On 6/19/07, Eric Baum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The modern feature is that whole peoples have chosen to reproduce at
half replacement level. In case you haven't thought about the
implications of that, that means their genes, for example, are
vanishing from the pool by a factor of 2 every 20
YKY On 6/19/07, Eric Baum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The modern feature is that whole peoples have chosen to reproduce
at half replacement level. In case you haven't thought about the
implications of that, that means their genes, for example, are
vanishing from the pool by a factor of 2 every
Charles N.B.: People have practiced birth control as far back as we
Charles have information. Look into the story of Oedipus Rex. Study
Charles the histories of the Polynesians. The only modern feature is
Charles that we are now allowing the practice to occur before the
Charles investment in
Eric Baum wrote:
... I claim that it is the very fact that you are making decisions
about whether to supress pain for higher goals that is the reason
you are conscious of pain. Your consciousness is the computation of
a top-level decision making module (or perhaps system). If you were
not
Josh On Saturday 16 June 2007 07:20:27 pm Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- Bo Morgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I haven't kept up with this thread. But I wanted to counter the
idea of a simple ordering of painfulness.
Josh
Can you give me an example?
Josh Anyone who has played a
Eric: I claim that it is the very fact that you are making decisions about
whether to supress pain for higher goals that is the reason you are
conscious of pain. Your consciousness is the computation of a
top-level decision making module (or perhaps system). If you were not
making decisions
I would claim that the specific nature of any quale, such as the
various nuanced pain sensations, depends (in fact, is the same thing
as) the code being run/ computation being performed when the quale
is perceived. I therefor don't
find it at all surprising that insects perceive pain
The difference between nondeterministic computation and deterministic
computation is a source of random numbers. Its a deep question in CS theory
whether this makes any difference-- or whether you can simulate a
nondeterministic computation using a pseudorandom number
generator. The difference is
Eric Baum wrote:
Josh On Saturday 16 June 2007 07:20:27 pm Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- Bo Morgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
...
I claim that it is the very fact that you are making decisions about
whether to supress pain for higher goals that is the reason you are
conscious of pain. Your
On 6/18/07, Charles D Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Consider a terminal cancer patient.
It's not the actual weighing that causes consciousness of pain, it's the
implementation which normally allows such weighing. This, in my
opinion, *is* a design flaw. Your original statement is a more
Jiri,
you are blind when it comes to my pain too.
In fact, you are blind when it comes to many sensations within your own
brain. Cut your corpus callosum, and the other half will have sensations
that you are blind to. Do you think they are not there now, before you
cut it?
If you use your
Eric,
I'm not 100% sure if someone/something else than me feels pain, but
considerable similarities between my and other humans
- architecture
- [triggers of] internal and external pain related responses
- independent descriptions of subjective pain perceptions which
correspond in certain ways
I haven't kept up with this thread. But I wanted to counter the idea of a
simple ordering of painfulness.
A simple ordering of painfulness is one way to think about pain that might
work in some simple systems, where resources are allocated in a serial
fashion, but may not work in systems
--- Bo Morgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I haven't kept up with this thread. But I wanted to counter the idea of a
simple ordering of painfulness.
A simple ordering of painfulness is one way to think about pain that might
work in some simple systems, where resources are allocated in a
On Saturday 16 June 2007 07:20:27 pm Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- Bo Morgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I haven't kept up with this thread. But I wanted to counter the idea of a
simple ordering of painfulness.
Can you give me an example?
Anyone who has played a competitive sport
--- Lukasz Stafiniak [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.goertzel.org/books/spirit/uni3.htm -- VIRTUAL ETHICS
The book chapter describes the need for ethics and cooperation in virtual
worlds, but does not address the question of whether machines can feel pain.
If you feel pain, you will insist
Eric,
Right. IMO roughly the same problem when processed by a
computer..
Why should you expect running a pain program on a computer to make you
feel pain any more than when I feel pain?
I don't. The thought was: If we don't feel pain when processing
software in our pain-enabled minds, why
Jiri Eric,
Right. IMO roughly the same problem when processed by a
computer..
Why should you expect running a pain program on a computer to make
you feel pain any more than when I feel pain?
Jiri I don't. The thought was: If we don't feel pain when processing
Jiri software in our
.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2007 6:26 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
VNA..can simulate *any* substrate.
I don't see any good reason for assuming that it would be anything
more than a zombie.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
unless you believe
Jiri James, Frank Jackson (in Epiphenomenal Qualia) defined qualia
Jiri as ...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but
Jiri also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of
Jiri purely physical information includes.. :-)
One of the biggest problems with the
Jiri Matt,
Here is a program that feels pain.
Jiri I got the logic, but no pain when processing the code in my
Jiri mind.
This is Frank Jackson's Mary fallacy, which I also debunk in WIT? Ch
14.
Running similar code at a conscious level won't generate your
sensation of pain because its not
Do you know those 10-15 mentioned hard items?
I agree with your following thoughts on the matter.
We have to seperate the mystical or spiritual from the physical, or determine
for some reason that the physical is truly missing something, that there is
something more than that is required for
James Do you know those 10-15 mentioned hard items? I agree with
James your following thoughts on the matter.
Actually, I saw a posting where you had the same (or at least a very
similar) quote from Jackson, pain, itchiness, startling at loud
noises, smelling rose, etc.
-
This list is
Mark,
Oh. You're stuck on qualia (and zombies)
Sort of, but not really. There is no need for qualia in order to
develop powerful AGI. I was just playing with some thoughts on
potential security implications associated with the speculation of
qualia being produced as a side-effect of certain
James,
determine for some reason that the physical is truly missing something
Look at twin particles = just another example of something missing in
the world as we can see it.
Is it good enough to act and think and reason as if you have
experienced the feeling.
For AGI - yes. Why not (?).
On Thursday 14 June 2007 07:19:18 am Mark Waser wrote:
Oh. You're stuck on qualia (and zombies). I haven't seen a good
compact argument to convince you (and e-mail is too low band-width and
non-interactive to do one of the longer ones). My apologies.
The best one-liner I know is,
I was just playing with some thoughts on
potential security implications associated with the speculation of
qualia being produced as a side-effect of certain algorithmic
complexity on VNA.
Which is, in many ways, pretty similar to my assumption that consciousness
will be produced as a
Jiri Eric,
Running similar code at a conscious level won't generate your
^^
The key word here was your.
Jiri sensation of pain because its not called by the right routines
Jiri and returning the
On 6/14/07, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't believe this addresses the issue of machine pain. Ethics is a complex
function which evolves to increase the reproductive success of a society, for
example, by banning sexual practices that don't lead to reproduction. Ethics
also
Whihc compiler did you use for Human OS V1.0?
Didnt realize we had a CPP compiler out alreadyh
Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Matt,
Here is a program that feels pain.
I got the logic, but no pain when processing the code in my mind.
Maybe you should mention in the pain.cpp
--- James Ratcliff [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Whihc compiler did you use for Human OS V1.0?
Didnt realize we had a CPP compiler out alreadyh
The purpose of my little pain-feeling program is to point out some of the
difficulties in applying ethics-for-humans to machines. The program has
On 6/13/07, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If yes, then how do you define pain in a machine?
A pain in a machine is the state in the machine that a person
empathizing with the machine would avoid putting the machine into,
other things being equal (that is, when there is no higher goal
On 6/13/07, Lukasz Stafiniak [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 6/13/07, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If yes, then how do you define pain in a machine?
A pain in a machine is the state in the machine that a person
empathizing with the machine would avoid putting the machine into,
other
Mark,
VNA..can simulate *any* substrate.
I don't see any good reason for assuming that it would be anything
more than a zombie.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
unless you believe that there is some other magic involved
I would not call it magic, but we might have to look beyond
--- Lukasz Stafiniak [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 6/13/07, Lukasz Stafiniak [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 6/13/07, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If yes, then how do you define pain in a machine?
A pain in a machine is the state in the machine that a person
empathizing with
On 6/14/07, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I would avoid deleting all the files on my hard disk, but it has nothing to do
with pain or empathy.
Let us separate the questions of pain and ethics. There are two independent
questions.
1. What mental or computational states correspond to
Matt,
Here is a program that feels pain.
I got the logic, but no pain when processing the code in my mind.
Maybe you should mention in the pain.cpp description that it needs to
be processed for long enough - so whatever is gonna process it, it
will eventually get to the 'I don't feel like
Two different responses to this type of arguement.
Once you simulate something to the fact that we cant tell the difference
between it in any way, then it IS that something for most all intents and
purposes as far as the tests you have go.
If it walks like a human, talks like a human, then for
James,
Frank Jackson (in Epiphenomenal Qualia) defined qualia as
...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of
certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical
information includes.. :-)
If it walks like a human, talks like a human, then for all those
Below is a program that can feel pain. It is a simulation of a programmable
2-input logic gate that you train using reinforcement conditioning.
/* pain.cpp
This program simulates a programmable 2-input logic gate.
You train it by reinforcement conditioning. You provide a pair of
input bits
Matt Mahoney writes: Below is a program that can feel pain. It is a simulation
of a programmable 2-input logic gate that you train using reinforcement
conditioning.
Is it ethical to compile and run this program?
-
This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email
To unsubscribe
Here is a program that feels pain. It is a simulation of a 2-input logic gate
that you train by reinforcement learning. It feels in the sense that it
adjusts its behavior to avoid negative reinforcement from the user.
/* pain.cpp - A program that can feel pleasure and pain.
The program
On Monday 11 June 2007 03:22:04 pm Matt Mahoney wrote:
/* pain.cpp - A program that can feel pleasure and pain.
...
Ouch! :-)
Josh
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To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to:
--- Derek Zahn [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Matt Mahoney writes: Below is a program that can feel pain. It is a
simulation of a programmable 2-input logic gate that you train using
reinforcement conditioning.
Is it ethical to compile and run this program?
Well, that is a good question. Ethics
And here's the human psuedocode:
1. Hold Knife above flame until red.
2. Place knife on arm.
3. a. Accept Pain sensation
b. Scream or respond as necessary
4. Press knife harder into skin.
5. Goto 3, until 6.
6. Pass out from pain
Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Below is a program
Mark,
Could you specify some of those good reasons (i.e. why a sufficiently
large/fast enough von Neumann architecture isn't sufficient substrate
for a sufficiently complex mind to be conscious and feel -- or, at
least, to believe itself to be conscious and believe itself to feel
For being
For feelings - like pain - there is a problem. But I don't feel like
spending much time explaining it little by little through many emails.
There are books and articles on this topic.
Indeed there are and they are entirely unconvincing. Anyone who writes
something can get it published.
If
Yep. It's clear that modelling others in a social context was at least one of
the strong evolutionary drivers to human-level cognition. Reciprocal altruism
(in, e.g. bats) is strongly correlated with increased brain size (compared to
similar animals without it, e.g. other bats).
It's clearly
On 6/3/07, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Further, prove that pain (or more preferably sensation in general) isn't an
emergent property of sufficient complexity.
Talking about Neumann's architecture - I don't see how could increases
in complexity of rules used for switching Boolean
On Jun 5, 2007, at 9:17 AM, J Storrs Hall, PhD wrote:
On Tuesday 05 June 2007 10:51:54 am Mark Waser wrote:
It's my belief/contention that a sufficiently complex mind will be
conscious
and feel -- regardless of substrate.
Sounds like Mike the computer in Moon is a Harsh Mistress
Your brain can be simulated on a large/fast enough von Neumann
architecture.
From the behavioral perspective (which is good enough for AGI) - yes,
but that's not the whole story when it comes to human brain. In our
brains, information not only is and moves but also feels.
It's my
To get any further with feelings you again have to have a better definition
and examples of what you are dealing with.
In humans, most feelings and emotions are brought about by chemical changes
in the body yes? Then from there it becomes knowledge in the brain, which we
use to make decisions
On Tuesday 05 June 2007 10:51:54 am Mark Waser wrote:
It's my belief/contention that a sufficiently complex mind will be conscious
and feel -- regardless of substrate.
Sounds like Mike the computer in Moon is a Harsh Mistress (Heinlein). Note,
btw, that Mike could be programmed in Loglan
I think a system can get arbitrarily complex without being conscious --
consciousness is a specific kind of model-based, summarizing,
self-monitoring
architecture.
Yes. That is a good clarification of what I meant rather than what I said.
That said, I think consciousness is necessary
but
On 6/5/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think a system can get arbitrarily complex without being conscious --
consciousness is a specific kind of model-based, summarizing,
self-monitoring
architecture.
Yes. That is a good clarification of what I meant rather than what I said.
Isn't it indisputable that agency is necessarily on behalf of some
perceived entity (a self) and that assessment of the morality of any
decision is always only relative to a subjective model of rightness?
I'm not sure that I should dive into this but I'm not the brightest
sometimes . . . . :-)
On 6/5/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Isn't it indisputable that agency is necessarily on behalf of some
perceived entity (a self) and that assessment of the morality of any
decision is always only relative to a subjective model of rightness?
I'm not sure that I should dive into
I do think its a misuse of agency to ascribe moral agency to what is
effectively only a tool. Even a human, operating under duress, i.e.
as a tool for another, should be considered as having diminished or no
moral agency, in my opinion.
So, effectively, it sounds like agency requires both
On 6/5/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I do think its a misuse of agency to ascribe moral agency to what is
effectively only a tool. Even a human, operating under duress, i.e.
as a tool for another, should be considered as having diminished or no
moral agency, in my opinion.
So,
On 6/5/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I would not claim that agency requires consciousness; it is necessary
only that an agent acts on its environment so as to minimize the
difference between the external environment and its internal model of
the preferred environment
OK.
Moral
? Or are they not moral since they're not conscious decisions
at the time of choice?:-).
Mark
- Original Message -
From: Jef Allbright [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2007 5:45 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
On 6/5/07, Mark Waser
Mark Waser writes:
BTW, with this definition of morality, I would argue that it is a very rare
human that makes moral decisions any appreciable percent of the time
Just a gentle suggestion: If you're planning to unveil a major AGI initiative
next month, focus on that at the moment.
Just a gentle suggestion: If you're planning to unveil a major AGI
initiative next month, focus on that at the moment.
I think that morality (aka Friendliness) is directly on-topic for *any* AGI
initiative; however, it's actually even more apropos for the approach that I'm
taking.
As I
Decisions are seen as increasingly moral to the extent that they enact
principles assessed as promoting an increasing context of increasingly
coherent values over increasing scope of consequences.
Or another question . . . . if I'm analyzing an action based upon the criteria
specified above
On 6/5/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Decisions are seen as increasingly moral to the extent that they enact
principles assessed as promoting an increasing context of increasingly
coherent values over increasing scope of consequences.
Or another question . . . . if I'm analyzing
Mark Waser writes:
I think that morality (aka Friendliness) is directly on-topic for *any* AGI
initiative; however, it's actually even more apropos for the approach that
I'm taking.
A very important part of what I'm proposing is attempting to deal with the
fact that no two humans agree
Hi Mark,
Your brain can be simulated on a large/fast enough von Neumann architecture.
From the behavioral perspective (which is good enough for AGI) - yes,
but that's not the whole story when it comes to human brain. In our
brains, information not only is and moves but also feels. From
my
What component do you have that can't exist in
a von Neumann architecture?
Brain :)
Your brain can be simulated on a large/fast enough von Neumann architecture.
Agreed, your PC cannot feel pain. Are you sure, however, that an entity
hosted/simulated on your PC doesn't/can't?
If the
Mark,
If Google came along and offered you $10 million for your AGI, would you
give it to them?
No, I would sell services.
How about the Russian mob for $1M and your life and the
lives of your family?
How about FBI? No? So maybe selling him a messed up version for $2M
and then hiring a
: Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Saturday, May 26, 2007 4:20 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
If Google came along and offered you $10 million for your AGI, would you
give it to them?
No, I would sell services.
How about the Russian mob for $1M
I think it is a serious mistake for anyone to say that the difference
between machines cannot in principle experience real feelings.
We are complex machines, so yes, machines can, but my PC cannot, even
though it can power AGI.
Agreed, your PC cannot feel pain. Are you sure, however, that an
You possibly already know this and are simplifying for the sake of
simplicity, but chemicals are not simply global environmental
settings.
Chemicals/hormones/peptides etc. are spatial concentration gradients
across the entire brain, which are much more difficult to emulate in
software then a
Mark,
I cannot hit everything now, so at least one part:
Are you *absolutely positive* that real pain and real
feelings aren't an emergent phenomenon of sufficiently complicated and
complex feedback loops? Are you *really sure* that a sufficiently
sophisticated AGI won't experience pain?
Josh I think that people have this notion that because emotions are
Josh so unignorable and compelling subjectively, that they must be
Josh complex. In fact the body's contribution, in an information
Josh theoretic sense, is tiny -- I'm sure I way overestimate it with
Josh the 1%.
Emotions are
Note that some people suffer from rare disorders that prevent them
from the sensation of pain (e.g. congenital insensitivity to pain).
the pain info doesn't even make it to the brain because of
malfunctioning nerve cells which are responsible for transmitting the
pain signals (caused by
Jiri Note that some people suffer from rare
Jiri disorders that prevent them from the sensation of pain
Jiri (e.g. congenital insensitivity to pain).
What that tells you is that the sensation you feel is genetically
programmed. Break the program, you break (or change) the sensation.
Run the
On 5/25/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Sophisticated logical
structures (at least in our bodies) are not enough for actual
feelings. For example, to feel pleasure, you also need things like
serotonin, acetylcholine, noradrenaline, glutamate, enkephalins and
endorphins. Worlds of
Mark Waser wrote:
AGIs (at least those that could run on current computers)
cannot really get excited about anything. It's like when you represent
the pain intensity with a number. No matter how high the number goes,
it doesn't really hurt. Real feelings - that's the key difference
between us
Hi,
On 5/23/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 5/20/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 5/16/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
-
A meta-question here with some prefatory information . . . .
The reason why I top-post (and when I do so, I *never* put content inside)
is because I frequently find it *really* convenient to have the entire text
of the previous message or two (no more) immediately available for
reference.
Richard Mark Waser wrote:
AGIs (at least those that could run on current computers)
cannot really get excited about anything. It's like when you
Richard represent
the pain intensity with a number. No matter how high the number
Richard goes,
it doesn't really hurt. Real feelings - that's the
AGIs (at least those that could run on current computers) cannot
really get excited about anything. It's like when you represent the
pain intensity with a number. No matter how high the number goes,
it doesn't really hurt. Real feelings - that's the key difference
between us and them and the
Mike Eric Baum: What is Thought [claims that] feelings.are
Mike explainable by a computational model.
Mike Feelings/ emotions are generated by the brain's computations,
Mike certainly. But they are physical/ body events. Does your Turing
Mike machine have a body other than that of some kind of
P.S. Eric, I haven't forgotten your question to me, will try to address it
in time - the answer is complex.
-
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To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to:
Eric,
The point is simply that you can only fully simulate emotions with a body as
well as a brain. And emotions while identified by the conscious brain are
felt with the body
I don't find it at all hard to understand - I fully agree - that emotions
are generated as a result of
On Wednesday 23 May 2007 06:34:29 pm Mike Tintner wrote:
My underlying argument, though, is that your (or any) computational model
of emotions, if it does not also include a body, will be fundamentally
flawed both physically AND computationally.
Does everyone here know what an ICE is in
@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2007 2:18 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
In computer systems, searches are much cleaner so the backup search
functionality typically doesn't make sense.
..I entirely disagree... searches are not simple enough that you
can count
- Original Message -
From: Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2007 4:14 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Hi Mark,
AGI(s) suggest solutions people decide what to do.
1. People are stupid and will often decide to do things
building something
as dangerous as an entity that will eventually be more powerful than us.
Mark
- Original Message -
From: Jiri Jelinek
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2007 1:11 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
relying on the fact that you
.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2007 2:18 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
In computer systems, searches are much cleaner so the backup search
functionality typically doesn't make sense.
..I entirely disagree... searches are not simple enough that you
can count
-
From: Jiri Jelinek
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2007 1:57 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
logic, when it relies upon single chain reasoning is relatively fragile. And
when it rests upon bad assumptions, it can be just a roadmap to disaster
for this as well in our
perception of and stories about emotionless people.
Mark
P.S. Great discussion. Thank you.
- Original Message -
From: Jiri Jelinek
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2007 6:21 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark
effects -- which is, of course, a very dangerous assumption).
- Original Message -
From: Jiri Jelinek
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2007 6:21 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
I understand your point but have an emotional/ethical problem
My point, in that essay, is that the nature of human emotions is rooted in
the human brain architecture,
Mark I'll agree that human emotions are rooted in human brain
Mark architecture but there is also the question -- is there
Mark something analogous to emotion which is generally
/selected through the force of evolution --
and it's hard to argue with long-term evolution.
- Original Message -
From: Eric Baum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2007 11:04 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
My point, in that essay
of and stories about emotionless people.
Mark
P.S. Great discussion. Thank you.
- Original Message -
*From:* Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED]
*To:* agi@v2.listbox.com
*Sent:* Tuesday, May 01, 2007 6:21 PM
*Subject:* Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Mark,
I understand your point but have
From the Boston Globe
(http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/29/hearts__minds/?page=full)
Antonio Damasio, a neuroscientist at USC, has played a pivotal role in
challenging the old assumptions and establishing emotions as an important
scientific subject. When Damasio
Well, this tells you something interesting about the human cognitive
architecture, but not too much about intelligence in general...
I think the dichotomy btw feeling and thinking is a consequence of the
limited reflective capabilities of the human brain... I wrote about this in
The Hidden
give reasons why I believe it has happened this way) but
which, in a ideal world/optimized entity, would be continuous.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Goertzel
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2007 11:05 AM
Subject: Re: [agi] Pure reason is a disease.
Well
On 5/1/07, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Well, this tells you something interesting about the human cognitive
architecture, but not too much about intelligence in general...
How do you know that it doesn't tell you much about intelligence in
general? That was an incredibly dismissive
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