breath and everything. And he made from
one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth,
having determined allotted periods and the boundaries of their
dwelling place, that they should seek God, and perhaps feel their way
toward him and find him. Yet he is actually not far from each one of
us, for "In him we live and move and have our being." (Acts 17:24-28)

 For what can be known abo

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Another of my posts that requires no reply. You all make this too complex.
There is the All or the Infinite (Dodson) or God or any other name for an
inner light in each one of us which is connected to the absolute. Anything
else complexifies, or even worse, erects a route by which enlightenment
must be attained with reference to things that are not absolute but claimed
to be. Anything but the All or the Infinite, etc. is a relative item on a
spectrum of relatives or energies. To make absolutes of such is what I call
binary thinking and I think it is what Peirce may have put under the term
dualism or dyadic. One reason it is difficult to arrive at unanimity is
that often words or phrases become absolutes when they are patently not.
Enough already. S
Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
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On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 10:49 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I drafted this post last night, only to see this morning your comment that
> you "would prefer not to get into theological discussions as such," so I
> hope that you will bear with my responses that fall into that category.
>
> GR:  ...  one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while Christ
> (the Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know God the
> Father through God the Son.
>
>
> Again, Peirce defined (and rejected) the "doctrine of an immanent deity"
> as the proposition that the Universe either *is* God or *is in* God;
> i.e., the Universe is either *identical to* God or *part of* God, "in
> organic connection with" Him.  Traditional Christian theology likewise *denies
> *this, instead affirming that God is transcendent, but also* in the
> Universe*--i.e., omnipresent--which is why it is possible to become
> *acquainted* with God to some degree through "contemplation and study of
> the physico-psychical universe" (CP 6.502; c. 1906).
>
> The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his
> handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals
> knowledge. There is no speech, nor are there words, whose voice is not
> heard. Their voice goes out through all the earth, and their words to the
> end of the world. (Psalm 19:1-4)
>
> The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and
> earth, does not live in temples made by man, nor is he served by human
> hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind
> life and breath and everything. And he made from one man every nation of
> mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having determined allotted
> periods and the boundaries of their dwelling place, that they should seek
> God, and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him. Yet he is actually
> not far from each one of us, for "In him we live and move and have our
> being." (Acts 17:24-28)
>
> For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it
> to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine
> nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world,
> in the things that have been made. (Romans 1:19-20)
>
>
> Moreover, "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14).  It is
> primarily in *this* sense that "we come to know God the Father through
> God the Son."
>
> Philip said to him, “Lord, show us the Father, and it is enough for us.”
> Jesus said to him, “Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know
> me, Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show
> us the Father’? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father
> is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority,
> but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the
> Father and the Father is in me, or else believe on account of the works
> themselves." (John 14:8-11)
>
>
> The Son is thus the *supreme* revelation of God, although not the *only*
> one.
>
> Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our fathers by the
> prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he
> appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world.
> He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature,
> and he upholds the universe by the word of his power. (Hebrews 1:1-3)
>
>
> That leads to my next response.
>
> GR:  For there are many trusted accounts (plus adjunct records, deeds,
> marriage licenses, etc.) of those who *did* know Peirce personally, did
> have direct collateral knowledge of him.
>
>
> This does not change the fact that *our* knowledge of Peirce *today* is
> entirely dependent on *indirect* experience *mediated* by Signs.
> Besides, there are many trusted accounts of those who knew *God*
> personally, who had direct Collateral Experience of *Him*; those who
> trust those accounts call them Scriptures, and many even today would also
> claim to 

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Mary, List:

GR:  I am fairly sure that you will get push back in this thread from your
notion that "the trinity is analogous to the concepts of firstness,
secondness, and thirdness of semiotics." Some here will, perhaps, suggest
that, rather, the trinity may be analogous to the three Universes of
Experience of metaphysics.


I think that it is only natural to experiment with comparing the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity to Peirce's three Categories and three Universes of
Experience, which are aligned with each other.  The tricky part is matching
up each Person with a Category/Universe, and it presumably depends (as
usual) on the *purpose *of the analysis.

Probably the most obvious assignment is the Son as 2ns/Actuality, by virtue
of His Incarnation as Jesus of Nazareth.  Is the Father then the divine
1ns/Idea, and the Holy Spirit the 3ns/Sign that unites them?  I have come
across suggestions in the secondary literature that this was basically
Augustine's scheme, where the Holy Spirit is the *love *between the Father
and the Son.  Or is the Father the eternal 3ns/Mind, and the Holy Spirit
the 1ns/Idea that is *involved *in the Father and the Son?  From a slightly
different standpoint, there is the doctrine that Christ is the sole
mediator (3ns) between God (1ns) and humanity (2ns).  It is an interesting
topic for contemplation (Musement?), but seems unlikely to provide
definitive conclusions.

ML:  [Add gender to this. The Virgin Mother as part of God was essential to
the worship of the Middle Ages.]


Although popular piety may have often veered (wrongly) in that direction,
the actual teaching of Christianity was never that Mary was "part of God,"
but always that Mary was the *mother of God* (*theotokos*) by virtue of
being the mother of Jesus, who was God.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:16 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Mary, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> ML: You say "How the Person of the Spirit comes into play is much too
> difficult/subtle to attempt to summarize here.” I totally agree, but I do
> think its absence in our discussion causes some of the (my) confusion. Can
> you explain how The Holy Spirit works in this discussion?
>
> ***GR: I did not mean to suggest that a discussion of the place of the
> Holy Spirit shouldn't figure in this discussion and, eventually, perhaps
> even prominently, especially because it hasn't been given sufficient
> attention, well, most anywhere. But in my very short summary of 'Trinity'
> in context of Peirce's semeiotic and metaphysics,  I found that I was not
> able to say anything meaningful in a few sentences. Of course, more to come.
>
>
> ML: It seems to me an/the essential aspect of God; it is what makes God
> God. There is God the father, God the son. And God the Holy Spirit.
>
> *** I'm glad you've begun the discussion of the place of the Spirit in
> trinitarian thinking, and while I would agree that is is 'an' essential
> aspect of God, I don't see how it could be considered 'the' essential
> aspect'. As you wrote, "There is God the father, God the son. And God the
> Holy Spirit." Since you agree that God is these three persons, I can't see
> how it is that the Spirit "makes God God."  If you could unpack that a bit,
> it would be helpful.
>
> ML: The Nicene Creed, in particular the Filioque doctrine, is very much
> related to our discussion. The Filioque  means “and son”—  and one
> interpretation of the Nicene Creed says that the Holy Spirit proceeded from
> the Father and the Son, not just the Father. The Eastern and Western
> churches split over this difference. And there are controversies in non
> Christian religions. Why does part of the controversy not reverse the order
> and state that the Father and Son proceeded from the Holy Spirit?
>
> ***At this point and, for me at *any *point, I would prefer not to get
> into theological discussions as such. As you noted, the Filioque
> controversy resulted in the schism between the Eastern and Western
> Churches, the Eastern Church holding that the Spirit proceeded from the
> Father alone, the Western Church that the Spirit proceeded from the Father
> and the Son (or, from the Father through the Son). I am concerned that such
> theological discussion could not only muddy the discussion but could get us
> completely off track. Having said that I'd be very interested in why you
> wrote: (1) "there are (related?) controversies in non Christian religions
> (would you give examples of these?) and why you asked (2) "Why does part
> of the controversy not reverse the order and state that the Father and Son
> proceeded from the Holy Spirit?"That is a most provocative question, I
> would say!
>
> ML: In a sense the trinity is analogous to the concepts of firstness,
> secondness, and thirdness of semiotics. And in “Neglected Argument for the
> Re

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[John F Sowa]

On 5/18/2019 10:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
On Peirce's account, if the Universe has /any effect at all/ on God, 
then it /cannot/ be a Sign whose Object is God.  Do you therefore deny 
that the Universe is a Sign?  Or do you view something other than God as 
its Object?  Or do you simply think that Peirce was /wrong/ about every 
Sign being strictly passive in relation to its Object?  Rejecting the 
impassibility of God leaves only those three options, as far as I can tell.


This is not Peirce's account.

It is a JAS account that has no basis in anything that Peirce wrote.

Please see the note on methodeutic.

To put words in Peirce's mouth violates every principle of
responsible scholarship.

John

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Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I drafted this post last night, only to see this morning your comment that
you "would prefer not to get into theological discussions as such," so I
hope that you will bear with my responses that fall into that category.

GR:  ...  one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while Christ (the
Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know God the Father
through God the Son.


Again, Peirce defined (and rejected) the "doctrine of an immanent deity" as
the proposition that the Universe either *is* God or *is in* God; i.e., the
Universe is either *identical to* God or *part of* God, "in organic
connection with" Him.  Traditional Christian theology likewise *denies *this,
instead affirming that God is transcendent, but also* in the
Universe*--i.e., omnipresent--which
is why it is possible to become *acquainted* with God to some degree
through "contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe" (CP
6.502; c. 1906).

The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his
handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals
knowledge. There is no speech, nor are there words, whose voice is not
heard. Their voice goes out through all the earth, and their words to the
end of the world. (Psalm 19:1-4)

The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and
earth, does not live in temples made by man, nor is he served by human
hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind
life and breath and everything. And he made from one man every nation of
mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having determined allotted
periods and the boundaries of their dwelling place, that they should seek
God, and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him. Yet he is actually
not far from each one of us, for "In him we live and move and have our
being." (Acts 17:24-28)

For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it
to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine
nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world,
in the things that have been made. (Romans 1:19-20)


Moreover, "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14).  It is
primarily in *this* sense that "we come to know God the Father through God
the Son."

Philip said to him, “Lord, show us the Father, and it is enough for us.”
Jesus said to him, “Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know
me, Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show
us the Father’? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father
is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own authority,
but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the
Father and the Father is in me, or else believe on account of the works
themselves." (John 14:8-11)


The Son is thus the *supreme* revelation of God, although not the *only*
one.

Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our fathers by the
prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he
appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world.
He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature,
and he upholds the universe by the word of his power. (Hebrews 1:1-3)


That leads to my next response.

GR:  For there are many trusted accounts (plus adjunct records, deeds,
marriage licenses, etc.) of those who *did* know Peirce personally, did
have direct collateral knowledge of him.


This does not change the fact that *our* knowledge of Peirce *today* is
entirely dependent on *indirect* experience *mediated* by Signs.  Besides,
there are many trusted accounts of those who knew *God* personally, who had
direct Collateral Experience of *Him*; those who trust those accounts call
them Scriptures, and many even today would also claim to have had, and to
continue having, such experiences.  I understand Peirce's "Humble Argument"
to rely on this.

GR:  I apologize for apparently getting it backwards, since you write that
it is not the Blackboard, but the Whiteboard that represents "the
particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be" (CSP).


No apology is necessary, but this is still not quite right.  The Blackboard
represents the primordial reality, what you have sometimes called the
"ur-continuity" (3ns).  The Whiteboard is a melded group of white marks *on
*the Blackboard, and represents a Platonic world of pure possibility
(1ns).  A discontinuous mark *on *the Whiteboard represents our particular
actual universe of existence (2ns).

GR:  My trinitarian view is that the Universe is perpetually being acted
upon by that Person of the Trinity which we Christians call the Son, the
Word; that it is through the God the Son that God the Father acts on the
Universe.


To clarify, are you suggesting that it is *only *through the Son, the Word,
that God the Father acts on the Universe?

GR:  At present 

Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

The Trinity has no legs because it is essentially the symbolic form of
creedally based religion which cannot be universal on its face. Father Son
and Holy Sirit would now best be understood as Source (Unconditional Love,
Creator, Ineffable, Underlying) Incarnation (Christ Consciousness and who
in fact all in fact are) and Spirit as the individualized forms material
and heavenly of all living beings. We are only on the cusp of this
awareness but most definitely the Trinity is not Reality as much as a way
of looking at it. Reality is always tangible unconditional love expressed
in Consciousness and activated by Spirits.
 Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
 Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83



On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:26 PM Mary Libertin 
wrote:

> Gary R., List,
>
> Gary R.,
>
> You say "How the Person of the Spirit comes into play is much too
> difficult/subtle to attempt to summarize here.” I totally agree, but I do
> think its absence in our discussion causes some of the (my) confusion. Can
> you explain how The Holy Spirit works in this discussion?
>
> It seems to me an/the essential aspect of God; it is what makes God God.
> There is God the father, God the son. And God the Holy Spirit.
>
> The Nicene Creed, in particular the Filioque doctrine, is very much
> related to our discussion. The Filioque  means “and son”—  and one
> interpretation of the Nicene Creed says that the Holy Spirit proceeded from
> the Father and the Son, not just the Father. The Eastern and Western
> churches split over this difference. And there are controversies in non
> Christian religions. Why does part of the controversy not reverse the order
> and state that the Father and Son proceeded from the Holy Spirit?
>
> In a sense the trinity is analogous to the concepts of firstness,
> secondness, and thirdness of semiotics. And in “Neglected Argument for the
> Reality of God” the play of musement explains the creation of ideas,
> empirical testing of ideas presented as an hypothesis, and a decision based
> on the result of the testing of the idea. Firstness depends on thirdness,
> which is law, not the law but a law. I see the three aspects in musement
> very much like the Holy Trinity. There is no beginning or ending.
>
> Substitute firstness with Father, or firstness with Holy Spirit,
> and … basically, stop to consider all of the various permutations of 1/2/3
> with F/S/HS. . . .To accept all of the relations between them (1/2/3 with
> F/S/HS) we have a process like semiosis, not a fixed hierarchy or
> chronology.
>
> [Add gender to this. The Virgin Mother as part of God was essential to the
> worship of the Middle Ages.]
>
> I see the debate among theologians and religions as analogous to debates
> within semiotics, not just within Peircean semiotics.
>
> I apologize for the disjointed nature of this presentation. It is due,
> only in part, to the nature of the subject. I do think the complication of
> the Holy Spirit takes us to the center of the discussion. I look forward to
> what others see as the role of the Holy Spirit in this. To leave it out
> seems sterile.
>
> Best,
> Mary Libertin
>
> On May 17, 2019, at 5:59 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:c
>
> How the Person of the Spirit comes into play is much too difficult/subtle
> to attempt to summarize here.
>
>
>

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