Let me first apologize for not yet reading the mentioned references on
the subject,
John Mikes wrote:
As long as we cannot qualify the steps in a 'process' leading to the
"emerged" new, we call it emergence, later we call it process.
Just look back into the cultural past, how many emergence-myst
Dear Russell,
Neat! I have been thinking of this idea in terms of a "very weak
anthropic principle" and a "communication principle". Roughtly these are:
"All observations by an observer are only those that do not contradict the
existence of the observer" and "any communication is only that whi
Stephen,
Eric is taking the quest to its logical conclusion.
Even Steve Wolfram hints that pure space is the source
of all instantiation. So the only question that needs
resolution is specifying the natural of the architecture
of that space - and - identifying how it brings entities
forces, part
In my paper "Why Occam's Razor", I identify a postulate called the
"projection postulate", which in words is something like "An observer
necessarily projects out an actual from the space of possibilities"
Mathematically, this corresponds to choosing a subset from the set of
all descriptions.
My pa
- Original Message -
From: "James N Rose" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "echo-CI"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 8:56 PM
Subject: Re: The universe consists of patterns of
Dear Russell,
Bingo! But can a method of definig the "subsethood" be defined? What
distinguishes one subset from another?
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Eric Hawthorne" <[EMA
It works because no observer can possibly see the whole of the
Plenitude, only subsets. The subsets do contain information.
Of course, people who believe in an omniscient God will have trouble
with this :).
Cheers
Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Dear Eric,
>
Dear Eric,
I like your idea! But how do we reconsile your notion with the notion
expressed by Russell:
> From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Sent: Monday, November 18, 2002 5:12 PM
> Subject: Re: not-sets, not-gates, and the universe
>
> > There is no prob
As I mentioned in an earlier post, titled "quantum computational cosmology"
why don't we assume/guess that the substrate (the fundamental concept of
the
universe or multiverse) is simply a capacity for there to be difference,
but also,
a capacity for all possible differences (and thus necessaril
Dear Ben,
I agree completely with that aspect of Bruno's thesis. ;-) It is the
assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that
bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a
notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?.
To me, its an
Among other things, Bruno is pointing out that if we assume everything in
the universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's, the
distinction btw subjective and objective reality is lost, and there's no way
to distinguish "simulated physics in a virtual reality" from "real physics."
Dear Ben,
So then it is:
Boolean Algebras /equivalent Turing Machines in the mathematical sense.
I am asking this to try to understand how Bruno has a problem with "BOTH
comp AND the existence of a stuffy substancial universe". It seems to me
that the term "machine" very much requir
The statement "Boolean Algebras are a subset of the class of Turing
Machines" doesn't seem quite right to me, I guess there's some kind of
logical typing involved there. A Turing machine is a kind of machine
[albeit mathematically modeled], whereas a boolean algebra is an algebra.
Boolean algebr
Dear Ben,
So you are writing that the class of Boolean Algebras are a subset of
the class of Turing Machines?
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Ben Goertzel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, Novemb
> You seem to be making points about the limitations
> >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
> >nature of the universe...
>
>
> Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
> reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from
> the
Essentially, you can consider a classic Turing machine to consist of a
data/input/output tape, and a program consisting of
-- elementary tape operations
-- boolean operations
I.e. a Turing machine program is a tape plus a program expressed in a
Boolean algebra that includes some tape-control pri
Dear Ben and Bruno,
Your discussions are fascinating! I have one related and pehaps even
trivial question: What is the relationship between the class of Turing
Machines and the class of Boolean Algebras? Is one a subset of the other?
Kindest regards,
Stephen
Ben Goertzel writes:
>I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that
>particularly worries me.
Good. I don't like to worry people. (Only those attached
dogmatically to BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy
substancial universe should perhaps be worried).
You seem to be ma
> See my web page for links to papers, and archive addresses with
> more explanations, including the basic results of my thesis.
> (Mainly the Universal Dovetailer Argument UDA and its Arithmetical
> version AUDA).
I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that
particularly wor
Ben Goertzel wrote:
>Bruno wrote:
>***
> Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping
>fully that idea.
>In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with
>the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then
>the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simula
Hal Finney wrote:
>Bruno Marchal writes:
>> Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same
>> problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists in
>> failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then
>> the association between mind-dynamics and
21 matches
Mail list logo
