Ben, Helmut, list, Ben, a very nice, succinct summary!
Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 10:59 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Helmut, list > > Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend for > their general rationale or justification on their correctability in the > course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on the idea > of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of being able to > correct itself as far as needed. Probable deduction, depending on the idea > of an indefinitely long run of experience, likewise depends on the idea of > a community. > > I'd argue that any kind of deductive inference also depends, like > induction and hypothetical inference, for its general rationale on the > prospect of being liable to eventual correction, since deduction is quite > capable of being complex and tricky - indeed, the very characters that make > a deduction valuable - the new or nontrivial aspects in which a deductive > conclusion can give to its premisses - are the ones that incline one to > check one's premisses, reasoning, and conclusions for errors. In the case > of deductive predictions, the prospect of error correction is much of the > main point, to check the conclusions (predictions) against observations. > > Best, Ben > > On 6/27/2014 10:30 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Hi, > > i have not read the text by Peirce, but wonder, what "social" might have > to do with "logic", because many, if not most social structures are > collusions (common illusions), such as myths, that are rather made up to > create an impression of logic, where there is none, in order to cope with > contingenncy. Ok, this process in itself follows some logic too. But what > is rooted in what: Logic in social principle, or does the social principle > desperately and like a parasite put its roots into any substrate, and force > some pseudo-logic upon this substrate, therewith ignoring mostly all real > logic? > > Best, > Helmut > > *Gesendet:* Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2014 um 22:51 Uhr > *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *An:* "Jon Awbrey" <jawb...@att.net> <jawb...@att.net> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logic is Social > > Jon wrote: > > *This normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social > rooting of logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and [. . .] > may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of logic and > the larger self in one another. * > > I fully agree. Excellent point! The normative aspect of the social > principle and logic rooting themselves in each other could no doubt be > fleshed out to some advantage, I would think. Certainly something to > reflect on. . . > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > > > > * Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College > of the City University of New York* > > On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 3:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net > wrote: > > Gary, List, > > I think it's good to remember that Peirce defines Logic as Formal > Semiotic, elsewhere explaining Formal as implying Normative. This > normative aspect has as much, maybe more, to do with the social rooting of > logic as the communicative or descriptive aspect, and, come to think of it > as I write, may help to explain the double or mutually recursive rooting of > logic and the larger self in one another. > > Jon > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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