On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Dennett's Comp:
Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) -
What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
Subjectivity is an illusion
And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense.
Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally
On 11.02.2012 04:27 Russell Standish said the following:
On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 09:39:50PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Let me ask you the same question that I have recently asked Brent.
Could you please tell me, the thermodynamic entropy of what is
discussed in Jason's example below?
On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or
religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this.
However,
On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Dennett's Comp:
Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) -
What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or
third person
On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining
why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are
misguided.
You need to explain, non-question-beggingly..
What a computer does is arithmetic
On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or
religion), that is, the provably
On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
[SPK]
I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem!
:-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical.
But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown
by
On Feb 11, 12:01 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining
why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are
misguided.
You need to explain,
On 11 Feb 2012, at 18:41, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of
On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Dennett's Comp:
Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) -
What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first
On 2/10/2012 14:01, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Another way to think of it would be in the terms of the Church Turing
Thesis, where you expect that a computation (in the Turing sense) to
have result and that result is independent of all your
implementations, such a
On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has
On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence
has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you
know it or not.
Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have
On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 12:32 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion),
that is, the provably unprovable, and I
On 2/11/2012 06:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi ACW,
Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion),
that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However,
let's try and see
On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest
ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more
about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less
On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Dennett's Comp:
Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) -
What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ?
I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or
third person
On 2/11/2012 6:13 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint
from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the
stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain
invariant under
On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I think you are radically overestimating the size of the book and the
importance of the size to the experiment. ELIZA was about 20Kb.
TO HELL WITH ELIZA That prehistoric program is NOT intelligent! What is
the point of
I don't really understand this thread - magical thinking? The neural network
between our ears is who / what we are, and everything that we will experience.
It is the source of consciousness - even if consciousness is regarded as an
epiphenomenon.
Gandalph
On Feb 11, 2012, at 9:34 PM,
On 2/11/2012 9:34 PM, John Clark wrote:
You may say that even if I'm right about that then a computer doing smart things would
just imply the consciousness of the people who made the computer. But here is where the
analogy breaks down, real computers don't work like the Chinese Room does, they
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