Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Ozzie, Clark:

In regard to recent exchanges on open axiomatic frameworks, it is of critical 
importance to denote the distinctions between Newton's statements about the 
"hypothetical"  and the nine terms of trichotomy. 

For a summary of Newton's views, See Ernan McMullin's :

http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/mullin02.php
The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science

Ernan McMullin
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame,


and, equally importantly,
http://www.pitt.edu/~mem208/courses/phph_s15/documents/mcmullin_the_origin_of_the_field_concept.pdf

Further, a critical distinction between the logic of physics and the logic of 
chemistry (as represented in CSP's nine terms of his trichotomy)  is the 
hypothesis of "gravitons" as mathematical objects (nominialistic philosophy?)  
and the hypothesis of chemical elements (electrical particles) in the chemical 
table of elements.

For CSP, the role of the index (molecular formula) lies at the center of his 
tabulation of operators. This concept of index is both the consequence of the 
chemical analysis and the antecedent of the arguments that generate the 
legisigns. 

If I understand Clark's post, his concern is his allegiance to the habits of 
physicists to invoke variables as universal explanatory operators.  A 
consequence of such habits of physical scientists is the LOSS of relations with 
pragmatic indices of nature.  Or, stated in more philosophical terms, apodictic 
signs are replaced by mathematical imagination and imaginary numbers.

In my view, a critical distinction that crisply separates CSP logic and 
physical logic (such as hypothetical gravitons) is centered precisely on the 
role of indices.  The example of molecular numbers as indices of integers and 
the derived physical (molecular) structures (such as DNA, RNA, Proteins and 
metabolites) illustrate the conundrum faced by both the semantics and syntax of 
physical symbols. Such physical structures are simply beyond the language of 
physical variables.  So, in order to paper-over the logical conundrums, the 
language of physics constructs hypothetical mathematical structures 
(n-dimensional spaces) that bear minimal connections to reality.

I believe that the history of physics is rich enough to remain apodictic and to 
work with local operators as well as the special cases invoking universal 
operators such as symmetry.
It appears to me that most (if not nearly all physicists) have abandoned 
apodictism.

CSP did not. 

Cheers

Jerry




On Oct 21, 2015, at 12:07 PM, Ozzie wrote:

> Clark ~
> It doesn't seem to me that you've followed the thread of my argument.  If you 
> have, then I'll simply say that I disagree with each of your major points. 
> 
> Regarding physics and gravitons:  I asserted they are hypothetical.  That is 
> widely known, and you didn't dispute it.  People do not use hypotheticals 
> when they can instead rely on facts and reality.  So physicists really do not 
> know what causes gravity; they have an unverified theory.   I asserted that 
> physicists were stalled -- unable to explain gravity in a satisfactory way 
> without resorting to hypothetical particles.  Your response: "It makes sense 
> by symmetry to assume gravity does the same sorts of things."  Yes, it makes 
> sense, if the prior unverified logic is correct, and if symmetry applies. 
> That's two "ifs," each with a probability of less than one, multiplied 
> together.  That is the analytical black box I described, with an admixture of 
> contents both real and imagined.  That black box with gravitons inside also 
> gets a lot of strings, particles and extra dimensions gratuitously thrown 
> into it by each Nobel-hopeful, which explains your lament: "Sadly physics 
> went down a theoretical dead end alley in my opinion."  Yet, you seem to like 
> that black box, as long as you first approve of its unverified contents.  
> 
> Maybe some day physicists will have the empirical data they require to answer 
> these questions.  They're certainly working on it, so I consider their black 
> box exercises as hypotheticals to eventually be tested/verified.   However, 
> those working on empirical issues regarding the physical mechanisms of 
> cognitive logic are brain researchers, not philosophers.  Each successful 
> test of their theories moves purely philosophical (non-empirical) theories of 
> logic toward the margin. 
> 
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick
> 
> 
> 
> On Oct 20, 2015, at 9:44 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:
> 
>> 
>>> On Oct 20, 2015, at 1:13 PM, Ozzie  wrote:
>>> 
>>> I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of 
>>> knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips over into speculation 
>>> when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by 
>>> nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown.  That 
>>> leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" 

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Forwarded ( Clark sent this, but did not CC this list serve.)
On Oct 21, 2015, at 1:52 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

> 
>> On Oct 21, 2015, at 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> In regard to recent exchanges on open axiomatic frameworks, it is of 
>> critical importance to denote the distinctions between Newton's statements 
>> about the "hypothetical"  and the nine terms of trichotomy. 
> 
> Just to be clear, I’ve not really discussed the larger topics. I’ve not read 
> the links that have been given. I’ve just been commenting on specific bits 
> related to Peirce and to what I see is misunderstanding the evolution within 
> science. I hope to go back through the links this weekend. Alas I have 
> limited time (which is why I often go weeks between posts)
> 
>> If I understand Clark's post, his concern is his allegiance to the habits of 
>> physicists to invoke variables as universal explanatory operators.  A 
>> consequence of such habits of physical scientists is the LOSS of relations 
>> with pragmatic indices of nature.  Or, stated in more philosophical terms, 
>> apodictic signs are replaced by mathematical imagination and imaginary 
>> numbers.
> 
> I suspect I’d say structures rather than variables. That is that structures 
> are broad and underlie a lot of phenomena. Variables can of course refer as 
> an index to many things including other structures. As such they have a sign 
> like function. I was more thinking in terms of what the equations point to. 
> So one level removed from an analysis of the logic of equations scientists 
> use.
> 
> I think it is characteristic of physicists to make a double move of trying to 
> see how expansive such structures are (with the goal being universal laws) 
> while recognizing the limits our empirical investigations allow. The problems 
> of errors in measurement and what other laws might be causing deformations 
> from an expected law is one. (That is the ideal gas law is idealized and 
> never found in nature - and arguably this is true of most law) Then the 
> problems that of course we can only test a range of contexts. Thus physicists 
> often say Newton’s Laws are true in a certain set of areas but not at small 
> scale or massive scale. I’m not sure that’s a fair way to put it, but 
> physicists often get at the limits due to testing because of this.
> 
> So the double move of a physicist is this expansion by trusting 
> laws/structures and then skepticism of such expansion. (Again this is more a 
> claim about intents and aims of scientists)
> 
> The issue of losing indices seems just incorrect. First of course real 
> structures (the scholastic realism) have an indexical component. We can here 
> get into a bit of a debate regarding the debates about Platonism and how 
> particulars exemplify forms. I’m not sure that’s necessary in a Peircean 
> approach since any form that is exemplifying the form entails an indexical 
> relationship I’d think. To the degree a physicists thinks structures are real 
> (acknowledging the philosophical confusion of the typical physicist) and sees 
> those structures in phenomena there is always an explicit and implicit 
> assumption of an index. So equations as signs are representational of the 
> structures but also entail an indexical relationship to the degree they are 
> physics and not mathematics. 
> 
> This divide between physics and mathematics is something I think key to the 
> self-identity of physicists as physicists. It’s certainly a major component 
> of both sides in the rancorous string debates that are now winding down.
> 
> 
>> In my view, a critical distinction that crisply separates CSP logic and 
>> physical logic (such as hypothetical gravitons) is centered precisely on the 
>> role of indices.  The example of molecular numbers as indices of integers 
>> and the derived physical (molecular) structures (such as DNA, RNA, Proteins 
>> and metabolites) illustrate the conundrum faced by both the semantics and 
>> syntax of physical symbols. Such physical structures are simply beyond the 
>> language of physical variables.  So, in order to paper-over the logical 
>> conundrums, the language of physics constructs hypothetical mathematical 
>> structures (n-dimensional spaces) that bear minimal connections to reality.
> 
> Physicists often can get “lost in the equations” such that the indexical 
> relationship is forgotten. I think that socially this is generally seen as a 
> negative. Physics without the index is just mathematics. They must always be 
> kept in mind.
> 
> The hypothetical aspect is hypothetical in two ways it seems to me in a 
> Peircean framework. First there is the issue of doubt/belief. Generally 
> hypothesis and especially speculative theoretical hypothesis just aren’t 
> believed in strongly as a practical matter. Second they are usually seen 
> initially as models to be put forth for verification and falsification. That 
> is to be a 

Re: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Why use the term 'memes'? Why not simply say: 'unquestioned beliefs'?
Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: tabor...@primus.ca 
  Cc: John Collier ; cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 2:24 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)



  Dear Edwina and All,
  the binary sets I had mentioned all base on the binary set: Information 
transfer via sub-/unconscious structure elements versus via conscious structure 
elements. To say it in Peircean terms (as Stephen Rose has claimed): The first 
three methods of fixating belief (authority, tenacity, a-priori) all need 
subconscious structure: An authority is only sure, as long as the authority is 
not questioned. Tenacity only is effective, as long as the tenacious one does 
not have to answer the question, why he/she is so tenacious. A-priori only 
works for sure as long it is not analyzed either. An analysis of the 
subconscious structure elements makes them conscious, and thus puts an end to 
them. Then there remains the scientific method. Then there probably will be the 
case, that not everybody in the society agrees with the now conscious, and 
therefore negotiable elements, so the society may cease to be a system, lose 
its structure, fall apart into many systems, like political parties. But then 
there is still (hopefully) democracy, a system with the structure installed: 
The agreement that it is possible to disagree and still work together. About 
memes I really would say, that people swallow them. But they make sick, can 
even make a whole society sick. I think all this is better explained by the 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. To semiotize all this sociological stuff is a 
challenge, I think. Maybe memes would be a word for unquestioned habits of ways 
of thinking? Algorhithms including subconscious or for-granted-taken premises, 
turned into immediate objects? Virus-like immediate objects with a surface that 
only fits to the representamen "This is relevant and true", and to the 
interpretant "copy and spread"?
  Best,
  Helmut

   "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
   
  Right - they are 'very much like that of solid material particles'. That's 
what I mean by saying that they are not semiosic. What are you supposed to do 
with them? Swallow them? 

  And I would say that of course meaning is part of their essence - otherwise, 
what is the point of their existence? What is being transmitted if not meaning?

  Edwina
- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 3:46 PM
Subject: RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

My understanding of Dawkins’ notion of meme is that it is specifically not 
anything more than a causal entity, passed on by repetition through receptive 
channels common to the transmitter and receiver. Meaning is not a part of their 
transmitability, though we can assign meaning to them, and often do, but this 
is an overlay, and not part of their essence as transmitable units. I think 
there are problems with making sense of their transmitability, not to mention 
of their identity conditions, but it seems to me that their “not being 
semiosic” is beside the point. Dawkins sees their dynamics as very much like 
that of solid material particles.



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: October 20, 2015 9:36 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)



Helmut - I'm against the very notion of 'memes' because they are 
non-semiosic. They are akin to solid material particles - and the cognitive 
process does not swallow solid material particles. It transforms them within 
the semiosic process. Again, memes are non-semiosic and not amenable to 
semiosis; you swallow them.



I don't get your binary sets of 

Meme-vs - rational belief

Diffusion - vs -narrative



Diffusion is a process; narrative is a 'thing'.

Meme is a 'thing'; a rational belief is a conclusion arrived at via reason.



Edwina

  - Original Message - 

  From: Helmut Raulien 

  To: h.raul...@gmx.de 

  Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L 

  Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:10 PM

  Subject: Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)









  Supplement:

  Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about 
diffusion I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water 
and turns it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when 
it is put into a proper 

Aw: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Dear Edwina and All,

the binary sets I had mentioned all base on the binary set: Information transfer via sub-/unconscious structure elements versus via conscious structure elements. To say it in Peircean terms (as Stephen Rose has claimed): The first three methods of fixating belief (authority, tenacity, a-priori) all need subconscious structure: An authority is only sure, as long as the authority is not questioned. Tenacity only is effective, as long as the tenacious one does not have to answer the question, why he/she is so tenacious. A-priori only works for sure as long it is not analyzed either. An analysis of the subconscious structure elements makes them conscious, and thus puts an end to them. Then there remains the scientific method. Then there probably will be the case, that not everybody in the society agrees with the now conscious, and therefore negotiable elements, so the society may cease to be a system, lose its structure, fall apart into many systems, like political parties. But then there is still (hopefully) democracy, a system with the structure installed: The agreement that it is possible to disagree and still work together. About memes I really would say, that people swallow them. But they make sick, can even make a whole society sick. I think all this is better explained by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. To semiotize all this sociological stuff is a challenge, I think. Maybe memes would be a word for unquestioned habits of ways of thinking? Algorhithms including subconscious or for-granted-taken premises, turned into immediate objects? Virus-like immediate objects with a surface that only fits to the representamen "This is relevant and true", and to the interpretant "copy and spread"?

Best,

Helmut



 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
 



Right - they are 'very much like that of solid material particles'. That's what I mean by saying that they are not semiosic. What are you supposed to do with them? Swallow them? 

 

And I would say that of course meaning is part of their essence - otherwise, what is the point of their existence? What is being transmitted if not meaning?

 

Edwina


- Original Message -

From: John Collier

To: Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien

Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 3:46 PM

Subject: RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 


My understanding of Dawkins’ notion of meme is that it is specifically not anything more than a causal entity, passed on by repetition through receptive channels common to the transmitter and receiver. Meaning is not a part of their transmitability, though we can assign meaning to them, and often do, but this is an overlay, and not part of their essence as transmitable units. I think there are problems with making sense of their transmitability, not to mention of their identity conditions, but it seems to me that their “not being semiosic” is beside the point. Dawkins sees their dynamics as very much like that of solid material particles.

 


John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier


 




From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: October 20, 2015 9:36 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)



 


Helmut - I'm against the very notion of 'memes' because they are non-semiosic. They are akin to solid material particles - and the cognitive process does not swallow solid material particles. It transforms them within the semiosic process. Again, memes are non-semiosic and not amenable to semiosis; you swallow them.



 



I don't get your binary sets of 



Meme-vs - rational belief



Diffusion - vs -narrative



 



Diffusion is a process; narrative is a 'thing'.



Meme is a 'thing'; a rational belief is a conclusion arrived at via reason.



 



Edwina




- Original Message - 



From: Helmut Raulien 



To: h.raul...@gmx.de 



Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L 



Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:10 PM



Subject: Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)



 




  


  


  





Supplement:



Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about diffusion I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water and turns it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when it is put into a proper social environment, that is a social system with a structure that allows the idea to diffuse (and copy itself). That is why I think, that the diffusion concept is not wrong, but neither complete.




Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,



I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to make the subconscious 

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Ozzie]

Clark, List ~
I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of 
knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips over into speculation 
when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by 
nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown.  That 
leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" properties to the mechanism, 
and to challenge others for doing the same -- except when they happen to agree. 
 

This happens in all disciplines, as when physicists stalled out on gravity, 
then conceived of a new "graviton" particle emitted by atoms to explain it.  
They've never seen a graviton, but "it must be there."  (They stay busy 
exploring the inside of their black box by smashing atoms in 
rarefied/unrealistic environments.)

Back to logic.  Like other humans, I simultaneously carry on logic at various 
levels:  I walk down the street, look at the scenery, talk with a friend, worry 
about an argument I had with a family member and mull over a project I'm 
working on -- while carrying on numerous autonomous activities such as 
digestion, breathing, etc.  Each of these is a logical activity.  Some logic 
concerns our survival, some concerns our emotions, and most focuses on 
practical matters of lesser importance/urgency.  Some logic is hard-wired into 
our DNA (instincts), other logic is based on experience/habit, and some is the 
product of on-the-fly cognition in the face of new circumstances.  All logic 
requires energy to carry out, and all logic that concludes with a decision to 
act requires energy, too.  Therefore, optimizing behavior requires an even 
higher form of logic to mediate/coordinate the competing demands for energy 
ordered up by the various logical mechanisms.  Our colleague Edwina has written 
about this mediating function before.

If someone claims that plants can/do communicate with each other, we would 
expect them to connect all of the logical dots in that story -- the physical 
components of plants that permits them to broadcast and receive signals, the 
nature of the electrochemical signals, factors in the environment that affect 
signaling, etc.  If logic occurs in plants, we would insist, show us exactly 
how it operates.  

Yet, when we speak of human abduction, induction, deduction, interpretants, 
signs, etc ... well, that black-box discussion contains no actual body parts, 
there are no alternative types of logic taking place at the same time, 
data/information is costless, the product of one logical exercise is of the 
same nature and value as all others, etc.  In short, our logical black box is 
chiefly filled with definitions and unrealistic/simplifying assumptions.  When 
those clash from one discussant to the next, each argues to the reasonableness 
of his/her definitions and assumptions -- but (genuine) empirical evidence is 
seldom offered.  Therefore, the debates are seldom/never resolved. 

Focusing solely on human cognition, then, here is my first Pragmatic question 
about semiotic logic:  If an object has interpretants, WHERE do those 
(object+interpretants) reside in the brain, and WHAT links them together?  Pick 
any object at all.  If we can't conceive of the way that even one object and 
its interpretants exist in physical reality, then we cannot demonstrate 
empirically that human cognition (the physical brain) actually employs semiotic 
logic.  This is an empirical matter; we have already asserted/predicted that 
the physical brain (cognition) makes use of objects and interpretants.  

That is only the first step.  Every other aspect of semiotic logic must have 
some physical/empirical counterpart, too, where logic is carried out, mediated 
and used to direct activity. 

I do believe that human cognition employs semiotic logic, but belief without an 
operational mechanism means that our views belong in the nominalist, black-box 
category.  It is inconsistent to believe that a physical brain 
evolved/optimized to carry out Pragmatic logic does so in a way divorced from 
physical reality.  

Once the physical nature of logic is addressed, other debates/discussions 
associated with black-box thinking will either fall by the wayside (empirical 
rejection) or be resolved through clarification.  Among these, I include the 
recent discussion of knowing-how-to-be vs. DNA, language as constructed vs. 
instinct, different types of abduction, circumstances conducive to induction, 
etc.  Those earlier views are not wrong, so much as they do not lead to a 
deeper understanding.  

I hope this illuminates my first paragraph above, and explains why I believe a 
new paradigm is required to proceed.  I have learned a few things about brain 
research by watching TED Talks at TED.com.

Regards,
Tom Wyrick
 

> On Oct 20, 2015, at 12:09 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Oct 19, 2015, at 4:09 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>> 
>> i) Environment (also called the physical), 
>> 

Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 
 



Supplement:

Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about diffusion I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water and turns it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when it is put into a proper social environment, that is a social system with a structure that allows the idea to diffuse (and copy itself). That is why I think, that the diffusion concept is not wrong, but neither complete.


Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,

I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to make the subconscious conscious, that is, to uncover memes to see where they come from. Many of them are myths, that is lies- and these lies may have been told deliberately, or they may have come up by a social systems own dynamics, as any system intends to reinforce itself. Anyway, to make the subconscious conscious is the way of psychoanalysis, and I do not see, what is so wrong about it, fundamentally. Of course, it is bad to have a wrong analysis, and Freud probably was wrong in many places (eg., that a child is polymorph-pervert). But I think, it is very good to replace a diffusion with a narrative- if the narrative is telling the truth, and if this can be made sure. Can it? By scientific method?

Best,

Helmut



"Clark Goble" 
 


 


On Oct 19, 2015, at 1:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 


Clark - I prefer not to think of Jung.  You wrote:

 

"the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as literature were correct."

 

I'm not sure what you mean by the above.




In most ways psychoanalysis is treating the mind (especially dreams) as if they were a literary work to be interpreted with the various ways literature was interpreted.  That’s why even though Jung, Freud and company aren’t typically taken seriously in science they still are in literature departments. 

 

The way a person interprets literature simply is quite different from say what goes on in contemporary psychology or cognitive science.

 

 
- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .





- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 19, 2015, at 4:09 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> 
> i) Environment (also called the physical), 
> 
> ii) Mind (also called the mental), and 
> 
> iii) Structure (also called the world of structures).  

It seems to me that the categories are problematic precisely because they 
really aren’t separate. For instance the environment includes structures as 
does mind. I think a big problem with how mind is discussed is precisely the 
language that people use. It’s here that Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is helpful. 
(I’d add that even within Peirce I find some discussion language problematic 
such as consciousness)



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[John Collier]

My understanding of Dawkins’ notion of meme is that it is specifically not 
anything more than a causal entity, passed on by repetition through receptive 
channels common to the transmitter and receiver. Meaning is not a part of their 
transmitability, though we can assign meaning to them, and often do, but this 
is an overlay, and not part of their essence as transmitable units. I think 
there are problems with making sense of their transmitability, not to mention 
of their identity conditions, but it seems to me that their “not being 
semiosic” is beside the point. Dawkins sees their dynamics as very much like 
that of solid material particles.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: October 20, 2015 9:36 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

Helmut - I'm against the very notion of 'memes' because they are non-semiosic. 
They are akin to solid material particles - and the cognitive process does not 
swallow solid material particles. It transforms them within the semiosic 
process. Again, memes are non-semiosic and not amenable to semiosis; you 
swallow them.

I don't get your binary sets of
Meme-vs - rational belief
Diffusion - vs -narrative

Diffusion is a process; narrative is a 'thing'.
Meme is a 'thing'; a rational belief is a conclusion arrived at via reason.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Helmut Raulien<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>
To: h.raul...@gmx.de<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com> ; 
Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:10 PM
Subject: Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)




Supplement:
Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about diffusion 
I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water and turns 
it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when it is put 
into a proper social environment, that is a social system with a structure that 
allows the idea to diffuse (and copy itself). That is why I think, that the 
diffusion concept is not wrong, but neither complete.
Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,
I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, 
or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious 
structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to 
make the subconscious conscious, that is, to uncover memes to see where they 
come from. Many of them are myths, that is lies- and these lies may have been 
told deliberately, or they may have come up by a social systems own dynamics, 
as any system intends to reinforce itself. Anyway, to make the subconscious 
conscious is the way of psychoanalysis, and I do not see, what is so wrong 
about it, fundamentally. Of course, it is bad to have a wrong analysis, and 
Freud probably was wrong in many places (eg., that a child is 
polymorph-pervert). But I think, it is very good to replace a diffusion with a 
narrative- if the narrative is telling the truth, and if this can be made sure. 
Can it? By scientific method?
Best,
Helmut

"Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>>


On Oct 19, 2015, at 1:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Clark - I prefer not to think of Jung.  You wrote:

"the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as 
literature were correct."

I'm not sure what you mean by the above.
In most ways psychoanalysis is treating the mind (especially dreams) as if they 
were a literary work to be interpreted with the various ways literature was 
interpreted.  That’s why even though Jung, Freud and company aren’t typically 
taken seriously in science they still are in literature departments.

The way a person interprets literature simply is quite different from say what 
goes on in contemporary psychology or cognitive science.


- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or 
"Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send 
a message not to PEIRCE-L but to 
l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe 
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or 
"Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send 
a message not to PEIRCE-L but to 
l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l.

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 19, 2015, at 12:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> "To me the big issue were common structures in the environment privileging 
> certain interpretations making either diffusion or common mind unnecessary. 
> (Much like certain structures evolve independently in nature due to the 
> environment)"
>  
> EDWINA: - Agree up to a point. That is, I agree with the 'common structures 
> in the envt privileging certain interpretations'...and diffusion is 
> unnecessary (and often impossible due to continental isolation)...but..I 
> think that 'common mind' is a reality. Otherwise, there could be multipe 
> interpretations. That is, I don't see the human behaviour as entirely 
> dependent on the envt; rather, the human behaviour is based on being logical 
> adaptations to environmental realities. I insert that 'logical adaptation'.  
>  
> So, it is interesting for example to see that populations that were 
> agricultural economies, that relied on irrigation to bring water to crops, 
> developed large populations AND also, some  form of mnemonic memory 
> technology (some form of symbolic script or technique) to keep records. This 
> was not emergent via diffusion (India, China, Egypt, Aztec, Inca)...Also, all 
> developed a hierarchical authority and 'god-kings' infrastructure

I think it depends upon what we mean by common mind. Clearly there are common 
biological components to the brain which would suggest a common bias to the 
mind. I think psychologists and clinicians in the classic structuralist period 
went well beyond that though. Think Jung for instance. Admittedly a lot of 
psycho-analysis was complete nonsense so that’s not surprising.

But I fully agree we can’t adopt a blank slate myth where all that matters is 
the environment. I should have made that more explicit. I’m skeptical that 
means the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as 
literature were correct.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 19, 2015, at 1:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark - I prefer not to think of Jung.  You wrote:
>  
> "the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as 
> literature were correct."
>  
> I'm not sure what you mean by the above.

In most ways psychoanalysis is treating the mind (especially dreams) as if they 
were a literary work to be interpreted with the various ways literature was 
interpreted.  That’s why even though Jung, Freud and company aren’t typically 
taken seriously in science they still are in literature departments. 

The way a person interprets literature simply is quite different from say what 
goes on in contemporary psychology or cognitive science.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 16, 2015, at 8:24 PM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
> 
> It was very innovative for Dawkins to introduce memetics into the narrative. 
> It’s unfortunate that he never developed it further than that.

To my eyes there are two unfortunate yet popular terms of the last 20 years: 
meme and frame. Both are of course true in certain regards but both are also 
often left so undeveloped as to lead to both uncritical thinking but also 
equivocation.

Part of the reason for this is that neither idea was developed sufficiently in 
the works that popularized them.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Clark - you wrote:

"To me the big issue were common structures in the environment privileging 
certain interpretations making either diffusion or common mind unnecessary. 
(Much like certain structures evolve independently in nature due to the 
environment)"

EDWINA: - Agree up to a point. That is, I agree with the 'common structures in 
the envt privileging certain interpretations'...and diffusion is unnecessary 
(and often impossible due to continental isolation)...but..I think that 'common 
mind' is a reality. Otherwise, there could be multipe interpretations. That is, 
I don't see the human behaviour as entirely dependent on the envt; rather, the 
human behaviour is based on being logical adaptations to environmental 
realities. I insert that 'logical adaptation'.  

So, it is interesting for example to see that populations that were 
agricultural economies, that relied on irrigation to bring water to crops, 
developed large populations AND also, some  form of mnemonic memory technology 
(some form of symbolic script or technique) to keep records. This was not 
emergent via diffusion (India, China, Egypt, Aztec, Inca)...Also, all developed 
a hierarchical authority and 'god-kings' infrastructure




  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 19, 2015 1:42 PM
  Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)




On Oct 17, 2015, at 6:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


Stephen J - yes, the spread of a belief/ behaviour by imitation has been 
proposed by some researchers in human society - for a long time. It certainly 
didn't start with Dawkins and his 'memes'. But criticism of this has been quite 
strong; that is, such an approach, that defines cultures as created by 
diffusion and copying from each other, 1)  ignores the functionality of the 
belief/behaviour and assumes that ALL people find ALL beliefs/behaviour 
functional; 2) it ignores the concept that beliefs/behaviour are rational 
adaptations to local economic and ecological realities; and 3) ignores the 
commonality of the biology of humans, in that the common need for language, the 
family unit, maintenance of long-term modes of behaviour - are biological 
aspects of the species. ..and 4) ignores those societies which have common 
modes of behaviour but have never been in touch with another similar group.

In other words - the mimesis-diffusion explanation for human culture has 
been heavily criticized long before Dawkin's reductionist memes.


  This goes back to the heydays of structuralism - especially in psychology. 
There appeared to be two main schools. Some saw the structures as inherent to 
humans due to a kind of shared mind (often based upon the metaphor or outright 
embrace of the Platonic Nous). Others saw these more in terms of diffusion of 
ideas.


  The problem was that often those pointing to these structures downplayed 
differences, made narratives fit into categories by distorting them, etc. 
(Campbell of course got a lot of justifiable criticism along these lines) To me 
the big issue were common structures in the environment privileging certain 
interpretations making either diffusion or common mind unnecessary. (Much like 
certain structures evolve independently in nature due to the environment)


  With regards to Peirce, while he was alive when these ideas were developing, 
I think his system of thought was able to deal with them fare superior to what 
went on in the 20th century. Part of that was by having a semiotic more robust 
than how the received Saussure view approached things. (I’m aware of those who 
say Saussure  had views more complicated than those usually portrayed - but as 
with Descartes there’s something useful in using the name as a shorthand for a 
set of views)






--



  -
  PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 17, 2015, at 6:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Stephen J - yes, the spread of a belief/ behaviour by imitation has been 
> proposed by some researchers in human society - for a long time. It certainly 
> didn't start with Dawkins and his 'memes'. But criticism of this has been 
> quite strong; that is, such an approach, that defines cultures as created by 
> diffusion and copying from each other, 1)  ignores the functionality of the 
> belief/behaviour and assumes that ALL people find ALL beliefs/behaviour 
> functional; 2) it ignores the concept that beliefs/behaviour are rational 
> adaptations to local economic and ecological realities; and 3) ignores the 
> commonality of the biology of humans, in that the common need for language, 
> the family unit, maintenance of long-term modes of behaviour - are biological 
> aspects of the species. ..and 4) ignores those societies which have common 
> modes of behaviour but have never been in touch with another similar group.
>  
> In other words - the mimesis-diffusion explanation for human culture has been 
> heavily criticized long before Dawkin's reductionist memes.

This goes back to the heydays of structuralism - especially in psychology. 
There appeared to be two main schools. Some saw the structures as inherent to 
humans due to a kind of shared mind (often based upon the metaphor or outright 
embrace of the Platonic Nous). Others saw these more in terms of diffusion of 
ideas.

The problem was that often those pointing to these structures downplayed 
differences, made narratives fit into categories by distorting them, etc. 
(Campbell of course got a lot of justifiable criticism along these lines) To me 
the big issue were common structures in the environment privileging certain 
interpretations making either diffusion or common mind unnecessary. (Much like 
certain structures evolve independently in nature due to the environment)

With regards to Peirce, while he was alive when these ideas were developing, I 
think his system of thought was able to deal with them fare superior to what 
went on in the 20th century. Part of that was by having a semiotic more robust 
than how the received Saussure view approached things. (I’m aware of those who 
say Saussure  had views more complicated than those usually portrayed - but as 
with Descartes there’s something useful in using the name as a shorthand for a 
set of views)



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Sungchul Ji]

(Please ignore the previous post which was sent accidentally and
prematurely).

Hi Clark, Edwina, Matt, lists,

Can it be that all three are essential as indicated in Figure 1 --

i) Environment (also called the physical),

ii) Mind (also called the mental), and

iii) Structure (also called the world of structures).

I am suggesting this possibility primarily based on the triadic model of
the world proposed by Burgin [1, p. 60] and the Peircean idea of ITR
(Irreducible Triadic Relation).


 World of structure
 (Structures)
/  \
  /  \
/  \
Physical world     Mental world
(Environment)   (Mind)

Figure 1.  The triadic model of the world by Burign [1]

It is interesting to note that Burgin puts Plato's *Ideas* and *Forms *in
the Mental world and mathematical *formulas* and *categories* in the World
of structures [1, pp. 56-92].

Combining Figure 1 and the ITR template leads to Figure 2:

 fg
Physical world  ---> World of structures --> Mental
  (Firstness ?)  (Secondness?) (Thridness ?)
 [Object] [Sign]
 [Interpretant]
  {Emotion ?} {Cognition ?}{Credition ?}
   |
   ^
   |
   |
   |___|
 h
Figure 2.  The world as the embodiment of the Irreducible Triadic Relation
(ITR).   f = physical evolution; g = biological evolution or 'anapoiesis'
of Nikolic [2] (?); h = information flow, which may be related to the
*enclosure
function* of the ultimate 'bab' or 'babushka' of Angel [3].

It is evident in Figure 2 that ITR is a useful template for revealing the
*similarities* and *connections* hidden under seemingly unrelated and
dissimilar triads as exemplified by (i) Burign's model of the world, (ii)
Pericean (metaphysics), (iii) [Peircean semiotics], and (iv) {Angels theory
of credition}.

Also Figure 2 may accommodate the concept of 'bab' introduced by Angel
(2013, 2016) which was found to be useful in describing the characteristic
properties of creditive process. The term comes from the 'babushka' dolls,
the larger ones enclosing the smaller ones.  This hierarchical structure of
the nesting dolls inspired Angel to coin the neologism, imparting to it
several anthropocentric properties characteristic of the process of
believing (Angel, 2013, 2016):

(i) Enclosure function = the cognitive process constituting or modifying
propositions (bab-configurations) such as vague ideas, confirmed knowledge,
values, or even moral claims
(ii) Converter function =  the belief process activated when
bab-configurations are transformed into action
(iii) S*tabilizer-function* = changes fluid bab-configurations by
repetition into stable attitudes and mindsets
(iv) M*odulator-function* = highlights in a specific way the differences of
individuals and the differences of situations, in which creditive process
can occur.

Angel (2016) describes the context in which he was motivated to coin "bab"
as follows:

“. . .  we had to introduce a term that integrates both – cognitive and
emotional aspects. Thus “bab” was introduced to denote such a known item
that consists of the contents of beliefs. Each “bab” can carry specific
emotional value and describes an item at various levels of complexity. The
term “bab” is a meta-theoretically conceived neologism inspired by the
hierarchical organization of the “Babushka” doll (in some regions also
called “Matreshka”). Similarly to such a doll of different “sizes”, the
same contents of a “bab” can exist with different values of “mightiness”,
expressing the different personal relevance of the belief content. . . .”

All the best.

Sung


References:
   [1] Burgin, M (2010)  Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity and
Unification.  World Scientific, New Jersey.
   [2] Nikolic D (2015)  *Practopoiesis*: Or How life fosters a mind.  J.
theoret. Biol. 373:40-61.
   [3] Angel, H.-F. (2013)  Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions (Runehov
A L, Oviedo L, and Azari N P, eds).  Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 536-539.
   [4] Angel H.-F. (2016) A Process of Merging Interior and Exterior Reality:
A Short View on the Structure of Credition, in: Teixeira,
Maria-Teresa (Ed): Mind in Nature, in: European Studies in Process Thought,
2016, Cambridge Scholars Publishing [in press].


On Mon, Oct 19, 2015 at 3:44 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Oct 19, 2015, at 1:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> Clark - I prefer not to think of Jung.  You wrote:
>
> "the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as
> literature were correct."
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by the above.
>
>
> In most ways 

Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,

I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to make the subconscious conscious, that is, to uncover memes to see where they come from. Many of them are myths, that is lies- and these lies may have been told deliberately, or they may have come up by a social systems own dynamics, as any system intends to reinforce itself. Anyway, to make the subconscious conscious is the way of psychoanalysis, and I do not see, what is so wrong about it, fundamentally. Of course, it is bad to have a wrong analysis, and Freud probably was wrong in many places (eg., that a child is polymorph-pervert). But I think, it is very good to replace a diffusion with a narrative- if the narrative is telling the truth, and if this can be made sure. Can it? By scientific method?

Best,

Helmut



"Clark Goble" 
 


 


On Oct 19, 2015, at 1:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 


Clark - I prefer not to think of Jung.  You wrote:

 

"the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as literature were correct."

 

I'm not sure what you mean by the above.




In most ways psychoanalysis is treating the mind (especially dreams) as if they were a literary work to be interpreted with the various ways literature was interpreted.  That’s why even though Jung, Freud and company aren’t typically taken seriously in science they still are in literature departments. 

 

The way a person interprets literature simply is quite different from say what goes on in contemporary psychology or cognitive science.

 

 
- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen J - yes, the spread of a belief/ behaviour by imitation has been 
proposed by some researchers in human society - for a long time. It certainly 
didn't start with Dawkins and his 'memes'. But criticism of this has been quite 
strong; that is, such an approach, that defines cultures as created by 
diffusion and copying from each other, 1)  ignores the functionality of the 
belief/behaviour and assumes that ALL people find ALL beliefs/behaviour 
functional; 2) it ignores the concept that beliefs/behaviour are rational 
adaptations to local economic and ecological realities; and 3) ignores the 
commonality of the biology of humans, in that the common need for language, the 
family unit, maintenance of long-term modes of behaviour - are biological 
aspects of the species. ..and 4) ignores those societies which have common 
modes of behaviour but have never been in touch with another similar group.

In other words - the mimesis-diffusion explanation for human culture has been 
heavily criticized long before Dawkin's reductionist memes.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Clark Goble' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 10:24 PM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  Paradoxically, I actually owe Dawkins for my divergence into semiotics. As a 
university student, I was plodding along within the context of the mainstream 
“it’s all in the selfish genes” narrative for some considerable time until I 
discovered memetics. That got me thinking first in terms of imitation as a 
fundamental principle not just for humans but for any organism, including cells 
and neurons, and developed on from there. It was very innovative for Dawkins to 
introduce memetics into the narrative. It’s unfortunate that he never developed 
it further than that.

  Animism may have been common, but the anthropocentrism seating the human form 
in the image of god at the centre of the universe is not very helpful, and has 
held us back... contrast this Occidental anthropocentrism against Buddhism. A 
Copernican scale of revolution in the life sciences is long overdue.

  sj

   

  From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
  Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 10:42 PM
  To: Peirce-L
  Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

   

   

On Oct 15, 2015, at 5:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

 

It is the "life because genes because natural selection" narrative.

   

  Does he push that?  Certainly he does pushback against various primarily 
religiously inspired beliefs that tend to dismiss the history of evolution. 
However I don’t think he claims that explains life. 

   

  I certainly think his particular approach to atheism could use a heavy dose 
of careful philosophical study. But in terms of evolution I’m not sure I have a 
whole lot of complaints beyond his thinking it says more about religion than it 
does. (It’s always easier to go up against non-sense arguments by the ill 
informed than from sophisticated interlocutors) 

   

Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric 
perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm 
that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. 

   

  I’m not sure what you mean here. Animism was a fairly common belief even in 
late antiquity. At a minimum the platonists ascribed to the planets 
consciousness. (They are the daemons often) I don’t know enough about the 
nuances of late antiquity to say much about how animals were views. Again I 
don’t know the details of the views of St. Francis of Assisi or his later 
followers but I’d assume they’d give animals a bit more status than even many 
today do.

   

  Certainly Peirce is far more expansive in what he calls mind. (Consciousness 
is a bit trickier but at times he appears to see consciousness as the inward 
part of a “swerve” of chance - and thus inherent in the universe)

   

The introduction of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all 
that.

   

  Biosemiotics is certainly interesting. I’m not quite sure it is as 
revolutionary to a Peircean perspective as you suggest. (I’m not sure that’s 
worth getting bogged down into mind you) It seems to me Peirce already saw his 
semiotics as having great breadth in biology.

   

   



--



  -
  PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers:

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Very nicely put, Edwina... I concur.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Saturday, 17 October 2015 2:43 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Clark Goble'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

Stephen J - yes, the spread of a belief/ behaviour by imitation has been 
proposed by some researchers in human society - for a long time. It certainly 
didn't start with Dawkins and his 'memes'. But criticism of this has been quite 
strong; that is, such an approach, that defines cultures as created by 
diffusion and copying from each other, 1)  ignores the functionality of the 
belief/behaviour and assumes that ALL people find ALL beliefs/behaviour 
functional; 2) it ignores the concept that beliefs/behaviour are rational 
adaptations to local economic and ecological realities; and 3) ignores the 
commonality of the biology of humans, in that the common need for language, the 
family unit, maintenance of long-term modes of behaviour - are biological 
aspects of the species. ..and 4) ignores those societies which have common 
modes of behaviour but have never been in touch with another similar group.

 

In other words - the mimesis-diffusion explanation for human culture has been 
heavily criticized long before Dawkin's reductionist memes.

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Clark Goble' <mailto:cl...@lextek.com>  ; 'Peirce-L' 
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 10:24 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

Paradoxically, I actually owe Dawkins for my divergence into semiotics. As a 
university student, I was plodding along within the context of the mainstream 
“it’s all in the selfish genes” narrative for some considerable time until I 
discovered memetics. That got me thinking first in terms of imitation as a 
fundamental principle not just for humans but for any organism, including cells 
and neurons, and developed on from there. It was very innovative for Dawkins to 
introduce memetics into the narrative. It’s unfortunate that he never developed 
it further than that.

Animism may have been common, but the anthropocentrism seating the human form 
in the image of god at the centre of the universe is not very helpful, and has 
held us back... contrast this Occidental anthropocentrism against Buddhism. A 
Copernican scale of revolution in the life sciences is long overdue.

sj

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 10:42 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

 

On Oct 15, 2015, at 5:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

 

It is the "life because genes because natural selection" narrative.

 

Does he push that?  Certainly he does pushback against various primarily 
religiously inspired beliefs that tend to dismiss the history of evolution. 
However I don’t think he claims that explains life. 

 

I certainly think his particular approach to atheism could use a heavy dose of 
careful philosophical study. But in terms of evolution I’m not sure I have a 
whole lot of complaints beyond his thinking it says more about religion than it 
does. (It’s always easier to go up against non-sense arguments by the ill 
informed than from sophisticated interlocutors) 

 

Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric 
perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm 
that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. 

 

I’m not sure what you mean here. Animism was a fairly common belief even in 
late antiquity. At a minimum the platonists ascribed to the planets 
consciousness. (They are the daemons often) I don’t know enough about the 
nuances of late antiquity to say much about how animals were views. Again I 
don’t know the details of the views of St. Francis of Assisi or his later 
followers but I’d assume they’d give animals a bit more status than even many 
today do.

 

Certainly Peirce is far more expansive in what he calls mind. (Consciousness is 
a bit trickier but at times he appears to see consciousness as the inward part 
of a “swerve” of chance - and thus inherent in the universe)

 

The introduction of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all that.

 

Biosemiotics is certainly interesting. I’m not quite sure it is as 
revolutionary to a Peircean perspective as you suggest. (I’m not sure that’s 
worth getting bogged down into mind you) It seems to me Peirce already saw his 
semiotics as having great breadth in biology.

 

 

  _  


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, sen

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, "The law of association of habits" was simply the title for my 2001
article to place in a brief summary form, its emphasis. It was taken from
the aforementioned quote by Peirce (with reference to "the law of
association of ideas"), and not intended as a precise expression of a
fundamental principle, in and of itself. It was careless of me to frame it
this way in this conversation, as it's only a headline grabber, not a
precisely articulated principle. I could just as easily have titled my paper
“The law of habituation of associations” and it would still be just as
clumsy, imprecise and incorrect. If this does not clarify your question for
you and what I was getting at in that title, then perhaps the following
simplistic example might, copy-pasted from something I posted to another
forum discussion:

In order to make a choice, perform an action, you need to have an objective,
something that matters. Say you want to get to the top of a flight of steps.
In order to achieve this simple objective, your brain constructs
"narratives"... I refer not to word narratives, but to sequences of logic,
habits and associations to coordinate muscles and movements. You begin your
motion up the stairs. Your first objective is the first step. You raise a
foot to the first step, recruiting the muscles and eye coordinations that
are associated together in the execution of that first step and locating
your foot's point of contact. You do this without thinking, but your brain’s
neurons are busily stringing nonverbal narratives together, again, in
accordance with their own habits/associations/motivations. This involves
habit (how your brain has been trained in muscle contractions within the
context of space and movement). It involves association (associating various
cues, visual, touch, contractions, etc) as you raise your foot and control
its ascent to the next step. It involves motivation, defining the goal that
matters and the sub-goals required to get there. In summary, every choice,
every decision, recruits the interconnected habits, associations and motives
required to realize them.

Now, given that I am not a Peirce scholar, you might like to reframe these
sorts of thought-narratives within the context of the categories and the
triadic scheme. But to summarize... my imprecise articulation as “the law of
association of habits” serves to imply the subconscious, nonverbal
narratives behind every choice. Every thought comes together as a context,
under the three aspects, being habit, association and "the desire to be"
(the "desire to be" is just another way of alluding to the pragmatic maxim).

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 12:23 AM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Stephen - I am well read in all of Peirce's writings. That wasn't,
therefore, what I was asking; I was asking what YOU meant by it. Habit, as a
generalization and collation of 'ideas' or 'codes' or 'modes of
organization' is Peirce's definition. But you refer to the 'association of
habits' (not ideas)and therefore, I asked you what you meant by this.

 

Since you refer only to habit (Thirdness) and the 'association of habits' -
and don't refer to causality from brute interaction of discrete particles
(Secondness) or the spontaneous generation of a novel entity
(Firstness)...then, I consider that these modes of generation of
interactions - are not within your axiomatic model.

 

How can evolution and adaptation take place without the immediacy of a brute
interaction of Secondness and the spontaneity of Firstness? 

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
<mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>  ; 'Peirce-L'
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 2:32 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Edwina

>”I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit
is the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set
of actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate
or network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits.“

Peirce appreciated the central importance of habit and association in
cognitive processes, and this is evident throughout his writings. The
essence of his view is captured in Peirce (1931-1966): 
'There is a law in this succession of ideas. We may roughly say it is the
law of habit. It is the great "Law of Association of Ideas," - the one law
of all psychical action.' (CP 7.388) 

Habit and association are covered more specifically as aspects of a general
law of mind, in Book III, Philosophy of Mind (CP 7.388-7.523) (cha

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, recent developments suggest that many creatures have “culture” not
just humans. Human cultures are as complex as they are because we have the
physiological tools (mind-bodies) that make them possible. There is nothing
magical about human cultures. They are simply manifestations of Peircean
biosemiotics that apply universally to all living things. Human hands and
vocal chords are the “tools” that are especially important in the evolution
of human culture. No magic, no woo, no anthropocentric man made in god’s
image, none of that nonsense. It’s just natural law doing what it does. The
late Thomas Sebeok understood precisely this very point:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-
speech-theory.html

And in other conversations on this list, I compared dynamic cities that
restructure themselves with historical experience, to brains as colonies of
neurons, to suggest the dynamic way that functional specialisations in
brains emerge. I have never suggested that there is anything about culture
that is carved in stone. But I think I see where your objection emerges.
Cultures are resistant to change for the very same reason that personality
and the brain’s functional specialisations are resistant to change... habit.
In a very real sense, a culture is like a thought, with its own habits,
associations and motivations that we identify in what the culture stands
for.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 2:04 AM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

One further comment, Stephen - with regard to your point 10, where you write
that 'for humans that ecosystem is Culture'. I disagree, for you do not
examine where and how and why cultural behaviour and beliefs develop. And,
you seem to view culture as 'carved in stone'. My view is that cultural
behaviour and beliefs develop as logical adaptations to the real ecological
realities - i.e., you can't have an agricultural economy in the Arctic and
so, you develop a hunting economy- and it has a very different socioeconomic
mode of organization than an agricultural economy- and also, enables/limits
a different size population.

 

And - cultural behaviour and beliefs will change, as the technology enables
more food production and the population increases. 

 

[And I'm against historicism]

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
<mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>  ; 'Peirce-L'
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Edwina, I formulated my “law of association of habits” in conjunction with
“the desire to be,” before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment
between his three categories and my habits, association and “desire to be”
(the “desire to be” relates to the constellation of motivations, desires,
fears, thrills, etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic
framework can only ever be a best guess... even Isaac Newton’s framework is
a best guess that thus far, beyond the controversies of SGR, has been shown
to work very well. The list of assumptions that I relied on to guide my
thinking, taken from a somewhat waffly list that I put together a couple of
years ago, was along the following lines (updated since then, for a more
informed readership):

1) The law of association of habits [title of my article that I got
published in Semiotica in 2001] provides the same sort of generality for
cognitive science that Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences in
his laws of motion. Moreover, it fits in perfectly with Peirce‘s philosophy
of Pragmatism (as in, usefulness – defining the things that matter);
2) Perhaps the law of association of habits relates also to matter, as per
Peirce’s famous reference to matter as “mind hidebound in habit”;
3) Our existence within cultures – and the fact that cultures can be
sustained over time – can be understood from the perspective of the law of
association of habits. For example – memes as habits, and imitation as a
subset of associative learning. Associative learning provides the mechanism
by which memes (habits) are transmitted. Imitation is one of the ways in
which we choose what to associate;
4) Persistence across time is the deal-breaker. No matter what accidental
complexity might manifest according to the laws of chance, the fact that
life persists across time, with all the thermodynamic forces (entropy)
acting against it, suggests that there is something more robust going on
than the mechanics of dumb luck;
5

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen, see my comments below:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 5:41 AM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  SJ:Edwina, recent developments suggest that many creatures have "culture" not 
just humans. Human cultures are as complex as they are because we have the 
physiological tools (mind-bodies) that make them possible. There is nothing 
magical about human cultures. They are simply manifestations of Peircean 
biosemiotics that apply universally to all living things. Human hands and vocal 
chords are the "tools" that are especially important in the evolution of human 
culture. No magic, no woo, no anthropocentric man made in god's image, none of 
that nonsense. It's just natural law doing what it does. The late Thomas Sebeok 
understood precisely this very point:
  
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html

  EDWINA: I'm not arguing for a magical nature of human culture! Nor am I 
talking about some anthropocentric man in god's image!! And what do you mean by 
defining them as 'manifestations of Peircean biosemiotics'?  I disagree that 
'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of our species. These 
technological adaptations are vital but the important tool is the human brain, 
with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning, imagination, logic and symbolic 
language. This enables a species that can only live as a community, for its 
knowledge base is learned rather than innate, and is expressed and communicated 
via language. The actual format of the human culture is, in my view, developed 
as a logical adaptation to a particular biomic ecology; that is, as I've said 
before, you can't grow wheat in the Arctic and therefore, develop a hunting 
economy which is organized (family mode, economy, political etc)..very, very 
differently from an agricultural mode. 


  SJ: And in other conversations on this list, I compared dynamic cities that 
restructure themselves with historical experience, to brains as colonies of 
neurons, to suggest the dynamic way that functional specialisations in brains 
emerge. I have never suggested that there is anything about culture that is 
carved in stone. But I think I see where your objection emerges. Cultures are 
resistant to change for the very same reason that personality and the brain's 
functional specialisations are resistant to change... habit. In a very real 
sense, a culture is like a thought, with its own habits, associations and 
motivations that we identify in what the culture stands for.



  EDWINA: I'd agree - societies are  like giant organisms, and indeed, 
behaviour and beliefs are very resistant to change, for such would destabilize 
the community. All organisms require stability of processes - and in those that 
can adapt, change begins and develops in the periphery - and can be slow, or in 
other cases, can...when the system as a whole requires change...be apocalpytic 
and sudden.



  sj

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 2:04 AM
  To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
  Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

   

  One further comment, Stephen - with regard to your point 10, where you write 
that 'for humans that ecosystem is Culture'. I disagree, for you do not examine 
where and how and why cultural behaviour and beliefs develop. And, you seem to 
view culture as 'carved in stone'. My view is that cultural behaviour and 
beliefs develop as logical adaptations to the real ecological realities - i.e., 
you can't have an agricultural economy in the Arctic and so, you develop a 
hunting economy- and it has a very different socioeconomic mode of organization 
than an agricultural economy- and also, enables/limits a different size 
population.

   

  And - cultural behaviour and beliefs will change, as the technology enables 
more food production and the population increases. 

   

  [And I'm against historicism]

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek 

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM

    Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

 

Edwina, I formulated my "law of association of habits" in conjunction with 
"the desire to be," before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of 
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my 
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment between 
his three categories and my habits, association and "desire to be" (the "desire 
to be" relates to the constellation of motivations, desires, fears, thrill

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Here it is, Edwina... here lies the crux of our differences:
>”I disagree that 'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of
our species. These technological adaptations are vital but the important
tool is the human brain, with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning,
imagination, logic and symbolic language.“

My thesis, like that of Norman Doidge, 2007
<http://www.normandoidge.com/?page_id=1259> , is that the neuroplastic brain
wires itself in response to experience. The mind-body unity implies that the
mind-body is a whole, mind is not separate to body. However... for the sake
of illustration, it is via the body that the mind apprehends the experiences
that wire the brain. Now it is true that apes, chimps, etc also have hands
and they also use vocalisations, but their vocalisations are limited, and
their hands are not predisposed to holding biros or drawing complex symbols
or building complex things... they also have smaller brain-body weight
ratios. And so apes will never, at their current levels of evolution,
develop the sorts of complex cultures that we inhabit. 

You bring us back to this old tough nut to crack... innate. I insist that
nothing is innate (beyond the predispositions defined in the context of the
biosemiotic paradigm). You insist that “hypothetical reasoning, imagination,
logic and symbolic language“ are innate in humans. But a human infant raised
among wild wolves will unlearn whatever innateness there is quicker than you
can say “define the things that matter in a lupine den” and this is what
accounts for the phenomenon of the feral child. This is consistent with the
axiomatic framework that I outlined. Your insistence on innate
characteristics cannot be sustained within such an axiomatic framework. It
is anthropocentric because it designates something “special” about the human
condition. But we are different to animals in degree, not in kind. All
living things conform to the same Peircean-biosemiotic principles (this is
what I meant by 'manifestations of Peircean biosemiotics'). We are not going
anywhere with this, and we have to just agree to disagree. There is no
crossing this Rubicon.

sj

PS: Koko the famous gorilla exhibits imagination and ability to work with
symbols. A lot of animals do. A lot of animals use tools. Just a moment ago,
I viewed a video clip of a wild bird snowboarding down a rooftop on a
margarine lid, just for the fun of it. There is nothing exceptional about
the human condition beyond the “tipping point” in development that has
enabled us to form the largest, most complex cultures. The human
exceptionalism that imbues humans with special powers is just another form
of anthropocentrism. Aha, I found the clip of the snowboarding bird:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DB_I08ahD1c
The usual narrative for this kind of thing is that the bird is acting on an
adaptive instinct... this kind of typical genocentric narrative is hogwash.
Maybe the bird is doing exactly what it looks like it’s doing... just
curious and having a bit of fun.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, 16 October 2015 2:53 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Stephen, see my comments below:

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
<mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>  ; 'Peirce-L'
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 5:41 AM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

SJ:Edwina, recent developments suggest that many creatures have “culture”
not just humans. Human cultures are as complex as they are because we have
the physiological tools (mind-bodies) that make them possible. There is
nothing magical about human cultures. They are simply manifestations of
Peircean biosemiotics that apply universally to all living things. Human
hands and vocal chords are the “tools” that are especially important in the
evolution of human culture. No magic, no woo, no anthropocentric man made in
god’s image, none of that nonsense. It’s just natural law doing what it
does. The late Thomas Sebeok understood precisely this very point:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-
speech-theory.html

EDWINA: I'm not arguing for a magical nature of human culture! Nor am I
talking about some anthropocentric man in god's image!! And what do you mean
by defining them as 'manifestations of Peircean biosemiotics'?  I disagree
that 'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of our species.
These technological adaptations are vital but the important tool is the
human brain, with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning, imagination,
logic and symbolic language. This enables a species that can only live as a
community, for its knowledge b

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen J - I guess we disagree on a lot!

1) I don't see how, with regard to symbolic language, having hands has any 
causal role. After all, there ARE people born without hands who most certainly 
learn language. And I don't see how an ape hand could not, purely technically, 
draw a complex diagramme. It's their brain, guiding that hand, that is 
incapable. Therefore, I remain in the 'innate capacity to symbolic language' 
camp - based on the equally innate capacity for logical reasoning and 
hypothetical imagination...

2) What 'predispositions defined in the biosemiotic paradigm'? 

3) There cannot be any valid case of a human infant raised among wild wolves; 
imagine a week-old baby - impossible to be raised by a wolf. Now, can there be 
a case of an autistic or brain-damaged child of over the age of let's say, 
five, abandoned in the wild by his family, living among animals - that's 
slightly possible but his inability to speak would more likely be the brain 
damage.

No, to define a unique characteristic of a species is not 'anthropocentric'! 
After all, animals can have unique characteristics (whales, elephants, 
insects...)... The FACT that only the human species uses symbolic language is a 
unique characteristic - and is due primarily to the large brain - with its 
innate capacity for logic, reasoning and imagination.  And I don't agree that 
we are different from animals only in degree; the use of symbolic language, 
which rests entirely on memory and imagination - as well as logic - is a HUGE 
difference.

As for the bird - that's one bird; not the whole species. 

4) You haven't defined the Peircean biosemiotic principle.

Yes - we don't agree on very much!

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 10:30 AM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  Here it is, Edwina... here lies the crux of our differences:
  >"I disagree that 'human hands and vocal chords' are the important tools of 
our species. These technological adaptations are vital but the important tool 
is the human brain, with its capacity for hypothetical reasoning, imagination, 
logic and symbolic language."

  My thesis, like that of Norman Doidge, 2007, is that the neuroplastic brain 
wires itself in response to experience. The mind-body unity implies that the 
mind-body is a whole, mind is not separate to body. However... for the sake of 
illustration, it is via the body that the mind apprehends the experiences that 
wire the brain. Now it is true that apes, chimps, etc also have hands and they 
also use vocalisations, but their vocalisations are limited, and their hands 
are not predisposed to holding biros or drawing complex symbols or building 
complex things... they also have smaller brain-body weight ratios. And so apes 
will never, at their current levels of evolution, develop the sorts of complex 
cultures that we inhabit. 

  You bring us back to this old tough nut to crack... innate. I insist that 
nothing is innate (beyond the predispositions defined in the context of the 
biosemiotic paradigm). You insist that "hypothetical reasoning, imagination, 
logic and symbolic language" are innate in humans. But a human infant raised 
among wild wolves will unlearn whatever innateness there is quicker than you 
can say "define the things that matter in a lupine den" and this is what 
accounts for the phenomenon of the feral child. This is consistent with the 
axiomatic framework that I outlined. Your insistence on innate characteristics 
cannot be sustained within such an axiomatic framework. It is anthropocentric 
because it designates something "special" about the human condition. But we are 
different to animals in degree, not in kind. All living things conform to the 
same Peircean-biosemiotic principles (this is what I meant by 'manifestations 
of Peircean biosemiotics'). We are not going anywhere with this, and we have to 
just agree to disagree. There is no crossing this Rubicon.

  sj

  PS: Koko the famous gorilla exhibits imagination and ability to work with 
symbols. A lot of animals do. A lot of animals use tools. Just a moment ago, I 
viewed a video clip of a wild bird snowboarding down a rooftop on a margarine 
lid, just for the fun of it. There is nothing exceptional about the human 
condition beyond the "tipping point" in development that has enabled us to form 
the largest, most complex cultures. The human exceptionalism that imbues humans 
with special powers is just another form of anthropocentrism. Aha, I found the 
clip of the snowboarding bird:
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DB_I08ahD1c
  The usual narrative for this kind of thing is that the bird is acting on an 
adaptive instinct... this kind of typical genocentric narrative is hogwash. 
Maybe the bird is doing exactly what it looks like it's doing..

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Paradoxically, I actually owe Dawkins for my divergence into semiotics. As a 
university student, I was plodding along within the context of the mainstream 
“it’s all in the selfish genes” narrative for some considerable time until I 
discovered memetics. That got me thinking first in terms of imitation as a 
fundamental principle not just for humans but for any organism, including cells 
and neurons, and developed on from there. It was very innovative for Dawkins to 
introduce memetics into the narrative. It’s unfortunate that he never developed 
it further than that.

Animism may have been common, but the anthropocentrism seating the human form 
in the image of god at the centre of the universe is not very helpful, and has 
held us back... contrast this Occidental anthropocentrism against Buddhism. A 
Copernican scale of revolution in the life sciences is long overdue.

sj

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 10:42 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

 

On Oct 15, 2015, at 5:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

 

It is the "life because genes because natural selection" narrative.

 

Does he push that?  Certainly he does pushback against various primarily 
religiously inspired beliefs that tend to dismiss the history of evolution. 
However I don’t think he claims that explains life. 

 

I certainly think his particular approach to atheism could use a heavy dose of 
careful philosophical study. But in terms of evolution I’m not sure I have a 
whole lot of complaints beyond his thinking it says more about religion than it 
does. (It’s always easier to go up against non-sense arguments by the ill 
informed than from sophisticated interlocutors) 

 

Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric 
perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm 
that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. 

 

I’m not sure what you mean here. Animism was a fairly common belief even in 
late antiquity. At a minimum the platonists ascribed to the planets 
consciousness. (They are the daemons often) I don’t know enough about the 
nuances of late antiquity to say much about how animals were views. Again I 
don’t know the details of the views of St. Francis of Assisi or his later 
followers but I’d assume they’d give animals a bit more status than even many 
today do.

 

Certainly Peirce is far more expansive in what he calls mind. (Consciousness is 
a bit trickier but at times he appears to see consciousness as the inward part 
of a “swerve” of chance - and thus inherent in the universe)

 

The introduction of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all that.

 

Biosemiotics is certainly interesting. I’m not quite sure it is as 
revolutionary to a Peircean perspective as you suggest. (I’m not sure that’s 
worth getting bogged down into mind you) It seems to me Peirce already saw his 
semiotics as having great breadth in biology.

 

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Jerry, List

Richard Dawkins is traversing the globe preaching his gospel. It is the
"life because genes because natural selection" narrative. And he is
preaching his gospel in the absence of any axiomatic framework that hangs
together (natural selection is a mechanism, not an axiomatic principle). He
has no axiomatic framework. We do. The possible implications of the
Peirce-biosemiotics paradigm are far-reaching... from politics, to religion,
to sexuality, to biology and the mind sciences and even to physics and the
thermodynamics of complexity. Yet, the indications are that The
Establishment's genocentrism-based narrative has not entirely released its
grip in our forums.

Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric
perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm
that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. The introduction
of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all that. So to get
bogged down on the semantics of the original Peirce is not even what he
himself would have wanted. I think, were he alive today, Peirce would
welcome the expansion of his semiotics into a more general paradigm for the
life sciences. And that means that he himself would be open to
recontextualising some of his assumptions.

sj

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 11:10 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

 

On Oct 14, 2015, at 10:29 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:





such as the need for an axiomatic
framework, or a review of important principles. Interdisciplinary thinking
requires such openness to ideas, as none of us can be experts on everything.

 

Yes, the need for openness in thinking broadly is readily apparent.

 

It would very helpful to your readers if you would clarify what you are
seeking to communicate in either

 "an axiomatic framework"  in the sense of the breadth of such a framework,
or

" a review of important principles".

 

Is your concern about a general logic for interdisciplinary thinking?

 

Or, about a semantic framework that encompasses a particular philosophy of
logic or metaphysics or epistemology?

 

These questions are phrased in such a manner as to give you full license
tell the readers how such an open space can be constructed with minimal
constraints.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 15, 2015, at 5:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
> 
> It is the "life because genes because natural selection" narrative.

Does he push that?  Certainly he does pushback against various primarily 
religiously inspired beliefs that tend to dismiss the history of evolution. 
However I don’t think he claims that explains life. 

I certainly think his particular approach to atheism could use a heavy dose of 
careful philosophical study. But in terms of evolution I’m not sure I have a 
whole lot of complaints beyond his thinking it says more about religion than it 
does. (It’s always easier to go up against non-sense arguments by the ill 
informed than from sophisticated interlocutors) 

> Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric 
> perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm 
> that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. 

I’m not sure what you mean here. Animism was a fairly common belief even in 
late antiquity. At a minimum the platonists ascribed to the planets 
consciousness. (They are the daemons often) I don’t know enough about the 
nuances of late antiquity to say much about how animals were views. Again I 
don’t know the details of the views of St. Francis of Assisi or his later 
followers but I’d assume they’d give animals a bit more status than even many 
today do.

Certainly Peirce is far more expansive in what he calls mind. (Consciousness is 
a bit trickier but at times he appears to see consciousness as the inward part 
of a “swerve” of chance - and thus inherent in the universe)

> The introduction of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all that.

Biosemiotics is certainly interesting. I’m not quite sure it is as 
revolutionary to a Peircean perspective as you suggest. (I’m not sure that’s 
worth getting bogged down into mind you) It seems to me Peirce already saw his 
semiotics as having great breadth in biology.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

One further comment, Stephen - with regard to your point 10, where you write 
that 'for humans that ecosystem is Culture'. I disagree, for you do not examine 
where and how and why cultural behaviour and beliefs develop. And, you seem to 
view culture as 'carved in stone'. My view is that cultural behaviour and 
beliefs develop as logical adaptations to the real ecological realities - i.e., 
you can't have an agricultural economy in the Arctic and so, you develop a 
hunting economy- and it has a very different socioeconomic mode of organization 
than an agricultural economy- and also, enables/limits a different size 
population.

And - cultural behaviour and beliefs will change, as the technology enables 
more food production and the population increases. 

[And I'm against historicism]

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  Edwina, I formulated my "law of association of habits" in conjunction with 
"the desire to be," before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of 
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my 
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment between 
his three categories and my habits, association and "desire to be" (the "desire 
to be" relates to the constellation of motivations, desires, fears, thrills, 
etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic framework can only 
ever be a best guess... even Isaac Newton's framework is a best guess that thus 
far, beyond the controversies of SGR, has been shown to work very well. The 
list of assumptions that I relied on to guide my thinking, taken from a 
somewhat waffly list that I put together a couple of years ago, was along the 
following lines (updated since then, for a more informed readership):

  1) The law of association of habits [title of my article that I got published 
in Semiotica in 2001] provides the same sort of generality for cognitive 
science that Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences in his laws of 
motion. Moreover, it fits in perfectly with Peirce's philosophy of Pragmatism 
(as in, usefulness - defining the things that matter);
  2) Perhaps the law of association of habits relates also to matter, as per 
Peirce's famous reference to matter as "mind hidebound in habit";
  3) Our existence within cultures - and the fact that cultures can be 
sustained over time - can be understood from the perspective of the law of 
association of habits. For example - memes as habits, and imitation as a subset 
of associative learning. Associative learning provides the mechanism by which 
memes (habits) are transmitted. Imitation is one of the ways in which we choose 
what to associate;
  4) Persistence across time is the deal-breaker. No matter what accidental 
complexity might manifest according to the laws of chance, the fact that life 
persists across time, with all the thermodynamic forces (entropy) acting 
against it, suggests that there is something more robust going on than the 
mechanics of dumb luck;
  5) The law of association of habits is fully generalizable to every entity 
that lives. This enables us to formulate a more general semiotics that brings 
us to biosemiotics, based in the ideas of Jakob von Uexküll;
  6) Existence continues to be strange and unfathomable, no matter what your 
theoretical base might be. The emphasis of the law of association of habits is 
on that which is observed. It strives to provide as consistent, logical, 
rational and coherent a theory as is possible, without having to contrive 
thermodynamically impossible scenarios, such as computers to process genetic 
code. There are gaps in our knowledge that may never be resolved, because it is 
impossible to conduct experimental controls. For example, morphic resonance may 
be so fundamental and basic that there is no way of isolating a control for it, 
because in order to do so, we would need to go to another universe;
  7) Within the context of the laws of thermodynamics (complexity, entropy), 
life is inevitable, not accidental;
  8) The law of association of habits is entropically friendly... imitation, 
for example, obviates the need to process complex data from genetic blueprints. 
By contrast, any suggestion that "computers" can occur in nature by way of 
natural selection fails to recognize such complexity as, thermodynamically, 
extremely unlikely;
  9) Things that are inexplicable to our current way of thinking must have 
logical, rational explanations. The law of association of habits might fit in 
neatly with such theoretical ideas as morphic resonance or non-locality 
(quantum physics);
  10) The law of association of habits is about making choices from ecosystems. 
For humans, that e

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen - I am well read in all of Peirce's writings. That wasn't, therefore, 
what I was asking; I was asking what YOU meant by it. Habit, as a 
generalization and collation of 'ideas' or 'codes' or 'modes of organization' 
is Peirce's definition. But you refer to the 'association of habits' (not 
ideas)and therefore, I asked you what you meant by this.

Since you refer only to habit (Thirdness) and the 'association of habits' - and 
don't refer to causality from brute interaction of discrete particles 
(Secondness) or the spontaneous generation of a novel entity 
(Firstness)...then, I consider that these modes of generation of interactions - 
are not within your axiomatic model.

How can evolution and adaptation take place without the immediacy of a brute 
interaction of Secondness and the spontaneity of Firstness? 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 2:32 PM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  Edwina

  >"I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit is 
the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set of 
actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate or 
network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits."

  Peirce appreciated the central importance of habit and association in 
cognitive processes, and this is evident throughout his writings. The essence 
of his view is captured in Peirce (1931-1966): 
  'There is a law in this succession of ideas. We may roughly say it is the law 
of habit. It is the great "Law of Association of Ideas," - the one law of all 
psychical action.' (CP 7.388) 

  Habit and association are covered more specifically as aspects of a general 
law of mind, in Book III, Philosophy of Mind (CP 7.388-7.523) (chapters 2 and 3 
are on association and habit respectively), in Peirce (1931-1966)

  >"Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e., direct 
brute interaction and spontaneous chance."

  I do not understand on what basis you infer this.

  >"This also means that you rule of evolution and adaptation, for, without 
these two modes - neither can take place."

  Definitely not. While I do not include natural selection in an axiomatic 
context (others might have justification for doing so, but this is not my 
choice), I definitely do accept that it plays a significant part in the 
rough-and-tumble of adaptation. Natural selection is one mechanism among 
several.

  sj

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 7:23 PM
  To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
  Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

   

  Stephen -

   

  I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit is 
the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set of 
actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate or 
network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits.

   

  Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e., direct 
brute interaction and spontaneous chance. This also means that you rule of 
evolution and adaptation, for, without these two modes - neither can take place.

   

  As I said - I totally reject the reductionist 'theory' of Dawkin's 'memes'; 
culture is far more complex than a set-of-beliefs.

   

  I agree that life is inevitable, not accidental, based on the laws of 
thermodynamics (complexity and entropy).

   

  Edwina

   

   

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek 

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM

    Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

 

Edwina, I formulated my "law of association of habits" in conjunction with 
"the desire to be," before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of 
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my 
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment between 
his three categories and my habits, association and "desire to be" (the "desire 
to be" relates to the constellation of motivations, desires, fears, thrills, 
etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic framework can only 
ever be a best guess... even Isaac Newton's framework is a best guess that thus 
far, beyond the controversies of SGR, has been shown to work very well. The 
list of assumptions that I relied on to guide my thinking, taken from a 
somewhat waffly list that I put together a couple of years ago, was along the 
following lines (updated since then, for a more informed readers

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina wrote:

How can evolution and adaptation take place without the immediacy of a
brute interaction of Secondness and the spontaneity of Firstness?

That, in a nutshell (that is, as greatly simplified) is the question Peirce
put to Hegel's philosophy.

Best,

Gary

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 6:23 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Stephen - I am well read in all of Peirce's writings. That wasn't,
> therefore, what I was asking; I was asking what YOU meant by it. Habit, as
> a generalization and collation of 'ideas' or 'codes' or 'modes of
> organization' is Peirce's definition. But you refer to the 'association of
> habits' (not ideas)and therefore, I asked you what you meant by this.
>
> Since you refer only to habit (Thirdness) and the 'association of habits'
> - and don't refer to causality from brute interaction of discrete particles
> (Secondness) or the spontaneous generation of a novel entity
> (Firstness)...then, I consider that these modes of generation of
> interactions - are not within your axiomatic model.
>
> How can evolution and adaptation take place without the immediacy of a
> brute interaction of Secondness and the spontaneity of Firstness?
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
> *To:* 'Edwina Taborsky' <tabor...@primus.ca> ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
> <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> ; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 15, 2015 2:32 PM
> *Subject:* RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
> Morality)
>
> Edwina
>
> >”I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A
> habit is the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an
> organized set of actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural)
> can associate or network with other habitsand not network with yet
> other habits.“
>
> Peirce appreciated the central importance of habit and association in
> cognitive processes, and this is evident throughout his writings. The
> essence of his view is captured in Peirce (1931-1966):
> 'There is a law in this succession of ideas. We may roughly say it is the
> law of habit. It is the great "Law of Association of Ideas," - the one law
> of all psychical action.' (CP 7.388)
>
> Habit and association are covered more specifically as aspects of a
> general law of mind, in Book III, Philosophy of Mind (CP 7.388-7.523)
> (chapters 2 and 3 are on association and habit respectively), in Peirce
> (1931-1966)
>
> >“Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e.,
> direct brute interaction and spontaneous chance.“
>
> I do not understand on what basis you infer this.
>
> >”This also means that you rule of evolution and adaptation, for, without
> these two modes - neither can take place.“
>
> Definitely not. While I do not include natural selection in an axiomatic
> context (others might have justification for doing so, but this is not my
> choice), I definitely do accept that it plays a significant part in the
> rough-and-tumble of adaptation. Natural selection is one mechanism among
> several.
>
> sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 15 October 2015 7:23 PM
> *To:* Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
> *Subject:* Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
> Morality)
>
>
>
> Stephen -
>
>
>
> I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit
> is the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set
> of actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate
> or network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits.
>
>
>
> Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e., direct
> brute interaction and spontaneous chance. This also means that you rule of
> evolution and adaptation, for, without these two modes - neither can take
> place.
>
>
>
> As I said - I totally reject the reductionist 'theory' of Dawkin's
> 'memes'; culture is far more complex than a set-of-beliefs.
>
>
>
> I agree that life is inevitable, not accidental, based on the laws of
> thermodynamics (complexity and entropy).
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
>
> *To:* 'Edwina Taborsky' <tabor...@primus.ca> ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
> <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

 for the inclusion or exclusion of
parameters like entanglement.

 





 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 3:01 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Stephen - the gene-centric belief is hardly the sole ownership of Richard
Dawkins; it's been a basic theme of classical neoDarwinism -  and is he
really 'traversing the globe and preaching'? There are other scientific
explorations of a less deterministic and reductionist analysis, one that
involves the view that the biological process is a broad informational
dynamics - and the gene is merely the 'holder' of an adaptive change.

 

However, you have not provided us, with a clear outline of your 'axiomatic
framework'. 

 

I'm not sure what you mean by an 'Occidental paradigm' nor your statement
that Peirce did not consider that non-human entities had consciousness. I
suggest that this is not correct - he most certainly considered that, eg,
mammals had consciousness.

 

You say that you are not a Peirce scholar and again, I'm not sure what you
mean by that - have you read his work with any thoroughness? And, after all,
biosemiotics is based on the Peircean analytic framework...Therefore, what
is it exactly that you are rejecting within the Peircean framework?

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Jerry LR Chandler' <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>  ; 'Peirce-L'
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 7:15 AM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Jerry, List

Richard Dawkins is traversing the globe preaching his gospel. It is the
"life because genes because natural selection" narrative. And he is
preaching his gospel in the absence of any axiomatic framework that hangs
together (natural selection is a mechanism, not an axiomatic principle). He
has no axiomatic framework. We do. The possible implications of the
Peirce-biosemiotics paradigm are far-reaching... from politics, to religion,
to sexuality, to biology and the mind sciences and even to physics and the
thermodynamics of complexity. Yet, the indications are that The
Establishment's genocentrism-based narrative has not entirely released its
grip in our forums.

Peirce was not God. His semiotics was framed from a fairly anthropocentric
perspective, given that his thinking originates from an Occidental paradigm
that did not attribute consciousness to non-human entities. The introduction
of biosemiotics into the Peircean narrative changes all that. So to get
bogged down on the semantics of the original Peirce is not even what he
himself would have wanted. I think, were he alive today, Peirce would
welcome the expansion of his semiotics into a more general paradigm for the
life sciences. And that means that he himself would be open to
recontextualising some of his assumptions.

sj

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 11:10 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 

 

On Oct 14, 2015, at 10:29 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:

 

such as the need for an axiomatic
framework, or a review of important principles. Interdisciplinary thinking
requires such openness to ideas, as none of us can be experts on everything.

 

Yes, the need for openness in thinking broadly is readily apparent.

 

It would very helpful to your readers if you would clarify what you are
seeking to communicate in either

 "an axiomatic framework"  in the sense of the breadth of such a framework,
or

" a review of important principles".

 

Is your concern about a general logic for interdisciplinary thinking?

 

Or, about a semantic framework that encompasses a particular philosophy of
logic or metaphysics or epistemology?

 

These questions are phrased in such a manner as to give you full license
tell the readers how such an open space can be constructed with minimal
constraints.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

  _  


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but
to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .






-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen -

I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit is the 
continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set of actions, 
an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate or network with 
other habitsand not network with yet other habits.

Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e., direct 
brute interaction and spontaneous chance. This also means that you rule of 
evolution and adaptation, for, without these two modes - neither can take place.

As I said - I totally reject the reductionist 'theory' of Dawkin's 'memes'; 
culture is far more complex than a set-of-beliefs.

I agree that life is inevitable, not accidental, based on the laws of 
thermodynamics (complexity and entropy).

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Jerry LR Chandler' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM
  Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)


  Edwina, I formulated my "law of association of habits" in conjunction with 
"the desire to be," before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of 
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my 
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment between 
his three categories and my habits, association and "desire to be" (the "desire 
to be" relates to the constellation of motivations, desires, fears, thrills, 
etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic framework can only 
ever be a best guess... even Isaac Newton's framework is a best guess that thus 
far, beyond the controversies of SGR, has been shown to work very well. The 
list of assumptions that I relied on to guide my thinking, taken from a 
somewhat waffly list that I put together a couple of years ago, was along the 
following lines (updated since then, for a more informed readership):

  1) The law of association of habits [title of my article that I got published 
in Semiotica in 2001] provides the same sort of generality for cognitive 
science that Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences in his laws of 
motion. Moreover, it fits in perfectly with Peirce's philosophy of Pragmatism 
(as in, usefulness - defining the things that matter);
  2) Perhaps the law of association of habits relates also to matter, as per 
Peirce's famous reference to matter as "mind hidebound in habit";
  3) Our existence within cultures - and the fact that cultures can be 
sustained over time - can be understood from the perspective of the law of 
association of habits. For example - memes as habits, and imitation as a subset 
of associative learning. Associative learning provides the mechanism by which 
memes (habits) are transmitted. Imitation is one of the ways in which we choose 
what to associate;
  4) Persistence across time is the deal-breaker. No matter what accidental 
complexity might manifest according to the laws of chance, the fact that life 
persists across time, with all the thermodynamic forces (entropy) acting 
against it, suggests that there is something more robust going on than the 
mechanics of dumb luck;
  5) The law of association of habits is fully generalizable to every entity 
that lives. This enables us to formulate a more general semiotics that brings 
us to biosemiotics, based in the ideas of Jakob von Uexküll;
  6) Existence continues to be strange and unfathomable, no matter what your 
theoretical base might be. The emphasis of the law of association of habits is 
on that which is observed. It strives to provide as consistent, logical, 
rational and coherent a theory as is possible, without having to contrive 
thermodynamically impossible scenarios, such as computers to process genetic 
code. There are gaps in our knowledge that may never be resolved, because it is 
impossible to conduct experimental controls. For example, morphic resonance may 
be so fundamental and basic that there is no way of isolating a control for it, 
because in order to do so, we would need to go to another universe;
  7) Within the context of the laws of thermodynamics (complexity, entropy), 
life is inevitable, not accidental;
  8) The law of association of habits is entropically friendly... imitation, 
for example, obviates the need to process complex data from genetic blueprints. 
By contrast, any suggestion that "computers" can occur in nature by way of 
natural selection fails to recognize such complexity as, thermodynamically, 
extremely unlikely;
  9) Things that are inexplicable to our current way of thinking must have 
logical, rational explanations. The law of association of habits might fit in 
neatly with such theoretical ideas as morphic resonance or non-locality 
(quantum physics);
  10) The law of association of habits is about making choices from ecosystems. 
For humans, that ecosystem is C

RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina

>”I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit
is the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set
of actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate
or network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits.“

Peirce appreciated the central importance of habit and association in
cognitive processes, and this is evident throughout his writings. The
essence of his view is captured in Peirce (1931-1966): 
'There is a law in this succession of ideas. We may roughly say it is the
law of habit. It is the great "Law of Association of Ideas," - the one law
of all psychical action.' (CP 7.388) 

Habit and association are covered more specifically as aspects of a general
law of mind, in Book III, Philosophy of Mind (CP 7.388-7.523) (chapters 2
and 3 are on association and habit respectively), in Peirce (1931-1966)

>“Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e., direct
brute interaction and spontaneous chance.“

I do not understand on what basis you infer this.

>”This also means that you rule of evolution and adaptation, for, without
these two modes - neither can take place.“

Definitely not. While I do not include natural selection in an axiomatic
context (others might have justification for doing so, but this is not my
choice), I definitely do accept that it plays a significant part in the
rough-and-tumble of adaptation. Natural selection is one mechanism among
several.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Thursday, 15 October 2015 7:23 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jerry LR Chandler'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Stephen -

 

I'm not quite sure what you mean by the 'association of habits'. A habit is
the continuity of a system of organization - it can be an organized set of
actions, an organized set of matter. Then, habits (plural) can associate or
network with other habitsand not network with yet other habits.

 

Your outline seems to rule out both Secondness and Firstness; i.e., direct
brute interaction and spontaneous chance. This also means that you rule of
evolution and adaptation, for, without these two modes - neither can take
place.

 

As I said - I totally reject the reductionist 'theory' of Dawkin's 'memes';
culture is far more complex than a set-of-beliefs.

 

I agree that life is inevitable, not accidental, based on the laws of
thermodynamics (complexity and entropy).

 

Edwina

 

 

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Jerry LR Chandler'
<mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>  ; 'Peirce-L'
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 1:06 PM

Subject: RE: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best
Morality)

 

Edwina, I formulated my “law of association of habits” in conjunction with
“the desire to be,” before I heard of Peirce. It was in the interests of
publishing my thoughts that I researched and stumbled upon Peirce (hence my
paper published in Semiotica 2001), to discover considerable alignment
between his three categories and my habits, association and “desire to be”
(the “desire to be” relates to the constellation of motivations, desires,
fears, thrills, etc that relate to the things that matter). An axiomatic
framework can only ever be a best guess... even Isaac Newton’s framework is
a best guess that thus far, beyond the controversies of SGR, has been shown
to work very well. The list of assumptions that I relied on to guide my
thinking, taken from a somewhat waffly list that I put together a couple of
years ago, was along the following lines (updated since then, for a more
informed readership):

1) The law of association of habits [title of my article that I got
published in Semiotica in 2001] provides the same sort of generality for
cognitive science that Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences in
his laws of motion. Moreover, it fits in perfectly with Peirce‘s philosophy
of Pragmatism (as in, usefulness – defining the things that matter);
2) Perhaps the law of association of habits relates also to matter, as per
Peirce’s famous reference to matter as “mind hidebound in habit”;
3) Our existence within cultures – and the fact that cultures can be
sustained over time – can be understood from the perspective of the law of
association of habits. For example – memes as habits, and imitation as a
subset of associative learning. Associative learning provides the mechanism
by which memes (habits) are transmitted. Imitation is one of the ways in
which we choose what to associate;
4) Persistence across time is the deal-breaker. No matter what accidental
complexity might manifest according to the laws of chance, the fact that
life persists across time, with all the thermodynamic f

Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

On Oct 14, 2015, at 10:29 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:

> such as the need for an axiomatic
> framework, or a review of important principles. Interdisciplinary thinking
> requires such openness to ideas, as none of us can be experts on everything.

Yes, the need for openness in thinking broadly is readily apparent.

It would very helpful to your readers if you would clarify what you are seeking 
to communicate in either
 "an axiomatic framework"  in the sense of the breadth of such a framework, or
" a review of important principles".

Is your concern about a general logic for interdisciplinary thinking?

Or, about a semantic framework that encompasses a particular philosophy of 
logic or metaphysics or epistemology?

These questions are phrased in such a manner as to give you full license tell 
the readers how such an open space can be constructed with minimal constraints.

Cheers

Jerry
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .