Excellent! Gary C. Moore
On Friday, June 27, 2014 2:00 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: Yes, thank you, Ben! I am a bit culture-pessimistic because of the news. Correcting errors in a worldwide close-to-ideal communication community is a good idea. I think, I sympathize with Apel (ultimate explanation of discourse ethics) and Habermas. There should be a semiotics of fallacy-signs, I think. Eg. the naturalistic fallacy is responsible for a lot of disaster, but also blunt tautology (it is so, because all my friends and relatives say that it is so), like the question, who is the righteous successor of some prophet. Or: We are peaceful, we dont kill anybody who is not against us. (Or a bit less (or not?) lethal myth: Economy must always grow, otherwise we will all suffer and starve, because while we were well, economy was growing all the time). This is typical social logic. But who is able to explain people what a tautology or a naturalistic fallacy is, and have them listening? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Freitag, 27. Juni 2014 um 17:06 Uhr Von: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> An: "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com> Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Betreff: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social Ben, Helmut, list, Ben, a very nice, succinct summary! Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: Helmut, list >Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for >their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the course >of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea of a >community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to correct >itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea of an >indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of a >community. >I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like induction >and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the prospect of being >liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite capable of being >complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make a deduction >valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive conclusion can >give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to check one's >premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case of deductive >predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the main point, to >check the conclusions (predictions) against observations. >Best, Ben >On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >Hi, >>i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what "social" might have to >>do with "logic", because many, if not most social structures are collusions >>(common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to create an >>impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with contingenncy. >>Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what is rooted in >>what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle desperately and >>like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force some pseudo-logic >>upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real logic? >>Best, >>Helmut >>Gesendet: Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr >>Von: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>An: "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> >>Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social >>Jon wrote: >>>This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting >>>of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] may help to >>>explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the larger >>>self in one another. >>>I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social principle >>>and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be fleshed out to >>>some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to reflect on. . . >>>Best, >>>Gary >>>Gary Richmond >>> >>>Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>Communication Studies >>>LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> >>>On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net > wrote: >>>Gary, List, >>>>I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal Semiotic, >>>>elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This normative aspect >>>>has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the >>>>communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write, >>>>may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and >>>>the larger self in one another. >>>>Jon > >----------------------------- >PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu >. 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