, but only Approve Middle .
Chris Benham
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
and bother by taking it completely out of the hands of a mass of
disinterested voters and just have a small number
of people decide who fills the office.
Chris Benham
Hi,
The current issue of the Pasadena Weekly, also available at
www.pasadenaweekly.com, includes an article I wrote. It shows how
for Solid Coalitions, and Irrelevant Ballots,
and has a sort of random-fill incentive?
What do you think of that? It seems so Venzke-like, have you ever
proposed it?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
selection.
Stephane (?),
Am I right in gathering that the approval cutoffs don't actually have
any effect on who wins??!
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
last candidate like in IRV and give him the weight
according to the number of voters
having that candidate as last approved;
3) repeat 1) and 2) until winner selection.
Stephane,
Am I right in gathering that the approval cutoffs don't actually have
any effect on who wins??!
Chris Benham
33: A B
://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/
Chris Benham
John Wong wrote:
I was wondering, can someone can expliain to me how they how work?
Also, can someone explain what is the Smith and Schwartz sets are. and
how do we determine which? Thanks in advance
the mono-raise
criterion, a binary yes-no test. Woodall has other
monotonicity criteria/properties. Your question can be interpreted in
more than one way.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/wood1996.pdf
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion
Chris Benham
John Wong wrote:
...what is the Landau set, and how is different from the Smith and the
Schwartz set?
http://lists.electorama.com/mmsearch.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-April/003908.html
[EM] Landau
://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Defeat_Disqualification_Approval
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Approval%2C_Minimum_Pairwise_Opposition
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Improved_Condorcet_Approval
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica
Chris Benham
I
Election
.
But if the Range winner is beaten by another candidate, pairwise by
preference, then there is a runoff.
Abd,
What do you propose if the Range winner is pairwise beaten by more than
one candidate?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
while being much more Condorcetish
than regular IRV.
Chris Benham
Thu Dec 20 21:43:33 PST 2007
Hi,
I think an approach towards implementing this kind of
logic in an election with unnumbered candidates would
be to allow voters to torpedo the options they
perceive as furthest from them.
Try
elect
the Republican if the arbitrary point schedule scores
first choices much higher than second and third
choices.
What point schedule appeals to you, and how do you
suggest truncation be handled?
Do you support Approval?
Chris Benham
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Chris Benham
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2007-September/020863.html
Sun Sep 23 12:30:45 PDT 2007
Kevin, Forest, interested participants,
My latest favourite FBC single-winner method:
1)Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballot, default
this personal view of yours to be a bit perverse and undemocratic.
Presumably you think this should
be the general view. If so, why?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, but this
mechanism could equally be used for the version you were discussing that
uses hybrid FPP-approval
ballots, and also to Bucklin.)
Doesn't this fix MCA's IIB problem at no cost (except a bit more
complexity)?
Chris Benham
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
with the highest
Approval minus MPO score.
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Chris,
--- Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
As far as my strategy simulation is concerned, this rule change raises
the
question of how voters should evaluate the possibility
to think that for a 3-slot method it had a maximal set of
properties (though not necessarily
the most attractive set) and that the great simplicity was a bonus.
Chris Benham
Chris,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Kevin,
In your latest post you alluded to MCA's failure
candidate with
the highest Approval-minus-MPO score.
This has now firmed as my preferred 3-slot (FBC
complying) method.
Any comments? I have no idea what it should be
called.
Chris Benham
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determined by the machinations and manoeuvres of
candidates/parties
*after* the voters have cast their ballots.
Chris Benham
Steve Eppley wrote Mon Mar 17 2008:
...However, IRV is worse at eliminating spoilers than some other methods.
It also undermines candidates who take centrist compromise
of their most preferred from the top-most ranking (or rating) on
their ballots. This is a failure of Sincere Favourite.
Chris Benham
Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Thu Apr 3 13:57:22 PDT 2008
Here's one new method (as far as I know, tell if you have seen this
before) for your
then it is just an Approval election.
Chris Benham
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the regular ICA winner.
Chris Benham
Chris Benham wrote (Apr.28):
Kevin,
Your Improved Condorcet//Approval (ICA) method I take attempts
to minimally modify Condorcet//Approval(ranking) so that it meets
Sincere Favourite (your version of FBC).
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica
http
and maybe give an
example of a
precisely defined method that you claim is better.
Chris Benham
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, so therefore I regard the trade-off I referred to as
really
a win-win.
Chris Benham
* Strong Minimal Defense: if more voters vote for (meaning rank or rate above
bottom) X and not Y than vote for Y, then Y can't win.
Get the name you always wanted with the new y7mail email address
Kathy Dopp has persisted in producing a paper on IRV. She concludes:
Ranked choice (RCV) / instant runoff voting (IRV) is not worthy of
consideration and its use should be avoided.
Chris Benham
The eight page report 15 Flaws and 3 Benefits of Instant Runoff or
Ranked Choice Voting explains
preference (if such were allowed) is never optimal; your second
preference is just determined by other voters
with the same first preference.
With this weird (but I suppose not in principle unacceptable) feature, what is
the point of requiring a second preference?
Chris Benham
[Election-Methods
of the individual
voters.
I'm sorry if I didn't make that clear enough. This corresponds with the use in
EM circles of the word utilities.
Chris Benham
Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Sat Jun 21 17:54:52 PDT 2008
Chris,
You example clearly does not provide an example of approval voting
being
- Original Message
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED]; EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Tuesday, 24 June, 2008 10:01:46 AM
Subject: Re: [Election-Methods] RELEASE: Instant Runoff Voting (Chris Benham)
At 12:55 AM 6/23/2008
Hello,
Continuing my commentry on Kathy Dopp's anti-IRV paper, under
Flaws of Instant Runoff Voting we find:
13.
voters may not be allowed to participate in the final selection round of an IRV
election
because all their choices were eliminated before the last counting round.
The only way
At 12:55 AM 6/23/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Kathy,
Imagine that Approval is used to elect the US President and
as in the current campaign the Republicans are fielding one
candidate, McCain. Does that mean that the big fight for the
Democrat nomination between Clinton and Obama we've just
hope this arrives in readable form. Probably more soon.
Chris Benham
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote (Fri Jun 13 2008):
15. Dopp: “Violates some election fairness principles
.
This charge reveals either a general lack of
understanding, or intentional
miss-representation. Every single voting
?
And what do you have in mind as Australia's worst problems with their version
of IRV?
Why do you want to stop IRV? Do you agree with Kathy Dopp that IRV is worse
than
FPP?
Chris Benham
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Election-Methods
on
the result I must insincerely rank my preferred front-runner above
second-bottom.
Chris Benham
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(a
not-too-bad method).
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (Fri Jul 11 15:11:38 PDT 2008 ):
Forest Simmons wrote (Sun Jul 6 16:36:32 PDT 2008 ):
There is a lot of momentum behind IRV. If we cannot stop it,
are there some tweaks that would make it more liveable?
Someone has suggested
At 02:01 AM 7/13/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates are
ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's favorite or perhaps, as Steve
Eppley has suggested, by the voter's specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm
incentive.
Your question about QLTD has been asked before:
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015367.html
http://lists.electorama.com/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015369.html
Possibly more later,
Chris Benham
Start at the new
no-one has to fill out rankings if they
don't want to.
Chris Benham
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, which of the many methods that meet the Condorcet criterion is your
favourite?
Chris Benham
Aaron Armitage wrote (Sun Jul 27,2008):
Of course every reason you might offer for choosing one system over another is
based on an idea of what a reasonable decision rule for making collective
decisions
by 1 vector MAXBEAT, where MAXBEATx is theMAXBEATx=max(PM:,x). TheMAXBEAT
vector is the winner.
Chris Benham
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with the most traction as a practical reform
proposal.
Chris Benham
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in the top
cycle
where the two methods give a different result.
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to be disapproved by a
majority to be disqualified.
I can't see that this method fails any desirable criterion that normal Range
meets.
Comments?
Chris Benham
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Chris Benham wrote:
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly
better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or
Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV.
http://rangevoting.org/
I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots
pt.
but would have a different effect regarding the approval component
(only A approved in the first case, both approved in the second).
Chris Benham:
I don't think I'm that keen on normalization, but I don't really
object to 'automating' the approval cutoff, so that ballots
Chris Benham wrote:
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly
better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or
Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV.
http://rangevoting.org/
I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots
Chris Benham wrote:
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly
better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or
Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV.
http://rangevoting.org/
I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots
support I will be happy to discuss its comparison with IRV.
Or failing that, perhaps you could give us some clue as to what method
you support by telling us some other criteria besides the Condorcet Criterion
that you think a method should meet.
Chris Benham
Make the switch to the world#39;s
.
Chris Benham
Aaron Armitage wrote (Sat.Oct.11):
Condorcet methods are the application of majority rule to elections which
have more than two candidates and which cannot sequester the electorate
for however many rounds it takes to produce a majority first-preference
winner. If we consider
which on each ballot
interpreted rating above mean as approval, but can still use the same type
of ballot as highish-resolution Range/Score/CR.
Chris Benham
Chris Benham wrote:
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly
better than the version of Range Voting (aka
to the polls TTR) except
voters are only allowed to rank 2 candidates.
Borda Voting is also very bad. It fails Majority Favourite and Rich Party
(meaning that it fails Clone-Loser in a way that advantages factions who field
more candidates).
Chris Benham
Greg Nisbet wrote:
What is the worst
of Approval
Opposition which you invented.
Chris Benham
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.
In this admittedly not very realistic scenario, no candidate is disqualified
and so A
wins. Schulze elects the buriers' favourite B.
Chris Benham
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--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Chris Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au a
écrit :
I have an idea for a new 3-slot voting method:
*Voters fill out 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is
bottom-most (indicating least preferred and not approved).
Interpreting top and middle rating as approval
approve just makes the method more vulnerable to Burial strategy and makes
the proposal much more complex.
Chris Benham
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C doubly defeats A, and B wins. (AWP also elects B)
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2008-October/023017.html
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote (Mon.Oct.20):
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-elmet at
broadpark.no
score, the highest approval score, and the lowest
approval-opposition
score.
Would you agree then that there is a need for an Invulnerability to Pushover
strategy
criterion, that is more important than mono-raise?
Chris Benham
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Jeu 23.10.08, Chris Benham
is much more likely than it being very
close in both.
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currently being advocated around the country. Among these are Range Voting
and Approval Voting. (See the NYU report linked above) While these schemes
are better in some ways than IRV, they retain some of the same fatal flaws which
make IRV unconstitutional.
http://www.mnvoters.org/IRV.htm
Chris Benham
to cancel or
postpone or manipulate the presidential election?
Can you please support your point by comparing the US with other
First World countries, perhaps just focussing on the last few decades?
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them on grounds like it fails Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help, and
probably mono-add-top?
Chris Benham
Dave Ketchum wrote (Fri.Nov.7):
Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as:
9 BA
Now we have 34 voting BA. Enough that they can expect to win and may have
as strong
Third winner.
49: AB
02: BA
22: B
27: CB
On these votes B is the CW, but IRV elects A. If the CB voters change to B
then B will be
the voted majority favourite, so of course IRV like Condorcet methods and FPP
will elect B.
Chris Benham
Greg wrote (Wed.Nov.19, 2008):
I have written up my
, then it must not be possible to make B
the winner by altering any of the ballots on which B is voted
above A.*
Does anyone else think that this is highly desirable?
Is it new?
Chris Benham
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such as
Later-no-Harm and Burial Invulnerability?
in the best of all possible worlds, namely normally distributed voting
populations in no more
than two dimensional issue space.
Why does that situation you refer to qualify as the best of all possible
worlds ?
Chris Benham
Forrest Simmons
have an example that doesn't?)
Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Fri.Nov.28) wrote:
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristofer,
Thanks for at least responding.
...I won't say anything about the desirability because I don't know
what it implies;..
Only judging criteria by how they fit
criterion.
Chris Benham
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(which of course meets Droop Proportionality SC), while for
multi-winner methods the Condorcet
criterion and Favourite Betrayal are both incompatible with Droop PSC. Also I
think Later-no-Harm
compliance is more valuable for multi-winner methods than for single-winner
methods.
Chris Benham
other criterion compliances and simplicity, that is my favourite
3-slot s-w method
and my favourite Favourite Betrayal complying method.
Chris Benham
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Election
Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Thurs.Dec.4):
Chris Benham wrote:
Regarding my proposed Unmanipulable Majority criterion:
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above
complying methods such as 3-slot SDC,TR.
Chris Benham
Forest Simmons wrote (Fri. Dec.5):
Suppose that the voters are distributed uniformly on a disc with center C, and
that they are voting to
choose from among several locations for a community center.
Then no matter how many locations
.
Simpler and much better than any of those methods are Condorcet//Approval
and Smith//Approval and Schwartz//Approval ,in each case interpreting
ranking as approval and so not allowing ranking among unapproved candidates.
Chris Benham
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has worked, the new
winner is B.
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) that show that either or both
of Margins and
S//A(r) fail my suggested Push-over Invulnerability criterion?
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Kristofer,
Woodall's DAC and DSC and Bucklin and Woodall's similar QLTD
all meet mono-raise and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions).
DSC meets LNHarm and the rest meet LNHelp.
Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sun.Dec.21):
snip
In any case, it may be possible
Marcus,
You wrote (25 Dec. 2008):
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (25 Dec 2008):
I had already proposed this criterion in 1997.
Why then do you list it as Woodall's CDTT criterion
instead of your own Generalised Majority Criterion?
Did, as far as you know, Woodall ever actually proposethe CDTT
-reversing buriers,
but not with the idea that electing a CW is obviously so wonderful that when
there is no voted CW
we must guess that there is a sincere CW and if we can infer that that can
only (assuming no voters
are order-reversing) be X then we must elect X.
Chris Benham
Stay connected
Ratings Winner (which
should be very very easy).
Chris Benham
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (29 Dec 2008):
The Generalised Majority Criterion says in effect that
the winner must come from Woodall's CDTT set, and is
defined by Markus Schulze thus (October 1997):
Definition (Generalized Majority
Benham
Dear Chris Benham,
you wrote (29 Dec 2008):
I think that compliance with GMC is a mistaken standard
in the sense that the best methods should fail it.
The GMC concept is spectacularly vulnerable to Mono-add-Plump!
[Situation #1]
25: AB
26: BC
23: CA
04: C
78 ballots (majority
demonstration, can you seriously contend
(with a straight face)
that electing C is a problem? Refresh my memory: who first suggested Max.
Approval Opposition
as a way of measuring a candidate's strength?
Chris Benham
Stay connected to the people that matter most with a smarter inbox. Take
-fill strategy for the C(B=C) voters.)
Chris Benham
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is higher are considered
to be weaker than
those where the loser's total approval score is lower).
Some may see this as more elegant than Schwartz//Approval, and maybe in some
more complicated
example it can give a different result.
Chris Benham
Stay connected to the people that matter most
positional
hat. And it isn't just
Approval, it's 'Approval and/or FPP'.
Chris Benham
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Jeu 15.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
Kevin,
You wrote (12 Jan 2009):
Why do we *currently* ever bother to satisfy
? How can a method that you
feel
performs the best have (in your eyes) anything wrong with its appearance?
Chris Benham
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Ven 23.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit :
I can't see what's so highly absurd about
failing mono-append. It's
basically
suggested a different version I prefer:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2009-January/023959.html
Chris Benham
Warren Smith wrote (8 June 2009):
One problem is nobody really has a good understanding of what good strategy is.
If one believes that range
of
ERBucklin(whole).
What was this erroneous interpretation? How can a method that meets
Favourite Betrayal, such as ER-Bucklin(whole) ever show favourite
betrayal incentive?
Chris Benham
Kevin Venzke wrote (9 June 2009):
Hello,
I think in Schulze(wv) and similar, decent methods, you shouldn't rank
than Range,..
That is more true of the automated approval version I suggested, and also it
isn't
completely clear-cut because Range meets Favourite Betrayal which is
incompatible
with Condorcet.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (25 June 2009) wrote:
I believe
that the strategist fears that if she votes sincerely there
will be no Condorcet winner,
so she order-reverse compromises to try to make her compromise the voted
Condorcet winner.
Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn wrote (26 June 2009) :
This Condorcet-Range hybrid you
-bottom
One is broken and the rest go to the wrong EM post.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/River
Also, some of my EM posts in the Electorama archive have links
to other EM posts which also go to the wrong one.
Chris Benham
.
Chris Benham
votes for): When the strength of the pairwise defeat ef is measured by votes
for,
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of the pairwise defeat ef is
measured
snip
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for Solid Coalitions.
I rate IRV (Alternative Vote with unlimited strict ranking from the top) as the
best of the single-winner methods that meet Later-no-Harm.
Chris Benham
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-no-Harm.
I understand that in the US the Alternative Vote is called IRV, but that
sometimes
various inferior approximations are given the same label.
Chris Benham
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them).
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monotonic?
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criterion.
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it, in
Top Two Runoff all but the top two first-round vote getters are eliminated
if no candidate gets more than half the votes in the first round.
Chris Benham
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to field x
candidates;
and because of the tempting Push-over (turkey raising) strategy incentive.
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.
Interpreting being ranked above at least one other candidate as approval, elect
the most
approved member of the Smith set (the smallest non-empty set S of candidates
that pairwise
beat all the outside-S candidates).*
Chris Benham
about their relative preference strengths.
If you read my entire post you will see that in it I endorse three methods,
one of which is a Condorcet method.
Chris Benham
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Condorcet etc.
51: ABC
41: BCA
08: CAB
BA 61.5 - 59, BC 112.5 - 12, AC 76.5 - 53
51% voted A as their unique favourite and 59% voted A above B, and yet B wins.
Chris Benham
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