On 2/11/2012 6:13 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like "primitive" substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn.

The only way I can see for the physical to emerge is from some 'anthropic' 3p argument. For example, energy conservation is implied by time-translation invariance and without time-translation invariance we wouldn't call something a 'physical law'. A 'law' that varied with time would be regarded as an 'accident'.

Hi Brent,

Your point here is powerful and is part of my argument against any form of ideal monism, such as Platonism.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to