Re: 答复: Certificate Problem Report (9WG: CFCA certificate with invalid domain)

2019-03-01 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
On 2/28/2019 7:45 PM, 孙圣男 wrote: > Dear Mozilla: > This problem had been confirmed. We contacted the customer and > confirmed this certificate haven't been deployed to production system, no > damage is caused. This certificate had been revoked in March 1, 2019. We had > fixed this bug in

Re: Request to Include Hongkong Post Root CA 3

2019-01-14 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
g1464306.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8980478 > [2] > https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/Ng99HcqhZtI/bkcimGlECAAJ > [3] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1267332 > [4] > https://crt.sh/?caid=7319=cablint,zlint,x509lint=2017-01-01

Re: Certigna Root Renewal Request

2018-10-24 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
On 10/24/2018 1:07 PM, Wayne Thayer wrote: > On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 1:46 PM David E. Ross via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> On 10/23/2018 11:45 AM, Wayne Thayer wrote: >>> I believe that the discussion over Certigna's r

Re: Certigna Root Renewal Request

2018-10-23 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
lla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1485413 > [3] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1265683 > If there remain unresolved issues, should not approval be withheld? -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com> Too often, Twitter is a source of verbal vomit. Examples in

Re: InfoCert Acquisition of Camerfirma

2018-09-26 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
eld until the issues leading to qualified reports are resolved? -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com> Too often, Twitter is a source of verbal vomit. Examples include Donald Trump, Roseanne Barr, and Elon Musk. ___ dev-security-policy mai

NSS Updates

2018-09-14 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
since version 60 is not compatible with several of the extensions that I consider important. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com> Too often, Twitter is a source of verbal vomit. Examples include Donald Trump, Roseanne Barr, and Elon Musk. _

Re: Request to Include SHECA UCA Global G2 Root and UCA Extended Validation Root

2018-08-31 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
No, I am not suggesting that such an audit is required at this time. I am merely saying that the documents must provide clear, objective statements against which an auditor can determine if the Mozilla policy is being followed. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com> Too often, Twitter is a

Re: Audits for new subCAs

2018-03-23 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
uot;subordinate certificates newly issued from roots"? I do not really want to be picky. However, when dealing with something as important as Internet security, being picky is mandatory. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> President Trump: Please stop using Twitter. We need to

Re: AC Camerfirma Chambers of Commerce and Global Chambersign 2016 Root Inclusion Request

2018-03-02 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
blished, misissued, and currently unrevoked > certificates in the CCR2016 hierarchy: > https://crt.sh/?caid=50473=cablint,zlint,x509lint=2011-01-01 If Camerfirma had been already approved and its root added to the RSS database, would not the above item be sufficient to remove that

Re: GlobalSign certificate with far-future notBefore

2018-01-23 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
ng to expire. The site's administration decides to obtain a new certificate from a different certification authority. Because of various administrative processes, the switch to the new site certificate cannot be accomplished quickly (e.g., moving the server); so they establish a notBefore date th

Re: Google OCSP service down

2018-01-21 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
under OCSP at [Edit > Preferences > Privacy & Security > Certificates], I am now able to reach Google Web sites. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> President Trump: Please stop using Twitter. We need to hear your voice and see you talking. We need to know when you

Re: Google OCSP service down

2018-01-21 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
ing security problems, I have doubts whether this request should be approved. See <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1325532>. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> President Trump: Please stop using Twitter. We need to hear your voice and see you talking. We need t

Re: Serial number length

2017-12-29 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
uired to obtain confirmation from their hardware suppliers that the MAC addresses in their devices are indeed unique. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> President Trump: Please stop using Twitter. We need to hear your voice and see you talking. We need to know when your message is reall

Re: Draft Security Blog about v2.5 of Root Store Policy

2017-09-06 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
er of a root certificate to the level > it trusted the previous owner. Excellent!! -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> Yes, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and other "founding fathers" owned slaves. However, they created a nation. Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Da

Let's Encrypt and Wildcard Domains

2017-08-28 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
subject was "Expired Server Certificate". -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> Yes, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and other "founding fathers" owned slaves. However, they created a nation. Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson a

Re: Certificates with less than 64 bits of entropy

2017-08-11 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
On 8/11/2017 7:26 AM, Ben Wilson wrote: > > With regard to Siemens, given the large number of certificates and > the disruption that massive revocations will have on their > infrastructure, what does this community expect them to do? > Each violation of published requirements for the operation

Re: Certificates with metadata-only subject fields

2017-08-09 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
Errors like this make me question whether the certification authority is sufficiently competent to be trusted. Small errors can indicate an increased likelihood of serious errors. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> President Trump demands loyalty to himself from Republican member

Re: CA Problem Reporting Mechanisms

2017-08-08 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
olicy. I cannot find such a requirement now unless the Baseline Requirements, which are included by reference in Mozilla's policy, require it. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> President Trump demands loyalty to himself from Republican members of Congress. I always thought that member

Re: Final Decision by Google on Symantec

2017-07-28 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
rupt termination of DigiNotar when that certification authority was found to have serious lapses in its operations. The world did not end. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/>. The only reason we have so many laws is that not enough people will do the right thing. (© 1997 by David Ros

Expired Certificates Listed by Certificate Manager

2017-07-25 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
Under the Servers tab for Certificate Manager, I see several root certificates whose expiration dates have passed. I believe these were all marked untrusted at one time. For example, I see six DigiNotar certificates, CNNIC's MCSHOLDING TEST, Equifax's MD5 Collisions, among others. Is it safe to

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

2017-07-19 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
On 7/19/2017 8:31 AM, Steve Medin wrote: >> -Original Message- >> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- >> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of >> Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy >> Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 4:39 PM >> To:

Re: Policy 2.5 Proposal: Make it clear that Mozilla policy has wider scope than the BRs

2017-06-08 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
On 6/8/2017 2:38 AM, Gervase Markham wrote: > On 02/06/17 11:28, Gervase Markham wrote: >> Proposal: add a bullet to section 2.3, where we define BR exceptions: >> >> "Insofar as the Baseline Requirements attempt to define their own scope, >> the scope of this policy (section 1.1) overrides that.

Re: An alternate perspective on Symantec

2017-06-06 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
t Symantec to notify promptly all holders of subscriber certificates of the terms of the probation. This would warn potential users of concern over Symantec's operations. This would also give existing users time to consider renewing their expiring subscriber certificates with other certification

Re: Policy 2.5 Proposal: Make it clear that Mozilla policy has wider scope than the BRs

2017-06-02 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
as a broader scope by levying additional requirements on certification authorities. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com> Consider: * Most state mandate that drivers have liability insurance. * Employers are mandated to have worker's compensation insurance. * If you live in a

Over 14K 'Let's Encrypt' SSL Certificates Issued To PayPal Phishing Sites

2017-03-26 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
about a site’s > content or who runs it. DV certificates do not include any > information about a website’s reputation, real-world identity, or > safety. To me, this means that certificates can be freely issued to criminal enterprises. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com> C

Re: Intermediates Supporting Many EE Certs

2017-02-13 Thread David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
e limitsbut the sentence is so long, I am not sure. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> Paraphrasing Mark Twain, who was quoting someone else: There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and alternative truths. ___ dev-security-policy ma

Re: Policy 2.4 Proposal: Implement "proper" SHA-1 ban

2017-02-07 Thread David E. Ross
is is also seen with "CA". That acronym means "certification authority", but it is too often seen to mean "root certificate". Enforceable policies require that all terminology be accurate and unambiguous. -- David E. Ross <http://www.rossde.com/> Pa

Re: Policy 2.4 Proposal: Require open licensing of CPs and CPSes

2016-12-08 Thread David E. Ross
tificates of certification authorities, the public should be able to access, view, and even copy those authorities' CPs and CPSs. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See <http://www.rossde.com/editorials/edtl_PutinUkraine.html>

Re: Policy 2.4 Proposal:Require full CP/CPS in English

2016-11-30 Thread David E. Ross
the CP/CPS also. As an alternative, auditors should choose between (a) assert compliance to the English version and (b) assert that the English version is an accurate and complete translation of the version in the certification authority's native language. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sude

Re: Job: Is it OK to post a job listing in this forum?

2016-05-26 Thread David E. Ross
oyee of the actual employer and not a 1099-MISC contractor] * The job opportunity is a role relevant to the forum's audience [who would review the posting to verify this?] If this is a valid use of news.mozilla.org, then perhaps a new MODERATED newsgroup would be appropriate. However, that would still requir

Re: Proposed limited exception to SHA-1 issuance

2016-02-27 Thread David E. Ross
rejecting SHA-1 certificates. See <http://news.softpedia.com/news/mozilla-gives-a-security-pass-to-the-people-it-shouldn-t-500986.shtml>. -- David E. Ross While many tributes to the late Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia now fill the news media, his legacy was not necessarily positive

Re: NEW Certificate Manager Add-on

2016-02-12 Thread David E. Ross
at <http://addonconverter.fotokraina.com/> in an attempt to make it compatible with SeaMonkey, and installed in SeaMonkey 2.39 on Windows 7. I did not get the icon you describe. Until this extension is modified to work not only with SeaMonkey (without use of the Extension Converter) but

Re: DocuSign (OpenTrust/Keynectis/Certplus) root renewal request

2016-02-09 Thread David E. Ross
raint” for > “rfc822names” if Subscriber Certificate are for email protection to be > set in the CA certificate (refer to section 10.3 below). > — All the possible “Extended Key Usage” that are set in the Subscriber > Certificate in order to be set in the CA certificate (refer t

Re: Audit report timing

2015-12-07 Thread David E. Ross
In the USA, individual tax returns for income received during a calendar year are not due until 15 April, 4.5 months after the end of the taxed year. I think > within three months of the point in time date or the end date of > the period does not give the certification authority sufficient t

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Timeline for Disclosing SubCAs

2015-11-20 Thread David E. Ross
cts the too casual use of "CA" by too many individuals to mean "certification authority" and "root certificate". "CA" is used for both -- often by the same individual -- but with different meanings at different times. That is why the acronym should not be us

Re: Policy Update: section 8 of Maintenance Policy

2015-11-05 Thread David E. Ross
On 11/5/2015 11:10 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > On 11/5/15 10:58 AM, David E. Ross wrote: >> >> Rather than list acceptable key types and sizes, cite the Baseline >> Requirements along with listing exceptions, both types and sizes that >> are not supported but are in

Re: Policy Update Proposal -- Remove Email Trust Bit

2015-10-13 Thread David E. Ross
v.security.policy/atSYV_QPPFA/ycC96j6PBAAJ > > For E-mail, I would much rather use OpenPGP instead of S/MIME. However, the mail-news component alters E-mail and newsgroup messages in a way after they have been encyrpted or signed that renders the encryption or signature invalid. Bug re

Re: Policy Update Proposal: Remove Code Signing Trust Bit

2015-09-16 Thread David E. Ross
to Slash.dot, ZDNet, or any other external news services? Or will this be announced only within Mozilla's media? -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See <http://www.rossde.com/editorials/edtl_PutinUkraine.html>. _

Invalid OCSP signing certificate in OCSP response

2015-06-28 Thread David E. Ross
I am getting a number of failures to reach Web sites. The error message says: An error occurred during a connection to [some domain]. Invalid OCSP signing certificate in OCSP response. (Error code: sec_error_ocsp_invalid_signing_cert) -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-06-02 Thread David E. Ross
, and other entities where trust between the provider of a service and its customers is important. By customers, I would include both subscribers (notified by the old owner) and end-users (notified here in mozilla.dev.security.policy). -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-06-01 Thread David E. Ross
On 6/1/2015 2:45 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: On 5/29/15 4:55 PM, David E. Ross wrote: On 5/29/2015 2:16 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: On 5/28/15 7:53 PM, David E. Ross wrote: I have started the wiki page for this, and I will appreciate your feedback on it. https://wiki.mozilla.org

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-05-29 Thread David E. Ross
On 5/29/2015 2:16 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: On 5/28/15 7:53 PM, David E. Ross wrote: I have started the wiki page for this, and I will appreciate your feedback on it. https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:RootTransferPolicy Thanks, Kathleen Does the line beginning In all of these cases, the CA

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-05-28 Thread David E. Ross
of this is confusing. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy

Re: Name-constraining government CAs, or not

2015-05-14 Thread David E. Ross
. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: May 2015 CA Communication

2015-05-12 Thread David E. Ross
, Kathleen What action will be taken if an E-mail is bounced for any reason (e.g., mail-box full, E-mail address unknown, message blocked as possible spam)? What action will be taken if a CA fails to respond? -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-04-25 Thread David E. Ross
On 4/24/2015 10:14 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Fri, April 24, 2015 7:52 pm, David E. Ross wrote: If a root has already been added to the NSS database, we must assume that it has undergone the Mozilla process for that inclusion. The process involves looking not only at the root but also

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-04-25 Thread David E. Ross
I forgot to include the following point. On 4/24/2015 11:32 PM, David E. Ross wrote: However, all certification authorities whose root certificates are in the NSS database have indeed undergone community review. How else can you explain that a single request to Mozilla from a certification

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-04-24 Thread David E. Ross
-- not Mozilla -- is responsible for initiating the process. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238. ___ dev-security-policy

Re: Policy about root cert transfers

2015-04-24 Thread David E. Ross
to the Web of Trust. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy

Re: Consequences of mis-issuance under CNNIC

2015-03-23 Thread David E. Ross
an agent of the Chinese military. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security

Re: TurkTrust Root Renewal Request

2015-03-06 Thread David E. Ross
to your discussion is dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org, without the leading mozilla-. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238

Re: Importing certs into NSS on organization's internal servers

2015-02-10 Thread David E. Ross
that Kaply will continue to maintain his Web site. I suggest you obtain permission to replicate his page within the Mozilla wiki. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=433238

Re: Server Certificates

2014-12-24 Thread David E. Ross
/2014 05:06 PM, David E. Ross wrote: I see a number of server certificates when I open the Certificate Manager window and select the Servers tab. Except possibly one or two, I did not add these; these came with an update to my browser. Some of these have expiration dates that have already passed

Server Certificates

2014-12-23 Thread David E. Ross
? Or is this intentional? -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064639. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy

Re: Clarification about WebTrust BR and WebTrust EV audits

2014-11-06 Thread David E. Ross
has Brower instead of Browser. -- David E. Ross I am sticking with SeaMonkey 2.26.1 until saved passwords can be used when autocomplete=off. See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064639. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security

Re: Short-lived certs

2014-09-04 Thread David E. Ross
. The same is true of distributors of malware. If short-lived certificates are subjected to less stringent security by client applications, I would fear that they would become hacker and malware tools. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See

Re: Short-lived certs

2014-09-04 Thread David E. Ross
: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of David E. Ross Sent: Thursday, September 4, 2014 11:36 AM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: Short-lived certs On 9/4/2014 3:21 AM, Gervase

Re: Audits of CA conformance to the BRs

2014-09-03 Thread David E. Ross
suggestion. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See http://www.rossde.com/editorials/edtl_PutinUkraine.html. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: Allow Redaction of issues detailed in BR Audit statements?

2014-08-27 Thread David E. Ross
On 8/27/2014 7:11 AM, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote: David E. Ross a écrit : With a redacted audit report, the presumption should be that hidden negative information exists that would disqualify the certification authority from having its root certificate in the NSS database if such information

Re: Audits of CA conformance to the BRs

2014-08-13 Thread David E. Ross
, not merely with a wall of shame on a Mozilla Web site but also sending out press releases to appropriate news media, alerts to US-CERT, and messages to non-Mozilla newsgroups. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See http://www.rossde.com

Re: Audits of CA conformance to the BRs

2014-08-13 Thread David E. Ross
On 8/13/2014 12:34 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: On Wed, August 13, 2014 12:02 pm, David E. Ross wrote: On 8/13/2014 11:16 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote [in part]: All, As the CFCA discussion showed, there are a few things still to figure out regarding the audits of CA conformance to the BRs. Here

Re: Proposal: Switch generic icon to negative feedback for non-https sites

2014-08-11 Thread David E. Ross
On 8/10/2014 8:16 PM, David E. Ross wrote: On 8/10/2014 4:09 PM, Matt Palmer wrote: On Sat, Aug 09, 2014 at 04:53:46PM -0700, David E. Ross wrote: Anyone wishing to argue this issue further -- to argue in favor of implementing a scheme to encourage all Web sites to be HTTPS with site

Re: Proposal: Switch generic icon to negative feedback for non-https sites

2014-08-09 Thread David E. Ross
interest in selling site certificates, he argues against the idea that all Web sites should be HTTPS. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See http://www.rossde.com/editorials/edtl_PutinUkraine.html

Re: Dynamic Path Resolution in AIA CA Issuers

2014-07-31 Thread David E. Ross
On 7/30/2014 3:14 PM, David E. Ross wrote: On 7/30/2014 12:17 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: On 7/28/14, 11:00 AM, Brian Smith wrote: I suggest that, instead of including the cross-signing certificates in the NSS certificate database, the mozilla::pkix code should be changed to look up those

Re: Dynamic Path Resolution in AIA CA Issuers

2014-07-30 Thread David E. Ross
automatically supply a missing intermediate certificate or replacing an incorrect one with the correct one effectively hides other possible security lapses. -- David E. Ross The Crimea is Putin's Sudetenland. The Ukraine will be Putin's Czechoslovakia. See http://www.rossde.com/editorials

Re: Proposal: Switch generic icon to negative feedback for non-https sites

2014-07-22 Thread David E. Ross
exposure to spam. I am not the only participant in news.mozilla.org newsgroups who munges his or her E-mail address. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames

Re: Proposal: Switch generic icon to negative feedback for non-https sites

2014-07-19 Thread David E. Ross
many of their root certificates as untrusted. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames, and trolling from that source

13 May 2014 Communication

2014-06-21 Thread David E. Ross
queue. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames, and trolling from that source. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list

Re: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-21 Thread David E. Ross
reports have been filed for each non-complying root certificate. See the following bugs: 1015767, 1015770, 1015771, 1015772, 1015773, 1026128, and 1026741. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2

OpenSSL Vulnerability

2014-06-05 Thread David E. Ross
Does NSS use any code in common with OpenSSL? Is any part of OpenSSL used in any Mozilla applications? -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames

Re: Behavior changes - inhibitAnyPolicy extension

2014-05-06 Thread David E. Ross
. OR Mozilla::pkix must be able to build at least one trusted path that lacks the inhibitAnyPolicy extension to grant EV treatment to a certificate. Any preference? Kathleen -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages

Re: Super CAs

2014-04-08 Thread David E. Ross
or not) have professional experience in performing formal audits. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames, and trolling from that source

Re: Super CAs

2014-03-18 Thread David E. Ross
where a certificate is meant. I would also add a prohibition against including the root certificate of any Super-CA. Finally, the wording cites third-party subordinate CAs. I assume the Super-CA is the first-party. What is a second-party subordinate CA? -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com

Re: Seeking guidance on proceeding with KISA root inclusion request

2014-03-04 Thread David E. Ross
. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames, and trolling from that source. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev

Re: DigiCert Request to Include Renewed Roots

2014-02-20 Thread David E. Ross
twice in the mozilla.dev.security.policy newsgroup. It was sent both to the newsgroup and to the E-mail address dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user

Re: DigiCert Request to Include Renewed Roots

2014-02-19 Thread David E. Ross
to the mozilla.dev.security.policy newsgroup OR to the dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org mailing list, BUT NOT BOTH. Each feeds into the other. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because

Super CAs

2014-02-15 Thread David E. Ross
-- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent because of spam, flames, and trolling from that source. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev

Re: DigiCert Request to Include Renewed Roots

2014-01-28 Thread David E. Ross
practices by allowing server administrators to be lazy and incompetent -- allowing them to tell users their browsing session is secure while the server is incompletely configured. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages posted through

Distrusting Root Certificates

2013-12-13 Thread David E. Ross
checkmarks for some or all of the trust bits. I checked the security for file cert8.db. All entities have write permission. Is this a known bug? -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ Where does your elected official stand? Which politicians refuse to tell us where they stand? See the non

Re: CAs contracting out the work to do the root inclusion process

2013-10-19 Thread David E. Ross
and administrative capabilities to act on their own. Such a lack might indicate other inabilities that could impair the trustworthiness of their operations. -- David E. Ross http://www.rossde.com/ Where does your elected official stand? Which politicians refuse to tell us where they stand? See the non