Kristofer:
> A few methods that pass CD:
>
> ICT
> Symmetrical ICT
> MMPO
> MDDTR
>
> A few methods that fail CD:
>
> Beatpath, RP, Kemeny, VoteFair, MinMax(wv) and apparently all
> traditional unimproved Condorcet versions.
>
> Approval and Score don't pass CD either. But, as I said before, it's
A few methods that pass CD:
ICT
Symmetrical ICT
MMPO
MDDTR
A few methods that fail CD:
Beatpath, RP, Kemeny, VoteFair, MinMax(wv) and apparently all
traditional unimproved Condorcet versions.
Approval and Score don't pass CD either. But, as I said before, it's
so easy to automatically avoid the
This is almost identical with the final version of CD that I posted
before, at EM.
At that time, I meant "CD" to stand for "Co-operation/Defection". But
it was pointed out that "Chicken-Dilemma is the accepted name for the
problem. Also (and I knew this at the time, but missed its
importance), the
Though it was by accident that I posted my Electowiki Symmetrical ICT
revision to EM, still, having done so, I should also post to EM what
was missing from the version that I posted to EM. In that version, I
left out the very thing that was needed to make Symmetrical ICT work
as intended:
After th
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:09 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2012/10/12 Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> It's easily fixed.
>>
>> To the definition, after the line
>>
>> X beats Y iff (X>Y) + (X=Y)B > (Y>X) + (X=Y)T...
>>
>> insert:
We've discussed this before, but I'd like to comment on it again:
--
Ideal Society with completely honest voters:
Try to satisfy Rawls' standard.
Score balloting. Instruct voters to rate the candidates propor
>He determines how often strategy (of any kind) works for the
> voters engaged in the strategy
In academic writing, there's a popular fallacy that strategy is a
bane, something to be thwarted.
Academics don't seem to get that strategy is an inherent part of voting.
Yes, it's desirable that certa
On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 6:51 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 4.10.2012, at 23.53, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>>> I think you recommended Symmetrical ICT for informational polling. I guess
>>> you like and trust it within that framework.
>>
>> I like and trust Sy
On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 3:24 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 4.10.2012, at 16.18, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> You said:
>>
>> Maybe you don't worry about recommending voters to turn strategic in
>> Condorcet elections since you don't like (or trus
Is before, with Strong Condorcet vs Symmetrical ICT, I'm going to list
some disadvantages of Strong Condorcet in comparison to Approval and
Score. Then I'll ask what redeeming advantages Strong Condorcet has,
to outweigh those disadvantages.
But, in this case, I'll supply an answer for you, though
On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 4:01 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 4.10.2012, at 7.49, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> You said:
>>
>> , maybe the question if you recommend the voters to rank sincerely or
>> if you recommend them to sometimes use the top ties (although the
>
Juho--
A follow-up addendum to my answer to your question:
Of course a method's count-rule should always be available to anyone
who wants it.
When recommending Symmetrical ICT for informational polling, or even
when introducing a poll (if time &/or print-space permits it) I'd
certainly tell what
On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 3:28 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 3.10.2012, at 20.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>>> (In that case, probably you should include that difference also in the
>>> definition of what the ballots mean.)
>>
>> Wrong. My definition of Symmetrica
nition of what the ballots mean.)
Wrong. My definition of Symmetrical ICT fully specifies the method and
its count rule.
I stated, above, the guarantees of which the voter can be assured,
when the method is Symmetrical ICT, but not when the method is
unimproved Condorcet ("Strong Condorcet").
27;s why Symmetrical ICT treats equal top and equal bottom
ranking differently, in keeping with (as I said) the preferences,
intent and wishes of the equal top and equal bottom ranking voters.
Some here don't like to hear this: The emperor (unimproved Condorcet)
doesn't have any clothes.
M
in your best interest, in keeping with
what you prefer and intend, when ranking X and Y equal top, or when
ranking W and Z equal bottom.
Mike Ossipoff
>
> Juho
>
>
> On 3.10.2012, at 6.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> Juho:
>>
>> In improved Condorcet, the voter
On Tue, Oct 2, 2012 at 12:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 2.10.2012, at 4.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> A) What is it that is gained by using traditional (unimproved)
>> Condorcet instead of Symmetrical Improved Condorcet?
>>
>> The downsides of unimproved are:
>
To advocates of traditional (unimproved) Condorcet versions, such as
Beatpath, Ranked-Pairs, River, Kemeny, VoteFair, etc:
I'm just asking a few questions about the methods that you advocate.
Method advocates are usually willing to answer questions about their
method proposals.
In this posting, I
On Sun, Sep 30, 2012 at 4:56 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> On 09/29/2012 10:49 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
[...]
[in answer about what a strong method is]:
> ...and not giving weird results
> or having weird result dynamics that could be used to discredit the method.
You mean like failing Part
Everyone here agrees that natural (sincere) circular ties would be
rare. Also, the choice is a lot less clear when there isn't a circular
tie. For those reasons, it matters much less what a rank method does
when there isn't a CW.
I read that Condorcet(margins) fails the Plurality Criterion. Did yo
Jameson--
First, thanks for putting in some good words for Approval, at EM yesterday.
But I note that, in your message at or to wiiipedia, as part of your
proposal of MJ there, you referred to Approval and Score as "inferior
methods".
Didn't we make a pledge to support (at minimum, that means no
The journal project sounds better as Adrian proposed it.
Jameson: I'm not sure about the wisdom of just dealing with what we
agree on--criterion-compliances and equivalences,
compiance-implication relationships among criteria. Hasn't that mostly
been done anyway? You spoke of all the many methods
(regarding Jameson's explanation of his proposed "journal" 's policy)
Sure, then who could disagree with that. So one amateur can't exclude
an article--He can merely rule on its "acceptability", and (at least
by implication) he can pretend to rule on its validity.
I guess the puzzling thing is th
er kind of forum. Democracy
Chronicles is about the advancement of democracy, reporting it,
demonstrating it. The non-democratic forum that you want is not
appropriate for DC. You should host it elsewhere.
Mike Ossipoff
, and this proposal has nothing to do with
> you.
>
> Jameson
>
&
To: Jameson and all who received his message:
Whose head-up-the-a** idea was that?
Certainly not.
Who decides who your "peers" are? Who chooses them?
At Democracy Chronicles, there is free and open discussion. If you
don't agree with something said in an article, then there is a
comments space
I'd said:
>>> But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on
>>> EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due
>>> to the innumerable different methods advocated by rank-method
>>> advocates, who will never be able to agree on one; and due to the
>>>
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 8:59 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I've written a "wikipedia essay" on how Majority Judgment would be a good
> option for resolving certain disputes, in the extremely rare (but real) case
> when it does come down to a vote. This essay has garnered a positive mention
> in a pen
It's time to agree to disagree.
But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on
EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due
to the innumerable different methods advocated by rank-method
advocates, who will never be able to agree on one; and due to t
Juho:
Here's the MinMax(margins) chicken dilemma example that I promised, in
which defection by B voters is successful and rewarded::
Sincere preferences:
75: A>B>>C
51: B>A>>C
100: C>>(A=B)
Voted rankings:
75: A>B
51: B
100: C
Try MinMax(margins) with that example.
Note that it's a Dodgson
anding is now solved. My example best sincere
winner criterion was meant to refer to the Minmax(margins) philosophy.
>
> On 24.9.2012, at 16.33, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> If you think that
>> MinMax(margins) or Dodgson is better than Symmetrical ICT, under
>&g
DNOW:
You said:
> Again -- the minority may/will in most cases also be divided in real
> elections.
Then Symmetrical ICT would be better than unimproved Condorcet methods
such as Beatpath, etc., because SITC doesn't have the chicken dilemma.
> Elections for all elected executive officers and a
On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 4:13 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 24.9.2012, at 8.43, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> You said that you don't support unimproved
>> Condorcet. But then, later, maybe in the same post, you cited Dodgson
>> and Beatpath as methods that you seem to
>>
>> You're the one who wants to use the notion of "the best winner with
>> sincere votes". Odd that you need to ask me to describe your ideal
>> sincere winner. If you want to object that ICT and SITC don't choose
>> the ideal sincere winnner well enough, then you're the one who needs
>> to say w
On Sat, Sep 22, 2012 at 6:11 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 22.9.2012, at 22.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> 2. Your statement above implies that Symmetrical ICT doesn't choose as
>> well as [...what?] when
>> people rank sincerely. That statement requires specification
Just a few words about the matter of whether chicken dilemma is a
genuine problem for Approval. Let's put this in perspective:
Though I'll again post about it later, I've described strong
mitigations and natural deterrents that exist in actual public
elections, and I've described strategic defecti
I call Strategic Fractional Ratings. You of course must have
missed my posting of that.
I've posted so much and so recently about the reasons why chicken
dilemma won't be a problem in Approval, and, posted specifically,
about SFR, that I don't think that I should repeat it again this s
Maybe you meant to compare unimproved Condorcet to Approval (because
you didn't want to compare it to ICT and Symmetrical ICT).
Ok. You mentioned the Chicken Dilemma. It exists in Approval and
Condorcet. Unimproved Condorcet doesn't get rid of the Chicken
Dilemma. It's basically the same in both m
Juho:
You said:
What kind of comparisons would you like me to make?
[endquote]
Whatever comparisons you think could favor unimproved Condorcet over
Symmetrical ICT.
I'll repeat my question: Do you claim that unimproved Condorcet can be
defended in a comparison with Symmetrical ICT, or ordinary
On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 7:30 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 21.9.2012, at 4.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> When you say "can't be elected", you need to examine what you mean by
>> that. Do you mean "can't be elected under combination of a selective
>
>> In what sense doesn't it "fly well"? What does that mean?
>
> I just meant that it is a waste of effort and energy to have "fake"
> candidates that appear as they >could be elected, but they can't, or whose
> presence may make the "natural" winner not win.
Again, you're quite right. We do hav
>> You said:
>>
>>> For example FBC is an important criterion, but I can accept methods that do
>>> not meet it, but that are good enough in the sense that they allow voters to
>>> rank their favourite always first, as a safe enough rule of thumb. I don't
>>> like methods that fail FBC in the sense
Juho--
This thread is demonstrating something that I spoke of earlier: There
are an unlimited number of things that different people can ask for
from voting systems, just as there are infinitely-many ways to count
rank ballots.
It couldn't be any more obvious, could it, that there's just no way
t
ckets; and on budget
priorities.
[endquote]
We'd find a very different tax rate structure, and a very different
budget, wouldn't we.
Ones actually chosen by us.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
l votes.
>
> i.e. NO endless amendments about filling number blanks.
>
Yes, choosing the median of all the proposed values is a good way of
making a numerical choice. ...probably, unless it would have a problem
that I don't know about.
The public could thereby vote directly
MJ advocates claim this "advantage" for MJ:
MJ prevents extreme rating from having such extreme effect.
To say it differently, a non-extreme rating might (or might not) have
as great effect as an extreme rating.
(Of course, because it might not, and if you want to maximize the
effect of a rating
>> Ok. I've heard the claim that MJ is ER-Bucklin. Maybe it's true.
>
> Here is where you go off track:
>
> I don't think this has ever been claimed, and certainly not by myself.
Fine. They aren't equivalent. Issue resolved, and subject closed.
>> But what would their equivalence (if valid)
>
> T
Ted:
You said:
> Majority Judgment (MJ) and Continuous Majority Judgment (CMJ) are both
> Median Ratings methods.
No sh*t ! :-)...But wait, isn't that explicit in their definition?
> As is ER-Bucklin(whole). You're probably
> most familiar with the latter, so let me start there. I will
n, Sep 10, 2012 at 6:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Michael Ossipoff recently claimed to have shown that MJ had a bigger problem
> with the chicken dilemma than approval or score. Though he'd made a basic
> mistake (apparently he thought that MJ used a coinflip as a tiebreaker),
&g
Two topics:
1. Brief preliminary comments in reply to Jameson's MJ SFR posting.
2. Score vs Approval based on considerations that have been discussed.
1.
At first I said here that MJ doesn't have SFT. But later I said that
it does have SFR, but that it's SFR is more complicated than that of
Scor
When I first spoke of SFR, I suggesting calculating, based on
faction-size estimates, how many points would make B beat C if the
faction is bigger than the A faction, but not otherwise.
I posted some formulas for that purpose, given various different kinds
of assumptions about that faction-size in
How to react to it is an individual choice, depending on the person
and on the situation. Sometimes (but hopefully not) the defection
could be so blatant and offensive, and the principle of not being
taken advantage of could be so important, that you'd refuse to
top-rate an acceptable in a u//a ele
I'd said:
And, because preferrers of MJ could strategically
0-rate Approval and Score, I didn't want to co-operate with tha
[endquote]
...when it could result in my MJ winning instead of one of my favorites.
I'd said:
If you equal top-rate a compromise in a poll, and then notice that the
compr
It seems to me that the Chicken Dilemma must involve a candidate whom
you'd approve or give max rating to if there weren't a Chicken
Dilemma. ...if you didn't care if you were taken advantage of by the
other faction.
So the giving of SFR, it seems to me, depends on the candidate
qualifying for an
On Sat, Sep 8, 2012 at 5:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> On 09/06/2012 03:43 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> Not exactly a winning combination of properties.
>
>
> Weren't you retiring from voting systems?
Yes. Don't worry. But remember what I sai
> And I just explained the tiebreaker in that popular proposal, as put forth
> in the book Majority Judgment. You apparently had never even heard of that
> tiebreaker, so I don't see why you think you're qualified to say anything
> about MJ.
Well, what you've just said qualifies me to say that MJ
onduct-guidelines ask you to not repeat claims that have been
answered and criticized, unless you can answer the criticisms of the
claims.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 4:36 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Two-level MJ is approval, because of the tiebreaker.
>
> Example: Say A gets 52% approval and B gets 57%. Both will have a median of
> "approved". After removing 4% "approved" votes from each
Whoa. I'm guessing that removing 4% is the resul
I'd said:
>> ...and it [SFR] isn't available in MJ, for the reasons that I described in
>> my previous reply to you.
>
Jameson replied:
> Yes it is. Because with approval-style votes, MJ gives approval results.
No. Not with a different count-rule.
I'm just guessing, but you seem to want to say
Jameson:
I'd said:
>> With Score, you add each ballot's rating of X to X's total.
>>
>> With MJ, if one or two newly-counted ballots rate X above hir current
>> median, then you must raise X's MJ score to hir rating on the ballot
>> with the lowest X-rating above X's median (or maybe to the mean
eachother nearly maximally against C, and yet whichever of {A,B} has
more voters will be the winner.
That's another thing that won't work in MJ.
(But now we aren't talking about the Chicken Dilemma. I'm discussing
the kind of trust and ethical voting that you were assuming for
On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 10:08 AM, Andy Jennings
wrote:
> Hi Mike,
>
> Can you elaborate on "worse chicken dilemma than approval or score"? Or
> point me to a specific message on the list where you prove that?
Yes. I refer you to my posting just before this one, in which I
replied to Jameson.
Mik
e one
with the lowest X-rating above X's median. ...unless you've sorted
all of the ballots, by their ratings, for each candidate.
You don't think that's a lot more computation-intensive than Score? (see above).
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Where I'd said "(If some but not all candidates are unbeaten:)", I'd
neglected to add, below that, the program statement that contains that
"if":
If NBeaten > 0 AND NBeaten < NC
Also, instead of just specifying that the section is the same as the
previous one except for two changes, I should writ
hat's Approval, or maybe Score. So I'd suggest that
Approval, or maybe Score, should be used for organizations,
committees, academic departments, etc.
But if something fancier is insisted on, or if a rank method is
insisted on, then I'd suggest ICT, or, better yet, Symmetrical ICT.
Michael Ossipoff
.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kristofer:
As I said, the purpose of my comment was good-natured agressiveness,
to provoke comparison of ICT, Symmetrical ICT, and unimproved
Condorcet. I was using an excuse to confrontationally push that
comparison.
I claim that such comparison can only favor ICT and Symmetrical ICT in
comparis
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 5:09 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2012/8/25 Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> ...
>>
>> Are you desperately reaching, in an effort to save unimproved
>> Condorcet from a comparison to ICT and Symmetrical ICT?
>
>
> I think you&#
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 4:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> On 08/24/2012 04:56 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found
>> and corrected all of its errors.
>
>
> Do you have any test v
Janeson--
We're using different notation, but, below, I'll clarify the difference.
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:21 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2012/8/24 Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found
>&
I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found
and corrected all of its errors.
This pseudocode is for counting Symmetrical ICT, a rank-count which, I
claim, avoids the strategy problems otherwise distort voters sincere
expression of preferences--does so better than any othe
I'm re-posting my Symmetrical ICT count-code posting, with the error
corrected. But first, let me show where the error is. It's in the
Pairwise Totals section, section 2. Here is the part where the error
is. I'll show it with the error, and then with the error fixed. Then
I'll show the entire posti
This, below, is pseudocode for Symmetrical ICT.
And,at this point, I emphasize that Symmetrical ICT does very well by
criteria and properties:
It can fairly be said to meet the Condorcet Criterion because, as I
said, it meets that criterion when "beats" is defined consistently
with the intentions
On Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 10:49 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
> Michael and Augustin, some suggestions for improving the site:
>
Michael Allan:
Thanks for your suggestions.
> * Display live counts and other signs of activity. Otherwise
> newcomers will assume the site is dead or dying.
As each
I left out an assumption, a different interpretation of the 2008 poll
results, in which Obama, Paul, and Kuccinich respectively received 99,
74, and 66 top-rating marks.
Maybe some of the Kuccinich-preferrers top-rated Paul too, but none of
the Paul-preferrers top-rated Kuccinich. Maybe, really, t
As I was saying, the idea of SFR is for A voters to give to B a
fraction of max rating, just enough to help B to beat C and win, if
certain conditions are met.
A, B, and C stand for the votes, or vote-percents, of candidates A, B, and C.
The obvious way to choose the fraction, f, of max points to
Jameson:
>> The idea is to give to B just enough so that B will be able to beat C
>> and win, only if the B voters are more numerous than the A voters.
>> After all, if B is bigger, then you don't mind helping B win for you.
>> B is then the rightful winner in {A,B}. But you don't want to help B
>
I don't know which name would be better.
First, some background:
The trouble with rank methods, and with all of the defection-resistant
methods (so far as I'm aware), is that they're too labor-intensive for
a count-fraud-secure handcount. Additionally, rankings can be counted
in innumerable ways,
Two presidential polls are currently ongoing at Democracy Chronicles.
The Approval poll:
With 48 ballots, Barak Obama is winning, so far. Dr. Jill Stein is in
2nd place. Obama leads Stein by 33%.
The ICT poll:
With 6 ballots, Jill Stein is winning, so far. She, Obama, and Rosanne
Barr are curre
older proposal that
has been looked at more, with Improved Condorcet having been proposed
by Kevin Venzke, and ICT by Chris Benham.
Michael Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Tue, Jul 31, 2012 at 1:15 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> The equal-top-ranking voters are not the ones who have a right to complain
> about a CC violation.
Quite so. The equal-top-ranking voters would have a right to complain
only if their ballots weren't counted in a way that reflects their
wish
On Mon, Jul 30, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> As far as I can tell, you are arguing that ICT meets the majority Condorcet
> criterion
No, I'm arguing that ICT meets Condorcet's Criterion, if Condorcet's
Criterion is about electing the candidate who beats each one of the
others, or who
unting
equal top rankings is more in keeping with the equal top ranking
voter's intent and wishes (in comparison to unimproved Condorcet's way
of counting them). So unimproved Condorcet's definition of "beat", its
interpretation of top-rankings, and its CW, can't be sai
I mentioned Double-Ended ICT as an enhancement of ICT. Here's another
possibility:
If no one is unbeaten, then you could do the top-count for winner only
among the Smith set or the Schwartz set.
Someone asked me which criteria ICT meets, other than the properties
for which I value it. For one thi
Today I posted the definition of FBC7. Let me post some other ones;
FBC1 (the first one, also called "Weak FBC"):
Premise:
V is a set of voters who have the same preferences and all vote in the
same way. Everyone other than V has already voted.
Requirement:
By voting someone over their favorit
On Sat, Jul 28, 2012 at 9:04 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Is this [FBC7] essentially equivalent to the normal statement of FBC?
It's roughly similar in strength, in the sense that the methods I know
to pass one also pass the other. But it's not just another way of
saying the same thing. The two cr
Should also say, in the Requirement:
for FBC4, "...and if V vote Compromise over Worst"
for FBC5, "...and if V vote Set A over Set B".
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Double-Ended ICT meets these stronger FBC versions:
FBC4:
Premise:
V is a set of voters who have the same preferences and vote in the
same way. Everyone but V has already voted. The only way that V can
keep Worst from winning is by making Compromise win instead. They have
a way of voting that wo
Or, to put it the other way around, Improved-Condorcet is the top-end
counterpart to Power-Truncation. I used to propose Power-Truncation as
a ballot-option.
There may have been some reason why I abandoned it. Maybe it had some
problem, some violation, or some bad-example embarrassment. I don't
kn
Robert--
I probably won't do test-simulations of Weighted-Ballot-Free, because,
with such a method, unbias ( in the form of equal expected s/q, in
every interval between two successive integers in q's range) is a
certainty, assuming that the probability-density function, F(q), being
used is accura
A rank-balloting poll, a mock election for the 2012 U.S. Presidential
election, is now being conducted at Democracy Chronicles.
The candidates are the same six candidates who are in the (currently
ongoing) Approval poll. There are now 47 ballots in the Aprpoval poll. The
rank-balloting poll has ba
First, the correction:
This correction isn't about eliminating or determining bias with a
uniform distribution. What I've said about that situation is correct.
Bias-Free is genuinely without bias, in the sense that the expected
s/q is the same in every interval between two successive integers, if
On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 6:23 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
> On 07/21/2012 08:01 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>> I spoke of using a polynomial approximation of G(q), the cumulative
>> state number,and differentiating it to get F(q), the
>> probability-density.
&
In my previous post about less biased divisor methods, I spoke of a
Taylor or McLaurin polynomial approximation of the "complicated
function" (the log-normal function, or the exponential of a fitted sum
of log-normal functions that Kristofer spoke of).
Actually, the McLaurin form of the Taylor pol
I spoke of using a polynomial approximation of G(q), the cumulative
state number,and differentiating it to get F(q), the
probability-density.
I'd like to add that a Taylor or McLaurin polynomial approximation of
a complicated function could be used. ...after you've determined, by
whatever method,
Oops! Two typos:
I said "parties" at one point,when I meant "states".
I said 1/q when I meant s/q.
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>> So either approach would be proposable, if that one overall
>> exponential is a good approximation. But Warren himself admitted that,
>> at the low-population end, it isn't accurate, because the states, at
>> some point, stop getting smaller. But Warren said that his single
>> exponential functi
>> And the parties needn't publish whole rankings. Each party need only
>> publish one other party to which it wants to transfer to if it
>> transfers.
>
> I think full rankings would be better. If excess is being
> transferred, then even large parties will transfer some of their vote.
Yes, but i
This posting accidentally got sent when I was partway through writing
it. I have no idea which keys on the keyboard somehow sent the
message.
I'm sending it again. This time I'll make sure that it only gets sent
when it's completed. I'll do that by not filling in the "To:" field
until I've finishe
When I say "interval" without qualifying it, I'm referring to the
interval between two intgers, for the value of q, the quotient of
dividing states' populations by some common divisor.
Divisor methods, expected s/q:
Divisor methods can eliminate bias by makiing equal, for all of the
intervals, th
Warren's apportionment webpage was recently (accurately) quoted to say
that Webster's method minimizes, for every pair of states, the
difference between the s/q of those two states.
Warren actually posted that statement at his website. When that quote
was posted, I immediately posted a demonstrati
Juho:
{referring to making seat% as close as possible to vote%]
> I note again that I have not set any such target.
[endquote]
Excuse me, I thought you had, because you repeatedly spoke of that as a goal.
>> You said that you agree that people have a right to equal
>> representation for everyo
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