Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-19 Thread Jiri Jelinek
Matt Mahoney wrote: Autobliss... Imagine that there is another human language which is the same as English, just the pain/pleasure related words have the opposite meaning. Then consider what would that mean for your Autobliss. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-19 Thread Trent Waddington
On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 6:20 PM, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Trent Waddington wrote: Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if you can't explain it to your grandmother then you don't understand it. That was Richard Feynman When? I don't really know who said it.. but everyone else

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-19 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Wed, 11/19/08, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. IMO, pain is more like a data with the potential to cause disorder in hard-wired algorithms. I'm not saying this fully covers it but it's IMO already out of

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-19 Thread Jiri Jelinek
Trent, Feynman's page on wikipedia has it as: If you can't explain something to a first year student, then you haven't really understood it. but Feynman reportedly said it in a number of ways, including the grandmother variant. I learned about it when taking physics classes a while ago so I don't

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-18 Thread John G. Rose
From: Trent Waddington [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-18 Thread Mark Waser
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my Do not bother debating with list. You can decide anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true. - Original Message - From: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-18 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my Do not bother debating with list. You can decide anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true.

Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-18 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-18 Thread Ben Goertzel
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 6:26 PM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: --- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no volition. By what definitions does it feel pain? Now you are making up new rules to decide that

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-18 Thread Trent Waddington
On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 9:29 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Clearly, this can be done, and has largely been done already ... though cutting and pasting or summarizing the relevant literature in emails would not a productive use of time Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-18 Thread Mark Waser
Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns. There is no other requirement. I made up no rules. I merely asked a question. You are the one who makes a definition like this and then says

Re: Definition of pain (was Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction)

2008-11-18 Thread Mark Waser
I am just trying to point out the contradictions in Mark's sweeping generalizations about the treatment of intelligent machines Huh? That's what you're trying to do? Normally people do that by pointing to two different statements and arguing that they contradict each other. Not by

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:  For example, in fifty years, I think it is quite possible we will be able to say with some confidence if certain machine intelligences we design are conscious nor not, and whether their pain is as real as the pain of another type of

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain real. What? You've got to be kidding . . . . What makes pain real is how the sufferer reacts to it -- not some abstract wishful thinking that we use to justify our

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Ed Porter
Matt, First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. If I zap you will a horrible electric shock of the type Sadam Hussein might have used when he was the chief interrogator/torturer of Iraq's Baathist party, it is not clear exactly how much

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real, at least subjectively real. I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Trent Waddington
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Eric Burton
There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be simulated soon On 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to make it less likely. Please explain how this is different from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one is human and the other is a simple program, because... Why

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Ed Porter
Matt, With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. I would, however, qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not to sympathize with people or animals, such as a dog, under certain circumstances when we directly sense outward manifestations that they are experiencing

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Eric Burton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be simulated soon When we start simulating people, there will be ethical debates about that. And

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
Before you can start searching for consciousness, you need to describe precisely what you are looking for. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Ed Porter
Matt, Matt, Although different people (or even the same people at different times) define consciousness differently, there as a considerable degree of overlap. I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Trent Waddington
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 9:03 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what Richard

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Mike Tintner
[so who's near Berkeley to report back?]: UC Berkeley Cognitive Science Students Association presents: Pain and the Brain Wednesday, November 19th 5101 Tolman Hall 6 pm - 8 pm UCSF neuroscienctist Dr. Howard Fields and Berkeley philosopher John Searle represent some of the most

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Ed Porter
Trent, No, it is not easy to implement. I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we are conscious of something. Some of the studies we have on the neural correlates of consciousness indicate humans only report being consciously aware of things that receive

Re: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Trent Waddington
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 10:21 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we are conscious of something. You must talk to different humans to me. I've not had anyone use the word conscious around me in decades.. and usually

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Matt Mahoney
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. You are describing episodic memory, the ability to recall

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Ed Porter
This is a subject on which I have done a lot of talking to myself, since as Richard's paper implies, our own subjective experiences are among the most real things to us. And we have the most direct access to our own consciousness, and is since of richness, simultaneity, and meaning. I am also

RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve the problem of consciousness--correction

2008-11-17 Thread Ed Porter
See the post I just sent to Matt Mahoney. You have a much greater access to your own memory than just high level episodic memory. Although your memories of such experience are more limited than their actual experience, you can remember qualities about them, that include their sense of richness,