Also it will be more and more the case that minds will arrive at similar or complementary conclusions, rendering claims of individuals to originality less and less credible. I wonder at what point this will alter the way in which we process common awareness. The wiki phenomenon is an obvious suggestion. But at some point the existing copyright codes may undergo some serious revision.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Helmut, list > > Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for > their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the > course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea > of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to > correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea > of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of > a community. > > I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like > induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the > prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite > capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make > a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive > conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to > check one's premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case > of deductive predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the > main point, to check the conclusions (predictions) against observations. > > Best, Ben > > On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Hi, > > i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what "social" might have > to do with "logic", because many, if not most social structures are > collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to > create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with > contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what > is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle > desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force > some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real > logic? > > Best, > Helmut > > *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr > *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *An:* "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> <jawb...@att.net> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social > > Jon wrote: > > *This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social > rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] > may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and > the larger self in one another. * > > I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social > principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be > fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to > reflect on. . . > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > > > > * Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College > of the City University of New York* > > On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal > Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This > normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of > logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it > as I write, may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of > logic and the larger self in one another. > > Jon > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
