Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Kirsti! I do not have time to write it as a scientifical correct book with all relevant literature mentioned (having an idea takes seconds, but comparing it with the most relevant existing texts about the subject has a different time scale) , and in the past it was always so, that things I had written turned out to being mistakes later, and I had to edit it all over again. I had done this with a website. But this way it is impossible for others to take the text, which changes all the time, serious. Eg. it is impossible to quote something from me. So, if I am going to write a kind of blog again, I should mark the part, that will not change anymore, as such, maybe draw a box around it, or use a special letter style ("font"?), and mark the other part, which may still be edited, too. And partition the text in chapters signed with dates. Or something like that. Coming soon in this theater (internet), I think.

Best wishes too,

Helmut

 

 

 06. August 2017 um 13:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.

I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most
superficial way.

I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are
others with similar aims.

Best wishes,

Kirsti

kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:41:
> Helmut,
>
> That is good to know. Thanks.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:
>> Kirsti,
>> you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
>> because I do not
>> have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
>> ground
>> for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
>> understanding you are after?"
>>
>> I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
>> out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
>> systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
>> Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
>> "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
>> kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
>> is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
>> both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
>> signs.
>>
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>> 05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
>> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
>> wrote:
>>
>> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
>> > Kirsti,
>> > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
>> > According to my
>> > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
>> >
>> > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
>> >
>> > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
>> add
>> > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?
>>
>> Helmut,
>>
>> It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
>> whole picture".
>>
>> A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
>> or
>> "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.
>>
>> What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
>> ground
>> of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
>> science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
>> methods and tools for research.
>>
>> There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
>> a
>> composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
>> making them.
>>
>> I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
>> not
>> have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
>> ground
>> for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
>> understanding you are after?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Kirsti
>>
>> >
>> > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
>> > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
>> >
>> > Helmut,
>> >
>> > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
>> > and
>> > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
>> > which
>> > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
>> arrived
>> > at
>> > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
>> working
>> > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
>> even
>> > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
>> >
>> > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
>> > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
>> >
>> > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
>> > spent
>> > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
>> > those
>> > issues.
>> >
>> > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
>> > CSP
>> > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
>> 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use 
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense 
(meaning) it is used nowadays.


I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in 
more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most 
superficial way.


I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are 
others with similar aims.


Best wishes,

Kirsti

kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:41:

Helmut,

That is good to know. Thanks.

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
"Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
signs.

Best,
Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
 > Kirsti,
 > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
 > According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
 >
 > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
 >
 > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
add
 > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 Helmut,

 It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
 whole picture".

 A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
or
 "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

 What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
ground
 of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
 science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
 methods and tools for research.

 There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
a
 composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
 making them.

 I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?

 Best,

 Kirsti

 >
 > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 >
 > Helmut,
 >
 > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
 > and
 > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
 > which
 > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
arrived
 > at
 > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
working
 > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
even
 > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
 >
 > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
 >
 > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
 > spent
 > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
 > those
 > issues.
 >
 > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
 > CSP
 > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
holding
 > the
 > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
 > three
 > logically necessary approaches.
 >
 > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early
1990's
 > I
 > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > > Kirsti, List,
 > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
 > and
 > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign
classes,
 > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
 > categorial
 > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
 > "NAND",
 > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND",
so
 > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > > composition is just a matter different from classification.
 > Therefore
 > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > > matter what a sini- 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis 
to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested in sign 
classifications. Classifications were a dominant topic at the times, in 
vogue. (Remnants of this vogue are still effective.) - Peirce was 
explaining her about his earlier work and results on the topic, as best 
he could. Also following the rules of polite correspondence (by then) 
and taking her interests (Welby's Significs) to the foreground.


As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main 
interests, works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. 
Not strong, that is.


Best

Kirsti






kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:39:

List,

I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work
with sign classifications.
Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims."

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he
must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for
Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby
drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It
was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by
him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical
analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign"
and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled
"Meaning":

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_,"
which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_
that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of
it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is
when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and
quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to
abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must
"represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although
the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from
carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article
is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's
Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an
island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not,
that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_
place on the island.

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed
Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain,
even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a
third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be
treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing
difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there
must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what
reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.
Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an
additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged
Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way,
we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its
own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according
to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If
the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_
or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course,
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ]
CP2.230 (1910) ]

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a
focus on signs and various 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut,

That is good to know. Thanks.

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
"Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
signs.

Best,
Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
 > Kirsti,
 > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
 > According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
 >
 > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
 >
 > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
add
 > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 Helmut,

 It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
 whole picture".

 A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
or
 "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

 What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
ground
 of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
 science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
 methods and tools for research.

 There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
a
 composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
 making them.

 I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?

 Best,

 Kirsti

 >
 > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 >
 > Helmut,
 >
 > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
 > and
 > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
 > which
 > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
arrived
 > at
 > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
working
 > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
even
 > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
 >
 > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
 >
 > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
 > spent
 > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
 > those
 > issues.
 >
 > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
 > CSP
 > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
holding
 > the
 > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
 > three
 > logically necessary approaches.
 >
 > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early
1990's
 > I
 > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > > Kirsti, List,
 > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
 > and
 > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign
classes,
 > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
 > categorial
 > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
 > "NAND",
 > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND",
so
 > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > > composition is just a matter different from classification.
 > Therefore
 > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
 > > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification
and
 > > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
 > to
 > > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
 > > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course,
is
 > not
 > > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
 > topics
 > > (make them one topic) to understand both.
 > > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

List,

I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work 
with sign classifications.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims."

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he
must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for
Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby
drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It
was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by
him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical
analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign"
and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled
"Meaning":

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_,"
which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_
that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of
it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is
when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and
quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to
abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must
"represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although
the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from
carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article
is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's
Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an
island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not,
that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_
place on the island.

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed
Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain,
even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a
third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be
treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing
difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there
must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what
reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.
Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an
additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged
Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way,
we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its
own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according
to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If
the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_
or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course,
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ]
CP2.230 (1910) ]

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a
focus on signs and various types and functions of signs. If someone
can provide an even later Peirce text that discusses meaning but
dispenses with the focus on signs, I could take that as supporting
Kirsti's claim about "historical fact." Otherwise I don't think that
claim stands up to scrutiny.

Gary f.

} I must follow up these continual lessons of the air, water, earth, I
perceive I have no time to lose. [Walt Whitman] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 5-Aug-17 07:00

Jerry, list,

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Helmut Raulien]

Kirsti,

you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
understanding you are after?"


 

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP. Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies: "Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut


05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi

wrote:

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
> Kirsti,
> you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
> According to my
> view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
>
> Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
>
> But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add
> all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

Helmut,

It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
whole picture".

A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or
"good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground
of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
methods and tools for research.

There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a
composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
making them.

I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
understanding you are after?

Best,

Kirsti




>
> 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
>
> Helmut,
>
> You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
> and
> "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
> which
> one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived
> at
> from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
> out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
> impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
>
> Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
> view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
>
> I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
> spent
> a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
> those
> issues.
>
> Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
> CSP
> to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding
> the
> firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
> three
> logically necessary approaches.
>
> I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
> this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's
> I
> tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
> > Kirsti, List,
> > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
> and
> > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
> > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
> > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
> categorial
> > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
> "NAND",
> > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
> > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
> > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
> > composition is just a matter different from classification.
> Therefore
> > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
> > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
> > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
> > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
> to
> > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
> > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is
> not
> > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
> topics
> > (make them one topic) to understand both.
> > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from
> CSP
> > just does not work. The "pieces" only
> > work in the context of his work as a whole."
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> > 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[gnox]

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that
"It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims." 

 

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he must have
done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for Peirce's
classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby drafted in late
December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It was here that he set
out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

 

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by him to
indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical analysis") or
"meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign" and of sign types.
Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled "Meaning":

 

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense-for the word "fast," which is
a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set
down on paper or pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the
very same word when it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one
word when it means "rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable,"
and a third when it refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should
be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, called its
Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is
perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from carrying
as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article is supposed
merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up
with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an island laid down upon the
soil of that island there must, under all ordinary circumstances, be some
position, some point, marked or not, that represents qua place on the map,
the very same point qua place on the island. 

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel,"
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be
not regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the
set of objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what
follows and often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object
each for the sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other
than its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some
explanation or argument or other context, showing how-upon what system or
for what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it
does. Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an additional
explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged Sign will make
up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way, we shall, or should,
ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its own explanation and those
of all its significant parts; and according to this explanation each such
part has some other part as its Object. According to this every Sign has,
actually or virtually, what we may call a Precept of explanation according
to which it is to be understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its
Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the "species"
of the Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object, the
two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If the Sign
is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the "ratio," or reason, of the
Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, are mere figures of
speech; but that does not render them useless.) ] CP2.230 (1910) ]

 

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a focus
on signs and various types and functions of signs. If someone can provide an
even later Peirce text that discusses meaning but dispenses with the focus
on signs, I could take that as supporting Kirsti's claim about "historical
fact." Otherwise I don't think that claim stands up to scrutiny.

 

Gary f.

 

} I must follow up these continual lessons of the air, water, earth, I
perceive I have no time to lose. [Walt Whitman] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 5-Aug-17 07:00



Jerry, list,

 

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside
and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he found that
way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, leave me out of
any expectations of participating in further discussions on the topic.

 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[John F Sowa]

On 8/4/2017 5:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot
tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.
That is, because additional information is needed


Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that
three-way distinction is extremely oversimplified.

Crystals, for example, are the prime example of solids.  Glasses appear
to be solids at normal temperatures (i.e., normal for the surface of
the earth).  But over long periods of time, they flow like liquids.

Water is the most familiar liquid, but it's also the strangest.
The H2O molecule is lighter than most gases, yet it tends to be
liquid because of attractions of H atoms to O atoms in neighboring
atoms in the liquid.  As a result, clusters of H2O atoms behave
like larger molecules.

That property causes water to require an unusually large amount of
heat to cause it to boil, and it also causes it to expand when it
freezes (crystallizes).

Then there are strange things like superfluids at extremely low
temperatures and plasmas at extremely high temperatures.  In the
early universe, there was nothing but plasma.  In stars, it's
the region of nuclear fusion that generates the light and heat.

There are also strange behaviors at surfaces between solids,
liquids, and gases.  For a short book on the complex interactions
at surfaces, see the lectures by a hysicist who won a Nobel prize
for such studies:
Pierre-Gilles de Gennes (1997) _Soft Interfaces_, Cambridge UP.

Finally, there are the strange forms of matter in living things.
There are very large molecules that behave and interact in far
more complex ways than any molecules in nonliving things.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Jerry, list,

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications 
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he 
found that way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, 
leave me out of any expectations of participating in further discussions 
on the topic.


Best,

Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37:

Kirsti:


On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings
on those issues.


In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the
essence of human communication and the formation of human communities,
including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics,
chemistry, biology, and the medical professions.

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...In view

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
According to my
 view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."

Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "

But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add
all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?


Helmut,

It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a 
whole picture".


A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or 
"good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.


What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground 
of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of 
science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering 
methods and tools for research.


There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a 
composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or 
making them.


I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not 
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground 
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and 
understanding you are after?


Best,

Kirsti






 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi

Helmut,

 You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
and
 "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
which
 one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived
at
 from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
 out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
 impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.

 Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".

 I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent
 a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
those
 issues.

 Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
CSP
 to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding
the
 firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
three
 logically necessary approaches.

 I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's
I
 tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > Kirsti, List,
 > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
and
 > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
 > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
categorial
 > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
"NAND",
 > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
 > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > composition is just a matter different from classification.
Therefore
 > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
 > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
 > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
to
 > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
 > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is
not
 > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
topics
 > (make them one topic) to understand both.
 > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from
CSP
 > just does not work. The "pieces" only
 > work in the context of his work as a whole."
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in
Peircean
 > philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
 > classifications.
 > This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
 > only,
 > or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce
definitely
 > left this road.
 >
 > By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
 > they
 > are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
 > research
 > relying on Peircean Categories.
 >
 > It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 > Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
 > the
 > reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
 > issue
 > was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on
the
 > issues involved.
 >
 > To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 > misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Jerry,

A misunderstanding here. I did not mean all sign classifications in the 
world. I meant those parts in CSP's work where he developed more and 
more complex classification systems; and that taken in the context of 
all his work. - Also, when said: "I have not found (etc...), I meant in 
the context of my work.


Of your work I said nothing.

Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?

Best, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37:

Kirsti:


On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings
on those issues.


In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the
essence of human communication and the formation of human communities,
including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics,
chemistry, biology, and the medical professions.

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...

Cheers

Jerry



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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

 

Maybe in the analogy with chemistry and physics one might say: Chemical composition is one thing, and classification into solids, liquids and gases another. Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.

That is, because additional information is needed: Temperature and pressure.


To tell whether something is a legisign, it also is not enough to look at the composition. You also need additional information, eg. whether the aligned letters or words make sense.
 

Best,

Helmut


 04. August 2017 um 17:15 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
wrote:


Helmut, Kirsti, List:


On Aug 3, 2017, at 2:54 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 

But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.


 



On Aug 3, 2017, at 4:37 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:



So then, what is it to be whole for all who investigate?

 




On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:39 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
 

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this "something higher". Kirsti

 

 

My comment is again a polar opposite to Kirsti’s.

 

CSP was seeking “something deeper” in his sense of meaning.

 

In his lifetime, the logic of chemistry was utterly mysterious. It was mysterious because of 

"


a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.


That is, the chemical sign relations fails to preserve the predicates of the sinsigns, that is, the quali-signs, that is the physical properties of matter, under the compositions of the legi-signs. 

 

The simple example of this abstract logic is the composition of water from hydrogen and oxygen. 

 

The intrinsic electrical nature of the chemical sciences is necessary to compose a quantitative logic for rationalizing the formation of water from hydrogen and oxygen. This physical logic depends on scientific theories that were created only after CSP past away.

 

Thus, the three classifications of signs that were developed by CSP:

 

quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-sign

 

do not distinguish between the separate and distinct logics of the sentences  of symbols of alphabets (propositions), mathematics (equations) and chemistry (reactions).

 

To make 21 st Century pragmatic sense out of the “quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-sign” relationships, one must look at deeper forms of multiple  "universal logics” in the sense of Tarski’s meta-languages.

 

It seems to me that a consistent philosophical reading of CSP depends on the linguistic competencies of the reader. CSP mastered several pre-meta-languages and several symbol systems and modern readers are faced with the challenging task of grasping which of several possible meta-languages he was expressing his beliefs within the temporal history of his lifespan.

 

Further, it seems to me that several Procrustean beds are ready used by philosophers to avoid the difficulties of grasping the composition of CSP’s natural logical classes and categories.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 

 

 

 

 


 

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Helmut Raulien]

Kirsti,

you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."

 

Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "

 

But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 

Helmut,

You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.

Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent
a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those
issues.

Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP
to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the
firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three
logically necessary approaches.

I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's I
tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
> Kirsti, List,
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
> hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
> understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
> eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
> but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
> where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
> composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
> composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
> a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
> matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
> triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
> say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
> them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
> possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
> (make them one topic) to understand both.
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
> just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
> philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
> classifications.
> This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
> only,
> or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
> left this road.
>
> By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
> they
> are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
> research
> relying on Peircean Categories.
>
> It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
> Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
> the
> reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
> issue
> was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
> issues involved.
>
> To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
> misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
> traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.
>
> Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> > List,
> > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
> is
> > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
> is
> > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
> Is
> > that so? It is my impression.
> > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
> > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
> transcendental
> > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> > wrote:
> > Clark understood pretty correctly 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Helmut, Kirsti, List:
> On Aug 3, 2017, at 2:54 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a 
> sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a 
> sini- or a legisign is composed of.

> On Aug 3, 2017, at 4:37 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> So then, what is it to be whole for all who investigate?
> 
>  
On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:39 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this "something 
higher". Kirsti


My comment is again a polar opposite to Kirsti’s.

CSP was seeking “something deeper” in his sense of meaning.

In his lifetime, the logic of chemistry was utterly mysterious. It was 
mysterious because of 
"
> a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what 
> a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

That is, the chemical sign relations fails to preserve the predicates of the 
sinsigns, that is, the quali-signs, that is the physical properties of matter, 
under the compositions of the legi-signs. 

The simple example of this abstract logic is the composition of water from 
hydrogen and oxygen. 

The intrinsic electrical nature of the chemical sciences is necessary to 
compose a quantitative logic for rationalizing the formation of water from 
hydrogen and oxygen. This physical logic depends on scientific theories that 
were created only after CSP past away.

Thus, the three classifications of signs that were developed by CSP:

quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-sign

do not distinguish between the separate and distinct logics of the sentences  
of symbols of alphabets (propositions), mathematics (equations) and chemistry 
(reactions).

To make 21 st Century pragmatic sense out of the “quali-sign, sin-sign and 
legi-sign” relationships, one must look at deeper forms of multiple  "universal 
logics” in the sense of Tarski’s meta-languages.

It seems to me that a consistent philosophical reading of CSP depends on the 
linguistic competencies of the reader. CSP mastered several pre-meta-languages 
and several symbol systems and modern readers are faced with the challenging 
task of grasping which of several possible meta-languages he was expressing his 
beliefs within the temporal history of his lifespan.

Further, it seems to me that several Procrustean beds are ready used by 
philosophers to avoid the difficulties of grasping the composition of CSP’s 
natural logical classes and categories.

Cheers

Jerry








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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Kirsti:

> On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> 
> I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a 
> lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues.

In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the essence 
of human communication and the formation of human communities, including 
professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics, chemistry, biology, and 
the medical professions. 

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...

Cheers

Jerry




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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this 
"something higher". Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 00:12:

Supplement:
I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s
Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as
"consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a
different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too,
thus is refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but
not for Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for"
something "higher"? Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s
supposition of it, just the old continental hybris? But then I could
not read on, they wanted my email adress. I guess, they want money.
Maybe I will give it to them. Capitalism is not good, but still much
better than this continental drive to explain the world in order to
rule it.

Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
(make them one topic) to understand both.
So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole."
Best,
Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
 philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
classifications.
 This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
only,
 or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
 left this road.

 By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
they
 are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
research
 relying on Peircean Categories.

 It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
the
 reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
issue
 was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
 issues involved.

 To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

 Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
 > List,
 > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
is
 > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
is
 > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
Is
 > that so? It is my impression.
 > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
 > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
 > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
transcendental
 > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
 > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
 > question
 > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
of
 > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
into
 > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
 >
 > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
 > 2000's.
 > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
 > refer
 > to the list archives.
 >
 > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 > Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
 > published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
 >
 > What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
 > that
 > his starting points were different from those most often refered
and
 > discussed here in the 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut,

You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and 
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which 
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at 
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working 
out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even 
impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.


Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my 
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".


I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent 
a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those 
issues.


Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP 
to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the 
firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three 
logically necessary approaches.


I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on 
this. This work has been immensely useful.  In 1980' and early 1990's I 
tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.


Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:

Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
(make them one topic) to understand both.
So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole."
Best,
Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
 philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
classifications.
 This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
only,
 or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
 left this road.

 By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
they
 are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
research
 relying on Peircean Categories.

 It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
the
 reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
issue
 was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
 issues involved.

 To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

 Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
 > List,
 > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
is
 > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
is
 > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
Is
 > that so? It is my impression.
 > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
 > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
 > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
transcendental
 > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
 > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
 > question
 > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
of
 > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
into
 > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
 >
 > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
 > 2000's.
 > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
 > refer
 > to the list archives.
 >
 > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 > Apel's book: "Charles 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,

"In an illuminating image, Aristotle compares the use made by the noetic
soul of phantasia to the role of diagrams in geometry:



*It is impossible even to think (noein) without a mental picture
(phantasmatos).  The same affection (pathos) is involved in thinking
(noein) as in drawing a diagram; for in this case although we make no use
of the fact that the magnitude of a triangle is a finite quality…In the
same way the man who is thinking (ho noon), though he may not be thinking
of a finite magnitude, still puts a finite magnitude before his eyes,
though he does not think of it as such.  And even if the nature of the
object is quantitative, but indeterminate, he still puts before him a
finite magnitude, although he thinks of it as merely quantitative.  Why it
is impossible to think of anything without continuity (tou synechous) or to
think of things which are timeless except in terms of time, is another
question. *

~ White, The Meaning of *Phantasia* in Aristotle's *De Anima*, III, 3–8
one two three.. synechism



Best,

Jerry R

On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 5:05 PM,  wrote:

> Helmut,
>
> It’s not that complicated.
>
>
>
> A triad is a *set of three* — three of anything.
>
>
>
> A trichotomy is a *division* of something into three — usually a division
> of a type into three classes, or subtypes. For example, *signs* can be
> subdivided into three classes, in various ways: icon/index/symbol,
> rheme/dicisign/argument, and so on. Peirce’s classification of signs
> includes ten trichotomies.
>
>
>
> In Peirce’s analysis of semiosis, every *sign* is correlated with an
> *object* and an *interpretant*, and the interrelation of the three is
> called a *triadic relation* because it relates a triad of correlates.
>
>
>
> Peirce’s “categories” could be called a “triad” because there are three of
> them, but Peirce rarely if ever calls them a “triad.” He doesn’t call them
> a “trichotomy” either: they are “irreducible elements” of any and all
> phenomena, according to Peirce’s phaneroscopic analysis, so they are not
> arrived at by dividing phenomena into classes. They are arrived at by
> prescinding from phenomena, by “prescissive abstraction.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
> *Sent:* 3-Aug-17 15:55
>
> Kirsti, List,
>
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard
> to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the
> sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the
> difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
>
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but
> a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is
> the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of
> sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a
> matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a
> quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is
> composed of.
>
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads
> are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that
> they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have
> had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon),
> so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to
> understand both.
>
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just
> does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[gnox]

Helmut,

It’s not that complicated.

 

A triad is a set of three — three of anything.

 

A trichotomy is a division of something into three — usually a division of a 
type into three classes, or subtypes. For example, signs can be subdivided into 
three classes, in various ways: icon/index/symbol, rheme/dicisign/argument, and 
so on. Peirce’s classification of signs includes ten trichotomies.

 

In Peirce’s analysis of semiosis, every sign is correlated with an object and 
an interpretant, and the interrelation of the three is called a triadic 
relation because it relates a triad of correlates.

 

Peirce’s “categories” could be called a “triad” because there are three of 
them, but Peirce rarely if ever calls them a “triad.” He doesn’t call them a 
“trichotomy” either: they are “irreducible elements” of any and all phenomena, 
according to Peirce’s phaneroscopic analysis, so they are not arrived at by 
dividing phenomena into classes. They are arrived at by prescinding from 
phenomena, by “prescissive abstraction.” 

 

Gary f.

 

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 3-Aug-17 15:55



Kirsti, List,

For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to 
understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign 
triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference 
between "qualisign" and "icon".

Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, 
so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign 
contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The 
answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are 
composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from 
classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a 
legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are 
two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are 
two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had 
understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is 
necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both.

So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does 
not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole."

Best,

Helmut


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Jerry Rhee]

Helmut, list:



You said:

“Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"?”



To which I would reply:

Consider what effects that might *conceivably* have practical bearings you
*conceive* the objects of your *conception* to have. Then, your *conception* of
those effects is the whole of your *conception* of the object.



“But then, while insisting that hypothetical generalizations should be
“submitted to the minutest criticism before being employed as premisses,”
he declares,

“It appears therefore that in scientific method the nominalists are
entirely right.  Everybody ought to be a nominalist at first, and to
continue in that opinion until he is driven out of it by the force majeure
of irreconcilable facts.

Still he ought to be all the time on the lookout for these facts,
considering how many other powerful minds have found themselves compelled
to come over to realism” [CP 4.1].  From all this, we conclude that though
a nominalist explanation is not *sufficient*, it could be at least
*necessary*?

~ Keeler and Pfeiffer



So then, what is it to be *whole* for all who investigate?



Hth,

Jerry R

On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 4:12 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement:
> I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce-
> reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as
> "consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a different
> topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too, thus is
> refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but not for
> Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for" something "higher"?
> Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s supposition of it, just
> the old continental hybris? But then I could not read on, they wanted my
> email adress. I guess, they want money. Maybe I will give it to them.
> Capitalism is not good, but still much better than this continental drive
> to explain the world in order to rule it.
> Kirsti, List,
> For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard
> to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the
> sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the
> difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
> Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
> parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but
> a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is
> the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of
> sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a
> matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a
> quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is
> composed of.
> So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads
> are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that
> they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have
> had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon),
> so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to
> understand both.
> So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just
> does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole."
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
> philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
> This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
> or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
> left this road.
>
> By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
> are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
> relying on Peircean Categories.
>
> It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
> Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
> reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
> was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
> issues involved.
>
> To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
> misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
> traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.
>
> Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
> work in the context of his work as a whole.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> > List,
> > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
> > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
> > that so? It is my impression.
> > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement:

I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too, thus is refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but not for Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for" something "higher"? Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s supposition of it, just the old continental hybris? But then I could not read on, they wanted my email adress. I guess, they want money. Maybe I will give it to them. Capitalism is not good, but still much better than this continental drive to explain the world in order to rule it.




Kirsti, List,

For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".

Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both.

So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole."

Best,

Helmut

 

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
left this road.

By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
relying on Peircean Categories.

It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
issues involved.

To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
> more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
> that so? It is my impression.
> And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
> Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
> philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
> question
> of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
> interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
> triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
>
> On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
> 2000's.
> As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
> refer
> to the list archives.
>
> It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
> Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
>
> What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
> that
> his starting points were different from those most often refered and
> discussed here in the list.
>
> Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
> familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
> developed
> his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Helmut Raulien]

Kirsti, List,

For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".

Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND", but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.

So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics (make them one topic) to understand both.

So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole."

Best,

Helmut

 

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
left this road.

By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
relying on Peircean Categories.

It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
issues involved.

To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
> more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
> that so? It is my impression.
> And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
> opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
> Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
> philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
> impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
> kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
> question
> of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
> interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
> triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
>
> On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
> 2000's.
> As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
> refer
> to the list archives.
>
> It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
> Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
>
> What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
> that
> his starting points were different from those most often refered and
> discussed here in the list.
>
> Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
> familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
> developed
> his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.
>
> In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
> Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost
> only
> analytical philosophy.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti
>
> CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
> >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond
> 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
> >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important
> part
> >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
> >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
> >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
> >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
> >
> > Well I think we're saying the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[Jerry Rhee]

Helmust, list:

Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion
is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts
are in us.

Best,
J

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
> classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is more
> connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is that so?
> It is my impression.
> And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in opposition
> to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So Peirce has a
> connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental philosophy, and
> maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my impression too, maybe wrong,
> I have not read so much.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
>  kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question
> of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
> interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
> triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
>
> On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's.
> As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer
> to the list archives.
>
> It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
> Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
> published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
>
> What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that
> his starting points were different from those most often refered and
> discussed here in the list.
>
> Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
> familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed
> his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.
>
> In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
> Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only
> analytical philosophy.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti
>
> CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
> >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
> >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important part
> >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
> >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
> >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
> >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
> >
> > Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the
> > more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of
> > structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have
> > strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
> > to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver.
> > But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
> >
> > I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
> > driver.
> >
> > My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with
> > further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
> > earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
> > variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus
> > on meaning.
> >
> >> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
> >> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
> >> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
> >> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
> >> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
> >> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite
> >> another affair.
> > (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
> >
> > He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
> > discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
> > _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking
> > how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that
> > to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
> > conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
> > pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps
> > that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the
> > paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
> > signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way
> > of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
> > discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t
> > be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning
> > of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
> > “would be”