On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint from the latest
ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of the material world is more
about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less
and less about anything like "primitive" substances. So in a sense, the physical world
might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems
to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be
derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do.
I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory
as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges
in a way that is invariant and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play
Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to
naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I
am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn.
The only way I can see for the physical to emerge is from some 'anthropic' 3p argument.
For example, energy conservation is implied by time-translation invariance and without
time-translation invariance we wouldn't call something a 'physical law'. A 'law' that
varied with time would be regarded as an 'accident'.
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