Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
John, List: JFS: I suspect that Peirce considered that his emphasis on diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning would be sufficient to explain the major goals of phaneroscopy: interpret experience in representations that would be suitable for both formal and informal reasoning. Where does Peirce ever state or imply that one of "the major goals of phaneroscopy" is to "interpret experience in representations that would be suitable for both formal and informal reasoning"? JFS: Second, I wanted to emphasize that the central role of phaneroscopy is the transition from experience to diagrams. Where does Peirce ever state or imply that "the central role of phaneroscopy is the transition from experience to diagrams"? JFS: In short, phaneroscopy is the process of mapping experience to diagrams that can be interpreted by all later sciences. Where does Peirce ever state or imply that "phaneroscopy is the process of mapping experience to diagrams"? The online Commens Dictionary (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/) provides 11 entries for "phenomenology," four for "phaneroscopy," and one each for "phenoscopy" and "ideoscopy." *Not one* of these 17 quotations from Peirce includes the word "diagram." On the other hand, one of the 23 entries for "mathematics" notes that "the mathematician observes nothing but the diagrams he himself constructs" (NEM 4:267, c. 1895), and both of the entries for "mathematical reasoning" include multiple instances of "diagram." CSP: For mathematical reasoning consists in constructing a diagram according to a general precept, in observing certain relations between parts of that diagram not explicitly required by the precept, showing that these relations will hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this conclusion in general terms. All valid necessary reasoning is in fact thus diagrammatic. (CP 1.54, c. 1896) CSP: It is true that a *distinctly *mathematical reasoning is one that is so intricate that we need some kind of diagram to follow it out. But something of the nature of a diagram, be it only an imaginary skeleton proposition, or even a mere noun with the ideas of its application and signification[,] is needed in all necessary reasoning. (R 459:10-11, 1903) In other words, rather than phanersocopy, "the transition from experience to diagrams" and "the process of mapping experience to diagrams" correspond to the practice of *applied mathematics* within any of the positive sciences. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 9:38 PM John F. Sowa wrote: > Jeff, Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS, List, > > On this issue, I agree with Jeff that the support of the sciences (all of > them) was uppermost in Peirce's mind. But I admit that a more explicit > statement of the issues would have been desirable. > > JBD: I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does > what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of > how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable > scientific inquigorers better to identify and correct for observational > errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, > develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for > given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing > hypotheses. > > I suspect that Peirce considered that his emphasis on diagrams and > diagrammatic reasoning would be sufficient to explain the major goals of > phaneroscopy: interpret experience in representations that would be > suitable for both formal and informal reasoning. I also believe that other > hypoicons could also serve as a supplement for the more informal asoects, > Arbitrary images, for example, can represent continuous patterns. > > JBD: Gary F was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary > and I may have some disagreements. > > I started to write a note in reponse to some points that Gary F made in a > note last wek. But I was sidetracked by some other issues. > > In the following point, Gary is responding to a note in which I quoted > seven paragraphs by CSP and two by Cornelis de Wall. For all nine > quotations and my summaries of each, see > http://jfsowa.com/peirce/diagrams.txt > > GF: why [do] you bother to repeat all this, since it’s all been said > before and nobody has questioned any of it. The only question I have is > why you insert “phaneroscopy” in your new subject line, as there is nothing > in the entire post about “phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular,” > because there is nothing in it that differentiates phaneroscopy from > “Peirce's thought in general.” > > First, I'm glad that we all agree on those nine poins. But Gary R did > question that note. He accused me of putting too much emphasis on diagrams > -- because, as he said, diagrams are the
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Jeff, Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS, List, On this issue, I agree with Jeff that the support of the sciences (all of them) was uppermost in Peirce's mind. But I admit that a more explicit statement of the issues would have been desirable. JBD: I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable scientific inquigorers better to identify and correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses. I suspect that Peirce considered that his emphasis on diagrams and diagrammatic reasoning would be sufficient to explain the major goals of phaneroscopy: interpret experience in representations that would be suitable for both formal and informal reasoning. I also believe that other hypoicons could also serve as a supplement for the more informal asoects, Arbitrary images, for example, can represent continuous patterns. JBD: Gary F was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements. I started to write a note in reponse to some points that Gary F made in a note last wek. But I was sidetracked by some other issues. In the following point, Gary is responding to a note in which I quoted seven paragraphs by CSP and two by Cornelis de Wall. For all nine quotations and my summaries of each, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/diagrams.txt GF: why [do] you bother to repeat all this, since its all been said before and nobody has questioned any of it. The only question I have is why you insert phaneroscopy in your new subject line, as there is nothing in the entire post about phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular, because there is nothing in it that differentiates phaneroscopy from Peirce's thought in general. First, I'm glad that we all agree on those nine poins. But Gary R did question that note. He accused me of putting too much emphasis on diagrams -- because, as he said, diagrams are the foundation of my research on conceptual graphs. I wanted to emphasize that I learned the importance of diagrams from Peirce. GF: Its a good summary of the role of diagrams in Peirces thought, but it does nothing to explain the unique role of phaneroscopy in his classification of sciences or in his philosophy. Second, I wanted to emphasize that the central role of phaneroscopy is the transition from experience to diagrams. Contrary to ADT's slide 25, there is no transition out of mathematics, since diagrams can (a) relate experience to any pattern or structure of any branch of science or common sense, (b) allow mathematics and formal logic to be applied to any and every representation of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness, and (c) furnish all the data required for the normative sciences to evaluate the truth or relevance of hypotheses (guesses) to diagrams from memories, reading, or dialogues with other people. GF: What does make [phaneroscopy] unique is precisely the subject of the current slow read of ADTs slides. Third, I have read each of the slides from ADT's original and from each of the transcriptions. I believe that he has made many important points. But as I showed about slide 25, he could have made his presentation more precise and more general if he had recognized the role of diagrams. In short, phaneroscopy is the process of mapping experience to diagrams that can be interpreted by all later sciences. The normative sciences evaluate them by the criteria of esthetics, ethics, and truth. That is the role of methodeutic. Finally, ADT's phrase "the rest of us" suggested that Peirce's mathematics is inadequate to support common sense. Yet every textbook from elementary school to the most advanced research is illustrated with diagrams, which could be mapped to and from EGs. In particular, the diagrams that linguists use to represent the syntax and semantics of ordinary languages have a direct mapping to and from EGs. I also believe that some kinds of diagrams can even represent the exotic languages that Dan Everett has studied. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Edwinia, List: I concur with you assertion below, but this view in inadequate to separate the dramatic differences between CSP’s notion of logic from classic logic and more importantly, why he choose to follow a semiotic path to ground his logic rather than the classic path of antecedents to consequences and / or syllogisms and /or Boolean logic and /or set theory? So, the challenge to interpretations of philosophy goes far deeper than this view suggests... > On Aug 30, 2021, at 8:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Therefore ... the mathematician is not working as an isolate, indifferent to > whether his theories are relevant in the 'real world' but - as in the > example of Peirce - is quite capable of using abstract AND practical theories > in his work. Some people might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the > practical and vice versa but the point is - to differentiate between the > Agent and the Subject matter. > > My personal experience is that the view of mathematics held by a mathematician matches the personal philosophy of the mathematician, usually in very occult ways. However, occasionally, the forms of the subject matter dominates the deeply abstract roots of mathematical structures. CSP falls into this latter category, he is very transparent on which subject matter he rests his pragmatic mathematics and logics on. The truth functions of the trichotomy rest on the realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the natural sciences. This point of view is not restricted to any one profession. Human individuality is not dissolved when on adopts a profession. Think about professional philosophers…. :-) Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Jerry, list 1] You wrote: . "The truth functions of the trichotomy rest on the realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the natural sciences." Yes, I very much agree. 2] And, you wrote: "This point of view is not restricted to any one profession. Human individuality is not dissolved when on adopts a profession. Think about professional philosophers…. :-) " And I very much agree with this as well. It's why I keep emphasizing that an explanation of 'What Peirce wrote' - is an interpretation, operating within a triadic semiosic process and thus, affected by the Interpreter's own 'human individuality'. Edwina On Mon 30/08/21 4:31 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent: Edwinia, List: I concur with you assertion below, but this view in inadequate to separate the dramatic differences between CSP’s notion of logic from classic logic and more importantly, why he choose to follow a semiotic path to ground his logic rather than the classic path of antecedents to consequences and / or syllogisms and /or Boolean logic and /or set theory? So, the challenge to interpretations of philosophy goes far deeper than this view suggests... On Aug 30, 2021, at 8:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Therefore ... the mathematician is not working as an isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the 'real world' but - as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable of using abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice versa but the point is - to differentiate between the Agent and the Subject matter. My personal experience is that the view of mathematics held by a mathematician matches the personal philosophy of the mathematician, usually in very occult ways. However, occasionally, the forms of the subject matter dominates the deeply abstract roots of mathematical structures. CSP falls into this latter category, he is very transparent on which subject matter he rests his pragmatic mathematics and logics on. The truth functions of the trichotomy rest on the realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the natural sciences. This point of view is not restricted to any one profession. Human individuality is not dissolved when on adopts a profession. Think about professional philosophers…. :-) CheersJerry Links: -- [1] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Jeff, List, I did notice, Jeff, that your usage of "phenomenology" is very close to John's - that is, it agrees with the "general" definition of the word that I quoted from the OED, as opposed to the "Philosophy" definition given there, which is much more detailed - but i won't try to persuade you, any more than i did John, that Peirce's definitions are more philosophical than general. I also noticed your reference to the "distinction between the phenomenological and nomological phases of inquiry," but i don't see the relevance of that distinction to phenomenological practice as Peirce defined it, so i don't intend to argue that point either. JD: I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses. GF: I don't think Peirce's phenomenology does that, so i certainly can't provide "an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience" does that kind of thing. Some phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition do try to give an account of how phenomenology can inform psychology in those ways; one example is Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind (3rd edition, 2021). But i don't see Peirce giving any such account for his phenomenology. If his phenomenology were more concerned with the material elements (or material categories) of phenomena, it might be possible to talk about "phenomenological phases of inquiry" within the special sciences, but Peirce says quite explicitly and consistently that his phenomenology/ phaneroscopy is concerned only with the formal elements and not the material elements of the phaneron. I have seen no text by Peirce suggesting that his phenomenological method can be of any direct assistance to special sciences such as astronomy, biology or psychology in the ways you list above. Some of these distinctions verge on hairsplitting, so i can easily see how Jon A.S. could be in general agreement with both posts (yours and mine). That's why i would rather not spend more time arguing over these distinctions, which may turn out to be more verbal than pragmatic. The outcome would make no difference to my practice of phaneroscopy, or anyone else's, as far as I can see. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 30-Aug-21 14:20 To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List, Jon says: "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff." Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main "business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements. At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on the apparent disagreement? Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that: 1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for explanations of consciousness. 2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly helpful in the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about (1) the proper
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Jeff, List: JD: Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main "business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements. Gary F. can correct me if I am mistaken, but I understood his disagreement with John to be primarily over *distinguishing *"pure" phenomenology/phaneroscopy as a positive science in its own right, situated between mathematics and the normative sciences in Peirce's classification, from its applications in the other positive sciences. GF (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00390.html): That he [Peirce] felt forced to change the name of this science to “phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of that he was referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). You can correct me if I am mistaken, but I understood you to be agreeing with Gary F. on this point, rather than John. JD (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00393.html): For my part, I think the point is important for understanding the business of the Peircean phenomenologist--especially when it comes to the application of the "pure" theory of the formal elements in experience to scientific questions in the normative sciences, metaphysics and the special sciences. In any case, neither Gary F. nor John said anything whatsoever about consciousness in their latest posts, so I am not sure which List members you perceive as advocating your #1 below. Even the subtitle of Atkins's book refers to analysis *and *consciousness, not analysis *of * consciousness. JD: Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses. To clarify, are you suggesting that this is "what needs to be done" by phenomenology/phaneroscopy *according to Peirce*, or is it your own proposal? Here I am inclined to agree with John. JFS (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00361.html): The analysis and evaluation of truth, bias, and prejudice is a task for the normative sciences. A psychologist might discover evidence of unconscious bias. But the use of that evidence for evaluating truth would be a task for methodeutic, not phaneroscopy. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List, > > Jon says: "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and > Jeff." > > Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main > "business" > of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying > phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that > Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I > may have some disagreements. > > At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still > somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say > more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you > stand on the apparent disagreement? > > Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes > to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that: > >1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of >conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are >particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for >explanations of consciousness. >2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of >the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of >scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in >experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice >of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better >analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will >be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to >observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to >how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate >plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Dear Jeff, list, You said: Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this list about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another. I agree. For it must be true that “Pragmatism maintains that in those cases the disputants must be at cross-purposes.” With best wishes, Jerry R On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 2:53 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Jerry, > > > Let me offer a brief response to the rhetorical points you make at the end > of your post. You say: > > > Jerry R: I see the answer as being obvious. > Jeff D: I don't think the answer as to what Peirce's view is concerning > the real business of the phenomenology is obvious. If it were obvious, > intelligent people wouldn't have disagreements about the matter. > > Jerry R: We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*? > Jeff D: My aim is to learn how to employ the methods Peirce recommends in > philosophical inquiry. Given the challenges involved in doing it well, > especially when it comes to phenomenology, I am often concerned that I > misunderstand what it is that I'm supposed to be doing at each step in my > inquiries about any positive question in philosophy. If the questions > weren't so hard, and if there weren't so many competing hypotheses, things > would be easier. As it is, I find myself struggling to ensure that I'm on a > productive track. > > Jerry R: For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist! > Jeff D: I'm trying to learn to do it better. It is not clear that I'm > doing it well. > > Jerry R: And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*, > amirite? > Jeff D: I don't assume Peirce must be right about how we should practice > phenomenological inquiry. He is fallible, as am I. Having said that, I've > studied other methods in philosophy, including those recommended by Plato, > Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Quine, Goodman, Sellars, van Frassen, etc. > Thus far, I've found limitations in their methods that are hard to fix. > Thus far, Peirce's methods seem more promising. Having said that, I'm > always looking for ways in which the methods I'm using might be refined and > improved. I'm fairly confident Peirce was moved by the same aim of > improving his methods. > > Jerry R: For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean > phenomenologist. > Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this > list about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the > normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The > fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying > pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it > through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another. > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ------ > *From:* Jerry Rhee > *Sent:* Monday, August 30, 2021 12:29:50 PM > *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide > > > Dear Jeff, list, > > > Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies. > > For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you, > > that it is inconsistent to agree with you > > and to agree with Gary *at the same time*, > > -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and > Jeff’, > > which is what JAS has said, > > when you agree with John but disagree with Gary. > > > “I didn’t presuppose that!” > > > That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly), > > “I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the > Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying > phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is: > > > 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of > conscious human experience. > > 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the > elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of > scientific intelligence.” > > > (for where and when, *exactly*, does Peirce say this? Please state the > reference and year) > > > So then, what *needs* to be done? > > What, here, is *necessary* to make philosophical inquiry more rigorou
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Jerry, Let me offer a brief response to the rhetorical points you make at the end of your post. You say: Jerry R: I see the answer as being obvious. Jeff D: I don't think the answer as to what Peirce's view is concerning the real business of the phenomenology is obvious. If it were obvious, intelligent people wouldn't have disagreements about the matter. Jerry R: We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, amirite? Jeff D: My aim is to learn how to employ the methods Peirce recommends in philosophical inquiry. Given the challenges involved in doing it well, especially when it comes to phenomenology, I am often concerned that I misunderstand what it is that I'm supposed to be doing at each step in my inquiries about any positive question in philosophy. If the questions weren't so hard, and if there weren't so many competing hypotheses, things would be easier. As it is, I find myself struggling to ensure that I'm on a productive track. Jerry R: For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist! Jeff D: I'm trying to learn to do it better. It is not clear that I'm doing it well. Jerry R: And what we do, as Peircean phenomenologist, must be right, amirite? Jeff D: I don't assume Peirce must be right about how we should practice phenomenological inquiry. He is fallible, as am I. Having said that, I've studied other methods in philosophy, including those recommended by Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Quine, Goodman, Sellars, van Frassen, etc. Thus far, I've found limitations in their methods that are hard to fix. Thus far, Peirce's methods seem more promising. Having said that, I'm always looking for ways in which the methods I'm using might be refined and improved. I'm fairly confident Peirce was moved by the same aim of improving his methods. Jerry R: For we cannot be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean phenomenologist. Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this list about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jerry Rhee Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 12:29:50 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide Dear Jeff, list, Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies. For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you, that it is inconsistent to agree with you and to agree with Gary at the same time, -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and Jeff’, which is what JAS has said, when you agree with John but disagree with Gary. “I didn’t presuppose that!” That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly), “I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is: 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of conscious human experience. 1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific intelligence.” (for where and when, exactly, does Peirce say this? Please state the reference and year) So then, what needs to be done? What, here, is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous in order to ultimate aim? I see the answer as being obvious. We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, amirite? For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist! And what we do, as Peircean phenomenologist, must be right, amirite? For we cannot be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean phenomenologist. With best wishes, Jerry R On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List, Jon says: "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff." Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main "business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements. At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on the apparent disagreement? Let me try to formulate
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
to > provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features > of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and > correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space > of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate > forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal > mathematical models for competing hypotheses. > > > All of this is part of what is necessary to make philosophical inquiry > more rigorous--i.e., mathematical as a science. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Monday, August 30, 2021 10:35 AM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide > > John, Edwina, List: > > ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree. > > > I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in > the case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a > *distinct > *science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and > must be carefully distinguished from its *applications *within the other > positive sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the > special sciences. > > ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the *subject matter* of > a science from the *agent-who-works* with that subject. > > > Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure > hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or > caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to > be primarily talking about the *subject matter* rather than the > *agent-who-works*. In other words, "mathematician" here simply means > "practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who *does *inquire and care > about such things might be a self-described mathematician, but is not > engaged in *pure *mathematics as defined by Peirce within his > classification of the sciences. After all, Peirce himself was an > accomplished mathematician, but was not doing *pure *mathematics during > his phaneroscopic, logical, metaphysical, and scientific investigations. In > those contexts, he was instead *applying *mathematics as a > phaneroscopist, logician, metaphysician, and scientist, respectively. > > ET: This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and > networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne. > > > Please elaborate on this remark. Where exactly does André state or imply > that thought is simple and linear, rather than complex and networked? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> John, List >> >> Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree. >> >> I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a >> science from the agent-who-works with that subject. >> >> Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne seems >> to do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a Move-On situation >> is illogical. And this is exactly what a number of us have been critiquing >> about De Tienne's outline. >> >> Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as an >> isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the 'real >> world' but - as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable of using >> abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people might be more >> comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice versa but the point >> is - to differentiate between the Agent and the Subject matter. >> >> This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and networked >> than the linearity offered by De Tienne. >> >> Again, thanks to John for pointing this out. >> >> Edwina >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List, Jon says: "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff." Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main "business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements. At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on the apparent disagreement? Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that: 1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for explanations of consciousness. 2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly helpful in the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about (1) the proper forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the plausibility of various hypotheses. Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's phenomenology: Atkins, Richard Kenneth. Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2018. The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main advantage of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then be able to formulate better metaphysical explanations of human consciousness. As I've indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on a misunderstanding of Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that Richard Atkins is committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for himself. Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses. All of this is part of what is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous--i.e., mathematical as a science. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 10:35 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide John, Edwina, List: ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree. I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in the case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a distinct science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and must be carefully distinguished from its applications within the other positive sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences. ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a science from the agent-who-works with that subject. Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to be primarily talking about the subject matter rather than the agent-who-works. In other words, "mathematician" here simply means "practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who does inquire and c
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, List
1] I don't see the point of your long paragraph about the duality of
'subject matter' and 'agent'. John's point was that the same agent is
quite capable of, and usually does, engage in a synechistic
interaction of pure and applied reasoning. So- your separation of the
'self-described mathematician' as someone who is not engaged in 'pure
mathematics' misses the point of scientific reasoning and continuity.
[See 1.55-62].
2] As for De Tienne's linearity - I see it in his separation of pure
and applied practices - and his 'emphasis on X-science FOLLOWS
Y-science, his terms of 'prior, precede, after, 'transition out of
it', 'what follows', transition from, 'steps',
I prefer the complex networking of Peirce's continuity/synechism,
where despite the sciences each having distinct subject matter and
methods, nevertheless, they are intimately networked with each other
and one doesn't 'transition' out of them.
Now, you my consider my views of De Tienne's outline as 'an
emotional rant, empty complaint, baseless' - all terms you have used
against me - but - those are my opinions.
Edwina
On Mon 30/08/21 1:35 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
John, Edwina, List:
ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As
in the case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy
is a distinct science in its own right, with its own purposes and
subject matter, and must be carefully distinguished from its
applications within the other positive sciences, including logic as
semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences.
ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter
of a science from the agent-who-works with that subject.
Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a
pure hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I
understand him to be primarily talking about the subject matter
rather than the agent-who-works. In other words, "mathematician" here
simply means "practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who does
inquire and care about such things might be a self-described
mathematician, but is not engaged in pure mathematics as defined by
Peirce within his classification of the sciences. After all, Peirce
himself was an accomplished mathematician, but was not doing pure
mathematics during his phaneroscopic, logical, metaphysical, and
scientific investigations. In those contexts, he was instead
applying mathematics as a phaneroscopist, logician, metaphysician,
and scientist, respectively.
ET: This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
Please elaborate on this remark. Where exactly does André state or
imply that thought is simple and linear, rather than complex and
networked?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
John, List
Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of
a science from the agent-who-works with that subject.
Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne
seems to do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a
Move-On situation is illogical. And this is exactly what a number of
us have been critiquing about De Tienne's outline.
Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as
an isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the
'real world' but - as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable
of using abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people
might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice
versa but the point is - to differentiate between the Agent and the
Subject matter.
This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
Again, thanks to John for pointing this out.
Edwina
Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
John, Edwina, List: ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree. I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in the case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a *distinct *science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and must be carefully distinguished from its *applications *within the other positive sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences. ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the *subject matter* of a science from the *agent-who-works* with that subject. Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to be primarily talking about the *subject matter* rather than the *agent-who-works*. In other words, "mathematician" here simply means "practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who *does *inquire and care about such things might be a self-described mathematician, but is not engaged in *pure *mathematics as defined by Peirce within his classification of the sciences. After all, Peirce himself was an accomplished mathematician, but was not doing *pure *mathematics during his phaneroscopic, logical, metaphysical, and scientific investigations. In those contexts, he was instead *applying *mathematics as a phaneroscopist, logician, metaphysician, and scientist, respectively. ET: This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne. Please elaborate on this remark. Where exactly does André state or imply that thought is simple and linear, rather than complex and networked? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > John, List > > Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree. > > I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a > science from the agent-who-works with that subject. > > Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne seems to > do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a Move-On situation is > illogical. And this is exactly what a number of us have been critiquing > about De Tienne's outline. > > Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as an > isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the 'real > world' but - as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable of using > abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people might be more > comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice versa but the point > is - to differentiate between the Agent and the Subject matter. > > This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and networked > than the linearity offered by De Tienne. > > Again, thanks to John for pointing this out. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, List
Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of
a science from the agent-who-works with that subject.
Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne
seems to do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a
Move-On situation is illogical. And this is exactly what a number of
us have been critiquing about De Tienne's outline.
Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as
an isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the
'real world' but - as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable
of using abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people
might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice
versa but the point is - to differentiate between the Agent and the
Subject matter.
This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
Again, thanks to John for pointing this out.
Edwina
On Mon 30/08/21 12:15 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
Jon AS, Gary F, List,
We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from
the
people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.
The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.
But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification. I recall that Gary F said that the
dependencies in the development seemed to be circular. And I
agree. In their daily work, everybody, including professional
mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any
way from any source. Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when
he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath.
But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original
discovery, is independent of any features from its origin. Its
principles then become available for any science of any kind.
JAS: I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the
phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis
agrees with the actual facts or not.
But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and
phenomenology from the people who develop and use them. All people
have all their knowledge available at all times. Peirce was a
polymath. At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while
analyzing experience. But in the next moment, he could use
normative
principles to evaluate the results. Then he could apply those
results to
a problem in physics. For a case study, see his Photometric
Researches, or the excerpts I posted at
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf
JAS: I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to
experience
in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by
the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of
imagination and the logical world of mathematics.
Yes. Experience includes sensations from external sources as well
as
anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception.
Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination. A chess expert
can
play a good game blindfold. And mathematicians can do the algebra
or
the geometry in their heads.
GF: John says, The special sciences depend on phenomenology for
the
raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses. But we have
previously agreed that in Peirces hierarchy of sciences, each
science
depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels
can
and often do get their raw data from those below.
Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf. Peirce published that
book
in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the
sciences.
On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be
called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the
distinction
between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light
(as it really is). On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton
and Maxwell.
In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic
in
evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the results that
other
scientists had derived by their observations.
Summary: All our knowledge about anything is ultimately derived
from
our experience (by formal or informal methods). Much of that
experience includes communications from other people who derived
their
knowledge from their own experience or from their experience in
communications with other people who ,,,
When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from
any
source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing
experience.
John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
Jon AS, Gary F, List, We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science. The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science depends on principles from the sciences that precede it. But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the Comte-Peirce classification. I recall that Gary F said that the dependencies in the development seemed to be circular. And I agree. In their daily work, everybody, including professional mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any way from any source. Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath. But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original discovery, is independent of any features from its origin. Its principles then become available for any science of any kind. JAS: I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis agrees with the actual facts or not. But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and phenomenology from the people who develop and use them. All people have all their knowledge available at all times. Peirce was a polymath. At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while analyzing experience. But in the next moment, he could use normative principles to evaluate the results. Then he could apply those results to a problem in physics. For a case study, see his Photometric Researches, or the excerpts I posted at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf JAS: I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of imagination and the logical world of mathematics. Yes. Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception. Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination. A chess expert can play a good game blindfold. And mathematicians can do the algebra or the geometry in their heads. GF: John says, The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses. But we have previously agreed that in Peirces hierarchy of sciences, each science depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can and often do get their raw data from those below. Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf. Peirce published that book in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the sciences. On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light (as it really is). On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton and Maxwell. In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic in evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the results that other scientists had derived by their observations. Summary: All our knowledge about anything is ultimately derived from our experience (by formal or informal methods). Much of that experience includes communications from other people who derived their knowledge from their own experience or from their experience in communications with other people who ,,, When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from any source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing experience. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
John, Edwina, List: JFS: JAS highlighted Peirce's distinction, which applies to both mathematics and phenomenology: JAS: It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not. JFS: Yes, of course. I am glad that we agree about this. I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the phenomenologist *does *inquire and care whether a given hypothesis agrees with the actual facts or not. That is why, unlike mathematics, Peirce considers phenomenology to be a *positive *science; but what distinguishes phenomenology from the *other* positive sciences in his classification, especially metaphysics and the special sciences, is the *kind *of facts that are of interest. The phenomenologist frames a hypothesis without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with *reality *or not, only whether it agrees with the "seemings" that are or could be present to the mind in any way. ET: BUT, my point is that such an imaginary realm is not self-sustaining and must, at some time, connect to reality, where it will examine whether or not its Forms have any functionality. I am happy to say that we agree about this, as well. In fact, I see it as consistent with André's remark on slide 26 that many of the possibilities explored by mathematicians "are not merely artificial fictions of the imagination but the direct suggestions of evocative forms encountered in experience" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00181.html). Here I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience in the *strict* sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by the *outer *world of existence, it also encompasses the *inner *world of imagination and the *logical *world of mathematics. Again, ascertaining which idealized forms "connect to reality" and thus "have any functionality" is a task for metaphysics and the special sciences, which--as John rightly observes--depend on the normative science of logic as semeiotic for the requisite principles, including methodeutic as its third branch. ET: And I'd also like to add that Gary F's very nice post on the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology is exactly what I have been arguing about for several weeks on this List ... Likewise, I agree with Gary F.'s post today ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00382.html), including "the one point where I think John’s description below needs to be modified." JFS: The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses. The basis for Peirce's classification is such that instead, the special sciences depend on phenomenology for *principles*, while phenomenology depends on the special sciences for *data*. Even so, since the *purpose *of phenomenology is very different from the *purpose *of the special sciences, as Gary F. said, each involves a different kind of attention to that same data. Moreover, *all *the positive sciences depend on mathematics for principles, but someone is engaged in *pure *mathematics only when framing hypotheses and drawing necessary conclusions from them *without *inquiring or caring whether they agree with the actual facts or not. Someone who *does *inquire and care about this is engaged in *applied *mathematics within one of the positive sciences. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Aug 29, 2021 at 8:40 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > John, List > > I'm not convinced of the isolationist purity of mathematics. I acknowledge > that 'pure' mathematics focuses on a hypothesis without acknowledgment of > whether or not it corresponds to reality or not. That can be said > about many hypothetical formations. As John said - this gives our > system the full freedom of imagination...aka..Firstness. > > BUT, my point is that such an imaginary realm is not self-sustaining and > must, at some time, connect to reality, where it will examine whether or > not its Forms have any functionality. This step might not be immediate; it > might even take years. > > But - without it, the imaginary realm would actually be hollow...Firstness > is fleeting.. > > And I'd also like to add that Gary F's very nice post on the relationship > between mathematics and phenomenology is exactly what I have been arguing > about for several weeks on this List - and have been continuously chastised > for doing so - I have rejected De Tienne's 'Move On' exhortations to us, to > Move On from Mathematics and have instead opted for the synechistic > interrelationship of these two realms-of-science. > > Edwina > > On Sat 28/08/21 8:27 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent: > > Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List > > I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, List
I'm not convinced of the isolationist purity of mathematics. I
acknowledge that 'pure' mathematics focuses on a hypothesis without
acknowledgment of whether or not it corresponds to reality or not.
That can be said about many hypothetical formations. As John said -
this gives our system the full freedom of
imagination...aka..Firstness.
BUT, my point is that such an imaginary realm is not
self-sustaining and must, at some time, connect to reality, where it
will examine whether or not its Forms have any functionality. This
step might not be immediate; it might even take years.
But - without it, the imaginary realm would actually be
hollow...Firstness is fleeting..
And I'd also like to add that Gary F's very nice post on the
relationship between mathematics and phenomenology is exactly what I
have been arguing about for several weeks on this List - and have
been continuously chastised for doing so - I have rejected De
Tienne's 'Move On' exhortations to us, to Move On from Mathematics
and have instead opted for the synechistic interrelationship of these
two realms-of-science.
Edwina
On Sat 28/08/21 8:27 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List
I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction.
ET: the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very
fuzzy. I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology. But I do
support
and agree with [Jeff's] agenda of using both mathematics and
phenomenology to function within a pragmatic interaction with the
world.
For both subjects, the distinction is precise. JAS highlighted
Peirce's distinction, which applies to both mathematics and
phenomenology:
JAS: It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559
(and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.
Yes, of course. That distinction is the greatest power of
mathematics: it is independent of whatever may exist in our
universe
or any other. It gives us the freedom to create new things that
never
existed before. The only constraints are physical, not mental.
That point is also true of phenomenology. For both fields, there is
no limitation on what anyone may imagine -- or on what anyone may
invent.
As an example, consider the game of chess. Before anyone carved
the wooden pieces, the rules of chess were the axioms of a pure
mathematical theory, for which there were no applicable facts.
But then, somebody (or perhaps a group of people) imagined a kind
of game that did not yet exist. They discussed the possibilities,
debated various options, and finally agreed to the axioms (rules)
and
the designs for physical boards and pieces. Before they played the
game, there were no facts that corresponded to the mathematical
theory
or to anybody's perceptions.
The tests of existence and accuracy are determined by the normative
sciences, especially methodeutic. For inventions, the only
limitations are the available physical resources to construct them.
JBD: For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure
phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied
activities--such as the activities of identifying possible sources
of
observational error, correcting for those errors, framing productive
questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations of the
problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible hypotheses,
and generating formal mathematical models of the hypothetical
explanations.
Those issues depend on the normative sciences, especially
methodeutic.
The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on
mathematics for forming hypotheses. Then they require the normative
sciences for testing and evaluating the hypotheses. In pure math,
the
variables do not refer to anything in actuality. In applied math,
one
or more of the variables are linked (via indexes) to something that
exists or may exist in actuality. Those indexes are derived and
tested by methodeutic.
John
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
John, Jeff, List, We seem to have consensus that Peirce's phenomenology makes observations based on direct experience and draws upon mathematical principles to analyze whatever appears into its elements, to arrive at a very general theory which he calls the "Doctrine of Categories." Without mathematics, it could accomplish nothing; without experience, it would have nothing to apply mathematical principles to, and again would accomplish nothing. Logic as semiotics inherits this characteristic form from phenomenology in the form of the Dicisign, as Frederik Stjernfelt has shown in Natural Propositions: iconic signs, often diagrammatic, must be combined with indexical signs in order to convey information - the icons signify the form, and the indices the subject matter of the informational sign, i.e. the identity of its object. I think John's account below is one expression of this consensus. But there is one point in it that I must take issue with. John says, "The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses." But we have previously agreed that in Peirce's hierarchy of sciences, each science depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can and often do get their raw data from those below. Since phenomenology is above the special sciences in the hierarchy, they should be drawing theoretical principles from it, not "raw data." I believe that this is indeed the case, and gave an example above of how semiotics "inherits" categorial principles from phenomenology. On the other hand, since phenomenology/phaneroscopy observes anything that can appear "to the mind," it can draw some "raw data" from special sciences. But what makes phaneroscopy distinctive, and places it before everything in the hierarchy of sciences except mathematics, is the kind of attention it deploys in its observations. "Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic" (CP2.197). As Peirce says to James in the 1904 letter previously quoted, "Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the same world; - the same world that the astronomer looks at. But what it observes in that world is different." Phenomenological observation is, we might say, looking for the mathematical essence of experiencing itself. It can do this because it does not draw upon any theoretical framework developed by the later sciences such as semiotic or astronomy. D.S. Kothari says "The simple fact is that no measurement, no experiment or observation is possible without a relevant theoretical framework." What sets phenomenology apart from (and above) all other positive sciences is that the only theoretical framework it employs is from mathematics, and a very pure kind of mathematics which is free of any prior application to normative or special sciences. For instance, it employs "dichotomic mathematics," (which Peirce referred to as "the simplest mathematics") to arrive at the concept of Secondness, which is the basis of the subject/object distinction in philosophy of mind; and Peirce was clear that phenomenology does not assume this distinction but reveals its experiential basis by applying that mathematical framework. If any scientific observation could be called "phenomenology" - which seems to be John's idea in what he has said up to now about phenomenology/phaneroscopy - there would be no need to practice it as the "primal positive science", as Peirce called it. This is the one point where I think John's description below needs to be modified. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of John F. Sowa Sent: 28-Aug-21 20:28 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction. ET: the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very fuzzy. I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology. But I do support and agree with [Jeff's] agenda of using both mathematics and phenomenology to function within a pragmatic interaction with the world. For both subjects, the distinction is precise. JAS highlighted Peirce's distinction, which applies to both mathematics and phenomenology: JAS: It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not. Yes, of course. That distinction is the greatest power of mathematics: it is independent of whatever may exist in our universe or any other. It gives us the freedom to create new things that never existed before. The only constraints are physical, not mental. That point is also true of phenomenology. For both fields, there is no limitation on what anyone may
