Helmut, I would recommend that you read Peirce on this, beginning perhaps with the two papers mentioned in my post yesterday, then moving on to his papers after 1900 on pragmatism. In a word, Peirce argues this point best.
Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Hi, > i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what "social" might have > to do with "logic", because many, if not most social structures are > collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to > create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with > contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what > is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle > desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force > some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real > logic? > Best, > Helmut > *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr > *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *An:* "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social > Jon wrote: > > > *This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social > rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] > may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and > the larger self in one another.* > > > I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social > principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be > fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to > reflect on. . . > > Best, > > Gary > > > Best, > > Gary > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: >> >> Gary, List, >> >> I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal >> Semiotic, >> elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This normative aspect >> has >> as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of logic as the >> communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it as I write, >> may >> help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and the >> larger self in one another. >> >> Jon >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply > List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts > should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not > to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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