Dear Andrew Myers,
this method looks interesting, as it is proportional, Condorcet and non
STV-like.
You write on your web-page, that: the correctness of the algorithm depends
on a currently unproved conjecture: that if improvement of a committee is
possible, it can be done by replacing one
Dear all,
A mathematically more sound notation of the importance of the functions of
the council members would be the following:
M1M2=M3M4=M5=M6=M7, where Mn is a member of the set of all council
members.
instead of P[VPa, VPb][Ma, Mb, Mc, Md].
The unified method is called Schulze generalized
Dear Peter Zbornik,
you wrote (9 May 2010):
In your paper schulze3.pdf, there are some instances,
where the Schulze proportional ranking fails to produce
an unambiguous ordering (see for instance the result
for data set A10). Why do there ambiguities occur and
how would you recommend them
Dear Markus Schulze,
You wrote On Sun, May 9, 2010 at 6:59 PM:
I recommend that you should solve indecisive situations by using the
numbers of the member ID cards of the candidates.
we have member ID cards, and each of them has a number.
I guess we could give the oldest member of the party the
Dear Markus Schulze,
I think got the idea of the Schulze proportional method after your
definition and Raph Frank's explanation and example.
I am however not sure that the Schulze proportional method satisfies the
proportionality criterion for the top-down approach to create party lists.
You
Dear Peter Zbornik,
the fact, that the Schulze single-winner election method
satisfies the majority criterion, is a direct consequence
of the fact that every pairwise victory is stronger than
every pairwise defeat.
Similarly, the fact, that the Schulze proportional ranking
method satisfies the
Dear Juho,
I attach a post scriptum to my email below (7.5.2010).
I wrote:
The unified method for two seats without boundary conditions would select
BA (i.e.Schulze STV)
Under the boundary condition AB (A is elected before B) the same unified
method would select AC otherwise (i.e. Schulze
On Fri, May 7, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
The proportional ranking needed is not PVPaVPbMaMbMcMd,
but P[VPa, VPb][Ma, Mb, Mc, Md].
Let us call this required ranking for boundary conditions.
Schulze's method can do that too.
Step 1: Elect the Schulze single seat
Dear Raph Frank,
Thanks, for sorting things out and for the example.
Based on your comments, I'll try to explain what I meant by the
unified method, even though you basically said it all in your
previous email.
Thus, as you pointed out, the unified Schulze method is equivalent
to Schulze STV,
On May 7, 2010, at 6:27 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Our main problem with the proposal of Schulze, is that it gives us
more hierarchy than we usually need, and that it drops
proportionality unnecessarily much.
Let's for the sake of the argument say, that we want to select the
Green regional
Dear Peter Zbornik,
in the scientific literature, candidates, who
have not yet been elected, are sometimes called
hopeful.
***
The Schulze proportional ranking method can be
described as follows:
Suppose place 1 to (n-1) have already been
filled. Suppose A(i)
Dear Markus Schulze, dear readers,
The example below is intriguing. But I am afraid I fail to understand
this formulation of Schulze's proportional ranking.
I would be grateful if M. Schulze or someone else, could give an
example, which could help me get it.
Specifically, I didn't understand what
Dear Peter Zbornik,
I wrote (6 May 2010):
The Schulze proportional ranking method can be
described as follows:
Suppose place 1 to (n-1) have already been
filled. Suppose A(i) (with i = 1,...,(n-1))
is the candidate of place i.
Suppose we want to fill the n-th place.
2010/5/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com:
Dear Markus Schulze, dear readers,
The example below is intriguing. But I am afraid I fail to understand
this formulation of Schulze's proportional ranking.
I would be grateful if M. Schulze or someone else, could give an
example, which could help
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 12:08 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
(I note that Raph Frank proposed also an approach where the election of the
last representative would be free of these sex related requirements. That is
one way of relieving the proportionality related problems
On May 5, 2010, at 1:36 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Juho,
I wrote (4 May 2010):
This is my proposal:
--Use the Schulze proportional ranking method.
--The top-ranked candidate becomes the president.
--The second-ranked candidate becomes the vice president.
--If the first two candidates
Dear Markus Schulze,
thank you for your proposal.
It seems that your method is the one, which fulfills the requirements I set
up for the Green party council elections the closest at the moment.
Its drawbacks is however, that it is a new, complex method with only limited
testing on data an no
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 9:19 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
What is the advantages of Schulze proportional ranking to the simpler top
down STV modified method described in
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM?
The first problem with this one is that it will elect the
a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences.
True in Condorcet, though not expected to happen often. Compared with
each other candidate, the CW must win in each such pair. Each such
can have first preference over the CW as seen by SOME voters.
IRV,
On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
I am sending a post scriptum to the email below.
1. The conservative method is only interesting if, the unambiguously
pre-elected president and vice president(s) are not in
This is a good approach in the category of simple (only one method
used) proportional ranking based methods.
Use of proportional ranking reduces the proportionality of the council
and the set of n presidents a bit but not much.
The election of the president can be seen to happen before the
If you are looking for a proportional Condorcet method, I will also
recommend the proportional election method that I developed. It is not
STV-like, but it achieves proportionality when there are blocs of
voters. It has the added advantage that it is already built into a
running Internet
On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 8:12 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
I am affraid that this is not possible. First we have mostly odd-numbered
council sizes, and secondly the gender rule does not require that half of
the men should be men and the other half women.
Our current gender rule
Some more comments on how the male/female requirements could be handled.
In the description of Markus Schulze (see below) there were two steps
where the male/female proportionality was handled. That approach works
if there are separate requirements for the set of three first
Dear all,
I am sending a post scriptum to the email below.
1. The conservative method is only interesting if, the unambiguously
pre-elected president and vice president(s) are not in the set of
proportionally (for instance STV) elected council members.
2. If the unambiguously elected president
On May 3, 2010, at 3:51 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
if the single-winner president or the proportionally elected VPs
sometimes are not a member of the set of proportionally elected
council members (which is likely),
Possible but maybe not very common.
then I would also like to ask
Dear Raph Frank,
you wrote (3 May 2010):
For the rest of the council, I think electing
them using Schulze-STV with the restriction
that only results where the President and VP
are members are allowed would give better
proportionality.
If I understand Peter Zbornik correctly, then he
wants
On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 1:00 PM, Markus Schulze
markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de wrote:
Dear Raph Frank,
you wrote (3 May 2010):
For the rest of the council, I think electing
them using Schulze-STV with the restriction
that only results where the President and VP
are members are
2010/5/3 Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk:
(What I mean by distorting effect is that if you have left, centre and
right, and centre has less first place support than the other two, then a
good approach may be to elect C if one elects only one representative. But
if one elects two then one could pick
On May 3, 2010, at 2:07 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
2010/5/3 Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk:
(What I mean by distorting effect is that if you have left,
centre and
right, and centre has less first place support than the other two,
then a
good approach may be to elect C if one elects only one
On May 3, 2010, at 2:07 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 1:00 PM, Markus Schulze markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de
wrote:
Dear Raph Frank,
you wrote (3 May 2010):
For the rest of the council, I think electing
them using Schulze-STV with the restriction
that only results
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
I am sending a post scriptum to the email below.
1. The conservative method is only interesting if, the unambiguously
pre-elected president and vice president(s) are not in the set of
proportionally (for instance STV) elected council members.
2. If the
Dear all,
if the single-winner president or the proportionally elected VPs
sometimes are not a member of the set of proportionally elected
council members (which is likely), then I would also like to ask you
for a proposal on the last conservative method, thus it would not be
optional, as I wrote
Ok, thanks.
Yes, my misstake.
Peter
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 11:26 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
2010/4/28 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com
OK, thanks.
Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.
Approval voting was used in the French
On Thu, Apr 29, 2010 at 2:45 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On Apr 28, 2010, at 9:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hello,
I have some catching up to do here.
I need to think more about some of the different methods and the proposals
I have gotten.
Some of the methods are new to me.
2010/4/28 Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On Apr 28, 2010, at 9:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hello,
I have some catching up to do here.
I need to think more about some of the different methods and the proposals
I have gotten.
Some of the methods are new to me.
As I am a layman it takes time to
At 08:59 AM 4/29/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
[quoting Juho]
One problem with Approval (that was not mentioned yet) is the
limited expressive power of the Approval vote and resulting problems
in choosing the right strategy, e.g. when there are three leading
candidates and one should approve
One device that is used by Borda Count, which is a related method, is to
have as many ranks as candidates. While I generally favor this (it allows
voters to use their ability to compare preferences to generate a rank
order), it may be collecting noise, if there are a lot of candidates. My
At 01:07 PM 4/29/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
One device that is used by Borda Count, which is a related method,
is to have as many ranks as candidates. While I generally favor this
(it allows voters to use their ability to compare preferences to
generate a rank order), it may be collecting
2010/4/29 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 01:07 PM 4/29/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
One device that is used by Borda Count, which is a related method, is to
have as many ranks as candidates. While I generally favor this (it allows
voters to use their ability to compare
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:47 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
You assume that there is only one VP.
Well, if more than 1 VP is possible, then the election could be
- Elect council with PR-STV
- The condorcet winner (only including the councillors) is President
- Elect 2 of the councilors as
On Apr 28, 2010, at 7:34 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:47 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
You assume that there is only one VP.
Well, if more than 1 VP is possible, then the election could be
- Elect council with PR-STV
- The condorcet winner (only including the
On Apr 28, 2010, at 5:34 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:47 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
You assume that there is only one VP.
Well, if more than 1 VP is possible, then the election could be
- Elect council with PR-STV
- The condorcet winner (only including the
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
strongest candidates? The used method should be such that this kind of
behaviour will not be rational.
Yes. If the order of election matters, then your first
2010/4/28 Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
strongest candidates? The used method should be such that this kind of
behaviour will not be rational.
Yes. If the
On Apr 28, 2010, at 8:37 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
strongest candidates? The used method should be such that this kind
At 11:37 AM 4/28/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Raph Frank mailto:raph...@gmail.comraph...@gmail.com
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho
mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.ukjuho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
strongest candidates?
Hello,
I have some catching up to do here.
I need to think more about some of the different methods and the proposals I
have gotten.
Some of the methods are new to me.
As I am a layman it takes time to understand them.
Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think.
Are there by
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:52 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
This is, I think, a decent general solution to ordering a set of STV
winners: re-count, with only the current winners eligible, for successively
smaller numbers of seats.
Yeah, it is reasonable.
The fundamental
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 7:19 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think.
Not sure if they have been used in politics. However, they have been
used by various open source organisations.
Schulze's method seems reasonably popular.
On Apr 28, 2010, at 2:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think.
Condorcet has not yet been used in a *government* general election.
that does not mean it hasn't been used in politics. it has been used
in organization elections for a
On Apr 28, 2010, at 11:29 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:52 PM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
This is, I think, a decent general solution to ordering a set of STV
winners: re-count, with only the current winners eligible, for successively
smaller numbers of
OK, thanks.
Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.
Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first round,
where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the second round.
Le Pen was hardly a centrist.
See
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 9:00 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first round,
where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the second round.
Le Pen was hardly a centrist.
See
On Apr 28, 2010, at 5:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com
OK, thanks.
Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.
Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first
round, where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the
At 05:26 PM 4/28/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Peter Zbornik mailto:pzbor...@gmail.compzbor...@gmail.com
OK, thanks.
Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.
Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first
round, where far-right
On Apr 28, 2010, at 9:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hello,
I have some catching up to do here.
I need to think more about some of the different methods and the
proposals I have gotten.
Some of the methods are new to me.
As I am a layman it takes time to understand them.
Condorcet methods
2010/4/26 Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise
candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
- use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and VPs (some
special rules are
Juho,
the requirements are correct, except that several elections is not a big
problem. Thus I do not require, that board, P and VP elections will take
place at the same time (= one can use the same ballots in all these
elections), it would be nice to have, though.
I have to study your proposal
Hi,
I would prefer to have the P. elected by the same people electing the board.
The P. is indeed the person most often representing the party on the
outside.
Peter
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 4:02 AM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.comwrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:54 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 1:54 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
A fully separate P election would make the board less proportional - unless
the elected P would have voting power only if he/she is already a member of
the board.
I think if there are a reasonable number of members, then the
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 7:19 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
Why not:
- ranked votes
- STV for council. Keep track of which members are elected first and second,
one of them will be VP.
- Condorcet winner among the councilmembers is P. (You could use original
ballots or have
2010/4/27 Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 7:19 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
wrote:
Why not:
- ranked votes
- STV for council. Keep track of which members are elected first and
second,
one of them will be VP.
- Condorcet winner among the
On Apr 27, 2010, at 6:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/27 Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 7:19 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
wrote:
Why not:
- ranked votes
- STV for council. Keep track of which members are elected first and second,
one of them will
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 2:09 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
Why?
The principle on which PR is based is that all seats are equal.
Actually, it could be first seat, or plurality winner, which is mostly
equivalent.
It could also have some strategic effects, where people decide
At 10:36 PM 4/26/2010, Andrew Myers wrote:
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Asset doesn't resemble what the Soviets had in the least There is
no party control, parties become unnecessary with Asset.
Abd,
The phrase parties become unnecessary is redolent of utopian idealism.
At 04:36 AM 4/27/2010, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi,
I would prefer to have the P. elected by the same people electing
the board. The P. is indeed the person most often representing the
party on the outside.
Okay, structural defect. The president is normally the presiding
officer of the board
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi,
I am a member of the Czech Green party, and we are giving our statutes
an overhaul.
We are a small parliamentary party with only some 2000 members.
Lately we have had quite some problems infighting due to the
winner-takes-it-all election methods used within the party.
I
At 04:24 PM 4/25/2010, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi,
I am a member of the Czech Green party, and we are giving our statutes
an overhaul.
We are a small parliamentary party with only some 2000 members.
Lately we have had quite some problems infighting due to the
winner-takes-it-all election methods
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Kristoffer,
The election methods you proposed are a great help.
Just one clarification in order to avoid misunderstandings: The
president and the vice presidents are all members of the board, i.e. you
have X board members out of which one is the president, vice
Hi Jameson,
answers in the text.
On Mon, Apr 26, 2010 at 6:58 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
Two questions, before I respond more fully:
1.
2010/4/25 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com
(v) asset voting is excluded due to lack of political support
Can you clarify? Is the
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
On Mon, Apr 26, 2010 at 4:20 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com mailto:a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
At 04:24 PM 4/25/2010, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi,
I am a member of the Czech Green party, and we are giving our
On Sun, Apr 25, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
DELIVERABLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
In the end, if proportional elections are to make their way into the
party statutesm, then I have to deliver the following:
1. a proposal of a text to the statutes, describing the election
On Mon, Apr 26, 2010 at 7:50 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes that is indeed the problem - it allows for bribery and blackmailing.
The secret ballot was introduced together with the equal voting right in
many states of Europe, including the Czech Republic.
I think there are good and well tested single-winner and proportional
multi-winner methods that the Czech Green party could use (like
Condorcet methods and STV). For the election of president (P) and vice-
presidents (VP) there maybe are no good existing solutions (see
requirements below),
At 02:50 PM 4/26/2010, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Hi Jameson,
answers in the text.
On Mon, Apr 26, 2010 at 6:58 PM, Jameson Quinn
mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.comjameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
Two questions, before I respond more fully:
1.
2010/4/25 Peter Zbornik
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise
candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
- use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and VPs (some
special rules
One more thing. If needed, the method could allow nominating only some
subset of all the candidates as candidates for the P and VP positions.
Juho
On Apr 27, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Juho wrote:
I think there are good and well tested single-winner and
proportional multi-winner methods that the
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a
compromise candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
- use STV (using the same ballots)
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise
candidate that all voters find
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a
At 03:39 PM 4/26/2010, Peter Zbornik wrote:
The best PR system in terms of producing decent factional
representation is STV-PR, and others can explain how to do it. There
are programs that exist. But with 400 ballots, counting ballots is trivial.
Has it occurred to you to wonder why, with
At 03:50 PM 4/26/2010, Andrew Myers wrote:
I'll be surprised if a version of asset voting is appealing to these
folks. To me, asset voting has always sounded very similar to Soviet
democracy.
This is downright weird.
A multistage process with a hierarchy of voters creates rich
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:54 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Asset doesn't resemble what the Soviets had in the least There is
no party control, parties become unnecessary with Asset.
Abd,
The phrase parties become unnecessary is redolent of utopian idealism.
Parties will exist. Or do you think somehow
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