Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

Hi,

i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might have to do with logic, because many, if not most social structures are collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real logic?

Best,

Helmut



Gesendet:Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
Von:Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
An:Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
Cc:Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff:Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social



Jon wrote:




This normative aspect hasas much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as thecommunicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] mayhelp to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and thelarger self in one another.




I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to reflect on. . .



Best,



Gary





Best,



Gary







Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York




On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

Gary, List,

I think its good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal Semiotic,
elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This normative aspect has
as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the
communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write, may
help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the
larger self in one another.

Jon


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Gary Richmond
Helmut,

I would recommend that you read Peirce on this, beginning perhaps with the
two papers mentioned in my post yesterday, then moving on to his papers
after 1900 on pragmatism. In a word, Peirce argues this point best.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*


On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de wrote:

 Hi,
 i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might have
 to do with logic, because many, if not most social structures are
 collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to
 create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with
 contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what
 is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle
 desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force
 some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real
 logic?
 Best,
 Helmut
  *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
 *Von:* Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
 *An:* Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
 *Cc:* Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social
  Jon wrote:


 *This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social
 rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .]
 may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and
 the larger self in one another.*


 I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social
 principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be
 fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to
 reflect on. . .

 Best,

 Gary


 Best,

 Gary


  *Gary Richmond*
 *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
 *Communication Studies*
 *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

 On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 Gary, List,

 I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal
 Semiotic,
 elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative.  This normative aspect
 has
 as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the
 communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write,
 may
 help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the
 larger self in one another.

 Jon


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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Benjamin Udell

Helmut, list

Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend 
for their general rationale or justification on their correctability in 
the course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on 
the idea of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being 
able to correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending 
on the idea of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends 
on the idea of a community.


I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like 
induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the 
prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is 
quite capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters 
that make a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which 
a deductive conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that 
incline one to check one's premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for 
errors. In the case of deductive predictions, the prospect of error 
correction is much of the main point, to check the conclusions 
(predictions) against observations.


Best, Ben

On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:


Hi,

i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might 
have to do with logic, because many, if not most social structures 
are collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made 
up to create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to 
cope with contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic 
too. But what is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does 
the social principle desperately and like a parasite put its roots 
into any substrate, and force some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, 
therewith ignoring mostly all real logic?


Best,
Helmut

*Gesendet:*  Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
*Von:*  Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
*An:*  Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
*Cc:*  Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Betreff:*  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social


Jon wrote:

*This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the
social rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive
aspect, and [. . .] may help to explain the double or mutually
recursive rooting of logic and the larger self in one another. *

I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social 
principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt 
be fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something 
to reflect on. . .


Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net  wrote:


Gary, List,

I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal 
Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative.  This 
normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social 
rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and, 
come to think of it as I write, may help to explain the double or 
mutually recursive rooting of logic and the larger self in one another.


Jon


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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Gary Richmond
Ben, Helmut, list,

Ben, a very nice, succinct summary!

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*


On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:

  Helmut, list

 Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for
 their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the
 course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea
 of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to
 correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea
 of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of
 a community.

 I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like
 induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the
 prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite
 capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make
 a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive
 conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to
 check one's premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case
 of deductive predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the
 main point, to check the conclusions (predictions) against observations.

 Best, Ben

 On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

 Hi,

 i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might have
 to do with logic, because many, if not most social structures are
 collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to
 create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with
 contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what
 is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle
 desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force
 some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real
 logic?

 Best,
 Helmut

 *Gesendet:*  Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
 *Von:*  Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
 gary.richm...@gmail.com
 *An:*  Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net jawb...@att.net
 *Cc:*  Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 *Betreff:*  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

  Jon wrote:

 *This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social
 rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .]
 may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and
 the larger self in one another. *

 I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social
 principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be
 fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to
 reflect on. . .

 Best,

 Gary

 *Gary Richmond*



 * Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College
 of the City University of New York*

 On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net  wrote:

 Gary, List,

 I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal
 Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative.  This
 normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of
 logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it
 as I write, may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of
 logic and the larger self in one another.

 Jon



 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON
 PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
 peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
 but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the
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 .







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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Also it will be more and more the case that minds will arrive at similar or
complementary conclusions, rendering claims of individuals to originality
less and less credible. I wonder at what point this will alter the way in
which we process common awareness. The wiki phenomenon is an obvious
suggestion. But at some point the existing copyright codes may undergo some
serious revision.

*@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose*


On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:

  Helmut, list

 Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for
 their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the
 course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea
 of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to
 correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea
 of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of
 a community.

 I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like
 induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the
 prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite
 capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make
 a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive
 conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to
 check one's premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case
 of deductive predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the
 main point, to check the conclusions (predictions) against observations.

 Best, Ben

 On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

 Hi,

 i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might have
 to do with logic, because many, if not most social structures are
 collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to
 create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with
 contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what
 is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle
 desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force
 some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real
 logic?

 Best,
 Helmut

 *Gesendet:*  Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
 *Von:*  Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
 gary.richm...@gmail.com
 *An:*  Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net jawb...@att.net
 *Cc:*  Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 *Betreff:*  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

  Jon wrote:

 *This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social
 rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .]
 may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and
 the larger self in one another. *

 I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social
 principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be
 fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to
 reflect on. . .

 Best,

 Gary

 *Gary Richmond*



 * Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College
 of the City University of New York*

 On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net  wrote:

 Gary, List,

 I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal
 Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative.  This
 normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of
 logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it
 as I write, may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of
 logic and the larger self in one another.

 Jon



 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON
 PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
 peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
 but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic Is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Jon Awbrey

Stephen, Gary, List,

These would be the passages that always come most readily to my mind in this 
connection:

Definition Of Logic
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/

Logic As Semiotic
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/04/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-logic-as-semiotic/

Peirce's Pickwickian Paragraph
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/scratchpad/#comment-2138

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

Yes, thank you, Ben! I am a bit culture-pessimistic because of the news. Correcting errors in a worldwide close-to-ideal communication community is a good idea. I think, I sympathize with Apel (ultimate explanation of discourse ethics) and Habermas. There should be a semiotics of fallacy-signs, I think. Eg. the naturalistic fallacy is responsible for a lot of disaster, but also blunt tautology (it is so, because all my friends and relatives say that it is so), like the question, who is the righteous successor of some prophet. Or: We are peaceful, we dont kill anybody who is not against us. (Or a bit less (or not?) lethal myth: Economy must always grow, otherwise we will all suffer and starve, because while we were well, economy was growing all the time). This is typical social logic. But who is able to explain people what a tautology or a naturalistic fallacy is, and have them listening?

Best,

Helmut



Gesendet:Freitag, 27. Juni 2014 um 17:06 Uhr
Von:Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
An:Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
Cc:Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff:Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social



Ben, Helmut, list,



Ben, a very nice, succinct summary!



Best,



Gary







Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York




On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:



Helmut, list

Peirces argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of a community.

Id argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to check ones premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case of deductive predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the main point, to check the conclusions (predictions) against observations.

Best, Ben


On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:




Hi,

i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might have to do with logic, because many, if not most social structures are collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real logic?

Best,
Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
Von: Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
An: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
Cc: Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social





Jon wrote:


This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the larger self in one another. 


I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to reflect on. . .

Best,

Gary


Gary Richmond


Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York




On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net  wrote:


Gary, List,

I think its good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write, may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the larger self in one another.

Jon








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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic Is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Gary Moore
Thank you!

Gary C. Moore


On Friday, June 27, 2014 1:54 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:
 


Stephen, Gary, List,

These would be the passages that always come most readily to my mind in this 
connection:

Definition Of Logic
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/

Logic As Semiotic
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/04/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-logic-as-semiotic/

Peirce's Pickwickian Paragraph
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/scratchpad/#comment-2138

Regards,


Jon

-- 

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-27 Thread Gary Moore
Excellent!

Gary C. Moore


On Friday, June 27, 2014 2:00 PM, Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de wrote:
 


Yes, thank you, Ben! I am a bit culture-pessimistic because of the news. 
Correcting errors in a worldwide close-to-ideal communication community is a 
good idea. I think, I sympathize with Apel (ultimate explanation of discourse 
ethics) and Habermas. There should be a semiotics of fallacy-signs, I think. 
Eg. the naturalistic fallacy is responsible for a lot of disaster, but also 
blunt tautology (it is so, because all my friends and relatives say that it is 
so), like the question, who is the righteous successor of some prophet. Or: We 
are peaceful, we dont kill anybody who is not against us. (Or a bit less (or 
not?) lethal myth: Economy must always grow, otherwise we will all suffer and 
starve, because while we were well, economy was growing all the time). This is 
typical social logic. But who is able to explain people what a tautology or a 
naturalistic fallacy is, and have them listening? 
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Freitag, 27. Juni 2014 um 17:06 Uhr
Von: Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
An: Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
Cc: Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social
Ben, Helmut, list,
 
Ben, a very nice, succinct summary!
 
Best,
 
Gary
 
  
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  
On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: 
Helmut, list
Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for 
their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the course 
of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea of a 
community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to correct 
itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea of an 
indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of a 
community.
I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like induction 
and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the prospect of being 
liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite capable of being 
complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make a deduction 
valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive conclusion can 
give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to check one's 
premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case of deductive 
predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the main point, to 
check the conclusions (predictions) against observations.
Best, Ben
On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Hi,
i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what social might have to 
do with logic, because many, if not most social structures are collusions 
(common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to create an 
impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with contingenncy. 
Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what is rooted in 
what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle desperately and 
like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force some pseudo-logic 
upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real logic?
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet:  Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
Von:  Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
An:  Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
Cc:  Peirce-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Betreff:  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social
Jon wrote:
This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting 
of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] may help to 
explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the larger 
self in one another. 
I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social principle 
and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be fleshed out to 
some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to reflect on. . .
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
 
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net  wrote:
Gary, List,
I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal Semiotic, 
elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative.  This normative aspect 
has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the 
communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write, 
may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and 
the larger self in one another.
Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social

2014-06-26 Thread Gary Richmond
Jon wrote:

*This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social
rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .]
may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and
the larger self in one another.*


I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social
principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be
fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to
reflect on. . .

Best,

Gary


Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*


On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 Gary, List,

 I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal Semiotic,
 elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative.  This normative aspect
 has
 as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the
 communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write,
 may
 help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the
 larger self in one another.

 Jon


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