Helmut, list
Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend
for their general rationale or justification on their correctability in
the course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on
the idea of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being
able to correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending
on the idea of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends
on the idea of a community.
I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like
induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the
prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is
quite capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters
that make a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which
a deductive conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that
incline one to check one's premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for
errors. In the case of deductive predictions, the prospect of error
correction is much of the main point, to check the conclusions
(predictions) against observations.
Best, Ben
On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Hi,
i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what "social" might
have to do with "logic", because many, if not most social structures
are collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made
up to create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to
cope with contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic
too. But what is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does
the social principle desperately and like a parasite put its roots
into any substrate, and force some pseudo-logic upon this substrate,
therewith ignoring mostly all real logic?
Best,
Helmut
*Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr
*Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
*An:* "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net>
*Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social
Jon wrote:
*This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the
social rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive
aspect, and [. . .] may help to explain the double or mutually
recursive rooting of logic and the larger self in one another. *
I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social
principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt
be fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something
to reflect on. . .
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net > wrote:
Gary, List,
I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal
Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This
normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social
rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and,
come to think of it as I write, may help to explain the double or
mutually recursive rooting of logic and the larger self in one another.
Jon
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