On 2/11/2012 6:13 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint
from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the
"stuff" of the material world is more about properties that remain
invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less
about anything like "primitive" substances. So in a sense, the
physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles
of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to
see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some
proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to
do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is
incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of
space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant
and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein
against Bruno's Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of
return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of
existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome
any critique that might help me learn.
The only way I can see for the physical to emerge is from some
'anthropic' 3p argument. For example, energy conservation is implied
by time-translation invariance and without time-translation invariance
we wouldn't call something a 'physical law'. A 'law' that varied
with time would be regarded as an 'accident'.
Brent
Hi Brent,
Your point here is powerful and is part of my argument against any
form of ideal monism, such as Platonism.
Onward!
Stephen
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