RE: To observe is to......

2006-10-11 Thread Colin Hales
Brent Meeker: snip Observation involves (necessitates) the AGI having experiences, some of which are an experiential representation of the external world. The process of generation of the experiential field(s) involves the insertion of the AGI in the chain of causality from that which

Re: To observe is to......

2006-10-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: Brent Meeker: snip Observation involves (necessitates) the AGI having experiences, some of which are an experiential representation of the external world. The process of generation of the experiential field(s) involves the insertion of the AGI in the chain of causality

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even just the

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit : David Nyman wrote: But this conclusion is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather to claim

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 10-oct.-06, à 22:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Bruno: you wrote: ...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ... Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1? Because it is equal to six. you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to

Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)

2006-10-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 11-oct.-06, à 05:46, George Levy a écrit : snip: I will comment at ease later> Therefore from the point of view of the second machine, the first machine appears conscious. Note that for the purpose of the argument WE don't have to assume initially that the second machine IS conscious, only

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit : If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show that matter is redundant, Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread David Nyman
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person

RE: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread Colin Hales
snip unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific). The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it is delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy of

Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)

2006-10-11 Thread 1Z
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person